Archive for October, 2002

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A BOOK RECOMMENDATION

October 30, 2002

My dissertation advisor and long-time friend, Joel Mokyr, has written a new book that will be published in December. Titled Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, it is an historical analysis of the relationship between economic growth and access to information on technological change and new ideas more broadly construed. From the book description:

He argues that the growth explosion in the modern West in the past two centuries was driven not just by the appearance of new technological ideas but also by the improved access to these ideas in society at large–as made possible by social networks comprising universities, publishers, professional sciences, and kindred institutions. Through a wealth of historical evidence set in clear and lively prose, he shows that changes in the intellectual and social environment and the institutional background in which knowledge was generated and disseminated brought about the Industrial Revolution, followed by sustained economic growth and continuing technological change.

Joel is an intellectual omnivore with wide-ranging interests, and the erudition of his writing makes his work even more compelling. And he’s willing to be controversial, so you’ll think when you read this. Read it and enjoy.

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CATCHING UP ON MY READING

October 30, 2002

Okay, I’m way behind in many things because so much is happening in electricity. In catching up on my reading I found some great comments by Will Wilkinson, whom I had the good fortune of meeting recently. Note especially his posts on Steven Pinker’s new book and why he is a Whig. In fact, my father and I have each referred to ourselves as Whigs for the same reasons as Will (and Ken Binmore, who Will cites), so I chuckled when I read it.

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ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THE RATE OF CHANGE

October 30, 2002

Brad DeLong has an article in the November issue of Wired that puts our rates of technological change in historical perspective. An excerpt:

Past industrial revolutions — steel, for example, or the coming of mass production to the automobile — had seen explosions of technology that drove the prices of key commodities (train rails, the Model T) down by 5 to 10 percent a year for one, two, or three decades. The information age is not your father’s Oldsmobile: The price of computation, according to Yale’s Bill Nordhaus, has dropped 42 percent per year over 60 years — a trillion-fold fall since 1940.

Today’s technological revolution has so far lasted between two and six times as long as previous revolutions. It is between five and ten times as fast, a race between a cheetah and a possum. And it is a larger share of the economy. It changes what people do in their work, where it is done, and even what economic activity is. The problem: We are not sure how. (Spare a thought for Alan Greenspan — negotiating a soft landing is even harder when you don’t know where the statistical ground is.)

We are not sure how. Yet another sense in which the market process is one of discovery, and a very diffuse one at that. Drives the central planners nuts, heh heh.

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HOW APPALLING IS THIS?

October 29, 2002

According to John Fund’s Political Diary on Opinionjournal.com today, California Governor Gray Davis showed his temper in a most appalling and embarrassing way on Friday 18 October. His outburst was prompted by a professor’s attempt to initiate a conversation about an editorial about electricity pricing in California written two days earlier by Vernon Smith, recent Nobel laureate. Opinionjournal.com has reprinted Smith’s article today.

All Ely Dahan wanted was a brief conversation with California’s Gov. Gray Davis of California about an exciting article by a Nobel Prize winner that had just appeared in The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Dahan, a UCLA business professor, thought the article had valuable insights into California’s electricity problems. What he got instead was a highly agitated governor ignoring the policy points, cursing the Journal as “f—ing a–h—s,” and declaring: “They don’t see the world realistically.” End of conversation. …

Mr. Dahan’s encounter with Mr. Davis came on Friday, Oct. 18, after the governor had finished a taping of CNN’s “Moneyline,” hosted by Lou Dobbs. Prof. Dahan approached the governor along with several students. Mr. Dahan wanted to discuss an article he had just read in the Oct. 16 Wall Street Journal by Vernon Smith, a George Mason University professor who the week before had been one of two winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics. The article, “Power to the People,” explained how California could take advantage of the fact that the cost of producing electricity can vary along with its pricing. California’s energy crisis was born because of a state rule imposing on utilities an “obligation to serve” all customers “could not be met at times of severe stress because the unresponsive demand exceeded energy supply, and the shortfall was met by rolling blackouts.” California utilities lost some $14 billion trying to avoid those blackouts. A small fraction of that would have solved the problem if utilities had been allowed to “sell less to consumers by offering a discount if they consumed less.”

Read the rest for yourself. Davis’ anti-intellectual lack of willingness to engage with ideas in the electricity policy process indicates a lot about him. I hope Davis has the dignity to be embarrassed about his outburst. But I doubt it.

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CALIFORNIA ISO FINDING AGAINST CALIFORNIA PUC’S FINDING

October 29, 2002

According to Energy Online Daily News article, the California Independent System Operator found that Duke Energy did not withold energy and cause a blackout on 8 May 2001. This ISO investigation was in response to an earlier California PUC report, on which I commented extensively (and critically) in this post.

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MORE ON OIL AND IRAQ

October 28, 2002

Some more good articles have come out in the past couple of days on the prospects for the oil industry of regime change in Iraq, including this LA Times article exploring whether regime change would weaken OPEC. The experts interviewed have mixed opinions on whether Iraq would leave OPEC under a new regime, but all agree that more capital investment in the industry in Iraq would change the dynamic of OPEC. OPEC is in difficult straits at the moment, and is unlikely to be able to sustain the current high prices, as the closing comment in this article notes:

“OPEC faces problems not just from Iraq,” said Petroleum Finance Co.’s Alkadiri. “Global demand isn’t increasing that rapidly. You have a lot of non-OPEC production coming on. Within OPEC, you have countries that are well over their production quotas. You have a whole bunch of problems that point to a struggle within the organization and, ultimately, to the unsustainability of present prices.”

An article in Saturday’s New York Times examines the prospects for the oil service sector of the industry, which could see a lot of work from rehabilitating Iraq’s derelict oil fields. The article refers to a Deutsche Bank analysis by Adam Sieminski, one of the best energy analysts around, that points out the agreements between Iraq, Russia and France in the past decade:

Over the last several years, Mr. Hussein has signed memorandums of understanding with oil companies to develop fields once sanctions are lifted. With the United States and Britain most sharply at odds with Mr. Hussein, American companies and BP did not participate in the process. Mr. Hussein himself favored companies from France, Russia and China — in an effort, Mr. Sieminski said, to win friends in the United Nations Security Council.

There is debate in the industry about whether those agreements will be honored once sanctions are lifted, Mr. Sieminski said. If Mr. Hussein remains, the memorandums would probably remain valid. But if he goes, there would most likely be a great deal of jockeying to develop fields that hold billions of barrels of oil, industry experts said.

This history makes the whole issue of “regime change in Iraq is about oil” very, very complicated. Have Russia and France been entering agreements with Iraq that violate the spirit of the UN sanctions? How likely is it that they would not be able to invest in Iraq? I would bet that these kind of considerations are influencing their attitudes toward regime change. Much of exploration and capital investment in the oil industry these days is done through multinational partnerships, and Russia and France would like to ensure that their oil companies can participate in such partnerships; Nick Schulz of Tech Central Station made this point in a National Review online commentary in September, and it’s very important. A negative spin on this point, though, would be that regime change in Iraq could remove Russian and French oil companies from their preferential relationships with Iraqi leadership, feeding into Russia and France not supporting regime change. I don’t think this negative spin makes sense, because having preferential treatment in an environment with decrepit capital assets, UN sanctions, and other obstacles to trade really cuts the prospects for profitability in Russia’s and France’s slice of the pie.

The truly beautiful thing about free trade and investment is that the size of the pie increases, so even if you have a small slice you end up with more than you had before. The richness and potential of Iraq’s human capital and oil assets are a growth opportunity for Iraqis and for multinational consortial of oil and oil service companies to work in collaboration with them to create value that does not currently exist. So there’s room for persuading Russian and French oil companies that a modern Iraq will benefit them, in addition to the benefit for Iraqis of modernity (to use Tom Friedman’s language, which I like in this case).

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TURMOIL IN THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY

October 23, 2002

Here and here are a couple of articles, from different perspectives, analyzing the decline in profitability in the British electricity industry over the past year. The past year has seen both a regulatory change in Britain and a decline in electricity prices, and several companies are not faring well in this economic environment. The credit crisis in the US has spilled over into this, too; one of the companies having trouble in Britain is TXU, the very beleaguered energy company that has had to sell much of its European capital to repay debt. Ugh.

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CO2 EMISSIONS TRADING, THE COASE THEOREM, AND CREATING NEW MARKETS

October 23, 2002

In many ways the jury is still out on the science of climate change, from clouds to carbon sinks to the magnitude and geographic incidence of likely effects. Notwithstanding those uncertainties, the political reality is that controlling greenhouse gases is getting more and more attention, and the possibility of government regulation at several levels looms.

Enter Richard Sandor and his colleagues at Environmental Financial Products in Chicago. Sandor is an economist and a market-creating entrepreneur, who has spearheaded the creation of markets for interest rate derivatives and for sulfur dioxide emissions in the past three decades. In a collaborative effort among many stakeholders, Sandor is leading the creation of a market for carbon dioxide emissions. This market, called the Chicago Climate Exchange, is the product of bringing together firms, consumers, government representatives, and advisors to determine the parameters and rules of the market.

The motivating principle behind creating emissions markets is the Coase Theorem: in the absence of transaction costs, the involved parties can bargain to a mutually beneficial efficient outcome. Problem is, transaction costs are almost never zero, so bargaining to a mutually beneficial outcome could be costly, perhaps so costly that exchange wouldn’t occur at all. This concept is very important for the possibility of market-based environmental policy – reducing transaction costs is a crucial component of enabling people to use markets to manage and optimize pollution.

Creating markets for emissions trading is a powerful way to decrease transaction costs. An important part of reducing transaction costs is the definition and enforcement of property rights, so that a company with a right to emit 50 tons/year can trade away some or all of that right, and will be held accountable for the amount that it does emit. So if it can make more money by selling the right than using it, it can sell it and reduce its emissions. Notice how this trade creates value by putting the emission rights in the hands of people who value them the most (some of whom might retire them so that those emissions will not happen, ever).

Chicago Climate Exchange’s proactive market-based approach to emissions reduction is a watershed in emissions policy, for many reasons. First, it is proactive; the SO2 “cap-and-trade” emissions trading that came out of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 followed on decades of command-and-control regulation, which had the possibility of creating vested interests in the existing command-and-control regulatory institutions. Second, and more importantly, the Chicago Climate Exchange involves the stakeholders themselves determining the number of emission credits to have, and the rules. Trading purists (like myself, I admit) have criticized the SO2 emissions trading process on the grounds that determining the cap, the number of emissions credits, is prone to political manipulation and is therefore not a very secure and well-defined property right. The security and definition of the property right is a crucial component of putting the Coase Theorem to work here — only if the property right is secure and well-defined do the market participants get as much benefit as possible from the exchange.

Chicago Climate Exchange is following a process by which the participants themselves, with all of their diverse interests, incentives and backgrounds, determine the cap. Technically speaking, this collaborative process endogenizes the property right definition process. They will also set rules for changing the cap, which will create security and certainty of the property right. That security reduces transaction costs, leading to increased trade and the creation of value.

Last week’s Economist has an article profiling Chicago Climate Exchange.

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COMPETITION AS A DISCOVERY PROCESS HOLDS FOR CELL PHONES, TOO

October 21, 2002

I love this Tech Central Station article by Steven Den Beste. He describes in great detail the evolution of competing standards for cellular phones in the US, versus the “harmonization” and settling on GSM as THE standard in the EU. Punch line: North American cellular networks and phones are more technically sound, and are updating to changes more easily. This is an important point: competition of standards enables a better standard, or set of standards, to evolve because they adapt better to the unknown. Here are some excerpts, but I recommend reading the whole thing:

If the U.S. had followed the same policy as Europe and mandated a standard, the CDMA air interface would never have been given the chance to prove itself. We in the U.S. now have just as good of nationwide systems and just as much roaming ability as the Europeans do, only our best systems are fundamentally better on a technical level than the best European systems, and are upgrading sooner with less pain. I can use my Verizon handset nearly anywhere in the U.S. or Canada that has cellular coverage at all (which is an area much larger than the EU), either directly on Verizon or roaming on a compatible system (such as Canada’s Bell Mobility). …

This kind of thing has played out much the same way hundreds of times before between Europe and the U.S., and nearly always it’s had the same result. And as Europe increasingly centralizes and “harmonizes” and moves more and more authority to Brussels, it’s going to keep happening. Decisions will be made from the center, and a lot of the time they’ll be made wrongly because the “center” is not the infinite repository of all knowledge and wisdom. The “center” chose GSM (and thus TDMA) to be the winner; America decided to let the market pick the winner, and it didn’t turn out to be TDMA. And now Europe is switching to the superior CDMA air interface which could never have been developed in Europe because of government regulation.

European centralization turned out to be a competitive advantage – for the U.S. And that’s going to keep happening. If I was vicious and wanted to wish commercial failure and misery on Europe, I could think of nothing better to inflict on it than the process going on now whereby more and more authority will move to Brussels to be used by unelected bureaucrats who answer to no one, and will make binding technological decisions based on politics and ideology.

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CONSUMER AWARENESS OF ENERGY

October 21, 2002

According to the most recent annual survey of electric deregulation by Deloitte and Touche, consumers are at a six-year low in their awareness of energy issues. The study correctly draws the conclusion that this lack of awareness in electricity stems from the stagnation of restructuring in the post-California, post-Enron environment of political and financial uncertainty. Interestingly, over half of those survey supported Russia’s selling crude oil in U.S. markets.

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