COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION

Lynne Kiesling

Well, I must have crossed to the dark side too, because I would have like to attended the FERC technical conference today that Mike mentioned in his post below. However, since I couldn’t do so, as a substitute I offer this Reason Public Policy Institute study that Adrian Moore and I wrote on ways to make the transmission part of the electricity value chain more competitive. From the executive summary:

Our policies governing electricity transmission—regulating it and moving slowly toward changes to support competitive wholesale electricity markets—are getting a sharp look from more people than ever. Existing long-distance transmission infrastructure is insufficient to support the changes that have come about in the industry since the deregulation of the early 1990s that led to the dramatic increase in the trade of generated electricity.

Ways to remedy this situation fall into three categories: build and upgrade transmission, build generation closer to population centers, or reduce the demand for transmission services. This study provides an analysis of the institutional changes being proposed and debated, particularly FERC’s RTO policy. By establishing RTO rules, FERC can move the industry toward building and managing a national grid network. But at the same time, FERC risks creating an ordered competition— competition engineered based on an assumption about how competition ought to be— rather than a competitive order, which arises spontaneously from human action and economic evolution based on choices and change over time. While ordered competition through the RTO structure could simply be a step to move the industry toward an institutional structure in which a competitive order can emerge, it is at best only part of the legislative and regulatory changes that would produce competition in the industry. To do that, legislative and regulatory changes will have to focus on removing barriers to entry and to technological change in the industry.

Our recommendations encourage the use of distributed generation technology, innovative forms of contracting, and other institutional and technological changes that would increase the contestability of the transmission segment of the electricity value chain, and could do so in a flexible, open-ended way.

That’s the mindset I bring to the questions posed in today’s conference.

FERC’S TRANSMISSION PRICING POLICY

Michael Giberson

In other FERC news, Platt’s is reporting that Chairman Pat Wood said the Commission would soon approve a policy statement to encourage transmission owners to either join regional transmission operators or completely divest their transmission to a third party. Wood told Platts Monday that the agency at its Dec 15 open meeting will release the finalized version of the transmission pricing policy statement it unveiled in early 2003.

Unfortunately I’ll miss the FERC meeting — the first regularly-scheduled FERC meeting that I will miss in about 3 years — because I’ll be at the Carnegie-Mellon/EPRI conference, “Electricity Transmission in Deregulated Markets,” with Lynne presenting our paper on public goods arguments in electric reliability.

TRANSMISSION MARKET POWER AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY

Michael Giberson

Maybe it is a sign that I have a warped soul, or perhaps I have gone over to the dark side. Whatever. In any case, what sounds really interesting and fun to do today would be attending a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission technical conference on Transmission Market Power and Barriers to Entry. Alas, I am too busy.

Here are the discussion questions that were posted last week. (The meeting announcement, discussion questions, and agenda are available from this page at FERC’s website.)

Transmission Market Power and Transmission Barriers to Entry Questions

1. How should transmission market power be defined? Should it be defined as merely the ownership of generation and transmission in the same relevant market?
2. Can transmission market power be used to foreclose competition or raise prices? If so, how?
3. How does transmission market power impact customer interests? For example, are prices significantly higher than they would have been without transmission market power? Is access to cheaper sources of supply limited? Is flexibility to respond to changing market conditions impaired?
4. How does transmission market power impact power supplier interests? For example, is power plants’ energy production constrained by the exercise or suspected exercise of transmission market power?
5. What challenges do owners of uncommitted capacity face in securing long term power contracts or selling power on a short term basis?
6. How does the existence of long term and evergreen firm transmission contracts affect power supplier entry?
7. How important a factor is transmission congestion in the production, scheduling and consumption of power? To what degree can transmission congestion be attributed to physical transmission constraints and what degree to the exercise of transmission market power? How can the Commission distinguish between these two?
8. How can the Commission differentiate between the exercise of transmission market power from legitimate reliability-driven denials of access?
9. Do instances exist where transmission unavailability has led to the abandonment of plans to either build or expand generating capacity or to contract with a merchant supplier?
10. Does the Commission’s pro forma open access transmission tariff adequately mitigate transmission market power? If not, specify whether there are ways the tariff could be modified or better enforced to achieve this goal.
11. Is it possible to eliminate or mitigate transmission market power apart from structural remedies? If so, how, and are there ways do to it apart from the OATT?
12. Can analytical tools to assess transmission market power be developed to screen out behavior motivated by legitimate business interests and direct the Commission’s attention to areas where transmission market power is more likely to be exercised?
13. Does the existence of significant transmission constraints constitute a barrier to entry that should be considered in authorizing market-based rates for a transmission provider?

Non-Transmission Barriers to Entry Questions

1. Can the lack of competition in fuel or other inputs constrain entry in the generation business? If so, how?
2. Can monopolization or attempted monopolization of future generating sites be a significant barrier to entry in generation? If so, how, and what can be done to remedy this problem?
3. Have financial constraints, such as access to capital or creditworthiness issues, been a serious barrier to entry in generation, or any other aspect of the electric power business?
4. Are there other barriers to entry the Commission should consider in granting market based rates? If so, how should the Commission test for the extent of harm to customers of competitors associated with such barriers?
5. Does the lack of an adequate competitive solicitation program by a utility that has monopsony power constitute a barrier to entry?

See what I mean? Really fun stuff!

FREE THE GRAPES!

Lynne Kiesling

The Supreme Court is hearing the interstate wine shipment case today. Two widely-read newspapers opine on the matter, and both agree: free the grapes!

From the USA Today:

The wine issue is not just a narrow legal one, but part of a broad pattern of state laws designed to shield well-connected industries from competition.

The wine laws protect powerful liquor distributors. Other industries, ranging from insurance brokers to car dealers, benefit from similar laws that shield them from out-of-state competition and Internet concerns that bypass the middlemen. When these laws are enacted, consumers are forced to pay more and have fewer choices. …

The distributors argue that wine is unique because it’s important to keep alcohol out of the mouths of minors.

In fact, underage drinking has hardly been a problem with wines shipped by mail. A 2003 study by the Federal Trade Commission found that the premium and niche wines ordered directly were not the type preferred by underage drinkers. What’s more, if teen drinkers were trying to buy wine directly, they could still do so by limiting their purchases to in-state wineries.

These wine statutes, as well as laws that protect other industries, do not get better with age. Case illustrates how industries keep profits, consumer costs high.

And from the Wall Street Journal (subscription):

If you’re wondering how ordering a bottle of wine for your uncle is any different from ordering him a shirt from L.L. Bean, the short answer is the 21st Amendment. The 1933 amendment that ended Prohibition also gave states the authority to regulate the importation and distribution of alcohol. The question for the Court is whether the 21st Amendment supersedes the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, under which the Founders gave Congress the sole right to regulate trade across state lines. Or, can states enact protectionist barriers to the importation of alcohol? …

Needless to say, the state liquor cartels aren’t happy at the prospect of being cut out as middlemen in this lucrative business. But the arguments they muster are as weak as a white wine spritzer. One is taxation; states may lose tax revenue if consumers can purchase wine over the Internet. Yes, that could happen since Congress has enacted a moratorium on taxes on Internet sales across state lines. But why should wine be any different from every other product sold online?

You know the liquor lobbies are really desperate, however, when they argue that direct wine sales would make it easier for minors to obtain alcohol. Kids these days are precocious, but it’s hard to imagine a teenager using dad’s credit card to order $20 bottles of wine for a party a couple of weeks from now. In any event, measures already in place for blocking intra-state wine shipments to minors could easily be extended to interstate sales.

If the Supreme Court lets states impose restrictions on wine sales, watch for curbs on other products sold online. A negative ruling could affect all Internet commerce in which a state can express a regulatory concern. Think automobiles or insurance or contact lenses.

UPDATE: The Progress and Freedom Foundation is one of the contributors to an amicus brief urging the Court to uphold interstate commerce:

“This case fundamentally is about the viability of interstate e-commerce in the United States,” says Tom Lenard, senior fellow and vice president for research at The Progress & Freedom Foundation. “The Internet is the quintessential interstate medium that overcomes the tyranny of distance, letting sellers in every state reach customers in every other state.”

FREE THE GRAPES!

Lynne Kiesling

The Supreme Court is hearing the interstate wine shipment case today. Two widely-read newspapers opine on the matter, and both agree: free the grapes!

From the USA Today:

The wine issue is not just a narrow legal one, but part of a broad pattern of state laws designed to shield well-connected industries from competition.

The wine laws protect powerful liquor distributors. Other industries, ranging from insurance brokers to car dealers, benefit from similar laws that shield them from out-of-state competition and Internet concerns that bypass the middlemen. When these laws are enacted, consumers are forced to pay more and have fewer choices. …

The distributors argue that wine is unique because it’s important to keep alcohol out of the mouths of minors.

In fact, underage drinking has hardly been a problem with wines shipped by mail. A 2003 study by the Federal Trade Commission found that the premium and niche wines ordered directly were not the type preferred by underage drinkers. What’s more, if teen drinkers were trying to buy wine directly, they could still do so by limiting their purchases to in-state wineries.

These wine statutes, as well as laws that protect other industries, do not get better with age. Case illustrates how industries keep profits, consumer costs high.

And from the Wall Street Journal (subscription):

If you’re wondering how ordering a bottle of wine for your uncle is any different from ordering him a shirt from L.L. Bean, the short answer is the 21st Amendment. The 1933 amendment that ended Prohibition also gave states the authority to regulate the importation and distribution of alcohol. The question for the Court is whether the 21st Amendment supersedes the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, under which the Founders gave Congress the sole right to regulate trade across state lines. Or, can states enact protectionist barriers to the importation of alcohol? …

Needless to say, the state liquor cartels aren’t happy at the prospect of being cut out as middlemen in this lucrative business. But the arguments they muster are as weak as a white wine spritzer. One is taxation; states may lose tax revenue if consumers can purchase wine over the Internet. Yes, that could happen since Congress has enacted a moratorium on taxes on Internet sales across state lines. But why should wine be any different from every other product sold online?

You know the liquor lobbies are really desperate, however, when they argue that direct wine sales would make it easier for minors to obtain alcohol. Kids these days are precocious, but it’s hard to imagine a teenager using dad’s credit card to order $20 bottles of wine for a party a couple of weeks from now. In any event, measures already in place for blocking intra-state wine shipments to minors could easily be extended to interstate sales.

If the Supreme Court lets states impose restrictions on wine sales, watch for curbs on other products sold online. A negative ruling could affect all Internet commerce in which a state can express a regulatory concern. Think automobiles or insurance or contact lenses.

UPDATE: The Progress and Freedom Foundation is one of the contributors to an amicus brief urging the Court to uphold interstate commerce:

“This case fundamentally is about the viability of interstate e-commerce in the United States,” says Tom Lenard, senior fellow and vice president for research at The Progress & Freedom Foundation. “The Internet is the quintessential interstate medium that overcomes the tyranny of distance, letting sellers in every state reach customers in every other state.”