Archive for February, 2007

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Using Technology and Prices to Empower Electricity Consumers

February 28, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

I am currently in the Harrisburg Airport, awaiting my flight home after having spent the past day at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Dickinson College has an interesting history; Philadelphia physician and signer of the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Rush, founded the college in 1783 as an educational institution to serve as a “bulwark of liberty” to provide a useful liberal arts education to the democratic citizenry of the new United States of America. The college is named after fellow Revolutionary Pennsylvanian John Dickinson, who was involved in the establishment of the college.

Dickinson has a really neat program called the Clarke Forum, which involves students in a year-long thematic, interdisciplinary examination of a particular issue. This year’s theme is energy. Last night I gave a talk titled The Interaction of Regulation, Markets, and Technology: Consumer Empowerment in the Electric Power Industry (warning: the pdf is 2MB, so download at your own risk). I had a great time, and the faculty and students asked great questions.

The punch line: the existing business models and regulatory institutions in the electric power industry must adapt to technological change, and by incorporating dynamic pricing and digital end-use technology innovations, will empower consumers to control and manage their own energy use while also better enabling us to address the environmental challenges that may arise from our use of electricity.

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TXU Going Private: Private Equity Buys Into Competitive Power Markets

February 26, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

TXU is going private. KKR and other private investors will acquire TXU and take it private. This is fascinating. Note from the press release two important things: the focus on environmental attributes of the deal, and $400 million planned for “demand side management”:

Planned Coal Units Reduced from Eleven to Three, Preventing 56 Million Tons of Annual Carbon Emissions

This scale-back represents a 75 percent reduction in new coal capacity. In addition, the company is committed to continuing its efforts to meaningfully reduce existing carbon emissions and seeks to join the United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP). USCAP is a broad-based group of businesses and leading environmental groups organized to work with the President, the Congress and all other stakeholders to enact an environmentally effective, economically sustainable and fair climate change program. As part of the company’s support for USCAP, TXU is also pledging to support the mandatory cap and trade program to regulate carbon emissions.

To satisfy ERCOT’s requirement for immediate additional capacity to meet the state’s increasing electricity demand, TXU expects to build two coal units at the Oak Grovesite and one coal unit at the Sandow site. TXU will immediately seek to suspend the permit application process for the other eight units and withdraw them once the transaction closes. TXU does not intend to apply or reapply for permits to build additional coal units utilizing current pulverized coal-fueled technology.

$400 Million Investment in Demand Side Management Initiatives

TXU will implement an aggressive demand reduction program through a $400 million investment in conservation and energy efficiency activities over the next five years.

Conservation and energy efficiency, fine. But where’s the dynamic pricing and commitment to offer customers differentiated products that will reduce the need for further investment in new generation and wires?

The new coal plants were controversial, so some recognition that active demand can reduce the need for them is a step in the right direction. What I find fascinating is that private equity would be interested in a play like this. Why? According to this Bloomberg story,

Shares of TXU surged $7.89, or 13 percent, to $67.91 at 2:30 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. That’s a more than fivefold increase since Chief Executive Officer C. John Wilder took over in February, 2004. The buyout was first reported after the market closed on Feb. 23. …

The company, after almost going bankrupt in 2002 because of a failed overseas expansion, has rebounded and may earn $2.6 billion in 2006, up 51 percent from a year earlier, according to the average of six analyst estimates compiled by Bloomberg.

Wilder returned TXU to a focus on electric generation and distribution in the Dallas region. Natural-gas prices that more than tripled this decade have raised Texas power prices, making TXU’s coal and nuclear plants more valuable.

The plants can produce more than 18,100 megawatts, and the company is also the largest electricity retailer in the state, selling power to more than 2.1 million homes and businesses. TXU owns a transmission business that could be sold to pay off debt used to fund the LBO.

TXU “turned into a good cash machine,” said Perry Sioshansi, president of Menlo Energy Economics, a consulting firm in Walnut Creek, California.

Note in particular the environmental policy aspect of this buyout, a focus that distinguishes it from earlier KKR buyouts. From the NYT article about the deal:

Within TXU, the controversial plan to build a raft of coal plants had become so damaging to its stock price that its board had been privately weighing a plan to scrap part of the project, said people involved in the talks, bringing the number of new plants to 5 or 6 from 11. Shareholders had sent the stock on a roller coaster ride from more than $67 a share to as low as about $53 over concerns about the risk and vast expenditure; the stock closed at $60.02 on Friday.

Indeed, it was the quick drop in TXU’s stock price that got the attention of Kohlberg Kravis and Texas Pacific, which look for undervalued companies and try to turn them around. Together, both firms approached C. John Wilder, TXU’s chief executive, in January with an offer for the company, these people said.

At the time, neither Kohlberg Kravis nor Texas Pacific told TXU about their ambition to scale back its controversial coal plants. But behind the scenes, both firms had been developing a new strategy for the company with the help of Goldman Sachs, their lead adviser.

Goldman Sachs has been a longtime proponent of reducing carbon emissions. Its former chief executive, Henry M. Paulson, now the secretary of the treasury, was also the chairman of the Nature Conservancy, an environmental activist group.

This will be very, very interesting to watch play out.

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FuturePundit on CO2 Emissions Reductions

February 26, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

I’m late to the party, but check out this post from Randall Parker at FuturePundit about using nuclear and wind power to meet most of our electricity demand:

Most drastically, we could halt all carbon dioxide emissions from electric generation (cutting out a third of US CO2 emissions) by switching to only non-fossil fuels for electric power generation. For example, in the United States we could switch to nuclear where we now use coal and natural gas. In 2005 nuclear power accounted for 19.3% of total electric power generated. The United States had 104 nuclear reactors operating in 2005 with a total capacity of 97 gigawatts (almost 1 gigawatt per plant). So as a rough first approximation if we built 400 nuclear power plants or 4 times as much as we already have we could shut down all the fossil-fuels burning plants. Though that would not provide enough electric power during the peak afternoon demand periods.

Not surprisingly, I particularly like the way Randall talked about dynamic pricing in the comment thread:

Dynamic pricing could flatten out the demand for electricity. This would reduce the need for natural gas peak electric generation.

Really cheap electricity at night could be used for many purposes:

- Light for enclosed plant nurseries. Give the plants light when it is cheap.

- Recharge pluggable hybrid car batteries.

- Super heat or cool salts or other materials and then blow air over them to cool or heat buildings during the day.

- Pump drinking water at night. e.g. run the California aqueduct more at night than during the day.

- Do more heavy computing tasks at night when the electric is cheaper. Shut down some processors during the day. e.g. recalculate database indexes at night or do design simulations at night.

- Do more aluminum smelting at night when electric is cheap. Ditto for other electric-intense heavy industry processes.

Currently peak electricity use is subsidized by those who use more off-peak electricity. The same average price all day and all night effectively subsidizes peak users. Dynamic pricing would raise peak prices and lower off-peak prices. Capital and business processes would be reconfigured to do more work at night.

Yeah, what he said.

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Debunking Myths About Markets

February 26, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

I frequently argue that markets provide the most effective institution for coordination of individual economic activity to improve well-being and create growth and prosperity. Market processes aggregate and transmit information among decentralized, distributed agents, enabling them to make decisions in their own individual interest while still (inadvertently) communicating information about their decisions (and their underlying preferences and costs) that will enable other agents to make decisions in their own individual interests. This is the means through which the coordination of economic activity occurs.

If you argue that regularly in your work, as I do, you will come across people who hold a variety of beliefs about market processes. Often these beliefs are strongly held, yet incorrect. I spend a lot of time talking about market processes and correcting these misperceptions. Thus I find this paper from Tom Palmer incredibly useful. Tom lays out “twenty myths about markets” and explains in careful, clear language what the misperception is for each one. If you find yourself making these kinds of explanations regularly, this paper will be a good resource for you.

Hat tip to Marginal Revolution for the link.

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Utility Competition Breaks out in Virginia

February 24, 2007

Michael Giberson

There were several bits of competition-related news items in Friday’s Washington Post. Catching my interest were Steven Pearlstein’s column advocating against the XM-Sirius merger (See also Howard Kurtz article from Wednesday and Rob Pegoraro’s tech column on Thursday) and a story on the passage of a bill by the Virginia state legislature that would terminate the state’s botched attempt at restructuring retail electric power.

But the news that really caught my eye was an article suggesting that, in a small way, water utility competition was breaking out in parts of Fairfax County, Virginia. I live in the city of Falls Church, a small independent city of about 10,000 people surrounded on three sides by Fairfax County, with a population of about 1,000,000. The city of Falls Church runs its own water utility, and for a variety of historic reasons the city’s water utility also serves a significant portion of the population in parts of the county surrounding the city, including much of the fast growing area around Tyson’s Corner and Merrifield. As the article explains:

Governments at all levels often scuffle over water, but the disputes usually involve who gets to use it or who has to clean it up. Yesterday’s action by the city is unusual because it centers on who has the right to sell it.

“Yesterday’s action” was the filing of a lawsuit by the city against the Fairfax County water authority. Apparently the formal agreement between the city and the county, by which they had historically parceled out monopoly water utility territories, expired in 1989. Until recently the county continued to respect the historic boundaries, but now the county is engaging in “a deliberate and concerted action” (in the words of the lawsuit) to interfere with the city’s customer base.

And of course by “interfere with the city’s customer base” what the article means is that the county water authority was offering a developer a much better price than city water utility customers get.

While my short-term economic interests fall in with the city in this case – the city water utility generates a little money that supports the broader city budget and in theory keeps my city taxes lower than they otherwise would be – I couldn’t be happier to see utility competition breaking out in Virginia. Let’s hope it brings benefits to all the local water consumers!

UPDATE: Here’s the Falls Church News-Press article on the lawsuit.

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Retail Competition in Electric Power: The Chicago Cubs Go Shopping

February 23, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

The Chicago Cubs will buy their power from Constellation New Energy, a competing retailer in Illinois (as well as several other states). Constellation will purchase the power from generators, transmit it to the local distribution network, where they will pay ComEd to distribute it to 1060 W. Addison St. [Note: technically, because of the physics of AC power, they won't distribute those exact electrons to Wrigley, but you get the idea.]

David Kolata of the Citizen’s Utility Board noted that what anemic retail competition we have in Illinois is for larger customers:

“For medium- and big-sized business there is some competition,” Mr. Kolata said.

But that doesn’t help the average citizen or homeowner, Mr. Kolata said.

“For residential customers there’s not a single competition option whatsoever” because suppliers are only interested in working with large consumers of electricity, he said.

All of Constellation’s Illinois customers are businesses, Ms. Hextell said.

But we must be careful not to infer from Mr. Kolata’s comments that blame rests with Constellation and other competing suppliers. Incumbent utilities (i.e. ComEd in northern Illinois) have been very effective at structuring what’s called “default service”, which is the provision of power service to customers who “choose not to choose”. They have structured default service in such a way that (even with a 25% rate increase to residential customers) they get to continue to charge low and stable rates, against which it is really hard for competing suppliers to enter the market. In econ-geek-speak, profit-maximizing incumbents have done an effective job of using the political/regulatory process to construct an entry barrier into the market to serve residential customers.

And even though residential service is very profitable to the incumbent utility, profitable enough that you would think it would attract entry, the cost of acquiring new customers is very high to potential competitors, because there are lots of customers, and the value proposition per household is likely to mean only a small profit margin per household if the competing supplier does win the customer, so that means that the competing supplier has to “make it up on volume” and sign up lots of customers. When the incumbent can use default service as an entry barrier, that volume hurdle becomes insuperable for most, if not all, potential competitors.

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Whole Foods-Wild Oats Merger: An Antitrust Concern?

February 22, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

Instead of worrying about XM-Sirius satellite radio, should antitrust authorities investigate the Whole Foods-Wild Oats merger? Here’s my unsurprising answer (particularly unsurprising to my three very close friends who are antitrust economists): probably not.

The core first questions are the same: what are the relevant substitutes, and would consumers be better or worse off relative to their well-being in the absence of the merger? Not having any extensive expertise in grocery markets, I can still imagine several viable substitutes/competitors that would provide rivalry for some or all of a merged Whole Wild Foods: Trader Joe’s, local farmers markets, CSAs (community supported agriculture), organic Wal Mart supercenters, and so on.

A personal anecdote on this point: since our Trader Joe’s opened and since we started subscribing to a farm four years ago, my purchases at either Whole Foods or Wild Oats have dwindled. I have also noticed that Whole Foods has had to change its pricing on the products that compete directly with products at Trader Joe’s.

I also imagine that our neighborhood, and my mother’s suburban neighborhood with its Wild Oats, are fairly representative of the markets that these two chains serve. I have seen increased competition in that product space in the past several years, and the concern when Whole Foods bought Fresh Fields and Bread & Circus on the east coast did not materialize. So that’s the if-I-believe-in-antitrust-here’s-what-I-say answer. Assuming that I believe in antitrust …

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The Problem of Unconventional Oil

February 22, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

The Wall Street Journal Energy Roundup has a post on new estimates of the supply of “unconventional oil and gas”. Not surprisingly, it’s good news and bad news: there’s lots of potentially recoverable stuff out there, which means that there is indeed potential for rightward shifts of the supply curve, but the Wood Mackenzie study they cite believes that the non-OPEC unconventional sources will peak in 2020.

The post usefully cites a Financial Times editorial from yesterday on the subject, which points out some of the difficult political economy of fossil fuel supply and consumption today:

There is a balancing act here. It would be handy to have proven techniques for extracting oil and gas from unconventional sources in the US and Canada. Society as a whole would benefit from the increased security of supply but subsidising unconventional production promises high emissions and plenty of pork with little assurance of success. Governments should focus more on basic technology and here the scarcity of qualified engineers is as worrying as the scarcity of oil.

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Personal Carbon Offsetting

February 21, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

Yesterday’s New York Times had an article about voluntary purchases of carbon offsets and their efficacy. Importantly, this article points out that private options exist for those who want to negate the carbon effects of their behavior.

The couple highlighted in the story used Climate Care. Other organizations that provide carbon offset purchase opportunities are listed in the right margin of this NRDC story on carbon offsetting. You can even give carbon offsets as gifts!

See also this Wikipedia entry on carbon offsets for more background. Both the NYT article and this Guardian article from last year talk about transparency problems and the difficulty of monitoring the offsetting activities in some areas and with some organizations.

The NYT article contains a logical slipperiness that it’s important to recognize:

Yet another perverse effect, say critics, is that some types of carbon-offset initiatives may actually slow the changes aimed at coping with global warming by prolonging consumers’ dependence on oil, coal and gas, and encouraging them to take more short-haul flights and drive bigger cars than they would otherwise have done.

Climate Care, for example, has linked up with Land Rover, a maker of sport utility vehicles, to help the company offset its own emissions. As part of a promotional program, Climate Care also helps purchasers of new Land Rovers offset their first 45,000 miles of driving.

In that way, the program may actually help sell “larger cars with higher emissions” and thus contribute more to global warming, according to Mary Taylor, a campaigner with the energy and climate team at Friends of the Earth.

Ummm … if we are talking about static efficiency, the only way Ms. Taylor’s statement can be true is if the offset is calculated and/or implemented inaccurately. Carbon offset transactions provide a voluntary, contractual way for the two parties involved (and the broker organization, e.g. Climate Care) to pursue the things they want to pursue. If I do indeed buy a larger car, but I buy a corresponding offset, then there’s no perverse effect. And the magnitude of the dynamic perverse effect requires a complicated counterfactual argument: at the margin, what size of car would I have bought if I had not bought a carbon offset, and to what extent does that purchase delay the implementation of non-fossil-fuel technologies? That analysis requires careful market analysis of the substitute brands that compete with Land Rover. It’s very likely that consumers would have bought a large vehicle anyway, because of their planned uses of the vehicle, and at the margin the offset induces them to choose Land Rover over a different, similarly-sized vehicle.

Here’s another piece of poor logic in the story, a version of the broken window fallacy:

Climate Care, the company that Mr. Grover used to offset his and his girlfriend’s carbon footprint, also undertook a project to finance the distribution of tens of thousands of low-energy fluorescent lights in South African townships.

Shortly after the program got under way, however, a state energy utility distributed millions of similar bulbs free. That meant that the “so-called reductions that Climate Care is selling to its customers arguably would have happened anyway,” said Larry Lohmann of the Corner House, a campaign group for environmental and social justice based in Britain, citing evidence from investigators in South Africa.

Grrrr. If private parties are willing and able to pay for the private, voluntary distribution of CFBs, then that is an expenditure that the South African government would not have to undertake, thus freeing those tax revenues to be spent in some other way that would benefit South Africans. So why is the private action the one that Mr. Lohmann considers superfluous? In reality, it’s probably the case that the light bulb purchase had been budgeted, the producer had a friend in the government, and there was some lobbying and rent seeking involved. But the underlying point holds: if private actors are willing to pay for so-called public goods and the government does it anyway, that’s called crowding out, and it’s an inefficient, distortionary act.

Why do I support the development of carbon offset transactions and their brokers? Because it’s a Coase-style private, voluntary, transaction-based approach that enables private parties to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.

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Are Volatile Natural Gas Prices Unreasonable?

February 21, 2007

Michael Giberson

In letters to the chairmen of FERC and the CFTC, Senator Jeff Bingaman asks what actions the agencies have taken in response to recent episodes of natural gas price volatility. Particularly of concern to the Senator were allegations of manipulation of the NYMEX gas futures contract price at the end of August 2006. (The letter reports that failed investment company Amaranth told NYMEX that the company suspected manipulation. I guess when you lose billions of dollars you have to come up with an excuse more elaborate than “the dog ate my homework.”)

Nominally, in any case, the Senator is not concerned about the misplaced bets of commodity fund speculators, but about the “significant challenge for consumers and businesses across the country, as well as the state regulators” created by price volatility. Of course most of the time you hear consumers complain about price volatility, they’re really complaining about the price level, and Senator Bingaman notes a GAO report of last September found that gas prices last year were up 190 percent since 1993.

More information can be found at the Energy Legal Blog, including copies of the letters sent by Bingaman. Here are links to my earlier comments on the Amaranth failure and the subsequent, unsurprising calls for more investment fund regulation. Finally, a comment with additional links from about a year ago, concerning a report on natural gas markets issued by four state’s Attorneys General and exhibiting concerns similar to those now expressed by Bingaman.

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