Archive for April, 2007

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Schumpeter, Coase, and Hayek

April 18, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

The last couple of weeks have been crazy here in KP land, with things I’ll be able to share in a bit. Today I am off to England (YAY!) for a Liberty Fund conference that I helped to organize. The readings are selections from Schumpeter, Coase, and Hayek.

Here’s the motivation: lots of economists and political scientists with whom I work and talk are inspired and motivated by ideas from Schumpeter, Coase, and Hayek, yet we don’t usually read them together or think of them together. What are the common themes in their ideas that inspire us so?

The Schumpeter readings are the newest territory for me, because my reading of Schumpeter is not as extensive as it is of Coase and Hayek. We’re reading some selections from his Theory of Economic Development, and some of his business cycle writings, in addition to the material with which I am familiar in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.

In rereading Hayek for this conference, two of the readings have struck me as even more profound than they have ever struck me before: The Meaning of Competition, from Individualism and Economic Order (1948), and the first two chapters of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 1. They are incredibly relevant to some of the issues involved in the inertial state of retail electricity competition that I just mentioned.

More on these ideas after the conference.

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State Lawmakers and Retail Electric Competition

April 18, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

I’d like to chime in a little bit on the point that Mike just raised about state lawmakers and retail competition. Although there’s plenty of blame to go around with respect to the inertial state of retail competition, I believe the primary cause is the incentives facing state legislators.

State regulators operate under laws established in their respective states, to serve missions determined by those laws. Under the common law structures that govern the states (except for Louisiana) as well as federal law, legal institutions evolve by precedent or by legislative action. State legislators can change the laws under which state PUCs operate. State regulators can certainly influence that legislative action, but the primary incentive facing state legislators is to satisfy their own constituencies, their voters. Furthermore, they do so on short election cycles, very short relative to the time scales on which meaningful institutional change can happen.

So here’s my model: state legislators have the objective of being reelected (standard public choice assumption). This process happens on four-year cycles. In the states that have had legislative change to implement regulatory restructuring (such as Illinois and Maryland), they made these legislative changes with the objective of reducing costs to their voters; however, legislators are also risk averse with respect to their voters — they prefer certain outcomes to uncertain outcomes. Therefore, when originally negotiating restructuring legislation, they tried to get the cost reduction while maintaining price caps for their voters, in other words, residential customers.

They anticipated that when those price caps came off electricity prices would be lower; all reasonable forecasts of fuel prices and electricity prices supported that conclusion. However, forecasts are often wrong, and in the case of natural gas and environmental regulation, forecasts turned out to even be in the wrong direction. Thus in states like Illinois and Maryland, with residential price caps coming off when fuel prices are higher than expected, the voters are not getting the certain outcome that their legislators bargained for and promised. All parties feel aggrieved and are blaming markets for the outcome (thus Commissioner Kelliher’s comments).

But such a conclusion overlooks the fundamental problems that lie at the core of political processes. In instituting such strong price caps for residential customers, legislators bought some short-run certainty for their voters, but the tradeoff for that short-run certainty is the painful reality that if you are wrong about your forecasts, you’ve created a system that is extremely rigid and ill-equipped to adapt to changing conditions and changing values (such as increasing concerns about environmental effects of electricity consumption). As for the legislator’s own incentives, the election cycle in the short run was shorter than the price cap cycle, but now the consequences will come home to roost with them, unless they can “do something” that appeases their voters.

Thus even though price caps were the initial cause of the problem, legislators continue to argue for price caps, because it creates the perception that they have “done something” to address the problem of high electricity prices to voters. They do so because they have little incentive to show political backbone and leadership, and to break out of this populist, election-cycle-driven incentive to create the appearance of being able to control and manage circumstances that in reality are very far out of their control. Sadly, by doing this legislators reinforce the institutional environment that prevents retail competition from bringing real value creation to customers, especially to residential customers.

Why, then, should we expect state legislators to show political leadership? Why should we expect them to be Churchill-esque and say that we will have some short-run pain in the process of achieving far greater long-run gains than ever before imaginable? I deeply, deeply wish it were so, but I have seen very little evidence of political leadership with respect to this issue. Honestly, I am appalled and disappointed with how little leadership and creativity I’ve seen in Illinois on this issue.

One way to offer political leadership on this issue is to shift the debate away from price and toward forward-looking changes, such as implementing smart grid technological change that can simultaneously enhance system reliability and national security while creating the potential to offer customers innovative products and services.

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Did the Court’s Billion Dollar Result Rely on Invented Analysis by Commission Staff?

April 18, 2007

Michael Giberson

A letter sent to FERC commissioners by a couple of high-paid economic consultants starts innocently enough:

In light of two recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we write to identify concerns regarding the analysis presented in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”) Staff’s Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets: Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential Investigation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, Docket No. PA02-2-000 (Mar. 2003) (the “Staff Report”).

I’m sure the Commission receives similar letters all the time from attorneys, consultants, and other interested parties, seeking to draw the Commission’s attention to various “concerns regarding the analysis” in some matter under debate.

This letter is different. The two economists — LECG’s Scott Harvey and Harvard’s William Hogan — are not just well paid, they are highly respected. The court decisions referenced threatened to thoroughly undermine use of long-term contracts in the electric power industry (at least when those contracts must be filed with FERC or otherwise affect rates under FERC jurisdiction), so the stakes are substantial. And the “concerns regarding the analysis” are substantial as well, and laid out in great detail in the ten page letter.

The staff report, popularly referred to as the “Gelinas Report,” stands at the center of the Commission’s analysis of problems in California and Western energy markets in 2000-2001. Numerous parties to contract disputes in the West have relied upon findings in that report to seek damages in various lawsuits or to justify after-the-fact changes to contractual terms.

Harvey and Hogan explain:

Until recently, questions concerning the empirical foundations of the [report's] Chapter V analysis might have been viewed as technical matters without import, expecially since the Commission never adopted it or any of the conclusions drawn from it by the Staff. However, the recent decisions in PUD and CPUC concerning billions of dollars in long-term contracts concluded that this analysis is the “most important evidence” ….

In their letter to Commissioners, Harvey and Hogan detail their extensive efforts to replicate the key analysis of the report’s Chapter V (aka, the “most important evidence” in a pair of billion-dollar court cases). Despite extensive, well-funded efforts to replicate the result (including acquiring data identified in the report, contacting FERC to discuss methods, and even resorting to FOIA requests in an effort to obtain FERC records concerning the analysis), they conclude that the analysis in the report — now a matter with billion-dollar consequences — cannot be reproduced. In fact, they believe that the data “that were stated to have provided the basis for the Chapter V analysis do not exist, and have never existed.” (Emphasis added.)

There’s more – ambiguities, anomalies, and so on – but read it yourself: Here is a link to the letter on FERC’s website.

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FERC Chairman: State Lawmakers to Blame for Retail Competition Failures

April 18, 2007

Michael Giberson

FERC Chairman Joseph Kelliher reached out to state policy makers in an effort to pass the blame for any failures of competitive retail power markets. As reported by Platts Electric Power Daily, in remarks to the American Bar Association Kelliher said some states have incorrectly blamed what they call lack of competition in wholesame markets for problems in their respective retail markets.

Years ago, state regulators “embraced” retail rate caps and freezes, Kelliher said. “Their gamble did not pay off and now they’re trying to affix blame [on federal regulators].”

Kelliher added that much of the criticism of FERC has come from “states that managed [deregulation] badly.”

I think Kelliher is mostly right on this point, though we ought to admit that restructuring the power industry is a complex task at both the wholesale and retail level. As much as I think that the current jurisdictional split between the feds and the states is to blame for many of the problems (and, by the way, this issue is in the purview of federal lawmakers), we have benefited from having multiple experiments.

As I remember it, eight or nine years ago I was thinking that a retail rate cap, while clearly not the efficient thing to do economically, was a reasonable regulatory “safety mechanism.” It wasn’t obvious to me in advance just how badly that approach would turn out. Live and learn.

It reminds me of a Benjamin Franklin quote that Vernon Smith likes to quote: “Tell me and I forget. Teach me and I remember. Involve me and I learn.” Of course while state regulators have been involved, it isn’t clear that they are learning the right thing. (But then that’s what blogs are for, right?)

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The Perils of Financial Innovation, or Not

April 17, 2007

Michael Giberson

I’m about half way through Richard Bookstaber’s book, A Demon of Our Own Design, subtitled “Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation.” Bookstaber was among the MIT-trained economists lured from academia to Wall Street in the 1980s. If you’ve read about portfolio insurance and the stock market crash of 1987 or the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, then you will be familiar with much of the ground Bookstaber covers. So far the book has spent a little too much time detailing who worked where when, and less on the nature of the financial innovations propagated, but it has been interesting enough to keep me going.

While the book’s title has the wiff of journalistic exposé to it, instead we’re treated to an insider’s account. At mid-book the author is just now beginning to explain his concerns over how various financial innovations are more tightly linking markets together, how increasing complexity of instruments practically ensures that unanticipated failures will occur, and how the combination of highly complex and tightly linked markets nearly guarantees periodic market meltdowns.

As I said, I’m only half way, so Bookstaber may yet provoke me out of my biases, but so far as I can tell while the occasional market meltdowns of the last twenty or thirty years may have cost some traders their jobs and some investors their money, the real economy has been more stable over the same period. In general, it seems, it is a natural result of allowing markets to allocate risk to persons better positioned to manage it.

Bookstaber spent a lot of the last twenty years as chief risk officer for large financial institutions, so it is clear that complexity and uncertainty made his life difficult. (Of course, it is also why firms ended up hiring MIT-trained PhD’s for the work. So it Bookstaber just wishing, in retrospect, that he could get have been paid all that money but without all the high-pressure and headaches that comes with trying to assess and control the risk profiles of multi-billion dollar global financial firms?)

The book flap teaser promises that Bookstaber will defend his calls for less complexity and looser coupling of markets, and I’m looking forward to those defenses. But if his prescriptions would have the effect of shifting risk back into the real economy (i.e., onto low and middle income workers and consumers, relatively speaking, rather than investors and other willing risk-takers), then I’d have to oppose.

(It is odd to post a ‘review’ when I’m only half way through the book. I sat down this morning with the intent to react to a recent news story about financial innovation, but the Bookstaber book comment came out first. Now I don’t have time to tell you what I think about the possibility of “legal insider trading.”)

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The Perils of Financial Innovation, or Not

April 17, 2007

Michael Giberson

I’m about half way through Richard Bookstaber’s book, A Demon of Our Own Design, subtitled “Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation.” Bookstaber was among the MIT-trained economists lured from academia to Wall Street in the 1980s. If you’ve read about portfolio insurance and the stock market crash of 1987 or the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, then you will be familiar with much of the ground Bookstaber covers. So far the book has spent a little too much time detailing who worked where when, and less on the nature of the financial innovations propagated, but it has been interesting enough to keep me going.

While the book’s title has the wiff of journalistic exposé to it, instead we’re treated to an insider’s account. At mid-book the author is just now beginning to explain his concerns over how various financial innovations are more tightly linking markets together, how increasing complexity of instruments practically ensures that unanticipated failures will occur, and how the combination of highly complex and tightly linked markets nearly guarantees periodic market meltdowns.

As I said, I’m only half way, so Bookstaber may yet provoke me out of my biases, but so far as I can tell while the occasional market meltdowns of the last twenty or thirty years may have cost some traders their jobs and some investors their money, the real economy has been more stable over the same period. In general, it seems, it is a natural result of allowing markets to allocate risk to persons better positioned to manage it.

Bookstaber spent a lot of the last twenty years as chief risk officer for large financial institutions, so it is clear that complexity and uncertainty made his life difficult. (Of course, it is also why firms ended up hiring MIT-trained PhD’s for the work. So it Bookstaber just wishing, in retrospect, that he could get have been paid all that money but without all the high-pressure and headaches that comes with trying to assess and control the risk profiles of multi-billion dollar global financial firms?)

The book flap teaser promises that Bookstaber will defend his calls for less complexity and looser coupling of markets, and I’m looking forward to those defenses. But if his prescriptions would have the effect of shifting risk back into the real economy (i.e., onto low and middle income workers and consumers, relatively speaking, rather than investors and other willing risk-takers), then I’d have to oppose.

(It is odd to post a ‘review’ when I’m only half way through the book. I sat down this morning with the intent to react to a recent news story about financial innovation, but the Bookstaber book comment came out first. Now I don’t have time to tell you what I think about the possibility of “legal insider trading.”)

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Innovation: Using Animal Fat to Produce Biodiesel

April 16, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

Conoco Phillips and Tyson Foods are going to announce a new joint venture today. They:

… will announce a strategic alliance … to produce and market the next generation of renewable diesel fuel, which will help supplement the traditional petroleum-based diesel fuel supply. The alliance plans to use beef, pork and poultry by-product fat to create a transportation fuel. This fuel will contribute to America’s energy security and help to address climate change concerns.

Over the last year, the companies have been collaborating on ways to leverage Tyson’s advanced knowledge in protein chemistry and production with ConocoPhillips’ processing and marketing expertise to introduce a renewable diesel to the United States. Tyson will make capital improvements this summer in order to begin pre-processing animal fat from some of its North American rendering facilities later in the year. ConocoPhillips also will begin the necessary capital expenditures to enable it to produce the fuel in several of its refineries. The finished product will be renewable diesel fuel mixtures that meet all federal standards for ultra-low-sulfur diesel. Production is expected to ramp up over time to as much as 175 million gallons per year of renewable diesel.

This may be an interesting innovation. Animal fat does store a lot of energy.

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Wisdom Worth Giving Up Bananas For

April 13, 2007

Michael Giberson

In response to a reader’s question, Tyler Cowen declines to offer support for any of the current candidates for president in ’08. Cowen offers these comments instead:

As biological creatures we are programmed to respond to faces, voices, names, and identities. We praise them, follow them, condemn them, figure out what side they are on, just like good ol’ East African Plains Apes. Who is not excited to see a President of the United States attending a Wizards game in a nearby box? I know I was, and I didn’t even vote for him. Chimps will give up bananas, just to be able to gaze at photos of high-status other chimps.

Cowen added that he hoped his blog would serve as “one small space where these necessary but ignoble human tendencies toward personalization are resisted and sometimes even criticized.”

A laudable goal, though it strikes me as a regular consumer of Cowen’s blogging that he certainly puts out a lot of personalization along with the ideas. (He reads Entertainment Weekly! He listens to all kinds of music! He played pretty good chess as a teenager in New Jersey!) Any regular reader will develop a mental model of him as a person, and then tend to associate the ideas with the (imagined) person, and may like or dislike the ideas because of the image of the person associated with the ideas.

…Interesting… I came here to praise the post, not bury it. I wonder if Cowen recognizes how his blog embodies this tension between reliance on personalization — is it necessary to maintain readership? — while professing to resist and even criticize personalization in the realm of ideas. Actually, I’m sure he does. (At least, my mental model of Cowen does, and almost by definition my mental model of Cowen is as smart as the actual Cowen, at least as I imagine him to be.)

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I’m Happy to Offer a Partial Retraction …

April 9, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

I overstated the case a bit when I said that CFLs are not dimmable, and Ed Reid helpfully pointed out Noli Control dimmable can lighting CFLs in his comment on my previous post about CFLs and policy. See also the the dimmable CFLs page at 1000bulbs.com.

I amend my claim thusly: they are technically dimmable, although not over the same wide range, as Buzzcut noted in his comment on the post. The state of the technology has required timers, converters, adapters, etc. to achieve dimming in the past.

These newer technologies appear to have gotten around some of those limitations, although I can’t comment on them specifically since I haven’t used them. I’m also not persuaded that the dimmable chandelier bulbs will fit in my chandelier without poking out over the top of the shades (which drives me crazy about the CFLs I have in lamps at home). But a year from now, when we’re done with our house renovation and have around 30 can lights, 3 pendants, and our chandelier, I’ll install dimmable CFLs in them and report back to you on their quality.

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Jerry Ellig on Electricity Choice in Virginia

April 9, 2007

Lynne Kiesling

Jerry Ellig had a commentary in the Richmond Times-Dispatch last week about retail electricity choice in Virginia. The state’s governor and legislature, ignoring evidence that shows the benefits of retail choice and that customers actually, actively want retail choice, have decided that customers can’t be trusted to make that determination for themselves. They are debating a bill that would eliminate retail competition for most Virginia consumers.

Competition might even make some new power-plant construction unnecessary. Competition could facilitate dynamic pricing options that would vary retail electricity prices as the cost of producing electricity changes over the course of the day. Like cell-phone plans that offer free night and weekend minutes, dynamic electricity pricing would let consumers save money by moving some of their electricity use to times when electricity is cheap to produce, such as late at night.

With less electricity demanded at “peak” times, fewer new power plants would be needed, and prices would be lower.

He very kindly quotes me, which I of course appreciate … If you live in Virginia and you value free markets, retail choice, and competition, now is a good time to share that preference with your elected representatives.

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