Archive for December 29th, 2008

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Would someone please check the price of bread in Connecticut? Another zone pricing post

December 29, 2008

Michael Giberson

Would someone please check current prices for bread in the towns of Greenwich, Port Chester, and Stamford, Connecticut? A December 23 story in the Greenwich Time notes the arrival, finally, of gasoline prices below $2/gallon in Greenwich, “after weeks of being surrounded by less-than-$2 in gas in municipalities such as Stamford and Port Chester. ” The story suggests that prices are higher in Greenwich due to zone pricing. In the words of the story, zone pricing is “a practice under which refiners sell gasoline to retailers at prices depending on what the market in a particular geographic area will bear.”

Anyway, I’m wondering whether bread prices differ much from Greenwich to Port Chester to Stamford, and if they do I further wonder whether wholesale bakeries practice “zone pricing” of bread, too. After all, late in the story a customer is quoted as saying that “Everything’s more expensive [in Greenwich],” and if everything is more expensive in Greenwich then maybe zone pricing of gasoline by refiners is not the fundamental cause.

Zone pricing has been banned in neighboring New York, but some people in the Hampton’s think the law is being ignored.

For background, see earlier my posts: Gasoline prices in New York three weeks after the zone pricing ban; Zone pricing ban coming to New York, will the results affirm policymakers’ hopes or economists’ analyses?)

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“Congress didn’t intend to create SUVs”

December 29, 2008

Michael Giberson

From Two Billion Cars by Daniel Sperling and Deborah Gordon:

Ironically, it was the fuel economy standards adopted by Congress in 1975 that set the stage for the later surge of gas-guzzling SUVs and light trucks. As Congress was designing its fuel economy, safety, and emission standards, Detroit lobbied to exempt light trucks, which at the time were used mostly by businesses and farms for hauling goods and providing services. This loophole was written into law, with light trucks subject to less stringent requirements. They also were exempt from the large tax imposed on “gas guzzlers.” The light-truck loopholes were to be the industry’s savior for almost three decades. Chrysler recovered from its 1980 near-bankruptcy in part by taking advantage of those loopholes, producing the first modern minivan, a vehicle built on a truck platform but designed for family travel. Minivans became the new version of the station wagon, only “better” because they were cheaper to make and buy, thanks to the gentler energy, emissions, and safety regulations, and their exemption from the gas-guzzler tax.

Consumers flocked to these cheaper carlike trucks. The advent of the minivan was accompanied by a slow expansion of the pickup truck market and soon followed by a surge of SUVs in the 1990s. Chrysler was again the leader, building on its 1987 acquisition of American Motors Corporation and its Jeep vehicle line to pioneer the SUV market. Ford and GM followed. SUVs flourished.

I think this brief narrative puts too much emphasis on the role of Congress, and neglects the effects of rising incomes and changing gasoline prices on automobile industry developments over the “almost three decades” discussed. Nonetheless, the episode should serve as a warning to folks with grand policy ambitions about the weaknesses of piecemeal, ad hoc interventions into people’s lives.

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Couple of “food miles” items

December 29, 2008

Lynne Kiesling

One topic that has gotten some attention in 2008 is “food miles”, or the estimate of the environmental impact of the total resource use and transportation required to get food from grower to consumer. One argument for eating more locally-produced food is that it reduces the transportation impact; however, in making that argument we also have to take into account differentials in total factor productivity. In other words, if your local farmers are less productive than distant farmers, producing and consuming a given amount of food produced locally could increase resource use because the local farmers have less of a comparative advantage and achieve lower yields. That increased resource use mitigates the transportation benefits of local production, and if large enough can outweigh them entirely.

At Aguanomics David Zetland had a post recently with some links to work on the “carbon footprint of food”; interestingly, one report finds that transportation constitutes a small share of food’s environmental impact, and that most of food’s climate impact is a result of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases (such as methane). Very interesting.

Back in November Ron Bailey wrote about food miles at Reason, and I’ve been wanting to post about it since then. He mentions the studies that David noted in his recent post, and Ron also commented on a Mercatus Center study of the food miles argument (pdf).

In their recent policy primer for the Mercatus Center at George University, however, economic geographer Pierre Desrochers and economic consultant Hiroko Shimizu challenge the notion that food miles are a good sustainability indicator. As Desrochers and Shimizu point out, the food trade has been historically driven by urbanization. As agriculture became more efficient, people were liberated from farms and able to develop other skills that helped raise general living standards. People freed from having to scrabble for food, for instance, could work in factories, write software, or become physicians. Modernization is a process in which people get further and further away from the farm. …

Food miles advocates fail to grasp the simple idea that food should be grown where it is most economically advantageous to do so. Relevant advantages consist of various combinations of soil, climate, labor, capital, and other factors. It is possible to grow bananas in Iceland, but Costa Rica really has the better climate for that activity. Transporting food is just one relatively small cost of providing modern consumers with their daily bread, meat, cheese, and veggies. Desrochers and Shimizu argue that concentrating agricultural production in the most favorable regions is the best way to minimize human impacts on the environment.

In other words, the productivity effects on resource use swamp the resources used and emissions generated in the transportation portion of the supply chain. Incorporating this aspect of productivity into the food miles argument illustrates the point I raised above — much of what determines resource use and emissions in the food supply chain is factor productivity and comparative advantage.

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The Blagojevich saga: the psychology of power, and rent-seeking

December 29, 2008

Lynne Kiesling

Two items have kept my attention over the holidays with respect to the Blagojevich fiasco. First, back when the story first broke, our local NPR station interviewed my colleague Adam Galinsky on the psychology of power. Adam’s research is fascinating, and in this interview he communicates very effectively how positions of power affect individual incentives and decision-making: “putting people into positions of power basically alters their psychological processes.” People in power start to feel more invulnerable and focus on their rewards and ignore potential pitfalls; this change leads them to make more risky decisions. I heartily encourage you to listen to this interview; it’s superb.

And it ties in to the second item, which relates to the endemic corrupting incentives that arise from political power. Don Boudreaux’s Christian Science Monitor column last week does a really good job of turning the whole Blagojevich fiasco into a “teachable moment” on rent seeking, as Josh Wright calls it.

Tullock’s insight is that the very ability of government to create lucrative special privileges diverts resources from socially productive pursuits into wasteful ones.

Knowing that government is willing and able to impose tariffs that will protect them from foreign competition – and knowing that such protection will raise their incomes – sugar farmers understandably spend some of their resources farming government rather than farming their land. …

… And the larger the potential gain from being granted such a privilege – that is, the larger the rents – the more intense will be rent-seekers’ incentives to chase after them. That puts tremendous pressure on – and gives tremendous leverage to – politicians.

It’s easy to look at the Blagojevich case and see a failure of personal ethics. It is about character. But it’s also about how government itself creates the very conditions for corruption. Think of all the special privileges governors can bestow: subsidies for stadiums, public-works contracts, special taxes and fees, not to mention myriad regulations with myriad loopholes. Chief executives – mayors, governors, and presidents – are supposed to be the chief enforcers of the law. Today, though, they are also chief bestowers of privileges. As such, the trading of favors is intense, leaving little bandwidth for actual public service. Society loses.

See also Brian Doherty’s comments at Reason Hit & Run. These commentaries are all consistent with my observations when this first broke: lobbying/rent seeking and political corruption are different in degree, but not in kind.

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