Archive for January, 2009

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Texas regulators choose companies to build transmission to reach wind power

January 30, 2009

Michael Giberson

On Thursday, Texas utility regulators selected nine companies to build portions of the nearly $5 billion-worth of transmission to better connect existing and anticipated generating resources in the western part of the state to the large consumer load centers in the east, central and southeast parts of the state.  (Most of those existing and anticipated generators are wind powered, but so far as I know nothing in the rules would prevent a company from building a coal plant in west texas and getting access to the grid.)

This map posted on the PUCT website shows the approximate assignment of lines to companies.  Note that one project in the McCamey area was assigned to STEC, but is not shown on the map. Click on the image for a larger view.

PUCT_CREZ_Transmission_Award_Map_2009_Jan_29

In the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jim Fuquay reports:

On Thursday, the Public Utility Commission of Texas identified nine organizations to build various segments of about 2,400 miles of power lines in the nearly $5 billion project. Transmission capacity now barely covers half of the state’s 8,000 megawatts of wind power, leading to curtailments among wind farms roughly half the days of the year.

Still, wind provided nearly 5 percent of the state’s electricity last year, the operator of the state’s biggest electric grid reported last week.

While you may wonder about the companies abilities to finance $5 billion in spending, Fuquay quotes Jim Owen at the Edison Electric Institute as pointing out that regulated transmission lines should be able to secure financing.

“Utilities are hugely capital-intensive,” Owen said, adding that speculative power-generation projects are running into roadblocks. “But if you have a regulated revenue stream, it helps significantly with the financing.”

Ah yes, the pleasures of doing business with captive consumers.  The consumers have to rely on the wisdom of the regulators to keep a check on regulated utilities. It is often also worthwhile for consumers to keep an eye on regulators.

In this particular case, while I haven’t looked at the underlying analyses too carefully, I think if you assume state and federal incentives for renewable power development continue, then the transmission additions makes sense for consumers.  Captive consumers throughout ERCOT will see an increase in the “wires” part of their bills to repay the expense of building the transmission, but these same consumers are likely to see more than offsetting reductions in the cost of buying power.

Notes: Related stories appeared in the Dallas Morning News, Reuters, and Greentech Media. You can find the map displayed above (and much, much more) via the PUCT Interchange site.  Click the “Login” button at the top right; on the next screen enter the control number 35665, and click “Search Now”; scroll down, the map is item #1274.

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UPDATED: Negative power prices in the West region of ERCOT in 2008

January 28, 2009

Michael Giberson

Last November I posted remarks on the frequently observed negative prices for power in ERCOT’s West region. In the post, which analyzed data from January through November, I linked the negative prices to the wind power capacity relative to the transmission capacity, and to the effects of the Production Tax Credit and other subsidies available to wind power producers in Texas.

I recently extended the data set to include all of 2008 and have updated the charts in the original post. As expected at the time of the earlier post, November and December did see a return of frequent negative prices (which had almost entirely disappeared from mid-June through mid-October.) All told, about 14 percent of ERCOT’s 15-minute pricing intervals fell below zero.

The charts are reproduced below along with a new chart showing the average price each day over the year. The unweighted average price for ERCOT West for the year was a positive $53.34. Unfortunately for wind power producers in the region, their output was higher during times that the price was low and their output was lower during times that the price was high.

The charts were derived from data provided through the ERCOT website, on their “Balancing Energy Services Market Clearing Prices for Energy Annual Report” page.

Frequency of negative prices in ERCOT West, 2008

Frequency of negative prices in ERCOT West, 2008

Frequency of negative prices by price bin, ERCOT West, 2008

Frequency of negative prices by price bin, ERCOT West, 2008

Daily average prices in ERCOT West, 2008

Daily average prices in ERCOT West, 2008

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Most expensive gasoline in America – a zone pricing protest

January 26, 2009

Michael Giberson

WABC-TV reported Friday on what was likely the highest priced retail gasoline in the country: an Exxon station in Summit, New Jersey was offering regular grade gasoline for $4.89/gallon.  According to AAA’s Daily Fuel Gauge Report, the current average price in the US is about $1.85/gallon, and the average price in New Jersey is nearer $1.66/gallon.

You may wonder whether the station makes any sales given that the prices are more than double those of area competitor*, but the station manager is not trying to make sales, he is trying to make a point about zone pricing.  (Zone pricing is a practice whereby refiners charge retail dealers different amounts for fuel based on traffic volume, station amenities, nearby household incomes, the strength of competitors and other factors.)

From WABC-TV:

The operator/owner of the Exxon on Ashwood Avenue in Summit, New Jersey is Eel Chang. He says his price, more than 3 bucks per gallon above the state average, is a form of protest against his parent company, Exxon.

Tappy: “So you’re deliberately don’t want people to buy this gas?”
Station Owner: “I wouldn’t say that.”
Tappy: “You’re discouraging people from buying this gas?”
Station Owner: “That’s one way to look at it.”

Mr. Chang’s takes issue with something called zone pricing. That’s where oil companies sell gasoline at different prices to stations in different areas.

The article said that, according to the New Jersey Gasoline Association, an Exxon station just two miles away is in a different Exxon price zone and that station is charged 15 to 20 cents less per gallon for the gasoline.  Mr. Chang, who has sued Exxon over the practice, asserts he can’t make a profit when the company is charging him so much more for gasoline.

Chang stylizes his price as a protest against the company he contracts with, not as a public policy matter, but gasoline retailer associations have frequently pursued anti-zone pricing policies with state and federal lawmakers.  Before New Jersey lawmakers launch into action, they may want to see how the zone pricing ban is working out for neighboring New York state.  New York implemented its ban just last November, and soon there may be evidence to justify policy makers’ hopes for the zone pricing ban (or perhaps not).

(*The answer is yes, the station does make a few sales, because apparently some consumers don’t pay much attention to prices when they pull up to the pump.)

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More on airline fuel cost hedging: Air New Zealand takes hit

January 23, 2009

Michael Giberson

As Lynne was saying yesterday with respect to Southwest Airlines losses of $117 million related to its fuel cost hedging operations, Air New Zealand is discovering with hedging that “sometimes you get the bear, sometimes the bear gets you.”

Platts reports Air New Zealand told the Australian stock exchange that “unbooked hedge positions for its 2009 financial year, which runs from April 2008 to March 2009, stood at $126.39 million.” That loss is up from the $81 million report of unbooked losses reported in October for 2009, and the air carrier’s hedging position for 2010 is also in the red.

Which doesn’t mean that the hedges were not a good idea at the time they were entered into, of course. The article also points out that “unbooked hedging losses can vary considerably from final booked losses, particularly if futures prices change significantly between the time mark-to-market is done and the contracts expire.”

The Platts story provides several details about Air New Zealand’s complex hedging strategy which relied on trading jet fuel options in Singapore and crude oil futures on the NYMEX.

Previously here: Does hedging against fuel price movements increase airline value?

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Zayed Future Energy Prize awarded to Dipal Chandra Barua

January 22, 2009

Michael Giberson

From the official announcement:

The first annual Zayed Future Energy Prize was awarded on January 19 … to Mr. Dipal Chandra Barua, Founding Managing Director of Grameen Shakti for his visionary efforts to bring renewable energy solutions to the rural population of Bangladesh…

Mr. Barua’s organization, Grameen Shakti (GS), has installed more than 200,000 solar PV systems that currently provide power for more than two million rural people. Under Mr. Barua’s leadership, GS has developed a number of other innovative initiatives, including a biogas technology that converts cow and poultry waste into gas for cooking, lighting and fertilizer. GS has installed more than 6,000 biogas plants and plans to construct 500,000 more by 2012. In addition, GS has trained rural women to be solar technicians hereby enabling green entrepreneurs through a highly successful micro-credit program.

Marc Gunther takes note of the prize announcement to applaud the work of Barua and Grameen Shakti, and quotes from his interview with Barua at the World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi.

Barua told me that about 70% of the 150 million people who live in Bangladesh have no electricity. They typically use polluting kerosene lamps to light their homes at night.

“I tell them that for the cost of kerosene, you can buy a solar system,” he said.

The economics work like this: Total cost of a rooftop solar photovoltaic panel (imported from Japan), a battery and the required electronics is about $350 to $400. Customers typically put 10-15% down and pay the rest in monthly payments for three years. By then, they own a system that should last 20 years, without fuel costs. The panel makes enough electricity to power a few lights, a black-and-white TV and, most important, a cell phone. “Everyone wants a mobile phone,” Barua says.

It looks pretty good to Gunther, but he ends up worrying about the implications for “sustainable development.”

So is this really sustainable development? Up to a point. Of course it’s a good thing for poor people get electricity from solar power. The thing is, the electricity powers a mobile phone or TV that isn’t sustainable, and then one thing then leads to another and, before you know it, Grameen Shakti’s customers will be wanting iPods and dishwashers and cars, just like the rest of us. No wonder sustainable development remains such an elusive goal.

I’m not so sure that we ought to worry too much about the sustainability of development in the way that Gunther does here, at least not if it gives pause to anyone thinking about ways to make the world a better place as viewed by the people affected.  No doubt most poor Bangladeshi now benefitting from the efforts of Grameen Shakti would much prefer to be in a world where their biggest problems were deciding between dishwashers and cars, rather than between kerosene and cow dung.  To worry about the possibly detrimental implications of these small steps for this abstract idea, sustainable development, seems a little small minded.

(I’m guessing, too, in partial response to Lynne’s question, that for serving the population involved, solar panels are more economical than nuclear power.)

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Any good analyses comparing renewable and nuclear costs?

January 22, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Today several items have floated across my radar screen contending that renewables are cheaper than nuclear power. Here, for example, is a snippet of a talk from Eric Schmidt of Google on the topic.

I can see the possibility, given the innovations in renewables, incorporating the savings in foregone wires construction (although that depends …), and the costs of construcing nuclear plants. I’m not sure either way, though, and it’s hard to get a good read because both industries have such convoluted subsidies. Moreover, researchers are working on cheaper, more modular, smaller scale nuclear plants, so the fact that both industries are experiencing innovation makes answering this question even more difficult.

Have you seen any good analyses comparing these costs? I’m keen to learn more.

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Fuel hedging: sometimes you get the bear, sometimes the bear gets you

January 22, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

One of my father’s default tag lines was “sometimes you get the bear, sometimes the bear gets you.” I use this phrase frequently when discussing hedging future price changes — if prices move in the direction you anticipated, you earn a profit, if they move in the opposite direction, you earn a loss.

Last quarter the bear got Southwest Airlines (hey, that’s a good pun too). Southwest reported a net loss last quarter, due in large part to their fuel price hedging position:

The loss included net charges of $117 million related to the falling value of its fuel-hedging positions. Without the charges, Southwest would have earned $61 million, or 8 cents per share, which beat expectations of analysts surveyed by Thomson Reuters, who forecast a gain of 5 cents per share excluding special items.

Recently, Southwest has cut back sharply on fuel hedging. It also said Thursday that it plans to reduce capacity this year by 4 percent and will rein in fleet-expansion plans.

In periods of uncertainty, you manage this risk by hedging your hedge, buy buying an instrument that in essence allows you to get out of buying the fuel at the price you contracted. I’m thinking of instruments like put options. Of course, you are unlikely to recoup all of your money by doing this, but you can mitigate your losses.

But, being the “glass is half full” person that I am, I focus on the fact that their net income before special items was higher than analyst expectations. I doubt that’s the case for other airlines in this market.

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“Fixing” the economy: how do you “fix” an ecosystem?

January 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

In the post-election show of sleeve-rolling-up meeting between Barack Obama and John McCain, their main rhetoric revolved around how they could work together to “fix up the economy”.  At the time I wrote about how that language rankled me (and Russ Roberts), because the economy is not a closed-system project, and politicians who have the hubris to believe that they can treat the economy like it’s a construction project will do us great harm. This hubris is what Hayek called the “fatal conceit”, but the phenomenon was apparent in the 18th century as well, when Adam Smith wrote in Theory of Moral Sentiments about the perils of giving “the man of system” power (as I discussed in this post from 2005).

In the intervening (pun intended!) two months, the prospect has gotten worse, with a proposed stimulus package approaching one trillion dollars that promises decades of debt to fund current spending that will have uncertain outcomes. Certainly this expenditure and debt obligation will “fix the economy”, won’t it?

In a very important article that I urge you to read, Max Borders joins me and Russ (and others) in observing that “fixing the economy” is precisely the wrong way to think about fostering economic growth and productivity. The economy is not like a house, it’s not like a machine,

The economy is an organic ecosystem.

Thus Max titles his article “The Economy Is Not A Machine”. In his explanation of why that’s the case, he invokes precisely the concept from which the name of this web site is derived:

But the whole idea of fixing, running, regulating, designing, or modeling an economy rests on the notion that, if the right smart guys are at the rheostats, the economy can be ordered by intelligent design. But the economy is no mechanism. There is no mission control. Government cannot swoop down like a deus ex machina to explain the inexplicable and fix the unfixable. Why? Because the knowledge required to grasp each of the billions of actions, transactions and interconnections would fry the neural circuitry of a thousand Ben Bernankes. This is what F. A. Hayek called the knowledge problem.

He then goes on to give an excellent description of why and how the economy is a complex adaptive system (one example of which is an organic ecosystem).

Both ecosystems and economies are distributed systems. In the former, billions of interdependent means-ends activities are a reflection of a billion preferences and choices. In the latter, species are dynamic and interwoven in a web of relationships. For both, the whole system is an ever-evolving cascade of change that is unfathomable to a single mind. Data snapshots may be useful for some things, but should not be intended as blueprints for government planners. Even sophisticated computer models will, like the old Philips machine, eventually fail. There are no oracles.

And the laws of ecosystems are not the mechanistic laws that allow us to predict with very good accuracy how machines will behave. Ecosystems evolve by trial and error, by experimentation. Any entrepreneur who has been responsible for a new product launch can tell you that markets are not mechanistic, and that distributed non-mechanistic nature aggregates up across markets into an economic that is a complex system.

His recommendation will sound familiar to you, because I have recommended it many times here and in my published work: design clear and transparent institutions that reduce transaction costs if you want economic growth.

By fundamentals I mean rules. Only rules can be the product of human design. These are the simple rules that lower “transaction costs,” which is a fancy way of saying help us trade with each other easily, minimizing conflict. We call these rules “institutions” (property rights, contract enforcement, and so on) – not legislation meant to regulate failure away, but to protect people from force, theft and fraud. For these are the rules that bring market discipline in a system of prices, profit and loss.

Policymakers cannot “fix” our organic economic ecosystem, but they can create an environment conducive to beneficial decentralized coordination, and through coordination, growth, by implementing institutions that reduce transaction costs and by eliminating institutions that throw up barriers to such coordination and exchange. If we could find a way for the politicians to profit from doing that, instead of profiting from promising to “fix the economy”, then we would see true, resilient, meaningful economic growth out of this recession.

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What provisions might a Federal Power Act of 2009 contain?

January 21, 2009

Michael Giberson

“What provisions might a Federal Power Act of 2009 contain?” asks Paul Joskow in the middle of his advice-giving essay on the state of U.S. electric power policy.

In brief, Joskow supports completing the task of restructuring the electric power industry by unbundling transmission, distribution, and generation in places where that action has not yet been taken, and installing voluntary RTO-type wholesale power markets in areas not yet served by an RTO.  Also, Joskow urges federal loan guarantees for merchant power companies to match the implicit loan guarantees available to state-regulated electric utilities, and wants any carbon permits given away free to go directly to consumers rather than to electric utilities.

But, you say, Joskow’s proposal would run roughshod over existing jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal government.  Yes, I say, and I think that is part of Joskow’s point.

He wrote, “Unlike every other energy sector, the electricity sector lacks a comprehensive national policy framework consistent with achieving [current policy] goals.”  Much of the nation remains stuck in an organizational and regulatory framework first established in the Federal Power Act of 1935, and federal action is required to help reorganized the industry in a manner better suited to current conditions.  Hence his suggestions for a “Federal Power Act of 2009.”

See also this post by Joskow at the EU Energy Policy Blog with a summary of the article. HT to Cheryl Morgan at MorganEnergy.

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Falling carbon permit prices in Europe: Threat or menace?

January 21, 2009

Michael Giberson

At Environmental Capital Keith Johnson notes that the financial market meltdown is driving down carbon permit prices in Europe, and as a result it is harder to fund clean-energy projects in the developing world.

Johnson calls this change in prospects for clean-energy developers “a negative side effect” of falling permit prices.  I can see how this change might be a negative side effort for investors in these projects, but for the rest of us falling permit prices are a good thing. After all, if the permit price reflects approximately the cost of reducing carbon emissions (a big “if”, but approximately justifiable*), then falling permit prices mean that the cost of reducing carbon emissions is going down.  If reducing carbon emissions is a worthy public policy goal, then attaining that goal is becoming cheaper.

To the non-investor, worry about the economic prospects of clean-energy projects seems to mix the ends of policy and one particular way of attaining those ends.  One advantage shared by both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals is that they do not wed the attainment of a goal to specific means (i.e. particular technologies or approaches), but rather let the market sort those things out in a least-cost way.

I understand, of course, reducing carbon emissions is becoming cheaper at the margin because the scale of overall economic activity is down.  That falling level of overall economic activity is a negative factor worthy of public policy attention, but the investment-worthiness of clean energy businesses is per se of no more public policy interest than the growth of dingus makers or widget manufacturing.

(*”Approximately justifiable” because companies coverned by the requirements must choose between reducing carbon emissions or buying a permit, so at the margin the price should reflect the cost of abatement.)

ASIDES:

Just because the falling level of economic activity is appropriately a matter of public policy attention doesn’t mean that public policy makers have a clue. On this topic, see Mario Rizzo’s ThinkMarkets blog post, intelligently named “The Macroeconomic Knowledge Problem.” (Around here we usually focus on microeconomic knowledge problems, so it is nice to know someone’s got our back.)

The comments by Rob Stavins comparing cap-and-trade and carbon taxes at the National Journal site (noted in my post yesterday) have now been supplemented by a number of other responses.

Rob Bradley reminds us that the policy choice isn’t just between cap-and-trade and carbon taxes.

Generally speaking, Johnson’s post at Environmental Capital provides an illustration of the mild counter-cyclical effects of a cap-and-trade approach that I mentioned briefly in yesterday’s post.

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