Archive for January 21st, 2009

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“Fixing” the economy: how do you “fix” an ecosystem?

January 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

In the post-election show of sleeve-rolling-up meeting between Barack Obama and John McCain, their main rhetoric revolved around how they could work together to “fix up the economy”.  At the time I wrote about how that language rankled me (and Russ Roberts), because the economy is not a closed-system project, and politicians who have the hubris to believe that they can treat the economy like it’s a construction project will do us great harm. This hubris is what Hayek called the “fatal conceit”, but the phenomenon was apparent in the 18th century as well, when Adam Smith wrote in Theory of Moral Sentiments about the perils of giving “the man of system” power (as I discussed in this post from 2005).

In the intervening (pun intended!) two months, the prospect has gotten worse, with a proposed stimulus package approaching one trillion dollars that promises decades of debt to fund current spending that will have uncertain outcomes. Certainly this expenditure and debt obligation will “fix the economy”, won’t it?

In a very important article that I urge you to read, Max Borders joins me and Russ (and others) in observing that “fixing the economy” is precisely the wrong way to think about fostering economic growth and productivity. The economy is not like a house, it’s not like a machine,

The economy is an organic ecosystem.

Thus Max titles his article “The Economy Is Not A Machine”. In his explanation of why that’s the case, he invokes precisely the concept from which the name of this web site is derived:

But the whole idea of fixing, running, regulating, designing, or modeling an economy rests on the notion that, if the right smart guys are at the rheostats, the economy can be ordered by intelligent design. But the economy is no mechanism. There is no mission control. Government cannot swoop down like a deus ex machina to explain the inexplicable and fix the unfixable. Why? Because the knowledge required to grasp each of the billions of actions, transactions and interconnections would fry the neural circuitry of a thousand Ben Bernankes. This is what F. A. Hayek called the knowledge problem.

He then goes on to give an excellent description of why and how the economy is a complex adaptive system (one example of which is an organic ecosystem).

Both ecosystems and economies are distributed systems. In the former, billions of interdependent means-ends activities are a reflection of a billion preferences and choices. In the latter, species are dynamic and interwoven in a web of relationships. For both, the whole system is an ever-evolving cascade of change that is unfathomable to a single mind. Data snapshots may be useful for some things, but should not be intended as blueprints for government planners. Even sophisticated computer models will, like the old Philips machine, eventually fail. There are no oracles.

And the laws of ecosystems are not the mechanistic laws that allow us to predict with very good accuracy how machines will behave. Ecosystems evolve by trial and error, by experimentation. Any entrepreneur who has been responsible for a new product launch can tell you that markets are not mechanistic, and that distributed non-mechanistic nature aggregates up across markets into an economic that is a complex system.

His recommendation will sound familiar to you, because I have recommended it many times here and in my published work: design clear and transparent institutions that reduce transaction costs if you want economic growth.

By fundamentals I mean rules. Only rules can be the product of human design. These are the simple rules that lower “transaction costs,” which is a fancy way of saying help us trade with each other easily, minimizing conflict. We call these rules “institutions” (property rights, contract enforcement, and so on) – not legislation meant to regulate failure away, but to protect people from force, theft and fraud. For these are the rules that bring market discipline in a system of prices, profit and loss.

Policymakers cannot “fix” our organic economic ecosystem, but they can create an environment conducive to beneficial decentralized coordination, and through coordination, growth, by implementing institutions that reduce transaction costs and by eliminating institutions that throw up barriers to such coordination and exchange. If we could find a way for the politicians to profit from doing that, instead of profiting from promising to “fix the economy”, then we would see true, resilient, meaningful economic growth out of this recession.

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What provisions might a Federal Power Act of 2009 contain?

January 21, 2009

Michael Giberson

“What provisions might a Federal Power Act of 2009 contain?” asks Paul Joskow in the middle of his advice-giving essay on the state of U.S. electric power policy.

In brief, Joskow supports completing the task of restructuring the electric power industry by unbundling transmission, distribution, and generation in places where that action has not yet been taken, and installing voluntary RTO-type wholesale power markets in areas not yet served by an RTO.  Also, Joskow urges federal loan guarantees for merchant power companies to match the implicit loan guarantees available to state-regulated electric utilities, and wants any carbon permits given away free to go directly to consumers rather than to electric utilities.

But, you say, Joskow’s proposal would run roughshod over existing jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal government.  Yes, I say, and I think that is part of Joskow’s point.

He wrote, “Unlike every other energy sector, the electricity sector lacks a comprehensive national policy framework consistent with achieving [current policy] goals.”  Much of the nation remains stuck in an organizational and regulatory framework first established in the Federal Power Act of 1935, and federal action is required to help reorganized the industry in a manner better suited to current conditions.  Hence his suggestions for a “Federal Power Act of 2009.”

See also this post by Joskow at the EU Energy Policy Blog with a summary of the article. HT to Cheryl Morgan at MorganEnergy.

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Falling carbon permit prices in Europe: Threat or menace?

January 21, 2009

Michael Giberson

At Environmental Capital Keith Johnson notes that the financial market meltdown is driving down carbon permit prices in Europe, and as a result it is harder to fund clean-energy projects in the developing world.

Johnson calls this change in prospects for clean-energy developers “a negative side effect” of falling permit prices.  I can see how this change might be a negative side effort for investors in these projects, but for the rest of us falling permit prices are a good thing. After all, if the permit price reflects approximately the cost of reducing carbon emissions (a big “if”, but approximately justifiable*), then falling permit prices mean that the cost of reducing carbon emissions is going down.  If reducing carbon emissions is a worthy public policy goal, then attaining that goal is becoming cheaper.

To the non-investor, worry about the economic prospects of clean-energy projects seems to mix the ends of policy and one particular way of attaining those ends.  One advantage shared by both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals is that they do not wed the attainment of a goal to specific means (i.e. particular technologies or approaches), but rather let the market sort those things out in a least-cost way.

I understand, of course, reducing carbon emissions is becoming cheaper at the margin because the scale of overall economic activity is down.  That falling level of overall economic activity is a negative factor worthy of public policy attention, but the investment-worthiness of clean energy businesses is per se of no more public policy interest than the growth of dingus makers or widget manufacturing.

(*”Approximately justifiable” because companies coverned by the requirements must choose between reducing carbon emissions or buying a permit, so at the margin the price should reflect the cost of abatement.)

ASIDES:

Just because the falling level of economic activity is appropriately a matter of public policy attention doesn’t mean that public policy makers have a clue. On this topic, see Mario Rizzo’s ThinkMarkets blog post, intelligently named “The Macroeconomic Knowledge Problem.” (Around here we usually focus on microeconomic knowledge problems, so it is nice to know someone’s got our back.)

The comments by Rob Stavins comparing cap-and-trade and carbon taxes at the National Journal site (noted in my post yesterday) have now been supplemented by a number of other responses.

Rob Bradley reminds us that the policy choice isn’t just between cap-and-trade and carbon taxes.

Generally speaking, Johnson’s post at Environmental Capital provides an illustration of the mild counter-cyclical effects of a cap-and-trade approach that I mentioned briefly in yesterday’s post.

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Airport kabuki: Bruce Schneier on “security theater”

January 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Bruce Schneier is one of the most thoughtful, knowledgeable security experts in the world, and he’s been constructively critical of the TSA’s airport policies and procedures for quite some time (so have I, but I have nothing like his expertise or his street cred). You may have seen Jeffrey Goldberg’s November 2008 Atlantic article, in which Schneier and Goldberg burst Swiss-cheese holes in the TSA’s policies and practices. In this article and other writings, Schneier describes the TSA’s policies and practices as “security theater”, intended to assuage an anxious traveling public without actually doing anything meaningful or substantive to ensure sufficient reduction in the probability of a terrorist attack using airports or airplanes.

Now Katharine Mangu-Ward has an interview with Schneier in Reason, and it’s well worth reading. The good news is that the TSA will phase out the small liquids policy (although until the UK does the same my travel will still involve stupid, pointless plastic bags of tiny bottles); can we expect some reasonable removal of the ludicrous shoe policy to follow? I certainly hope so.

Here’s one of my favorite parts of the article:

Reason: What would success look like for the TSA? If you were made King of Airport Security tomorrow and given the entire current budget of the TSA to do whatever you wanted, what kind of system would you design?

Schneier: If I were in charge of the TSA’s budget, I’d give most of it back. Politically, I wouldn’t be able to, of course, but it would be the best thing to do. Spending money on airport/airplane security only makes sense if the bad guys target airplanes. In general, money spent defending particular targets or tactics only makes sense if we can guess them correctly. If tactics and targets are scarce, defending against specific ones makes us safer. If tactics and targets are plentiful—as they are—it only forces the bad guys to pick new ones. Spending money on intelligence, investigation, and emergency response is effective regardless of the tactic or the target. Airport security is a last line of defense, and not a very good one at that. We need to remember that at budget time.

Schneier, unlike the TSA management, is capable of making reasoned, and reasonable, assessments of relative risk. This relative risk assessment is crucial for getting the most bang from the taxpayer’s money that is spent on security. Schneier argues that much of the TSA budget is better spent on “intelligence, investigation, and emergency response”. Schneier is also very effective at communicating the importance of making those relative risk assessments, and at communicating the necessity of evaluating and making tradeoffs instead of seeing security as a binary absolute. The TSA management could learn a thing (or a few!) from Schneier, both on substance and on communicating ideas.

That said, I’m confused by what I think is a false dichotomy he creates here:

Reason: What’s your reaction when you hear people say that we live in a “security state”?

Schneier: We live in an information state, which is subtly different. All computer processes produce data as a byproduct. As more parts of our lives are mediated by computers, more personal information about us is produced. This information is collected, and then bought and sold, by other institutions, both government and commercial, without our knowledge and consent. Some of this is driven by security concerns, but a lot of it is driven by economics. The problem is that personal data is looked at as property, which can be bought and sold, instead of as a right. Long term, we need to fix that.

I don’t understand the “property instead of a right” distinction. I can reconcile this “instead of” by saying that personal data are property, but they are the property of the individual to whom the data pertain. Therefore, individuals have rights to retain their data, access their data, and prevent others from accessing their data. Isn’t that approach consistent with the way we treat rights to personal data, and other personal property, in other situations?

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