Archive for March, 2009

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Slate on winning your NCAA pool

March 18, 2009

Michael Giberson

At Slate, Chris Wilson advances the idea that the best way to win your local NCAA basketball pool is “to look for situations where the national bracket values a team much higher than the objective statistics.” By betting on the undervalued teams you are more likely to come out ahead.

In the past I have explored some related ideas, but since I’m not betting any money this year my approach was much more subjective and impressionistic.  In Wilson’s  view, this should make me an easy target for sophisticated analysts.

As usual, the most important goal I have is to do better than my wife. We both have Pitt to go all of the way, so I’ll have to win it in the trenches.

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AIG-ency problems

March 17, 2009

Michael Giberson

At the Streetwise Professor, Craig Pirrong finds that the current political flap over AIG bonuses well illustrates the value of rules over discretion. His conclusion matches my view: “Several hundred million dollars is a lot of money.  But it pales in comparison to the amount that would be lost by undermining contracts and the rule of law.”

Pirrong also notes the problem created when companies are propped up for policy reasons and therefore become agents of government policy:

It is clear that the Treasury and Fed felt compelled to support AIG, rather than let it implode, in order to protect its counterparties, who happened to be large, systemically important financial institutions (e.g., Goldman).  But supporting these institutions indirectly, by funneling money through AIG, rather than in a more direct way, has created a huge agency problem.  AIG has become, in effect, the government’s agent in maintaining the solvency of other large financial institutions.  But AIG and its managers have their own agendas, and their interests and incentives are not well aligned with those of the other large financial institutions, or with the taxpayers who are ultimately on the hook in this arrangement.

As Tyler Cowen remarks at Marginal Revolution, “The real lesson is that this is another reason not to nationalize banks.  It means politicizing every decision which ends up in the newspaper.”

Or, as I learned it in graduate school, the problem with “discretion” instead of “rules” is that it becomes continuous rather than discrete.

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Environmental benefits and the production tax credit for wind power

March 16, 2009

Michael Giberson

Wind power has been subsidized by state and federal governments in the United States because it is seen as clean and renewable, and perhaps even because wind power is seen as glamorous. Consumers pay higher electric rates and taxpayers pay higher taxes to support these subsidies, and it is a quite reasonable public policy question to ask whether the benefits are worth the costs. (Of course wind power is not the only energy technology subsidized by government policy.)

The primary external benefits from expanded wind power production comes from emissions avoided due to the reduced use of fossil-fuel fired electric generation, predominantly natural gas and coal. Which fuel is displaced, however, depends in large part on where the wind power project is located and what time of day the wind power is put onto the grid.

Conventionally, an estimate of reduced emissions might be made through an elaborate production cost modeling exercise, comparing overall use of different input fuels against scenarios featuring different levels of installed wind capacity. It is one useful approach, but it would be good as a reality check to test such estimates against actual data. Two recent estimates of fuel displaced by wind power rely on data analysis to get their results.

Monitoring_Analytics-Fuel_displaced_by_wind_power, link to larger view on FlickrA relatively straightforward approach to this estimate was taken by Monitoring Analytics, the external market monitor for the PJM market, in preparing “Estimated Marginal Fuel Displacement By Wind Generation in PJM.” The chart was posted online without accompanying documentation, but folks at Monitoring Analytics tell me their estimate was derived from market data on wind power output by hour combined with data on marginal generation by fuel type by hour. As the chart nearby indicates, about 75 to 80 percent of the wind-produced power in PJM displaced coal-fired power. (Coal is the orange portion of the bars.)

Joseph Cullen took a more data-intensive econometric approach to estimating the fuel displaced and related emission reductions in ERCOT due to wind power. Cullen ran regressions on the output of each non-wind generating unit in the ERCOT market against wind power output to identify the actual responsiveness of each generator to changes in wind power. (I’m over-simplifying his methods. See his paper for details.) In ERCOT, for the time period analyzed, Cullen estimated that about 80 percent of the time wind displaced gas-fired generation and about 20 percent of the time wind displaced coal-fired generation.

One of my policy objections to the production tax credit approach to subsidizing wind power is that it offers the same subsidy per MWh output without respect to the environmental benefits provided (if any). Therefore it tends to be more attractive to the developer to invest where wind power output will be high – i.e. West Texas, among other places – and the external benefits relatively muted – instead of where the external benefits would be high, as in PJM. So much wind power capacity has been added in West Texas, relative to the current grid capability, that wind power capacity in effect just displaces other wind power generation during high output periods.

Why should consumers and taxpayers subsidize that?

From a commercial point of view, it certainly makes sense to build wind power where wind power output will be high. I’m not opposed to smart commercial activity. I don’t see that public policies should subsidize it. Rather, public policy should be oriented at achieving external benefits in a cost-effective manner.

Consumers and taxpayers will end up getting more for their money from policies that put a price on the externality.

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Smart grid federal policy

March 16, 2009

Michael Giberson

As Lynne just noted, this week Chicago is hosting GridEcon, a conference on smart grid economics.

Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., the agenda for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission meeting this week indicates that the Commission will be issuing a policy statement on smart grid policy.

No preliminary statements have been made under the docket number listed for the policy statement, PL09-4-000. The interested reader should visit the FERC homepage on March 19, where related information likely will be featured under the “What’s New” header, or check out the calendar event page after the meeting.  Of course, you can also check back here for commentary from Lynne or me, after the policy statement is out.

The very interested reader may want to consider watching the meeting webcast live, since this seems like the kind of topic that would be discussed at the meeting.

DISCLAIMER: I don’t guarantee a smart grid discussion. If you end up sitting through hours of webcast discussion examining mandatory reliability standards — agenda items E-5, E-6, and E-9 — followed by details of years-old California market melt-down inspired contractual disputes — E-10, E-18 and E-20 — without the word “smart” passing a Commissioner’s lips, well that’s your tough luck. Live beginning about 10 AM EDT on March 19, at your own risk.

March 19 UPDATE: FERC’s news release on their smart grid policy statement.  FERC Fact Sheet. Also, visit FERC’s smart grid page.  FERC invited comments on the proposed policy statement, which will be due 45 days after the statement is published in the Federal Register.  Staff presentations, commissioner statements, and related information available from the calendar event page.

The archived webcast should be available later today at http://www.capitolconnection.gmu.edu/ferc/ferc.htm (available for about 3 months). The smart grid policy statement was the only discussion item for the meeting according to the Supplemental Notice on the agenda.

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Monday and Tuesday: GridEcon in Chicago

March 16, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Today and tomorrow I will be at GridEcon in Chicago! As one of the co-organizers I am making some opening remarks:

I am very happy to welcome you all to what I hope is the first annual GridEcon conference. As you all know, we are in the midst of a crucial time for this discussion. Catalyzed by the current economic downturn and increasing attention to the economic and environmental implications of energy use, business and policy attention are turning toward smart grid technologies as beneficial opportunities to invest in our aging and obsolete electricity infrastructure. The $4.5 billion dedicated to smart grid in the recent federal stimulus package is one very large example of such attention.

GridEcon creates an environment in which we can share ideas and create new ones about the economics of smart grid technology and smart grid policy. For at least the past decade many parties, including many of you in this room, have been working on and thinking about the technical aspects of digital communication technology’s increasingly valuable role in the electric power network. Over that time we have concentrated on the technical aspects of that role, such as the technical standards governing the communication of information among different devices and applications, increasingly across the boundaries of firms. The work we have done on the GridWise Architecture Council to raise awareness around interoperability and to enable dispersed efforts on interoperability to coalesce is one example. Now, as work continues on those technical issues, we take up the business and policy questions more directly. I believe that through our discussions here and through the open interactions of the Domain Expert Working Groups that NIST and GWAC have organized, we are creating a framework for communication of the technical work and the business and policy work to lead to a set of valuable, resilient, and adaptable architectural principles. These principles include those that have gone into the good work that’s been accomplished thus far on technical standards, but without sound market design and regulatory policy, these standards will languish and not be widely adopted.

Read the rest of this entry ?

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Chicago Half Marathon

March 14, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

OK, folks, I just took the plunge and registered for the Chicago Half Marathon in September! Running has always been the weakest of the sports in which I participate, so I’ll be happy to get some moral support here and there. I’ve never run longer than 8 miles in a race, or even in training for that matter … GAAH.

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Will pricing carbon raise electricity prices?

March 14, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

UPDATE: Thanks to the commenter who alerted me that I mis-labeled my graph, and that equilibrium B should be at the intersection of S’ and D’. I may not get to update the graph Monday, my apologies.

There’s been an interesting discussion going on this week building off of a Sean Casten post at Grist, in which he states

For climate law to work, it must put a price on CO2 emissions. But there is no logical reason why that must imply an increase in energy costs, for the simple reason that energy is not CO2.

Rich Sweeney then picked it up at Common Tragedies, and the conversation in the comments on both posts has been good. The substance of what I wanted to add is already reflected in the conversation, but I’m going to say it in a different way, based on how I interpret Sean’s comment from his perspective.

For those who don’t know Sean, he is the President and CEO of Recycled Energy Development, which has a business model of capturing and recycling waste energy that occurs in large-scale industrial processes. Waste energy recovery reduces a firm’s energy costs by reducing the amount of electricity it uses per unit of production; consequently, it reduces GHG emissions. This chain leads to RED’s claim to reduce greenhouse gases profitably.

The value creation potential here, both economic and environmental, is enormous. Our energy efficiency of converting fuel into electricity is 33%, which means that 100 units (I’m going to be general here to stay away from getting too techy) of fuel go into the generator and 33 units worth of electricity is produced (then the losses continue down the supply chain, where ultimately that 100 units of fuel results in the use of 4 units of electricity to power an incandescent light bulb). That means that there is a lot of room to increase generation energy efficiency by recovering waste heat, using combined heat and power, district heating, and so on to put the waste energy to productive use.

I interpret Sean’s comment through this waste energy recovery lens, and I think he is making what I would call a general equilibrium point about how fuel markets could evolve and adapt to the carbon policy. Please also note here that I am abstracting from transportation and focusing solely on the use of carbon-based fuels to generate electricity for resale and for use in industrial processes. If we price carbon (for now assume away any difference between tax and C&T), the chain of effects consistent with his argument are

  • The fuel supply curve shifts to the left, reflecting the increasing marginal cost effect of the carbon policy
  • In expectation, seeing this potential effect, firms increase their energy efficiency and engage in more actions like waste heat recovery, shifting the demand for fuel to the left
  • Thus in equilibrium, fuel prices could be lower than they were before the initial equilibrium, if the magnitude of the demand shift is larger than the magnitude of the supply shift

Thus I think Sean’s point is that there is so much potential energy efficiency because the amount of wasted energy in the electricity generation system right now is enormous; this potential translates into a large demand shift response to carbon policy in carbon-based fuel markets. But that’s the unknown: if firms don’t respond to carbon policy by sufficient waste heat recapture and other methods that increase energy efficiency, then carbon policy would lead to an increase in fuel prices. I even drew a graph!

ee-graph

Thus I agree with the commenters who pointed out that we have to be really careful in distinguishing between costs and prices; carbon policy will unambiguously increase marginal costs in fuel markets, but if firms respond by shifting their demand, that cost increase need not translate to higher prices in fuel markets, which means that the firm’s fuel costs in their budget may not go up.

The other variable here is long-run population growth. As population grows, for how long will this potential energy efficiency potential be available to suppress the translation of carbon policy into higher fuel prices? But I do think that Sean is right, and that we have a lot of gains and value creation opportunities to capture.

So the big remaining challenge is that there are huge regulatory and cultural barriers to implementing the kind of energy efficiency and waste heat recovery techniques Sean advocates. Electricity generators are heavily invested, literally and metaphorically, in these inefficient large-scale central generation assets. The existing regulatory apparatus is built precisely to ensure that those firms earn a cost-plus rate of return on those assets, so they have little incentive to engage in waste heat recapture. Pricing carbon is likely to change that, but I’m skeptical that those are the places we will see big improvements in generation energy efficiency.

The other areas are places like Sean’s industrial customers, who have good economic incentives, and in areas where buildings can connect together to do distributed generation and combined heat and power within a microgrid structure. But there we run up against the century-old prohibition against anyone building distribution wires, especially across public rights-of-way, except for the government-granted monopoly regulated distribution utility. The potential energy efficiency gains from CHP in microgrids are substantial, and will enable the kind of effect that Sean’s describing to happen … but the distribution utility has every incentive to fight such innovations tooth and nail. They even go so far as to argue that consumers should not be allowed to do this because it will increase the costs of the system to all of the other customers who stay with the utility.

This is the pernicious conflict we now face between a cost-based regulatory system and energy efficiency. Until we have regulatory reform that breaks this vicious incentive cycle, Sean’s vision cannot become a reality.

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Also in the WSJ: “There is No Such Thing as Nuclear Waste”

March 13, 2009

Michael Giberson

William Tucker, author of “Terrestrial Energy: How Nuclear Power Will Lead the Green Revolution and End America’s Long Energy Odyssey,” has an essay in today’s WSJ pinning the U.S. nuclear waste problem on decisions by Presidents Ford and Carter to abandon reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

The reasons for abandoning reprocessing – mostly fear that plutonium would end up as bombs in terrorist hands – are no longer such a concern (because other sources would be more convenient, should someone want to develop a bomb, than a U.S. reprocessing facility). Reprocessing dramatically reduces the waste disposal problem.

Tucker says, “France, which completely reprocesses its recyclable material, stores all the unused remains — from 30 years of generating 75% of its electricity from nuclear energy — beneath the floor of a single room at La Hague.” (Maybe the Nuclear Energy Institute could offer to store the unused material from reprocessing in the basement of their Washington, D.C., offices?)

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Because it is not news until it is on Comedy Central; or, carbon taxes their brains

March 13, 2009

Michael Giberson

Carbon tax and cap-and-trade fun, courtesy of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and bloggers at Common Tragedies.

In brief: on Monday the WSJ lead editorial complained about the distributional effects of cap-and-trade, correctly noting that the effect of pricing carbon would depend on consumption but misleadingly illustrated with a chart based on carbon-emitting production by state.  Two economists at Resources for the Future sent a letter to the editor pointing out the problem, and after the WSJ said it would not run the letter, one of the economists – Rich Sweeney – posted it on his blog at Common Tragedies.

Subtlety being the soul of blogging, he headlined the post: “The Wall Street Journal is an idiot.”

This morning at CT, Sweeney is back with, “Write a letter to the editor, and nobody cares. Call someone an idiot on the internet and…….”

The answer is: get your letter published in the WSJ. Nearby on the editorial page is a rejoinder, where the editorialists, in their words, “try to take their [the RFF economists'] argument seriously.” [What?  Does this mean the first editorial was done without considering recently published work by the mainstream-if-slightly-staid folks at the pre-eminient environmental policy think tank?  I guess for the second editorial, the difference was that the WSJ editors were actually wearing their thinking caps.]

Elsewhere in the house of WSJ, Environmental Capital blogger Keith Johnson pulls up a chair ringside, “Knockdown, Dragout: Think Tank v. WSJ Edit Page on Cap-and-Trade.”

Johnson concluded:

The RFF guys responded this morning: “Now the question is whether the WSJ really cares about the true net effect of carbon policy on households in states like Michigan and Pennsylvania, or if they’re simply clinging to any story that will allow them to politically undermine cap and trade.”

It’s certainly fodder for a lively debate. The only thing that would make it better would be moving it to Comedy Central.

I’m all for getting this debate onto Comedy Central.  We will be talking about cap-and-trade and carbon taxes in a few weeks in the Energy Economics class.

Students here are leaving for Spring Break this afternoon.  I figure Comedy Central is about the only chance I have got to get a serious energy econ idea entertained by even a handful of students for the next 9 days.

[Note to Jon Stewart: Call me.  I can play straight man.]

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Some smart grid reading recommendations

March 12, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

I am attending a meeting of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group today and tomorrow, and am speaking on a panel about smart grid this afternoon. Thus I’m going to take this opportunity to clear some of my long-open browser tabs and offer up a selection of the readings I’ve found most interesting in the past week or so.

  • Monday’s Smart Grid News notes have a lot of interesting comments. Note, in particular, the first item that stresses the risk we face that “the Smart Grid [sic] for distribution utilities could be shanghaied by an overemphasis on transmission”. This observation reiterates the same point that I made in my post last week about smart grid and renewables interconnection.
  • A New York Times/Greenwire story asks “will Americans learn to love the smart grid?” This story is important for two reasons. First, the author interviewed Eric Lightner at DOE, who notes that the way to sell smart grid to consumers is to stop talking about technology: “What people really want to hear is, ‘How is this going to reduce our costs, help us green the planet and plug in our hybrid vehicles if those come to market?’” Second, the author interviews Kurt Yeager, who makes the crucial observation that “[t]here’s a fair amount of skepticism because a lot of the initiatives are indeed focused on providing that intelligence to the utilities but not the consumer.”
  • This CNet article discusses 4 reasons that smart grid will create benefits, and includes a nice discussion with my PNL and GridWise colleague Steve Widergren. I think the 4 reasons the author highlights are good: reduce costly blackout impacts, information transparency on energy consumption and costs, helps businesses reduce their carbon footprints, and entrepreneurial opportunities for tech companies. I would, though, add two points: his discussion of increased information did not go far enough — he does not go so far as to discuss the benefits of having transactive, price-responsive end-use devices. The failure to discuss that means that, as one of the commenters notes, that other than the tech company point he is too focused on utility-centric benefits of smart grid.
  • This Philadelphia Inquirer column from Jeff Gelles is really, really great. He envisions an information-rich, technology-enabled electric power network and its valuable capabilities, and he’s very eloquent about it. He also does a good job of pointing out that the electric power network is a system of diverse systems, and therefore that smart grid is not a single, monolithic thing. A strongly recommended read.
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