Archive for April, 2009

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Wind power and bird deaths and Frederic Bastiat

April 22, 2009

Michael Giberson

Wind power gets a lot of criticism for contributing to bird deaths. Reports of bird-turbine collisions lead some environmentalists to withhold support from wind power. You sometimes see free market advocates, who otherwise seem not to get much concerned over the effects of economic activity on wildlife, suddenly quite concerned about wind power’s avian mortality problem. (I haven’t linked to particular stories, but they are widely available. Start here, read all you like.)

It seems a bit like Bastiat’s point about the seen and unseen effects of a policy. It is easy to see the link between wind power and dead birds at the foot of a wind turbine tower, and hard to see the link between fossil fueled generation and dead birds in places far from the coal mines and smokestacks. (If you prefer your literary references to be to current science rather than 18th-century French pamphleteers, imagine that I invoked cognitive biases instead of Bastiat.)

But, if recent analysis of the relationships between electric power generation and bird deaths holds up to further scrutiny, wind power should be celebrated as promoting bird life.  The linked study, just published in the June 2009 issue of Energy Policy, concluded that wind power and nuclear power cause about 0.3 to 0.4 bird deaths per GWh of power generated while fossil fuel-based generation leads to more than 5 bird fatalities per GWh. On average, then, each GWh of wind power displacing fossil fuel power eliminates 4.6 bird fatalities.

To be sure, this conclusion should come with a host of footnotes. First, as author Benjamin Sovacool clearly states in the article, his results should be seen as a preliminary assessment. Limited data was available, and several simplifying assumptions were necessary to arrive at his conclusions. Second, bird mortality effects vary dramatically by site for wind power, so assessment of averages obscures localized differences. Third, assessments of averages also obscures the more-relevant-for-action assessment of marginal effects. Overall, there is much still to be learned about the evironmental impacts of wind turbines. Sovacool’s paper seems a good contribution toward this learning.

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GE-FPL smart grid investments in Florida

April 22, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

GE and Silver Springs Network will work with FPL to implement smart grid investments for 1 million Miami customers (here’s GE’s press release). This is an exciting and promising investment, and its open architecture holds a lot of promise for the development of customer-facing applications. GE and Silver Springs have great technology.

So why am I not doing cartwheels in the streets about this? Two reasons. Take this quote from the WSJ Environmental Capital post linked above:

What will Miami’s smart grid do, exactly? The whole power grid, from power plants to wall sockets, will be put on an Internet footing. That will let the power company—FPL—get a better handle on how electricity flows through its system and better manage supply and demand. Consumers will get an idea how much power they really use—and when. And companies like GE, Cisco, and Silver Springs will get a new market to sell their smart meters and wireless networking equipment.

The Miami project is a result of the stimulus package—roughly half the $200 million cost will come from federal smart grid incentives, while FPL will pick up the rest, figuring the new-and-improved network will soon pay for itself. Consumers won’t have to pay anything, says Mr. Gilligan, but he expects households to see savings of between 10% and 20% on their power bills. That’s because consumers who are aware of how much they are using, tend to use less electricity.

This is a utility-centric value proposition, not a consumer-centric one; as has been the case for the past century, the customer is an afterthought, is load that has to be centrally managed and served. The focus remains on the utility, the utility’s investments, the utility’s benefits. Yes, those benefits can ultimately redound to customers through lower operating costs. But Florida’s regulatory institutions remain in the 20th century, and the firms in its electricity industry remain vertically integrated. Its retail consumers do not have any choice; there is no competition for their business. Florida does not have a regulatory environment that enables the possible innovations in retail products and services that would create new value beyond the distribution automation and the provision of electricity consumption information to consumers.

And that’s my second reason to be cautiously optimistic about this investment. If you approach the retail electricity market from a regulated, utility-centric perspective, not only will you view consumers as load to be centrally managed and served, you will think of “enabling the consumer” as nothing more than providing them with technology to increase their information on their electricity use. Information is a start, but a truly consumer-focused smart grid strategy must involve pricing, must involve allowing entrepreneurs to develop new products and services around the technology, and must be transactive.

In other words, a truly value-creating smart grid industry model requires not just the technology, but also the regulatory institutions that enable retail innovation, retail competition, and retail choice. Without that combination of technology and institutions, we will fail to create all of the potential benefits from smart grid investments.

The next paragraph in the post indicates some prospect for a truly transactive smart grid in Miami, though:

Most of the area will see the basic infrastructure of the next-generation power grid, such as the smart meters that wirelessly transmit information on electricity use back to the power company. The really intelligent part of the smart grid will be limited to about 1,000 households in the Miami demonstration. Those homes will be outfitted with smart-energy gadgets to use electricity more wisely. “Eco-panels,” for instance, will help manage power use when electricity is most expensive; smart appliances will reschedule themselves to run when it’s cheapest.

Although no mention is made of it in the post, in order for price-responsive transactive “gadgets” and a home energy management portal to create value for consumers and save them money, the regulatory institutions have to allow dynamic pricing. Smart grids and smart appliances and dumb pricing squander the opportunities that the technology creates.

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Estimates of net cost of Waxman-Markey bill

April 22, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

If you are interested in following the Waxman-Markey energy-climate bill as it wends its way through Congress, John at Environmental Economics alerts us to the EPA’s analysis of the bill’s cost. The EPA estimates that it will cost less than $150/year, contrary to other, higher estimates. I’m not convinced by the EPA estimates, either; I’d like to see an independent benefit-cost analysis.

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Peer-to-peer power through microgrids

April 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

When we think of concepts like peer-to-peer networks and disintermediation, we usually think of industries that are very Internet-centric. But these concepts can, should, and will apply in electric power networks too: smart grid technology enables peer-to-peer power.

The study referenced in that BBC article analyzes the potential for microgrids, and argues that the real potential from applying smart grid technology to create microgrids is in the ability to create a neighborhood peer-to-peer network in which neighboring customers can buy and sell from each other:

“A microgrid is a collection of small generators for a collection of users in close proximity,” explained Dr Markvart, whose research appears in the Royal Academy of Engineering’s Ingenia magazine.

“It supplies heat through the household, but you already have cables in the ground, so it is easy to construct an electricity network. Then you create some sort of control network.”

That network could be made into a smart grid using more sophisticated software and grid computing technologies.

As an analogy, the microgrids could work like peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies, such as BitTorrents, where demand is split up and shared around the network of “users”.

As distributed generation and plug-in hybrid vehicles proliferate in the market, more numbers and types of electricity consumers will have the resources to be both buyers and sellers in such a peer-to-peer network. Look, for example, at the picture of a P2P network at the Wikipedia peer-to-peer entry.

Now imagine that instead of computers, each of the entities depicted on this network is a home or small business in a microgrid network. Power, and commercial transactions, can flow in both directions between pairs on the network, and they can flow between any pairs of agents who have agreed to participate. Just think of what that can do to reliability, especially if you pair it up with transactive, price-responsive end-use technologies that have the type of behavior I described in this post on smart grid and complexity and this post on how intelligent end-use devices make a transactive smart grid valuable.

If you are interested in learning more about a microgrid project, here’s a report on the Galvin Electricity Initiative prototype microgrid project at the Illinois Institute of Technology. It focuses on the technical details and capabilities of a microgrid to provide reliable, high-quality electric power service, not on the microgrid’s transactive capabilities, but it’s a good introduction.

The technology exists for P2P power networks. The institutional structure, though, does not allow for such a decentralized, transactive network — the regulatory environment typically does not allow microgrids for a variety of reasons, including the monopoly granted to the local utility on the construction of distribution wires that cross public rights-of-way.

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Experiments in business

April 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

“The level of experimentation is abysmal,” says Prof List. “These firms do not take full advantage of feedback opportunities they’re presented with. After seeing example after example, we sat down and said, ‘We have to try to do something to stop this.’ One change we could make is to teach 75 to 100 of the best MBA students in the world how to think about feedback opportunities and how to think about designing their own field experiments to learn something that can make their company better.”

From a story in the Financial Times about a class by Steven Levitt and John List, “Using experiments in firms,” taught in the business school at the University of Chicago.

“We’re on a proselytising mission of bringing a different way of thinking,” says Prof Levitt.“We’re trying to bring about a revolution in business….”

(HT to Steven Levitt at Freakonomics)

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Risk amnesia

April 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

Rick Bush explains how one manager prevents “risk amnesia” in a Transmission & Distribution World column. (Reg. required.) Risk amnesia is a condition that can spring up when an investment decision turns out badly, and suddenly no one can recall being part of the decision. Bush wrote:

Donnelly cracked me up when he shared how he addresses risk amnesia. “I take out my camera phone and take a photo of each one of us who are in the room making investment decisions. That way, none of us can later say, ‘I wasn’t in on that decision.’”

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No “magic number” for renewable power

April 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

Peter Behr, reporting for ClimateWire in an article online at the New York Times, captures some of the discussion surrounding the recent NERC report on integrating renewable power to the transmission grid [NERC Press Release] [NERC Executive Summary] [Full NERC Report].

The vast expansion of wind and solar power planned by the Obama administration and congressional leaders is fraught with challenges for the nation’s aged electricity network, grid monitors with the North American Electric Reliability Corp. say.

But a NERC report released today does not call for a slowdown in deployment of renewable energy. Officials expressed confidence that technology solutions will arrive in time.

A section heading in the article states: “No one knows the ‘magic number’ of renewable capacity.”

Revis James, who directs energy technology assessment for the Electric Power Research Institute, said that a critical question hangs over the push to increase renewable energy output. “How much renewable energy can you have before [you] have to have systemic improvements to the system to handle the variability of renewables?” he said. “Is 10 percent too high? No one knows what the magic number is.”

Let’s get right to the answer: there is no “magic number.”

Understanding of the relationships between renewable energy and grid operations is growing with experience, but that understanding is not ever going to yield a magic number. Instead, there are multiple relationships in play and many margins of analysis.

Consider, for example, the nature of the grid that the variable resource is attaching to. ERCOT got lucky in that restructuring of the industry in Texas led to a lot of investment in efficient, flexible natural gas generating plants. As increasing amounts of wind came onto the ERCOT system, there was already a lot of new, efficient, complementary gas-fired generation around to help manage the variable output. Had economics favored large coal-fired steam or new nuclear units in the early 2000s, ERCOT would have had much more difficulty accommodating wind.

For another kind of example, consider the effects of changing relative fuel costs on the dispatch order for a utility or regional power market.  As the recent FERC “State of the Market” report explains, as gas prices fell faster than coal prices in late 2008, efficient gas units became competitive with and even cheaper than baseload coal in some areas. But if flexible efficient natural gas units are operating as baseload units – so near the top of their output range most of the time – then they have little flexibility available to follow load swings or compensate for variable wind power supplies.

Ancillary services practices matter, too. Regional grids with relatively open, transparent balancing markets used for redispatch will find it easier to accommodate variable wind power than systems that rely upon heavy penalties for “unscheduled energy” and cumbersome administrative congestion management procedures. Similarly, grids that have economical and flexible means for procuring regulation service (also called “automated generation control”) and responsive reserves with do better than grids with rigid tools for obtaining such ancillary services. Both of these elements have tended to favor RTO/ISO type markets for the integration of renewable power over traditional, vertically-integrated utilities.

One of the challenges of power market design for RTOs has been figuring out how to pay and how much to pay for generators (and load) willing and able to provide flexibility to the system operator. Frequently, system operators simply assumed that whatever flexibility a generator had should be and would be made available to the system operator to use for reliability purposes. While interruptible loads were typically paid for the service the provided, the programs and the prices were not initially well-integrated to market operations. Over time, the system operators, market participants, and regulators are learning that you get what you pay for. When the RTO didn’t pay for flexibility, it tended to see less and less of it made available.

If the system operator needs flexibility to manage the system reliably, the market operator needs to be able to pay for it (and, to complete the idea, needs to be able to charge the generation owner or load whose system use requires the presence of other, flexible units on the system).

At the recent Gulf Coast Power Association meetings, some representatives of generation and financial investor interests recommended ERCOT pursue a capacity market to support investment in generation. (I didn’t hear any load-side representatives endorse the capacity market concept.) The panel on renewable energy was asked whether a capacity market might be needed to support investment into sufficiently flexible stand-by generation.

The answer here is no, a capacity market is not needed to support investment in complementary generation units or responsive load, but the regional spot market better have some other means for paying for the necessary flexibility. Well-designed ancillary services markets and complementary dynamic procurement practices should do the trick.

Only it is no trick, just a matter of working out the market design.

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What if power companies became more like banks?

April 18, 2009

Michael Giberson

Chris Davis, at PowrTalk, asks, “What if power companies became more like banks?

Maybe the idea seems a little scary, especially with the way some banks have performed lately, but if it scares you then you are missing the point. Here is more:

When electricity comes from distributed renewables, there is less for the power company to do. In a distributed renewables world, people make their own power and for the most part use it where they make it. But power companies exist to make and distribute that power, so the bothersome renewables are encroaching squarely on the their raison d’etre. Where is the business model, the profit motive, for the power company in such a world?

… What if power companies became more like banks? Power companies might end up making better money managing and distributing power that is created by others (just as banks seem to make excellent money managing and distributing the stored value, the cash, that is created and owned by others).

Right? For the utility, there’s less heavy lifting (building and operating and maintaining power plants and transmission lines) but more thinking (analyzing and efficiently and dependably allocating the power from so many distributed production points).

Davis has seen a vision of the utility of the future: “a scrawny, geeky, googilian smart power company that is laughing all the way to the bank.”

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Headed to Lubbock …

April 17, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

As you read this, I am on a plane headed to Lubbock, Texas, to attend the Collegiate Triathlon National Championship and to race in the Collegiate Sprint Triathlon on Saturday morning. I am pleased and honored to be the faculty advisor for the Northwestern University Triathlon Club, and we’ll have a great group of athletes racing in both the sprint race and the championship race on Saturday!

Please send us your positive vibes … especially in the early morning, when the water temperature will be around 60F and the air temperature will be around 48F. BRRRRRR!

And then in the afternoon I get to see Mike and have a KP meetup. Sounds like a great day to me!

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Regulated utilities, Wall Street, and smart grid investment

April 17, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

This earth2tech post comments on a presentation from Rich Sedano at the Ceres conference this week in San Francisco. Rich has been working on electricity regulatory issues, demand response, and institutional design for a long time, and his insights as reported here are very important and frequently overlooked:

The way Sedano sees it, the Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees Wall Street credit rating agencies, and state-level utility regulators have failed to communicate and, by extension, to establish consistent rules and incentives — leaving utilities “waiting for a sign that it’s safe to pull the trigger on an investment and hoping they don’t miss the opportunity to do the right thing.”

Not enough people realize the role that credit rating agencies, and/or a utility’s perception of a credit rating agency’s likely response, play in influencing utility investment decisions. I’ve often argued that the 100-plus year history of regulatory codependency between the regulator and the regulated reinforces a culture of risk aversion and cautious decision-making that stifles innovation and the adoption of new technology. The credit rating agency dynamic reinforces that pattern:

As Sedano noted, when it comes to considering investments, utilities keep credit ratings top of mind — and ultimately their very perception of how credit raters will view different investments can cause them to rule out certain options, thus avoiding or postponing investment in efficiency tools or smart grid technologies altogether. Instead of leading innovation, utilities are waiting for markets to catch up. Meanwhile, state regulators often focus on immediate stakeholders and overlook utilities’ place in the larger financial market.

Plus, he said, there’s a jargon problem — financiers don’t speak electricity, and utility regulators don’t speak Wall Street. Better communication between Wall Street regulators, credit rating agencies and state utility regulators, which control utility rates and investments, could help ease the gridlock.

Hear, hear.

On another note, why is it that conferences like this very cool-sounding Ceres one never include academics? I think academic economists who work on applied institutional design topics would add substantially to this conversation in the technology, investment, and sustainability space. Here I’m thinking not just selfishly, but also of outstanding economists and communicators like David Zetland.

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