Archive for April, 2009

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Edmund Phelps explains “knowledge problem”

April 17, 2009

Michael Giberson

Occasionally we hear from readers curious about the blog name, “knowledge problem.” Edmund Phelps explains the knowledge problem in an excellent essay that appeared in the Financial Times. (Registration may be required for FT.com; the essay is also posted in full at the FT‘s Capitalism blog.)

Joseph Schumpeter’s early theory proposed that a capitalist economy is quicker to seize sudden opportunities and thus has higher productivity, thanks to capitalist culture: the zeal of capable entrepreneurs and diligence of expert bankers. But … most growth in knowledge is not science-driven. Schumpeterian ­economics – Adam Smith plus sociology – captures very little.

Friedrich Hayek offered another view in the 1930s. Any modern economy, capitalist or state-run, is a great soup of private “know-how” dispersed among the specialised participants. No one, he said, not even a state agency, could amass all the knowledge that each participant “on the spot” inevitably acquires. The state would have no idea where to invest. Only capitalism solves this “knowledge problem”.

There is much more in the essay than this brief clip reveals. In fact, the very next paragraph provides the one of the best brief explanations of Hayek’s central insight into capitalism. In addition to a little Schumpeter and a lot of Hayek, Phelps nods to David Hume and invokes some Frank Knight on uncertainty.

The whole thing is worth reading.

(HT to Greg Ransom at Taking Hayek Seriously.)

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Flawed report, subsequent debate should advance understanding of NYISO market

April 16, 2009

Michael Giberson

In New York, a debate over the NYISO market design initiated by a report by Robert McCullough and committee hearings in the state legislature.

The initial McCullough report asserted that the NYISO’s use of a uniform clearing price auction (the report calls it a “market-clearing price auction”, but “uniform clearing price” is technically more accurate) resulted in $2.2 billion in excessive charges for power customers in the state. I think the polite response is that McCullough’s analysis and conclusions are not well thought out. See NYISO external market monitor David Patton’s testimony to the state legislative committees for a good explanation of the economic analysis of the uniform clearing price issue.

NYISO contracted electric-power-economics heavyweight Sue Tierney to write an analysis of the McCullough Report, and Tierney’s assessment readily knocks down many points of the initial McCullough Report. The New York Public Service Commission also produced a counter-analysis of the first McCullough Report.

Perhaps to no one’s surprise, McCullough struck back with another report, this one mostly directed at points made by Tierney and then providing additional analysis on “hockey stick bidding” in the NYISO market.  McCullough also advocates for greater market transparency.

McCullough’s work often strikes me as more founded in political opportunism than economic analysis – the economics equivalent of ambulance chasing – but I think McCullough gets off a few good responses to Tierney in this second report. I’m a fan of increasing ISO market transparency, too, so I’m inclined to favor McCullough’s positions on those issues.

While the report that sparked the exchange was badly flawed, I think the ongoing debate will prove productive. (At least so long as the New York state legislature doesn’t muck things up by trying to put McCullough worst ideas into law.)

NOTES:

The Public Utility Law Project of New York (PULP) has been following the issue, see the blog posts here and here for their views and many related links. Also, see related news stories on this list managed by PULP. Stories by the Times-Union newspaper also cover the activity, here and here, and related blog posts here and here.

The NYISO is the independent power system and power market operator for the electric power industry in New York. I realize that not all of our readers instantly recognize the acronym or know what the ISO does. Someday I’ll get around to writing a good, basic explanation of what these markets are and why they work the way they do. (Does such an explanation already exist somewhere online? If you know of one, post a link in the comments and save me the trouble of writing one myself.)

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Lobbying pays — is anyone surprised?

April 16, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Perhaps the only thing surprising about the research described in this Washington Post article is how demonstrable and quantifiable the effects are:

In a remarkable illustration of the power of lobbying in Washington, a study released last week found that a single tax break in 2004 earned companies $220 for every dollar they spent on the issue — a 22,000 percent rate of return on their investment.

The study by researchers at the University of Kansas underscores the central reason that lobbying has become a $3 billion-a-year industry in Washington: It pays.

I like the way Mr. Coyote put it:

We have a sense that there is more corruption than ever in politics, but I think its demonstrably true that people and politicians are not any more or less evil than they were 100 years ago.  The only difference is that the sums in play from political influence are so much larger.  Its a concept I try to explain to people all the time.  The way to fix corruption in politics is not through campaign finance reform, it is through reducing the size of government.  Because no matter what restrictions one puts in place, if we set up a system where it pays to invest in politicians, then people will find a way to do so.

Yes. This statement is a variation on my oft-made claim that the way to reduce corruption, lobbying, wasteful rent-seeking, and the inefficiency and distortion that political processes induce is to remove as many important decision from the political process as possible.

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Uneconomical cogeneration

April 16, 2009

Michael Giberson

Cogeneration plants, which use a fuel source to produce both electric power and useful heat, can be very efficient projects. Whether particular projects are efficient will depend on the implementation, of course, and whether projects are profitable will depend on fuel and other costs and the revenues from selling power and heat.

From Syracuse, New York, the story of Project Orange illustrates some of the things that can go wrong on the business side of a cogen venture. My conclusion, based only on this and a few other news stories, is that the venture was well designed for the policy and regulatory foundations in place when the project went into operation in 1992 (especially, a PURPA-based contract to sell power to the local utility and a 40-year deal to sell cheap steam to Syracuse University), but regulatory rules-of-the-road changed.  The project wasn’t prepared to accomodate the changes. Litigation ensued.

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Smart grid, complexity, and swarm logic

April 15, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

One of the recurring themes here at KP is that smart grid technology makes it possible to harness distributed intelligence in the electric power network, and when you couple that network of distributed intelligence with a decentralized flow of information (such as price signals and market processes), you can get reliability through decentralized coordination instead of through the imposition of hierarchical control. Moreover, because individual agents are voluntarily coordinating instead of being forced into a control structure, it’s likely that decentralized coordination generates more social surplus, increases total welfare, etc.

Here’s an exciting new building intelligence product than can start to deliver on that vision. As described in this CNet article, Regen Energy is producing wireless device controllers that, when networked, can adjust device energy use based on individualized, decentralized trigger settings:

Rather than send specific instructions to each controller, the system sets parameters, such as cutting power consumption at peak times during the day. The EnviroGrid controllers individually make adjustments to the chillers, such as turning them off for 10 minutes out of an hour, which in aggregate hit the overall goal, Kerbel explained.

“We tell the controllers, ‘Here are some rough guidelines for upper and lower limits’ (of energy consumption) and they do the work,” he said. “Right now, the way to do this sort of thing is to get a building engineer who does an analysis and then get a software programmer to write custom code.”

The technology is a prime example of how computer and networking technologies are quickly being applied to the energy industry to improve efficiency.

The decentralized decision-making approach is also a break with tradition central building management systems where building equipment is typically purchased for peak power demands.

Yes, indeed it is! It’s also a break with the top-down control hierarchy mindset that pervades the engineering, the regulatory, and the business model cultures in this industry.

Regen refers to their technology as using “swarm logic”, based on the complex adaptive systems ideas of self-organization and emergent order as seen in bees, ants, and other large populations that coordinate with the use of distributed intelligence, rules for responding to observed behavior, and limited hierarchy. As I argue in my book, based on the work of Hayek and other complexity-oriented economists, this kind of self-organization and emergent order also characterizes healthy, competitive markets.

A recent Technology Review article also gives a nice overview of the technology and the idea of swarm logic:

“Every node thinks for itself,” says Mark Kerbel, cofounder and chief executive officer of REGEN Energy, which invented the proprietary algorithm embedded in each device. Before making a decision, he explains, a node will consider the circumstances of other nodes in its network. For example, if a refrigerator needs to cycle on to maintain a minimum temperature, a node connected to a fan or pump will stay off for an extra 15 minutes to keep power use below a certain threshold. “The devices must satisfy the local restraint but simultaneously satisfy the system objective,” says Kerbel, adding that a typical building might have between 10 and 40 controllers working together in a single “hive.” The devices are simple and quick to install and, because there’s no human intervention, require no special training to use.

It’s a dramatic departure from the top-down command model associated with current building-automation systems. Some researchers say that the decentralized approach to energy management offers a cheaper, more effective way to manage supply and demand in a delicately balanced electricity system. Indeed, some believe that it could be an early prescription for an emerging smart grid.

In this case the only hierarchy imposed from the system controller is some global objective function, such as minimizing overall energy use. Each device controller is programmed with trigger points, such as total system use or frequency level, and is then also programmed to take an action once it is at the trigger; note that this trigger is also likely to be more granular and smaller-scale than, say, a “turn off” command, so the functionality of the device to the consumer will only be minimally affected. In aggregate, the individual actions of the distributed responsive devices achieve the system objective without impairing functionality or consumer value in any meaningful way. And using this swarm logic and self-organization model to harness distributed intelligence is also saving consumers money:

Tests have so far demonstrated that building owners–of hospitals, hotels, shopping malls, factories, and other large facilities–could save as much as 30 percent on their peak-demand charges. Those savings, REGEN claims, more than cover the cost of renting the devices, which is an option for major electricity consumers reluctant to buy the technology up front. If the devices are purchased, the payback is less than three years, says Kerbel.

Thus far it sounds like Regen’s device controllers are responding to data on physical conditions. But it’s not a difficult stretch to enable the distributed controllers to respond to price signals, which would make them transactive. Different types of devices could have different trigger price settings, reflecting the preferences of the building owner. Once they do that, Regen would probably pass my transactive test.

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New CBO study on ethanol

April 13, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

If you are interested in the ongoing scientific, economic, and political sturm und drang around ethanol, fossil fuels, and food, this WSJ Environmental Capital post alerts us to a new study from the Congressional Budget Office claiming that ethanol production was only responsible for 10-15% of the increase in food prices in 2007-2008. Increasing energy prices are responsible for a larger share of the price increase, according to the study. Other interesting tidbits in the post.

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Can Congress be trusted to design effective carbon policy? I doubt it

April 13, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Friday’s Wall Street Journal editorial on cap and trade and the Waxman-Markey bill has prompted me to come out of the closet and say something publicly that I’ve been thinking for a couple of months: although I think that the most effective and economically efficient carbon policy is one that directly reflects the property rights issues inherent in common-pool resources, I don’t think we can, or should, trust this Congress to do the important, necessary objective institutional design to enable efficient carbon markets.

The fundamental economic problem in most environmental issues, including climate change, is ill-defined property rights. Either the inability or the unwillingness to define property rights is what creates inefficient overuse of common-pool resources.

In a complex and imperfect world, in which transaction costs are high enough and markets don’t arise organically to create opportunities to internalize these costs, we rely on collective action to create institutions to help us govern our use of common-pool resources. In general, policies that define use rights or property rights but do not stipulate how parties are to use the common-pool resource are the ones that have the best hope of coming close to dynamic efficiency. One reason that’s true is that it leaves opportunities open for entrepreneurs of all kinds to innovate and figure out novel ways to economize on the now-scarce right. When devising such policies, no bureaucrat can predict what those best responses and emergent creativity will be. These are the reasons why the EPA Acid Rain Program has been so successful at reducing sulfur dioxide emissions; defining SO2 emission rights and enabling their trade induced low-cost abaters to do so, and in many cases it took unexpected forms (including substituting low-sulfur Wyoming coal).

These are the theoretical reasons why I’ve always been inclined to prefer carbon markets over a carbon tax, despite their being indistinguishable on the blackboard. And, as I argued in this Reason panel a couple of years ago, both are prone to political manipulation, so in a non-Nirvana-fallacy, second-best sense I have argued for carbon markets because of their innovation and dynamic efficiency implications. This recent post from the New Republic’s environment blog provides a couple of good arguments for why carbon taxes won’t be any simpler or less manipulable. Even the imperfect outcome when the government sets the number of permits is a more direct reflection of the fundamental property rights problem than a Pigouvian tax would be. Of course, the collaborative process that the Chicago Climate Exchange members undertook to negotiate and determine a mutually agreeable carbon cap is the closest example we have to a full-on Coasean solution to determining these rights.

But then the past eight months happened — financial crisis, federal stimulus, and so on — and now we have the Waxman-Markey 648-page “discussion draft” climate change-focused House energy bill proposal (here’s the summary if your time and your stomach do not permit full ingestion of the complete draft). It has a renewable portfolio standard, lots of proposals to implement new building code regulations, and few specifics about designing carbon markets beyond a statement that 15% of them would be given to future participants as a political chit. Ezra Klein has a good post on this, with links, although he is more sanguine and more willing to accept incursions against individual liberty than I am. He’s also got a post on their legislative strategy that shed some light for me on my own opinion:

The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 — otherwise known as the Waxman-Markey climate change bill — is not a cap and trade bill. Nor is it energy legislation. It’s not about modernizing the grid or promoting efficiency or encouraging renewables. Instead, it’s everything. Call it the Big Bill Strategy. And Waxman and Markey are perfectly explicit about this.

And, in the context of everything that’s come out of DC in the past eight months, this is where I get off the train. Congress’ bad behavior and poor decisions have finally accumulated to the point where I see them as utterly incapable of designing any kind of meaningful, transaction-cost-minimizing carbon policy. I’ve certainly become convinced that I do not trust them to design carbon markets. A carbon tax is still not a good policy, but the politicization of the potential carbon market and its bundling with other, inflexible energy policies will doom any carbon market that this Congress designs to a failure along the lines of the ridiculously over-politicized EU Emissions Trading Scheme.

While this bill is still just a House draft, the combination of the desire to leave most carbon-related items open to negotiation with the overwhelming urge to control and manage the individual decisions of millions of individuals suggests that Congress has neither the external incentives nor the internal motives to enagage in good, scientific, non-political institutional design to implement carbon markets.

So if I don’t trust them with carbon markets and I don’t advocate a tax, what do I propose? We’ve got regional markets that (after controlling for recession) are growing. The voluntary CCX market is growing both domestically and internationally (including China), adding members constantly. Other regional markets, such as RGGI and California, could over time grow along with the CCX into a set of integrated regional markets. Isn’t that how financial markets have always evolved througout human history? I’m not thrilled with that answer, but I think it’s loss-minimizing relative to the economic and environmental harm that a botched, overly-politicized federal carbon policy can induce.

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Sunday drive-by grassroots economics

April 12, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Idea courtesy of Paul Kedrosky, who posted a list of on-the-ground observations of economic activity. Yesterday I spent a couple of hours browsing and running some errands at my nearby suburban mall, and both the vehicle traffic there and back and the foot trafffic while there seemed light. But by the time I left at 1:00 my level of the parking deck was full.

The shops seemed pretty busy, especially Nordstrom, and there are some early spring deals out there (I got a super-cute top at Martin & Osa at a very good price!). But what was most striking was how crowded Forever 21 was! The line for the fitting rooms was about 25 people when I was there, and everyone’s arms were laden. Then they only had three people working the checkout, and there were about a dozen people waiting to check out, most of whom were buying multiple items.

I have three hypotheses for why Forever 21 was so busy:

  1. It’s inexpensive “disposable fashion”, so when people trade down from other, more pricey shops, they shop at Forever 21 (same argument for H&M)
  2. Its target market is adolescent and young adult women, whose discretionary spending may be less sensitive to recession than other spending
  3. It’s Easter/Passover weekend, and I overheard several conversations between moms and their daughters who were home from university for the weekend
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Can green bank proposal pass the laugh test?

April 12, 2009

Michael Giberson

The Houston Chronicle has an article on a proposal to set up a federally-chartered bank to lend billions of dollars to renewable energy projects.

Renewable energy ‘green bank’ idea takes root

By TOM FOWLER Copyright 2009 Houston Chronicle

A coalition of energy companies hopes to reinvigorate the market for funding renewable energy projects by creating a government-backed “green bank” to serve as a conduit for billions of dollars in federal loans.

Under the plan, outlined in federal legislation sponsored by Rep. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., the bank would be an independent, wholly owned corporation of the federal government focused solely on loaning money to a range of projects deemed to promote clean energy.

I might have had something intelligent to say about the proposal, but I started laughing too hard  at the phrase “independent, wholly owned corporation of the federal government”.

While I can’t imagine that the federal government is better suited than the banking and investment community in lending to renewable energy projects, my lack of an imagination is not a critique.

I really don’t have anything to say about the substance of the proposal, I just can’t get passed the “independent, wholly owned corporation” part.

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Training log update: Buckeye Outdoors

April 11, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

An update on my question from earlier this week about online training logs. While I agree with Kent that the Beginner Triathlete updated site is good, it’s still just more than I want to deal with, and more cumbersome than I want.

But thanks to a couple of fellow triathletes I follow on Twitter, I found Buckeye Outdoors. It’s a pretty simple, clean interface, and is set up to generate training reports and graphs of various pieces of training data. I think it hits the sweet spot for me; if the TwitterFeed connection works for pulling my workouts into Twitter, then it’s a lock!

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