Archive for July, 2009

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2009 power prices in ERCOT’s West zone: a mix of wind power, natural gas prices, transmission constraints, and (inefficient) congestion management practices

July 22, 2009

Michael Giberson

ERCOT reached a new peak load record last week, beating the record set just a week before. Boone Pickens is backing off a little from earlier ambitions to build the world’s largest wind power facility near Pampa, Texas. The Wall Street Journal reported recently that low natural gas prices are limiting interest in new renewable power projects. (It seems like such an obvious point that I wonder why they bothered to publish it. In any case, what has changed since they reported the same idea last October?)

Seems like a good time to follow up on earlier posts on wind power and electric power prices in ERCOT’s west zone.

In 2009 so far, power prices in ERCOT have been very low, averaging in the $22 MWh – $32 MWh range, with the West zone at the low end of that range and the Houston zone at the upper end. [All price data from the ERCOT website.] The main factor responsible for low ERCOT power prices has been low natural gas prices, but wind power is the primary reason pushing prices even lower in the West.

Natural gas fueled generators are typically the units that are “on the margin” in ERCOT, meaning the units available to adjust up or down in response to changes in demand and therefore the units most likely to be influencing the price in ERCOT’s balancing energy market.  Over the first 6 months of 2008, with natural gas prices beginning near $7 per million BTU and peaking mid-year over $13) average power prices in the West zone were about $55 MWh and Houston zone prices were over $87 MWh.  This year has seen NYMEX natural gas prices drifting from just over $4 per million BTU in January, down below $3.50, and back to about $3.85 recently.

Wind power output is up in 2009, due largely to significant wind power capacity additions in 2008 and early 2009. (2009: 2,300 MW average output; 2008: 1,916 MW)  To some extent wind power output lowers energy prices statewide.  But when wind power output is high, current transmission limits mean that not all of the power generated in the West zone can readily flow east and south where much of the state’s power consumption takes place.  Transmission limits are easily reached these days, given existing wind power capacity, so the effect of wind power on prices has been intensified in the West.

But negative prices are, surprisingly, less frequent in 2009. (Less than 14 percent of the time in 2009, compared to over 19 percent of the time during the first six months of last year.  The outcome is contrary to my projection earlier this year.)

As explained here before, negative prices in ERCOT’s West zone emerge largely due to the federal Production Tax Credit and Texas state subsidies available to wind power producers, which provide the producers incentives to continue to supply power even when they have to pay the ERCOT market to take the power away.  The subsidies lead to some economic waste in that some cheap, slow-moving baseload generators will be induced to shut down and restart much more frequently than otherwise, even though it would be cheaper overall for the wind generators to curtail instead. (But it is hard to put a good number on this economic waste because analysis of the relevant subsidies for various energy sources and associated externalities becomes very complex very quickly.)

Frequency of Negative prices by Month, ERCOT West, 2008 and 2009

2008

2009

Jan

8.61%

12.53%

Feb

18.82%

11.53%

March

33.33%

15.66%

April

20.63%

23.06%

May

19.62%

12.50%

June

16.46%

7.19%

Jan-Jun

19.55%

13.77%

What has happened in 2009 is that much more of the congestion created by high levels of wind power output in the West has been managed using reliability procedures instead of market-based procedures. Nothing sinister going on here (probably), just a result of the way the ERCOT zonal market design works (or not) to handle congestion of the transmission grid.

The zonal market design limits market-based methods for congestion management to a select number of so-called “commercially significant constraints.”  When other transmission elements become congested, operators must take recourse to non-market methods to manage the grid.  A line between the West zone and the South zone has become frequently congested this year, but no West-to-South lines are currently monitored as part of the market.  When the line approaches its limit, ERCOT operators identify a generator that can relieve the West-to-South line and then pays the generator to curtail production.  The cost of these reliability-based processes is averaged out to all consumers ERCOT-wide.

The reliability-based curtailment of power output in the West zone reduces the likelihood of congestion on the West-to-North zone elements that are part of the zonal market, which reduces the downward pressure on price in the West zone.  Without this out-of-market curtailment going on, power prices would be a lot lower on average in the West zone, and probably would be negative more often as well.

I haven’t found ERCOT data showing just how extensive this out-of-market curtailment is, but reportedly in some months this year the amount of intra-zonal congestion management has been many times the amount of market-based congestion management.  ERCOT updates its list of “commercially significant constraints” each year, and is beginning the review process for the next update, so maybe they’ll add the West-to-South line to the zonal market.  Perhaps also, data on congestion management practices will become available as part of that process.

A better solution than updating the zonal market list of constraints is to shift to a nodal market design, something that ERCOT expects to do in 2010.  A nodal market design automatically includes effectively all transmission elements as part of a market-based approach to congestion management.  The result is that congestion is more likely to be managed efficiently, and transparent price signals better reflect the value of power at different locations on the grid.

NOTE: Link to post charting ERCOT West prices, January-June 2009, including data on frequency of negative prices.

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Consumers, utilities and the smart grid

July 22, 2009

Michael Giberson

One point made here once or twice in the past is that consumers need to pay attention if they hope to get the most from the spread of smart grid technology. Another tale that makes this point comes from Energy Circle, “Smart Meters: Are Consumers An Afterthought?“:

As a resident of Toronto, I am privileged to live in a house equipped with a Smart Meter provided by Toronto Hydro. I also work at Energy Circle, which means I have been witness to the extraordinary power of real-time monitoring. Yesterday, I contacted Hydro to find out when we could expect our Smart Meter to start providing us with real-time data about our electricity use, so that we could start to benefit from the lessons gained by tracking and reducing our energy usage. The news isn’t great.

Follow the link to the story to see the rest of the not-so-great news.

ADDED: And for another story in the “not-so-great” category, pointed out in a comment by “Fat Man”: in France a regulator has concluded a company offering distributed energy management services should pay the electric company for the power it helps consumers save.

The company says its “distributive load shedding” technology can save users as much as 10 percent on their electricity bills and save power producers billions in investments in new plants used only to meet peak demand. Voltalis’s business model assumes the grid operator pays Voltalis for help in maintaining supply and demand equilibrium.

But the regulatory commission ruled that Voltalis should pay the power company because “its service would not be possible without the producer maintaining production.”

… Jean-Louis Borloo, the French energy and environment minister, backed the regulators in their decision. But on Monday, perhaps because of the rising political heat, he said he would appoint a working group to propose the legal and regulatory changes necessary “to favor energy-saving and respect the interest of all the parties involved.” The panel is to report back by year’s end.

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FTC finds no evidence of illegal activity after investigation of Western New York gasoline prices

July 21, 2009

Michael Giberson

Apparently you just have to know who to ask. Yesterday, the FTC sent me a copy of the FTC letter to Representative Brian Higgins describing the agency’s investigation of Western New York gasoline prices last fall. (For background see this earlier post and here.)

Be aware that here begins a very long post about gasoline prices in Western New York.

First a few selections from the FTC letter:

Dear Representative Higgins:

You and Senator Charles E. Schumer have requested a public report on the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation into unusually high gasoline prices in Western New York during the fall of 2008. Thank you for bring this important issue to our attention. We share your concern about the impact of high gasoline prices on the day-to-day life of consumers and understand the frustration and hardship that are created when those prices rise significantly above those in surrounding areas without any obvious market explanation, as occurred in this instance. Such situations receive our closest attention.

However, after careful and extensive investigation, FTC staff did not find any evidence of illegal activity in gasoline markets in any of the affected cities. To the contrary, staff found evidence suggesting it is unlikely that illegal conduct caused these price levels, although staff was unable to identify precise reasons why retail gasoline prices in some cities in Western New York and Vermont did not fall as quickly as prices in other Northeast cities. Although we are unable to establish any direct relationship, we do note that prices began to fall soon after you raised public concerns about the elevated prices and both you and Senator Schumer asked us to conduct an investigation.  This letter describes the scope of the investigation and summarizes the findings of Commission staff, subject to the Commission’s obligations not to disclose confidential information.

RE: “we do note that prices began to fall soon after you raised public concerns”

This line, which Rep. Higgins quoted in his press release back in May, continues to strike me as unnecessarily servile in tone — offering the Congressman the flattering innuendo, but not actually claiming post hoc ergo propter hoc.  I think the word I’m looking for is “unctuous.”  But still, … well, I’ll say more on this point in my wrap up remarks.

I. Investigation of Unusual Pricing Activity in Western New York

The Commission’s ongoing Gasoline and Diesel Price Monitoring Project identified retail gasoline prices significantly above predicted values in Western New York cities, and in Burlington, Vermont, during the fall and early winter of 2008.  In response to these observations and to requests from you and Senator Schumer, Commission staff conducted an analysis of retail gasoline prices in Western New York and Burlington, Vermont, to confirm that prices in those markets were unusually high.

Staff first analyzed whether average retail price levels in the Buffalo, Rochester, and Jamestown, New York, and Burlington, Vermont, metropolitan areas were higher than would be expected, using their normal relationship with Albany gas prices as a baseline.  Staff analyzed price data for a ten-year period to establish historical differences between average retail prices in these cities and Albany.  This analysis confirmed that average retail gasoline prices in these cities were significantly higher than expected relative to Albany.

I’ll skip the full discussion of the methods of investigation. In brief: Staff looked for, but did not discover, any supply disruptions or other unusual market conditions; they coordinated with the attorneys general of New York and Vermont; they interviewed and obtained documents and data from numerous relevant companies; and purchased data from the Oil Price Information Service.

Through its investigation, staff discovered that no company possessed a monopoly share of any retail gasoline market in Western New York or Vermont, nor was any company large enough to effectively attempt to create a monopoly through illegal means.  Further, staff identified no unfair method of competition that could explain how a company or group of companies could have illegally caused the observed price levels last fall.  Accordingly, staff’s investigation focused on the only remaining plausible theory of illegal behavior … — that companies … might have engaged in collusion.

Collusion in each of the affected cities would have been very difficult because numerous companies set prices at retail gas stations in each city and no single station owner or group of owners controls a large share of the volumes sold in any city….

Collusion across all of the affected cities would have been even more difficult because numerous companies other than those that operate in Buffalo set retail gasoline prices in Rochester and Jamestown. …

Other market factors also would have made collusion very difficult.  For example, as crude oil prices plummeted during the fall, product costs for gasoline retailers throughout the nation fell with unprecedented speed and magnitude.  As wholesale gasoline prices fell substantially on a daily basis, the numerous retail price setters in each affected city would have had to reach agreement on cartel prices on a frequent basis – probably each day if not more frequently.  Having to reach agreement so frequently would have made it very difficult to effectively maintain a collusive scheme throughout the fall of last year.

Nor did market data support the notion that a conspiracy existed to raise prices last fall….

In sum, staff’s investigation yielded no evidence that illegal anticompetitive conduct caused the price levels experienced in Western New York or Vermont last fall.

[Emphasis added. The link above was a footnote in the original letter. The letter continues with a brief discussion of policy options. Probably the less said about them, the better.]

So the “evidence suggesting it is unlikely that illegal conduct caused these price levels” mentioned in the second paragraph of the letter comes down to discovering that many companies are involved in price setting in the affected areas, and that the circumstances make it unlikely in the extreme that these companies could have collusively coordinated prices.  With some confidence we can conclude that the FTC has ruled out most potential supply-side explanations for the relatively higher gasoline prices in Western New York.

Markets are made of supply and demand, of course, and if supply factors are not the cause, then the economist’s attention should tend toward possible demand-side explanations. That the period of interest was one in which wholesale and retail prices were falling “with unprecedented speed and magnitude” is of particular note.

As it happens I have access to a year’s worth of OPIS price data for New York that includes fall and early winter of 2008.  Not the ten years of data that the FTC has, but it does show some of the relevant points.  As of May 1, 2008, prices in Buffalo averaged $3.75, which was about 3 cents below prices in Albany that day. By the end of June, prices in both areas were higher and the price in Buffalo had caught up to the price in Albany.  Mid-July, prices begin to fall, following the wholesale price down.

But, and this is the issue that would catch the Congressman’s eye, prices in Buffalo did not fall as quickly as prices in Albany.  In the OPIS data I have, average retail prices in Buffalo and Albany were both $4.24 on June 30 (some data selection issues behind these averages, email me if you have questions, but the numbers should be pretty good).  Through early July, Buffalo prices were a few pennies higher and Albany a few pennies lower, then prices started to fall “with unprecedented speed and magnitude”, as the FTC put it.  This unprecedented fall can be seen in the following chart created via GasBuddy.com.

Gasbuddy_New_York_prices_2003-2009

Rep. Higgins’ first letter to the FTC requesting an investigation was sent October 22. On that day prices in Buffalo averaged more than 30 cents per gallon higher than prices in Albany, a 35 cent swing in relative prices compared to the May 1 averages.

The question is why, and if the answer is not found on the supply side, then let’s look at the demand side of the market.

Notice in the six years of data charted above that when prices are falling, they tend to fall a little faster in Albany than they do in Buffalo or Rochester. In fact, until 2008 Rochester prices tended to fall much more slowly than prices in Albany or Buffalo.  For Buffalo, and now I’m just eyeballing the chart, the result appears to be a price higher than in Albany by few cents per gallon for as much as a week or so.  Then prices in Buffalo catch up with prices in Albany.  Two things are different in the price fall of 2008: first, with prices falling so fast and so far, it was months – not days – before the slower falling prices in Buffalo caught prices in Albany; and second, this time prices in Rochester tended to fall a little faster than prices in Buffalo.

Asymmetric price adjustment – prices falling more slowly than they rise (also called the “rockets and feathers” phenomena) – have been extensively studied in gasoline markets. Work by Matthew Lewis has put forward some interesting consumer-search based explanations of the phenomena. (See this paper and related papers available here.)  It might be the case that consumers in Albany tend to acquire more price information before buying gasoline when prices are falling, at least relative to consumers in Rochester and Buffalo, and that could explain why prices tend to fall faster in Albany.  Maybe consumers in Buffalo were just happy to get lower prices, relatively speaking, and not overly focused on searching out the lowest possible among the lower prices before buying gasoline.

Interestingly, this argument brings me back to the FTC’s flattering innuendo. If the explanation for the relatively slow fall of prices in Buffalo was a lack of consumer attention to finding the lowest possible among lower prices, then the Congressman’s efforts to put the issue back in the news just might have spurred a little more consumer search behavior, which then served to push prices down a little faster. I’m not convinced, but wouldn’t claim “no effect,” either, without more study.

Also interesting is the right-most edge of the chart above.  Again using GasBuddy.com, the chart below shows average prices for Albany, Rochester, and Buffalo just for the most recent three months. Prices peaked in the state around June 20, and have been falling since.

Gasbuddy_New_York_prices_Three-months-in-2009

Notice that prices are again falling faster in Albany than in Buffalo or Rochester.  Alert the media!

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Endangered species for sale, for their own good and ours

July 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

At Aguanomics, David Zetland takes on a topic that I find greatly interesting and important — using private property rights to conserve endangered species, reduce poaching, and enable indigenous communities who live around such animals to thrive without species extinction as a consequence. In fact, one of my first-ever posts back in 2002 was about the Irbis Enterprises work with Mongolian herders and snow leopards. I also discussed property rights in tigers in a 2005 post and a 2006 post. Note that Irbis Enterprises is now part of the Snow Leopard Trust.

David observes

That’s why the Brazilian rainforest is disappearing — because government policy makes it easier to slash and burn and move on than to conserve the greenery.

The way to protect the rainforest, the whales, etc. is with stronger property rights, and individuals and companies (e.g., the Nature Conservancy) are set up to provide that protection. (To learn more about this kind of free market environmentalism, visit the Property and Environment Research Center.)

Note also that property rights are not just a binary yes-no either-or. Ownership implies a variety of rights (the frequent metaphor is that a property right is a bundle of sticks), and if you have defined, defensible, divisible, and alienable property rights, then you are more likely to get the beneficial outcomes David discusses.

For example, if you own a piece of property between my property and a lovely mountain range, if I value my view by enough, I can buy your development rights on your property. If that happens, then you and subsequent owners can build on the property, but not in a way that impedes my view. In that case the divisibility of your property rights means that you can profit from selling me a right that I value more than you do. [With thanks to Randy Simmons, from whom I've plagiarized this example.]

Think about what a boon this would be in the rainforest. Organizations like pharmaceutical companies and environmental nonprofits could own the land and the plants, water, and animals on it, and could exchange specific development rights that were contingent upon not destroying the assets. Think about the implications for another current tradeoff in land use in Brazil — rainforest vs. clear-cutting to plant soybeans for soy biodiesel. If the big ag companies had to pay to buy the rainforest, that would change the economics of soy biodiesel, not to mention the implications of rainforest owners being able to retain development rights and divide up the bundle of rights.

This divisibility is also how conservation easements work — a property owner sells (or gives, in the case of it being a charitable contribution) a piece of his/her bundle of rights.

The idea is pretty intuitive for land, watersheds, viewsheds, etc., but how about animals? To my mind, animals are more like water and less like land; animals move, and that means I think the characteristic of the property right in animals is the ability of the community to define and enforce use rights. That means treating the animal population as a common-pool resource and defining use rights (number allowed to kill per year, for example).

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PSA: Bad customer service from Budget car rental

July 20, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

We interrupt our regular discussion of economics for a public service announcement: I’ve been having a horrendous customer service experience with Budget car rental. Briefly, the re-routing of my flight to Collegiate Triathlon Nationals, due to inclement weather in Dallas, meant that I had to re-reserve the rental car, and the Expedia agent assured me that I would be paying the same rate, or one even lower. However, when we got to Midland and were rushing to get to the meeting with the team two hours away in Lubbock, the Budget desk agent failed to point out that the rate she was quoting would result in a charge that was more than $500 higher than what I had been quoted over the phone, and through my initial reservation.

I have written to Budget twice, to no avail, so now I am invoking the power of reputation networks to encourage you not to give Budget your business. It’s a competitive industry, one that should be grounded in customer service, so you have many market options. I have never been treated as shabbily in any customer experience as I have been by Budget. I don’t want them to profit from their poor behavior, and I don’t want any of you to be treated as poorly in a market transaction as Budget has treated me in this one. Take your business elsewhere.

The text of the letter I sent to them is below the cut.

Read the rest of this entry ?

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Nine months after the zone pricing ban in New York…

July 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

New York banned “zone pricing” of gasoline as of last November. In the news:

(Henrietta, N.Y.) – Nine months after a state law banning zone pricing for gas went into effect, drivers can still find about a 20 cent per gallon disparity in price depending on where they buy it.

For example, gas at the Kwik Fill in Henrietta is $2.51 a gallon–18 cents less than at the Kwik Fill in Greece. …

New York State Senator Jim Alesi (R), of Fairport, wrote that law. He suspects wholesale suppliers and he’s already proposed an amendment to include them in a new law.

“We have to include the wholesalers in this, because as long as the wholesalers are not included in this then they can still engage in zone pricing,” he said.

Not sure what Sen. Alesi is talking about. According to the text of the law, it only applies to wholesalers. (To wit: “No wholesaler shall engage in zone pricing with respect to any motor fuel of like grade or quality.”)

Zone pricing has been discussed extensively here in the past (click to see posts). As previously noted, zone pricing is the practice of gasoline wholesalers setting prices for sale to gasoline retailers by area, based upon a projected ability of the area to support higher or lower prices. While practices vary by wholesaler, typically incomes in the area and the level of competition between retailers would be taken into account as wholesales select the price it wishes to charge.

Opponents of the practice, typically those gasoline retailers facing higher than average wholesale prices, claim that zone prices cause higher prices for consumers. Economic analysis tends to support the view that zone pricing raises some retail prices and reduces others, with no clear negative impact on consumer welfare. To the extent a zone pricing ban would affect prices, it would be expected to raise prices in lower-income areas and reduce prices in higher-income areas.

For this reason a zone pricing ban is sometimes considered “consumer protection for the affluent.”

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Punishing gasoline customers for non-existent ‘price gouging’ by New Jersy station

July 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

First, the news:

Washington Township, N.J., gas station ordered temporarily closed for price gouging

A judge on Monday [July 13] ordered the temporary closing of a Washington Township, N.J., gas station after the owners pleaded guilty to price gouging.

Express Fuel on Route 31 North, south of Washington, will reopen on Monday. The judge also ordered the station’s owners to pay a $1,500 fine and court costs.

An investigation by the Warren County Department of Weights & Measures revealed the station owners violated a rule permitting only one price change within a 24-hour period.

On June 19, the price for regular gas changed three times within a few hours. At 11:03 a.m. that day, the price was $2.43.9 a gallon. The price went down to $2.39.9 at 11:24 a.m. and up to $2.41.9 at 2:10 p.m.

Weights and Measures Superintendent Michael Santos said typically the price changes are all upward or all downward. He said the changes reflect competition among gas stations.

Santos speculated the Express Fuel price went down and back up that day because the owners realized they mistakenly lowered the price more than they needed to.

The gas station is closed all week.

This stupidity momentarily rendered me speechless.

During that moment, I looked up some associated data. All of the prices mentioned in the article were about 10 to 15 cents below the average price in the state at the time (about $2.56/gallon mid-June according to AAA’s Fuel Gauge Report). So this is not “price gouging” in the normal English-language meaning of the term, not even close.

Nonetheless, more than one price change in a day is apparently a violation of somebody’s rule. Pending revision of the rule to something more sensible, there was a technical violation of the rule. Fine. Stupid rule, as this case illustrates, but a violation is a violation.

But why impose a penalty on the station that also penalizes gasoline customers in the area by giving them one fewer station to shop at for a week?

Clearly the court-ordered shutdown of the station for a week will harm consumers many times more than the harm, if any, from the station changing its price twice in a day.

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What’s so funny about generating power from onion juice?

July 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

In the news, many stories about the debut of a power system at Gills Onion that will produce electricity from onion-based biogas. The topic seems to have spurred extra effort to insert jokes into headlines (Don’t cry for me, California; Energy, layer by layer; From The Onion … No, Not That One), but the technology is pretty cool.

At the food processing plant about 35 to 40 percent of the onion – tops, skins, edges – were leftover by-products, mostly used for composting the onsite vegetable fields. In the new power system, the leftover onions are pressed to separate the juice, the juice processed into biogas and the biogas fed into fuel cells to generate power on-site. An article in Distributed Generation describes some of the details of the processes. Video story here via the Boston Globe.

The company spent about $10 million to build a 600 kw power plant. Some of the money they’ll get back through incentives from the local electric utility supporting self-generation, so I suspect there is a California state subsidy behind it somewhere.  The plant is expected to reduce the company’s electric bill by $700,000 annually and save $400,000 in waste disposal costs.  The company expects a six-year payback period on their investment.

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Offshore wind power and data center?

July 20, 2009

Michael Giberson

A reader points out a news release by Baryonyx Corp. announcing its success in a recent Texas lease offer for two offshore wind concessions. Baryonyx intends not only to build the offshore wind power plants but also to co-locate a high-reliability data center with the wind farms.

File the idea as “just so crazy it might work.” At first wind farms and data centers seem like strange bedfellows. Wind farms offer variable power and data centers demand reliable power. But at least part of the idea is that by co-locating a large load with wind power, it can reduce the need for significant transmission upgrades to accompany the wind farm.

I suppose the power system issue is whether the net load at the point that the project connects to the grid is more or less variable with the data center added to the wind farm than without it. If the data center power usage is positively correlated with wind farm output, then the answer is yes. My first guess would be a negative correlation, but I don’t know much about data center load profiles and haven’t looked at any data.

(The press release makes an odd claim about providing “indigenous low-carbon energy to offset imported energy.”  Wind power in Texas tends to offset natural gas and coal consumption, and while a small amount of natural gas is imported, most of it comes from Canada. Well, press releases are not known for the rigor of their claims.)

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Power consumers in ERCOT should keep an eye on PUCT rulemaking project 34577

July 17, 2009

Michael Giberson

Earlier in July, the Public Utility Commission of Texas issued a proposed amendment to its CREZ regulations (the regulations governing the building of transmission to better support development of renewable energy in Texas). The main focus of the proposal is to refine and clarify the process by which the Commission ensures sufficient renewable energy development will take place to justify construction of the planned transmission lines.

A secondary purpose is to revise a section of the regulations addressing the concerns of renewable energy developers that too much wind power development will occur, overwhelming the capability of the transmission system. Consumers should keep an eye on this part of the proposal.

Some developers have been advocating some sort of priority system under which, when transmission-capability is constrained, the newer projects get curtailed first. That sort of system would help discourage overinvestment in a region.

The problem with that kind of rule from an efficiency standpoint is that it isn’t obvious that the older projects are likely to be the most efficient (and likely the opposite is the case). In any case, the forthcoming nodal market design is designed from the ground up to address just this kind of problem using prices.  Wind farm operators that don’t want to be curtailed just need to offer power at a low enough price to ensure their offer is lower than the competition.  When there is “too much” wind power, prices may go very low (or even negative when wind power production is subsidized).

Of course, wind power operators don’t like rationing the excess by price, because that means the price sometimes will go very low. They would rather have a rule to curtail their competition without having to cut prices. Consumers, on the other hand, benefit when suppliers have to compete through cutting prices.

The proposed amendment looks good from the consumers point of view. The regulation was initially written in a way that suggested the commission should discourage ‘excess’ interconnection and curtail some suppliers by non-price methods.  The proposal would change the language to first have the commission assess whether market prices do an adequate job of managing congestion – which the new nodal market design should do – and then. if the commission finds that the market isn’t doing an adequate job, the commission may initiate a proceeding and may consider limiting interconnection or non-price priority methods.

Wind power developers do face a real problem coordinating investments in renewable power capacity with the buildout of transmission capability. Since wind power developers are simultaneously and independently making investment plans, it is possible that too many will pursue options in location A and too few in location B, just because they are acting like competitive companies should act (i.e., non-collusively).

But enough information about what competitors are up to is available through public documents at ERCOT or the PUCT that companies can avoid getting into too much difficulty, as long as they do there due diligence work diligently.  Once the investments are made, and especially if these investments are made with taxpayer subsidies or electric consumer fee support, consumers should have every expectation that renewable power producers compete in the market just like everyone else is suppose to.

If the price goes negative, that is just the power consumers’ way of getting some of the tax subsidy back.

NOTE: The PUCT rulemaking project number is 34577.

Documents in the proceeding can be found via the PUCT Interchange site – click the login button, enter 34577 as the control number, and press “Search Now.”

HT to the Caprock Plains Wind Energy Association blog.

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