Archive for September, 2009

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New York’s zone pricing ban not eliminating retail gasoline price differences

September 30, 2009

Michael Giberson

At least some retail gasoline consumers in New York expected that the zone pricing ban implemented last year would tend to equalize retail gasoline prices in an area. Rochester TV station WHEC discovers that a year after the law was signed by the governor, and about 10 months after the zone pricing law went into effect, that gasoline prices in suburban Rochester still vary substantially. WHEC reports that consumers don’t like the price variations and believe the law is not working as intended.

The problem, according to Bill Adams, who owns two area stations and represents the state retail gasoline dealers association, is that the law passed last year applies only to middlemen who buy from refiners and sell to retail stations. The law does not apply to refiners distributing gasoline to affiliated retailers, nor to retail stations that buy directly from refiners. The New York state assembly has passed an amendment to the law that attempts to cover this gap, which the governor says he will sign, but the New York state senate has not acted on the law.

Of course retail gasoline stations remain relatively free to set their own prices, and would continue to have the freedom under the proposed amendment.  Even if the state can limit the pricing flexibility still enjoyed by some middlemen, there is no guarantee that the changes will eliminate price differences within a region, and no reason to believe it would.

(SEE ALSO: Earlier zone pricing posts at Knowledge Problem.)

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No market allowed for desired prayer spaces

September 29, 2009

Michael Giberson

Al Roth at Market Design, “Reserving spaces in crowded places,” notes that authorities are cracking down on the illegal practice of reserving prayer spaces and renting them out to worshipers.  He quotes from the Saudi Gazette:

“It is forbidden to reserve places in the mosques, unless the person has left for urgent reasons and intends to return soon, as otherwise it is tantamount to taking something by force,” Al-Fawzan told Okaz newspaper on Thursday. “It is also forbidden to rent a reserved place, and the authorities should put a stop to this vice (munkar).”

Note that in a market for prayer spaces, high-income and low-income persons can benefit.  The low-income person (or more specifically, a person facing low opportunity costs) can earn money by holding a desired prayer spot and trading it to a high-income person just before prayer times. The banned practice would seem to create net economic benefits – price-based rationing tends to be efficiency enhancing – but this observation neglects any external spiritual or economic benefits that might accrue from high-income persons spending more time waiting in mosques.

Banning the practice seems to benefit the middle at the expense of the extremes, the middle being those people too busy to arrive too early, but too poor (or too pious?) to pay for a good spot. Henceforth, to signal piety or just get an otherwise desirable location, worshipers will have to show up early.

It would be interesting to know whether political connections (governmental or clerical) can obtain a desirable prayer spot without waiting.  Can the right connections and a little influence buy what money cannot under the rules?

(Notice the similarity to rock concerts: when concert tickets are in excess demand and scalpers are prohibited, fans have to show up early.  In the case of rock concerts in public stadiums, at least, a good political connection and a little influence usually secures a good seat.)

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No results found for “true number may be lower or higher”

September 28, 2009

Michael Giberson

The true number of hits for the “true number may be higher” are lower than reported.

Mind Hacks (via Cheap Talk and Marginal Revolution) points out news reports often stress when stating an estimated value that the “true number may be higher,” but infrequently that the “true number may be lower.” The primary evidence cited is a comparison of Google search results for the two phrases, with “higher” shown at 20,300 hits and “lower” shown at a mere 3 hits. (I found about 43,000 hits for higher and about 5,300 hits for “lower”, so Google may be targeting results a bit based on search history.)

Ah, but what about the careful journalist who reports that the “true number may be higher or lower“?  Searching for “true number may be higher” will inadvertently capture these quotes as well, biasing the results.

However, the “true number may be higher or lower” only produced 412 hits in my Google search, so the bias is small relative to the numbers above.  Perhaps there are few careful journalists, or many careful journalists who are afflicted by less discriminating copy editors.

No one, at least as indicated by my Google search results, says  the “true number may be lower or higher“. (Of course, sometime soon Google will index this page, and “lower or higher” will gain an entry in that vast catalog.)

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Peer-based comparisons can induce consumers to reduce energy use

September 28, 2009

Michael Giberson

Research by Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman, and Alice Shih indicates that providing energy consumers with information on energy consumption relative to a peer group tends to reduce energy use. Here is their abstract:

By providing feedback to customers on home electricity and natural gas usage with a focus on peer comparisons, utilities can reduce energy consumption at a low cost. We analyze data from two large-scale, random-assignment field experiments conducted by utility companies providing electricity (the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)) and electricity and natural gas (Puget Sound Energy (PSE)), in partnership with a private company, Positive Energy/oPower, which provides monthly or quarterly mailed peer feedback reports to customers. We find reductions in energy consumption of 1.2% (PSE) to 2.1% percent (SMUD), with the decrease sustained over time (seven months (PSE) and twelve months (SMUD)).

The paper is, “Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage.”  (Links: the report at NBER; and a non-gated version of the report.)

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“Gas station owners were surprisingly altruistic during that time of crisis”

September 26, 2009

Michael Giberson

The post title was extracted from the conclusion of Henry Neilson’s article, “Price gouging versus price reduction in retail gasoline markets during Hurricane Rita” (Economic Letters, October 2009), but I’m not sure the evidence supports the conclusion of altruism.

Neilson collected gasoline price data in the Byran-College Station, Texas, area for several weeks after Hurricane Katrina, a period which included Hurricane Rita.  He uses his data from before and after Rita to examine whether gasoline station owners took advantage of the market disruption (which led to evacuations from Houston, with some evacuees moving to or through the area under study) to engage in price gouging.  He found retail price margins fell during the period right around Rita, leading to Neilson’s conclusion: “not only was there no evidence of retail price gouging, but that there was actually evidence supporting the opposite. Gas station owners were surprisingly altruistic during that time of crisis.

While the evidence presented doesn’t suggest price gouging, I think Neilson is way too hasty in his conclusion of altruism.  Four issues arise:

First, It is worth noting that Texas has an anti-price gouging law. Before Rita hit Texas, the Texas Attorney General was in the news warning businesses against price gouging:

“I have instructed my investigators and attorneys to take quick legal action if we find businesses deliberately gouging consumers in advance of this storm and in its aftermath,” said Attorney General Abbott. “We will aggressively urge the courts to impose harsh penalties against anyone who would profit off the backs of those already suffering.”

Similar warnings were issued after Hurricane Katrina, just a few weeks earlier.  So was it altruism or fear of harsh penalties imposed by the state?  Neilson doesn’t mention the anti-price gouging law or the pre-Rita warnings from the Attorney General, and no evidence in the article allows us to discriminate between the possible explanations.

Second, asymmetric price adjustment in gasoline markets has been studied extensively; it is fairly well established that retailer margins usually fall during times of increasing wholesale prices, and retailer margins increase during times of falling wholesale prices.  Since Neilson documents a period during which wholesale prices increase and he observes that retailer margins fall, we could conclude that this is just another episode of asymmetric price adjustment.  What’s love got to do with it?

Third, Neilson doesn’t directly observe retailer margins.  Instead, he observes posted retail prices and infers margins by comparison to wholesale spot prices (netting out taxes).  But frequently gasoline stations are supplied under contracts which do not directly expose them to wholesale spot prices, and therefore margins may not have fallen to the extent suggested, and possibly not at all for some retailers.

Finally, Neilson reports that several stations ran out of gasoline supplies during the period (“For most of the collection period, the value of the variable Number of Stations without Gas was equal to zero, except from September 23 through September 28. At one point in the collection period seventeen of the stations had run out of gas simultaneously.” Emphasis added.) Seventeen out of 28 stations – sixty percent – without supplies!  So, perhaps coincidentally, on the day the Attorney General is in the news warning against price gouging, stations in the area begin running out of supplies.

Neilson suggests the episode offers “evidence consistent with Rotemberg’s (2006) fair pricing model among gas station owners in Bryan/College Station, Texas, during Hurricane Rita.” As previously noted on this blog, I think Rotemberg raises interesting issues but I’m not impressed by his attempts to resolve those issues.  In any case, it seems at least problematic to attribute the observed behavior to fairness or altruism.  Competing parsimonious explanations exist, but were not compared to Neilson’s altruism-based explanation.

And, independently of whether or not gasoline station owners intended to be altruistic, the question arises whether economic welfare would have been helped or hindered by a larger increase in price. September 23, 2005, the day before Hurricane Rita hit the Texas coast, was a day many people were evacuating coastal areas.  Demand is extraordinarily high in the Bryan/College Station gasoline market at the time; supplies may have already been impaired somewhat by Hurricane Katrina’s effects on the Gulf region.  In this market, according to the evidence presented, stations kept prices low and several ran out of supplies.  How many evacuees and local residents would have been better off finding gasoline available at slightly higher prices?

I should have titled this post: Another case of the predictable consequence of anti-price gouging laws. (See related posts.)

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Weekend jaunt from Chicago: New Glarus, Wisconsin

September 26, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

The area around New Glarus, Wisconsin, is one of our favorite places when we want to get out of town. Great roads for cycling, camping, beautiful scenery, and of course the newly-expanded New Glarus Brewery. Gone are the days when we could get Spotted Cow and Uff Da Bock around here; now we have to drive to Wisconsin to get some. If you are not familiar with the area, this Gaper’s Block post provides a good weekend getaway guide, including recommendations for bicycling on the several very good trails in the area — especially good for families!

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Deductive economic rationality and its limitations

September 25, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

In this really outstanding post on FT.com’s Economists Forum, Roman Freedman and Michael Goldberg point out some of the essential flaws of the underlying concept of “rationality” as it is defined and used in economics:

The centrepiece of this standard of rationality, the so-called “Rational Expectations Hypothesis”, presumes that economists can model exactly how rational individuals comprehend the future. In a bit of magical thinking, it supposes that each of the many models devised by economists provides the “true” account of how market outcomes, such as asset prices, will unfold over time.

The economics literature is full of different models, each one assuming that it adequately captures how all rational market participants make decisions. Although the free-market Chicago school, neo-Keynesianism, and behavioural finance are quite different in other respects, each assumes the same REH-based standard of rationality.

In other words, REH-based models ignore markets’ very raison d’etre: no one, as Friedrich Hayek pointed out, can have access to the “totality” of knowledge and information dispersed throughout the economy. Similarly, as John Maynard Keynes and Karl Popper showed, we cannot rationally predict the future course of our knowledge. Today’s models of rational decision-making ignore these well-known arguments.

They then go on to discuss the implications of this adherence to the strict, deductive, Cartesian rational expectations hypothesis for business cycles and financial market fluctuations. These are really good and really important arguments. They also touch on the point I raised in my post last week on paternalistic regulation — if you make policy grounded in behavioral economics models that are grounded in this unrealistic rationality concept, then you will conclude that any behavior that deviates from the predictions of your model and its “perfect rationality” is irrational or anomalous. Furthermore, if you believe that some central authority can amass the knowledge to determine what that “perfect rationalilty” outcome would be, then you will empower that authority to force you to behave in that way. But if you admit to the knowledge assumptions of Hayek, Keynes, and Popper, then you have to abandon that “perfect rationality” benchmark, and recognize that comparison with this benchmark is unrealistic, useless, or even pernicious, because it leads you to undervalue the individual’s ability to determine what the best actions are to take given their local knowledge.

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“Blended deceit from the nanny state”

September 25, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

If you are a wine fan (oenophile if you’re feeling fancy) and you are not reading Dr. Vino regularly, you are missing a real treat. Dr. Vino is a political scientist who, in addition to having a good nose and good taste and a good palate, is an expert on the political economy of regulation in the wine industry. His recent post summarizing last weekend’s wine commentary contained this gem:

Canadian wines can contain 70% imported wine and still say “cellared in Canada” on the label. Big companies are for the practice according to The Economist, who calls it “Blended deceit from the nanny state.”

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Price signals and free markets lead to oil exploration: who’d a thunk it?

September 24, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

From a good article in today’s New York Times: 2009 is turning out to be a bumper year for new oil discoveries; new oil discoveries always occur, but this year has been unusually fruitful. This quote from the article illustrates the important dynamic intertemporal incentives that price signals provide:

These discoveries, spanning five continents, are the result of hefty investments that began earlier in the decade when oil prices rose, and of new technologies that allow explorers to drill at greater depths and break tougher rocks.

“That’s the wonderful thing about price signals in a free market — it puts people in a better position to take more exploration risk,” said James T. Hackett, chairman and chief executive of Anadarko Petroleum.

More than 200 discoveries have been reported so far this year in dozens of countries, including northern Iraq’s Kurdish region, Australia, Israel, Iran, Brazil, Norway, Ghana and Russia. They have been made by international giants, like Exxon Mobil, but also by industry minnows, like Tullow Oil.

Note here the hetergeneity of both the location of the discoveries and the types of firms that are exploring and discovering.

See also the comments and the tie to peak oil from Tim Haab at Environmental Economics.

There’s also an interesting similarity, and contrast, with how high natural gas prices have induced further exploration and discovery in the U.S. in the form of shale gas. Extracting shale gas is more costly because it’s embedded in shale rock, but the high natural gas prices since 2003 have induced innovation and exploration. That, combined with other discoveries, has led to historically high natural gas inventories (shifting out the supply curve); this year’s recession has reduced the demand for natural gas (shifting in the demand curve). Not surprisingly, therefore, the price of natural gas is about one-fourth of what is was back in, say, 2005. This week NPR has been running a series on natural gas innovation and exploration; the first in the series is here, and there are more resources associated with the series on their web site as well.

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An illustration of comparative advantage from professional cycling

September 24, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

As a cyclist, it should come as no surprise that I follow professional cycling pretty closely, and have done for some time. As an economist, it’s a rich laboratory for seeing all kinds of different economic concepts and principles play out.

Today I found a good one in an interview with Dave Zabriskie of Team Garmin-Slipstream, who is currently the U.S. time trial champion and recently won the week-long Tour of Missouri stage race. One of the aspects of being a cyclist is being mechanical — some cyclists are all about knowing the ins and outs of taking their bikes apart and putting them back together, while others are just as happy to take it to the shop and let a professional mechanic handle it. Most of us  are somewhere in between, but leaning more toward letting the mechanics handle most of the bike work. The pro cyclists are not that different, as these comments from DZ illustrate:

schmalz Now are you the type of racer who doesn’t do any mechanical stuff; you don’t feel comfortable with that?

DZ [A hint of hesitation] I can do some of it.

schmalz What’s the toughest thing you can do? Can you do a bottom bracket?

DZ What’s there to do there?

schmalz Can you put one in, attach it to the cranks, and have it work?

DZ It’s got to sides to it. Well, the new ones are pretty easy. Yeah, I think I can do that.

schmalz I can’t do anything that goes through the frame. I don’t do headsets and bottom bracket stuff but I can do everything else. I can adjust cables, derailleurs.

DZ I’m at the point now where I just give it to them. I’m pretty close with some mechanics so I just hand it off to them and they dial it in real quick.

schmalz And you hve guys where you live and on the road you have team mechanics?

DZ Yeah.

schmalz So you’re not especially mechanical?

DZ Well, I keep it clean, lubed up. Air in the tires. I went through a stage where I tried to get into that stuff. I overhauled a headset and did some things but it’s just a lot easier and a more efficient use of my time to let someone else take care of it. [emphasis added]

Note how well he expresses the concept of comparative advantage — more efficient use of his time to train and ride his bike and rest than to work on his bike. It’s a really good illustration of comparative advantage. [As an aside, for teaching purposes: if the mechanic is a better mechanic and DZ is a better rider, then it's a situation of absolute advantage as well as comparative advantage, but suppose DZ is both a better rider and mechanic ... then it's a pure comparative advantage play. Good example for classroom discussion.]

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