Archive for January, 2010

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Publishers and ebooks: innovation, DRM, and resale price maintenance

January 31, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

I hope all of you economists out there are following the current brouhaha between Amazon and the publisher Macmillan, because the number of fascinating economics issues is stunning. In brief, Macmillan is one of the publishers working with Apple on the iPad and Apple’s ebook store. At the same time (I remain agnostic on any causal association), Macmillan proposed to Amazon a shift in pricing and ebook availability to a so-called “agency” model, which involves dynamic pricing over time as the book’s release date recedes (starting at a higher price on release); they also said that if Amazon did not agree to such agency pricing and wished to leave the retail ebook price at $9.99, then Macmillan would start “windowing” their ebook releases, and would allow Amazon to issue ebooks only 7 months after the hardcover release. As described by Engadget,

Macmillan claims that its new model is meant to keep retailers, publishers, and authors profitable in the emerging electronic frontier while encouraging competition amongst new devices and new stores. It gives retailers a 30% commission and sets the price for each book individually: digital editions of most adult trade books will be priced from $5.99 to $14.99 while first releases will “almost always” hit the electronic shelves day on date with the physical hardcover release and be priced between $12.99 and $14.99 — pricing that will be dynamic over time.

Then, on Friday Amazon removed all of Macmillan’s ebook and print book products from their site, leading to a host of reactions, including this selection:

Then on Sunday, after Macmillan’s CEO issued a statement about their proposed change in terms with Amazon, lots of authors complained to Amazon, and many blog and web site editors de-linked Amazon from their sites and thus reducing traffic to Amazon. As of Sunday evening, Macmillan’s products were again available at Amazon, and Amazon had published a carefully-worded apology.

Accusations of bullying and the exercise of market power are flying against both parties: Amazon has market power as a leading book retailer, and they are bullying Macmillan by removing their print products to keep retail ebook prices low and sell more Kindles! Macmillan has, as the Amazon “apology” puts it, a “monopoly over their own titles”, and thus we have to capitulate to their bullying! Macmillan is trying to tell Amazon the retail price at which to sell their products, abominable!

This last accusation hints at one of the two particularly interesting economics topics involved in this episode — consumer welfare and resale price maintenance. I do think that this situation will raise some interest in and attention to the competitive or anti-competitive RPM implications of Macmillan’s proposal and Amazon’s response. First, is it really the case that Macmillan is trying to set Amazon’s (or Apple’s, for that matter) retail prices for their products? Second, would Macmillan’s proposed agency model and dynamic pricing benefit consumers or not? As it happens, there has been something of a revival of interest in resale price maintenance in the antitrust literature since 2007, when a longstanding precedent in the area was revised to more of a “rule of reason” approach. Here are some recommended readings on RPM to get you thinking about this:

The second important economic issue is digital rights management and how both Amazon and Apple restrict the use rights of their ebook customers. That will have to wait for another post.

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Adler on the Housemartins: Sunday Song Lyric

January 31, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

While I’m out reading around … Jonathan Adler asks “Who remembers the Housemartins?” I do, I do! I actually liked them better than their Beautiful South spinoff, although both have a dark humor and a tight, jangly, pop-y vibe that was one of my favorite themes in British music in the 1980s. Sadly, I haven’t listened to them in years, because it’s all on vinyl, in a box up in my home office/attic …

Speaking of tight, jangly British music, I had my own 80s music revival experience on Friday night, when the KP Spouse and our friend Sharon and I went to see Lloyd Cole and his new group, the Lloyd Cole Small Ensemble, at the Old Town School of Folk Music. Lloyd Cole has always impressed me as a clever and inventive songwriter, accompanied by his clear and distinctive voice and spare, clean guitar lines. With his original band the Commotions, he created two albums that were in regular rotation on my stereo. Even today I still have LC&TC songs and Lloyd Cole solo songs figuring prominently on playlists on my iPod; “Four Flights Up”, “Perfect Skin”, and “Are You Ready To Be Heartbroken?” are awesome, and his solo “A Long Way Down” has this most excellent lyric:

Didn’t I hear you say your heart’s made out of steel
And no one’s gonna get so close
No one’s gonna know how you feel

Now you’re a punch drunk sycophant
A little SOB
You say your mind is made up
Isn’t that the way that it’s supposed to be?

“Punch drunk sycophant” has since become one of my favorite phrases. And finally, to reinforce his status as a music icon, in 2006 Camera Obscura (a fine, lovely Scottish band!) released their song “Lloyd, I’m Ready To Be Heartbroken.” (link will play the song on lala.com, give it a listen!). If you are an 80s Lloyd Cole & the Commotions fan who’s not listened in a while, or if you have never heard of him before, give him and his new band a listen; it’ll be worth your attention.

Oh, and today’s his birthday. Happy birthday Lloyd!

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Boudreaux on populism and corporatist capitalism

January 31, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Just a quick note to bring your attention to, and endorse, the point Don Boudreaux made in a recent letter to the editor of the Washington Post:

To the extent that trade – both national and international – is restricted, incumbent capitalists are shielded from what Joseph Schumpeter called the “gale of creative destruction.”  Subsidies and tariffs always protect established capitalists from having to compete with new rivals, new products, and new ways of doing business.  Such “anti-capitalist” protection harms not only upstart entrepreneurs; most importantly, it hurts the countless unseen and unrepresented consumers who are denied the gains they would have enjoyed from the innovation and competition that are squelched by the “anti-capitalist” restrictive policies that seem so in vogue today at Davos.

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How valuable will a monopoly be to Lubbock Power & Light?

January 31, 2010

Michael Giberson

After over 90 years of operating in competition with a rival electric utility in town, late last year Lubbock Power & Light and Xcel announced a deal in which municipal electric utility LP&L would buy out Xcel’s distribution assets and customer accounts in the city for $87 million, leaving LP&L as a monopoly electric utility in the city.

Regulatory filings with the state reveal much more of the details of the deal.  A newspaper story in the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal notes, for example, that the $87 million will buy assets that Xcel values at $64.2 million.  Lubbock’s electric power consumers may wonder what the city is getting for that extra $22.8 million payment.

It is a complex deal that, in addition to paying Xcel to get out of town, accommodates changes in numerous existing contracts between the two companies.  For example, a few years ago when LP&L was on the brink of bankruptcy, LP&L and Xcel entered into a deal under which Xcel controls operations at LP&L’s generating plants and LP&L began buying all of its power supply needs from Xcel.  That deal expires in 2019, but under the acquisition plan Xcel would continue to make available some wholesale power to LP&L.  Xcel purchases waste water from the city for cooling a power plant, and that agreement would be revised as well.  All the complexities make it hard to evaluate what, exactly, the deal is worth to citizens of Lubbock – putative owners of the municipal utility – and the value to be created by the deal (if any).

One question to be asked, as a starter, is why LP&L needs to pay anything above scrap value for the Xcel distribution system in the city.  After all, the city claims its existing system is sufficient to serve the entire city and that maintaining two utility systems is town is wasteful.  So LP&L doesn’t need Xcel’s distribution assets to take on current Xcel’s customers, and adding the distribution assets will simply result in a costly, wasteful, and over-built local distribution system.

Scrap value would be too low, since some of the Xcel distribution system may be incorporated into LP&L’s system (in cases in which the Xcel system is superior to the LP&L segment that it duplicates), but book value on the assets seems a reasonable upper limit.  In any case it is hard to believe LP&L should pay a premium over book value for Xcel’s assets.

Is having a monopoly going to be so valuable to LP&L that they are willing to pay Xcel a $20+ million bonus to get out of town? What does that imply for future electricity rates in the city?

BACKGROUND – Earlier posts on electric utility competition in Lubbock:

Note that, technically speaking, one or two small neighborhoods will still have a choice between LP&L and South Plains Electric Coop, but otherwise LP&L becomes the monopoly provider in the city of Lubbock.

ADDED: The related regulatory filings at the PUC of Texas can be found via the PUCT’s Interchange document system.  Start on this page, enter 37901 as the “Control Number,” and press the “Search Now” button.

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Government sponsored applied corporate research

January 29, 2010

Michael Giberson

I’m not necessarily opposed to government funding for research, but does General Electric really need taxpayer funds in order to do research on high-temperature electronics intended to support high tech oil and gas drilling?  Isn’t this exactly the kind of applied product research that, together, patent protections and markets can manage just fine?  Really, couldn’t General Electric, perhaps with the support of the oil and gas industry or the oil and gas equipment manufacturing industry, come up with a few million dollars more without U.S. Department of Energy support?

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Econstories: Keynes-Hayek rap

January 26, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Love it, just love it! Check out more information and details at Econstories.tv.

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Integrating variable energy resources to the electric power grid

January 26, 2010

Michael Giberson

Are their barriers impeding integration of variable energy resources to the electric grid? FERC wants to know:

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) seeks comment on the extent to which barriers may exist that impede the reliable and efficient integration of variable energy resources (VERs) into the electric grid, and whether reforms are needed to eliminate those barriers. In order to meet the challenges posed by the integration of increasing numbers of VERs, ensure that jurisdictional rates are just and reasonable, eliminate impediments to open access transmission service for all resources, facilitate the efficient development of infrastructure, and ensure that the reliability of the grid is maintained, the Commission seeks to explore whether reforms are necessary to ensure that wholesale electricity tariffs are just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory. This Notice will enable the Commission to determine whether wholesale electricity tariff reforms are necessary.

Hmmm, “variable energy resources”?  Does that mean things like steam generation units that can be adjusted up and down over some range (but not things like a gas turbine that is either on or off, but not adjustable in between)? No, they mean “variable but not very controllable energy resources” such as wind and solar power.  They write: “For purposes of this proceeding, the term variable energy resource (VER) refers to renewable energy resources that are characterized by variability in the fuel source that is beyond the control of the resource operator.”

I wonder why they didn’t just use the term “renewable energy resources”? Were they afraid of offending hydro and geothermal interests?  Are they hoping to ease the taint of not-very-controllable from renewable energy resources?

The proceeding is “Integration of Variable Energy Resources” (FERC RM10-11-000). In paragraph 10, FERC states:

Our goal is not to adopt rules that favor one type of supply source over another. Instead, the Commission’s purpose in this proceeding is to investigate market and operational reforms necessary to achieve two goals: first, to ensure that rates for jurisdictional service are just and reasonable, reflecting the implementation of practices that increase the efficiency of providing service; and second, to prevent VERs from facing undue discrimination. These goals are consistent with the requirements of sections 205 and 206 of the FPA.

The challenge here is in separating the “due discrimination” from the “undue discrimination,” which is to say the charges and special terms and conditions applied to VERs that are reasonable given the character of the resource from the charges, terms and conditions which are unreasonable.

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Price gouging in Haiti

January 26, 2010

Michael Giberson

Reports from Haiti suggest that prices for many useful and necessary goods have jumped considerably since the earthquake.  Candles, matches, ice, water, food items, bus trips from the capital, petrol, plastic sandals, charcoal, rice, sugar – the list of items now selling at dramatically higher prices seems endless.  Last week I suggested that claims of price gouging that were heard in Venezuela and Alaska were stretching the meaning of the term a bit, but if anything represents pure price gouging it is sharp price hikes on necessary items amid the current devastation in Haiti.

I don’t know whether or not Haitian law prohibits or limits price increases on necessary goods during emergencies, but surely the ethics of price gouging are the same in Haiti as in other places.  Consider some of the episodes that are described as price gouging in news articles.

  • Wall Street Journal: “The Hotel Oloffson, where many journalists are camped out, was charging up to $100 per night — for a mattress in the parking lot. A bottle of Gatorade at the hotel was going for seven dollars.”
  • New York Times: One vendor mentions was a Manouchka Wendiwou, described as “a vendor in La Saline who raised her candle prices by 60 percent and made no apology for charging what the market would bear.”  The article also notes that matches, foodstuffs, gasoline, and ice are showing dramatically higher prices in Haiti.
  • Philadelphia Inquirer: Mentions “price-gouging for gas and water” hampering relief efforts.
  • Boston Globe: “Price gouging was rampant at the main bus terminal. Fortune and others said the cost of a ticket out of town more than doubled since the quake hit. But it was a price that hundreds were willing to pay after nearly a week of living on the streets….”
  • Ottowa Citizen: “About 30 per cent of gas stations in Port-au-Prince have opened, and officials say there is no longer a fuel shortage. But prices have tripled from pre-earthquake levels.”

If price gouging is unethical, then we ought to condemn these reported behaviors right?

But I find it hard to condemn these actions, which generally appear to be pro-social commercial responses to abnormal social and economic conditions. Higher prices motivate more careful use of existing supplies as well as extraordinary efforts to secure additional supplies. Changing relative prices help guide the efforts of suppliers and merchants to the most vitally needed items. Both the incentive and information aspects of prices are critical to guiding decentralized responses to human needs in this rapidly changing situation.

The New York Times article observes that, “Haiti’s huge informal sector reacted faster to the quake than did established companies and banks. Outdoor markets like La Saline are already filled with goods from the countryside, including salt, cornmeal, fruits like mangoes and used clothing from the United States.”  How fast would that informal sector have reacted if the government felt an obligation to enforce some notion of anti-price gouging policy?

NOTE: Chris MacDonald discusses a bit of the ethics of price gouging in Haiti at his Business Ethics Blog.  See Business As Usual (plus Price Gouging) in Parts of Haiti.

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Energy storage on the grid: transmission equipment or market participant? (Again)

January 25, 2010

Michael Giberson

In the wholesale power markets world, commercial energy storage concepts are commonly somewhat of an afterthought. None of the large regional wholesale power markets integrated into transmission operations put too much effort into thinking about energy storage as they developed their market rules.

A part of the problem is that the transmission system and the rules that surround it is set up to move power from generation sources to electrical loads. Grid-connected energy storage devices are something of a hybrid: sometimes act like generators – supplying power – and sometimes act like loads – consuming power. They don’t always fit neatly into traditional categories. Further mixing things up, energy storage can contribute greatly to system reliability, usually treated as a matter for transmission-system based coordination rather than market transaction.

But as commercial-scale energy storage begins to arrive on the scene it has become more important to sort through these issues.

I’m just quoting myself from a post of 14 months ago on the topic of integrating energy storage players into regional power markets.  At the time the case involved American Electric Power’s desire to add a battery storage system as part of a transmission system upgrade in Texas, and a request that the energy storage device be treated as transmission facilities (and therefore have costs recovered through regulated transmission rates) rather than as an energy market participant of some sort.  The PUC of Texas permitted AEP its battery-storage-system-as-transmission-facility.

Last week FERC took initial action on a similar request (link goes to decision; see also FERC news release).  Western Grid Development LLC has proposed installing energy storage devices on the CAISO-managed transmission system and seeks to have its system treated as transmission facilities. The comments and protests filed in response to the Western Grid raise the same concerns heard in the AEP/Texas case.  Some parties object that storage inherently involves participation in energy buying and selling and therefore the systems ought to be energy market participants; Western Grid states that any purchase or sale of energy would be incidental to operation of the system in support of the transmission grid, done only at the direction of CAISO, and net revenues – if any – would be refunded to transmission ratepayers.

In FERC’s decision, it agreed that the facilities could be treated as transmission equipment so long as they are built and operated as described by Western Grid, and so long as the CAISO approves the project as part of the ISO’s regional transmission planning process.  (CAISO, by the way, filed a strong protest in response to the Western Grid request, so I expect Western Grid will have much work to do to gets its project off the ground, even with this preliminary approval by FERC.)

FERC was clear that this decision is limited to Western Grid’s project as proposed and does not suggest any general position on the treatment of energy storage devices on the grid.  In fact no general position may be available, given, as FERC explains, “electricity storage devices …do not readily fit into only one of the traditional asset functions of generation, transmission or distribution. Under certain circumstances, storage devices can resemble any of these functions or even load. For this reason, the Commission has addressed the classification of energy storage devices on a case-by-case basis.”

By the way, a number of the key people involved in Western Grid are also working together on the Tres Amigas project though (I think) no official links exist between the two companies.

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A private right of action on price gouging

January 25, 2010

Michael Giberson

One bill,, submitted to the New York State Assembly last year (but, so far as I can tell, not passed into law; ADDED: See status note below.), proposes to grant consumers a private right of action when they become victims of price gouging in times of emergency. Currently only the state’s Attorney General has authority to bring legal action against someone accused of violating the state’s price gouging law.

The bill’s sponsor suggests that “the threat of enforcement by the Attorney General is not serving as an adequate deterrent,” and implies allowing private rights of actions would help.  To that end, “the purpose of this bill is to grant citizens who are victims of illegal price gouging in times of emergency the right to directly sue the responsible party.” The proposal would allow a victim to sue to recover up to “actual damages” or $1000, whichever is greater, and give the court discretion to award a prevailing plaintiff up to $5000 and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

The bill does not specify who is considered a “victim” under the law.  I can imagine a few problems that may result.

The existing New York law on price gouging is in Section 396-r of the New York Code.  The law provides that during “any abnormal disruption of the market for consumer goods and services vital and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers, no party within the chain of distribution of such consumer goods or services or both shall sell or offer to sell any such goods or services or both for an amount which represents an unconscionably excessive price.”  The law narrows the description of “abnormal disruption” to events resulting in a state of emergency declared by the governor, and otherwise tries to specify just what the law covers, but on the question of what makes a price too high, the law simply states: “Whether a price is unconscionably excessive is a question of law for the court,” and it offers a bit of guidance.

So here is one problem: One part of that guidance suggests a price could be unconscionably excessive if “the amount charged grossly exceeded the price at which the same or similar goods or services were readily obtainable by other consumers in the trade area.”  Therefore, the definition seems to apply in cases in which the “victim” incurs the hazard, i.e. could have purchased at other prices but chose to buy from a merchant offering the good or service for a much higher price. Why would a consumer do this? Well, under this proposal the consumer could file a private action by which he might rewarded as much as $1,000 damages plus up to a $5,000 penalty and reasonable attorneys’ fees because the consumer chose to pay the higher price.

More generally, which victims would qualify to seek compensation? While the consumer charged an amount grossly exceeding some reference price is typically seen as a price gouging victim, what about consumers that would have purchased the good or service but for the unconscionably excessive price at which it is offered? Surely they, too, are victims under the logic of price gouging.  Will they also be able to seek private rights of action and obtain a reward?  If not then the law protects consumers willing and able to pay the higher price, but not consumers who find themselves priced out of the market.  If the law permits these victims-without-receipts to file private suits of action, the potential liability of a business charging higher prices after an emergency can become very large and ill-defined.

Supporters of anti-price gouging legislation may say this is all fine.  The first case suggests that consumers may intentionally seek out merchants offering too-high prices with the intent of subsequently filing a price gouging claim, but that just means that more citizens are motivated to help deter price gouging, and that’s the point, right?  The second case, with a large and ill-documented class of consumers who would-have-but-didn’t-buy at the too-high price, by dramatically increasing the potential liability, similarly serves to help deter price gouging.  Again, that’s the point and what could be wrong?

Well, nothing in New York’s anti-price gouging law requires merchants to remain open for business during market disruptions associated with declared emergencies.  And if remaining open might expose the store to large but hard-to-define liabilities, the store’s owner might reasonably just close up shop.  Consumers, then, would be made worse off by the action of this “consumer protection” policy.

UPDATE: As indicated on the bill’s information page, in early February 2010 the Consumer Protection Committee of the State Senate approved the bill on an 8-2 vote and sent it to the Finance Committee.  An identical bill, A278A, passed the State Assembly last year.

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