Archive for March 29th, 2010

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Georgia bill would add useful flexibility to price gouging law

March 29, 2010

Michael Giberson

A bill passed by the Georgia state senate would add some helpful flexibility to the state’s anti-price gouging law.  The primary purpose of the bill would be to allow the state to limit the range of items for which the price gouging rules will be enforced based upon the nature of the emergency.  For example, if a storm mostly damaged windows and roofs, the price gouging rule might be enforced on plywood and hotel rooms, but not on ice and gasoline.  Another part of the bill would allow gasoline retailers to raise the price of retail gasoline to reflect the cost of replenishing the store’s supplies rather than linking allowed retail prices to the historical cost of the gasoline sold. Currently the state allows “replacement cost pricing” for plywood during declared emergencies, but gasoline price increases were evaluated with reference to pre-emergency historical cost.

I’d rather see the state repeal its price gouging laws altogether.  The laws probably create more costs than benefits, and can lead businesses to shut down during emergencies rather than risk violating anti-price gouging laws.

From the Atlanta Constitution-Journal, “Bill allows gas price increase in emergency“:

Less than two years after hurricanes brought a run on gas, the state Senate has passed legislation letting station owners charge much higher prices as soon as an emergency is declared.

Officials with the Governor’s Office of Consumer Affairs worry the measure, if it becomes law in its current form, would make it tough to prosecute a gas station for price gouging.

“I think it would be very difficult to determine that price gouging had occurred,” said Bill Cloud, spokesman for the office. “I don’t know that we would have confidence in saying that, as the bill exists right now, we would be able to define, or describe or enforce price gouging as it relates to petroleum products.”

The bill was originally meant to give the governor more flexibility in deciding which products would fall under gouging laws during an emergency. For instance, if an emergency involved damage to homes but not a disruption in the flow of gas, gouging laws could apply to plywood or building materials and not fuel.

However the bill, which was backed by Gov. Sonny Perdue, was rewritten by the Senate Agriculture and Consumer Affairs Committee to allow stations, in an emergency, to charge for gas what they decide it will cost to replenish the fuel they have on site.

Meanwhile, one committee of the Connecticut state assembly unanimously approved a bill which offers a “mathematical definition that the state would use to identify gas station price gouging subsequent to natural disasters.”

“In the past, gas dealers have had trouble knowing what constitutes an emergency and what the definition of gouging is,” [State Rep. Jim] Shapiro said. “So the current provisions against gouging have been tough to enforce. This new anti-gouging provision clarifies the rules to provide consumers and businesses information to act accordingly when there is problems.”

Clarity in the law is usually a good thing – in order to comply with the law, businesses need to be able to tell what level of price increase will constitute a violation of the law.  But, as an industry spokesman stated, “the devil is in the details.”

In this case the bill declares it will not be a violation of the price gouging law if a retailer’s average margin during the “abnormal market disruption” is no higher than the maximum margin during the 90-day period prior to the beginning of the market disruption.  Because the definition is in terms of changing margin rather than changing prices, it may allow retail prices to track changing wholesale costs.  However, the bill fails to clarify whether the relevant rack price is the historical rack price paid at the time of the initial wholesale gasoline purchase, or a contemporaneous rack price at which replacement fuel could be acquired. The historical cost method would restrain price increases and hamper market adjustment more, the contemporaneous rack price method would restrain price increases and hamper market adjustment less.

Once again, probably an improvement over the existing state of affairs, but I’d rather see Connecticut repeal its price gouging laws altogether, too. As with Georgia, the Connecticut law probably creates more costs than benefits.

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Incentives for efficient use of storage in electric power systems

March 29, 2010

Michael Giberson

In the most recent Energy Journal, Ramteem Sioshonsi has an article examining the welfare effects of the incentives to use energy storage in electric power systems. (“Welfare Impacts of Electricity Storage and the Implications of Ownership Structure,” See volume 31:2 here.) He considers the incentives faced by consumers, generators, and merchant energy storage owners (companies lacking consumer or generator affiliates).

His theoretical analysis demonstrates:

[W]elfare-maximizing storage use benefits consumers while reducing producer profits, [and therefore] will result in consumers and producers having vastly different incentives to use storage from one another and from merchant storage owners.  This is because the three different agent types will use storage to maximize their net payoffs. In the case of consumers this would consist of the sum of arbitrage value and consumer surplus change, whereas producers would maximize the sum of generation and arbitrage profits.  Merchant storage operators, on the other hand, will maximize arbitrage profits only.  Because consumer surplus is enhanced by welfare-maximizing storage use, and since consumers that own storage would not consider the impact of storage use on generator profits, they will tend to have an incentive to overuse storage.  Conversely, because storage use reduces producer profits, generators will have an incentive to underuse storage.

A numerical analysis based loosely on ERCOT system characteristics in 2005 provides further elaboration of the model.

Our numerical example showed that for most reasonable storage device efficiencies merchant ownership of storage is welfare-maximizing compared to the alternatives of consumer or generator ownership….  When storage assets can be divided amongst agent types the socially optimal allocation of storage favors merchants, although some consumer ownership of storage can be beneficial since their overuse of storage can compensate for underuse by merchants.

Sioshonsi observes that as the number of storage operators increases, overall use of storage capability approaches the social welfare maximizing outcome.  This is, of course, the familiar effect of competition in markets on welfare.

Reading this paper I couldn’t help but think of the Tres Amigas proposal, which I think would be the first merchant energy storage project of any significant size if built. (Am I overlooking any large grid-connected merchant energy storage projects?)  While this article was far from an analysis of the welfare consequences of building the Tres Amigas project, it does suggest that the project’s storage capability would offer substantial public benefits.

Sioshonsi only considers use of energy storage to buy and sell energy, but grid-connected energy storage can also be used to provide transmission support services (generally called “ancillary services”).  When energy storage gets built as a transmission-system component and factored into regulated transmission rates, regulations tend to prevent that energy storage from being used for energy price arbitrage.  So, “transmission-system” energy storage assets will be underused relative to the public interest.  But markets for ancillary services are incomplete, meaning merchant incentives to supply ancillary services may also be underdeveloped.  Most of the regional, integrated power markets (i.e. RTOs) have substantially improved their ancillary services markets over the past several years, and the way forward here is to continue to improve ancillary services markets.

ASIDE: Sioshonsi also notes that an integrated utility with consumer loads and its own generation assets may inherently favor the socially optimum welfare use of storage assets, “since these entities would be concerned with both producer and consumer surplus.”  However, this expansive claim is just an add-on remark in the conclusion not examined in the body of the paper.  Suffice to say that if the interests of integrated utilities were always aligned with both producer and consumer surplus, we could dispense with both restructuring and regulation and let consumers live in the warm embrace of unregulated, integrated monopoly power companies.

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