Archive for April 16th, 2010

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CFTC approves box office futures market

April 16, 2010

Michael Giberson

Today the CFTC approved Media Derivatives Inc.’s request to create a futures exchange based on box office receipts.  The exchange “is primarily focused on the development of a variety of products to benefit the entertainment industry with one if its initially proposed products being designed to help mitigate risk and enhance the successful financing of motion pictures through trading of opening weekend domestic box office receipts.”

See also reports at Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times.

Media Derivatives’s Trend Exchange market is one of two similar proposals that have been submitted to the CFTC for approval.  The other proposal has been submitted by Cantor Fitzgerald, a Wall Street investment and brokerage company, which acquired play-money site Hollywood Stock Exchange a few years ago.

ADDENDUM: Will the CFTC allow the newly approved box office futures exchange to actually offer box office futures contracts?

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Libertarian paternalism series at Cato Unbound

April 16, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

I’ve been meaning to write about the libertarian paternalism series at Cato Unbound for a week or so, but have been too busy to pull it off. Happily, Ilya Somin has a good post that touches on a couple of the themes I wanted to raise (and I second his recommendation to read the series, and the Whitman posts specifically). In particular, he points out that the libertarian paternalism arguments do have a double standard because they focus on the cognitive biases of individuals in making consumption and investment decisions, but they fail to apply the same behavioral analysis to policymakers and regulators.

It may well be that private citizens acting in markets and civil society often make decisions that they later regret because of cognitive errors. However, regulators and voters are people too. They also might make bad decisions because of cognitive errors. Libertarian paternalist scholars generally ignore this possibility by implicitly comparing perfectly rational regulators with often irrational consumers. But there is no a priori reason to believe that the former are more rational than the latter.

He then goes on to discuss the cognitive biases of regulators, and voters, and their implications for these policy “nudges”. I know that there are several electricity regulators and policymakers who, being naturally attuned to the top-down control culture and history of the industry but also wanting some expansion of individual choice, see the concept of “nudge” as a way to overcome the biases and transaction costs associated with individual consumers paying attention to their electricity consumption. These policymakers should also pay attention to their own biases, though, and the ways that their inclinations to control and manage economic outcomes lead them to focus on outcomes that actually may not be in the best interest of individuals, and may therefore lead to either a decline in economic welfare or a set of unintended consequences as people innovate around the nudges. Or both.

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Technology + dynamic pricing conserves water too (duh)

April 16, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

I love this story; it’s like Knowledge Problem + Aguanomics = individual choice, efficiency, conservation, and elegance. Water conservation is a large and growing concern, in large part because our public policy does such an abominable job of creating a framework/market design to send good scarcity signals to diverse individual users, and to enable them to trade rights among those uses. But in many places, water use also means electricity use, because of the large pumping demand associated with it.

That combination of water use and electricity use provided the impetus for a recent pilot study in California:

A pilot study conducted last summer in Palm Desert, Calif., suggests that they can.

The study, financed by the California Energy Commission, asked participants — who were paid $25 a month — to reduce their water use at “peak” times. A peak time refers to the hours when electricity use is at or near its daily high, and therefore especially expensive.

For Palm Desert, those hours are noon to 6 p.m.

The participants were given so-called “smart water meters” that recorded their water use at 15-minute intervals. Crucially, the meters also enabled participants to see how much water they were using — information that is unavailable to most households.

The results were striking: at peak times, participating homeowners used less than half the amount of water as those in the control group. The homeowners’ total use also ended up being 17 percent lower than the control group’s.

There are a few interesting aspects of this study. Note first that the payment to the homeowner was a lump sum. There is not a dynamic price per unit of water consumed, nor is there even a time-of-use peak-off-peak price structure, so the main driver of the observed conservation is the improvement in information visibility to the homeowner. The $25 lump sum payment probably contributed to raising their awareness too. A dynamic price or a TOU price is also likely to reinforce this result.

Second, note that the peak time denoted here was the peak electricity price time. The article indicates that the 50% reduction in peak water use did not lead to a commensurate reduction in electricity demand, although there was some reduction. So the relationship between water use and electricity use is quite nonlinear. One thing to consider is that in the desert a lot of people use evaporative cooling, so there is some margin of substitution between cooling using water and cooling using air conditioning.

Finally, the article points out that by making homeowners more informed and aware of their water consumption, the smart water meters helped them and the water authority to identify unknown leaks. This result was an unanticipated outcome, and identifying those unanticipated relationships is something that decentralized, individual incentive systems do best.

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