Archive for May 17th, 2010

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Per capita energy consumption has declined in the United States

May 17, 2010

Michael Giberson

At the Freakonomics blog, James McWilliams offers a review of sorts of Robert Bryce’s new book Power Hungry: The Myths of “Green” Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future.  McWilliams reports that the book is “a sustained attack on our irrational infatuation with wind and solar power.” Part of Bryce’s “sustained attack” is a chapter on Denmark and wind energy, and McWilliams’s piece mostly directs itself to explaining and commenting on the Denmark chapter.

Unfortunately, McWilliams’s review only convinces me I shouldn’t rely on his opinions on energy topics.

I end up not believing the review mostly because the explanations of Denmark’s situation feel incomplete and a bit ad hoc.  But rather than ask you to trust my feelings, let’s look at a point McWilliams made where fact checking is easy. Here is McWilliams:

It should be noted, in all fairness to Denmark, that its citizens have done something the U.S. seems unwilling to do: they’ve kept energy demand flat. Today, Denmark uses the same amount of per capita energy as it did in 1981. Remarkable.

Do you interpret these two sentences as McWilliams claiming that Danish consumers have kept per capita energy use level since 1981 and U.S. consumers have increased per capita energy use?

A few moments on the internet turns up data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration on per capita energy use: per capita energy use was 332 million BTU in the United States in 1981, 327 million BTU in 2008, and 310 million BTU in 2009.  These numbers are from the 2008 Annual Energy Review and the 2010 Annual Energy Outlook.  A EIA spreadsheet from the 2006 International Energy Annual [XLS] has data on many countries, including the U.S. and Denmark, over the period 1980-2006. In general both countries have seen ups and downs in per capita energy use from 1980 to 2006, with the ups tending to reflect periods of low energy prices or stronger economic growth and the downs tending to reflect periods of higher energy prices or weaker energy growth. Unremarkable.

Since I can’t rely on McWilliams’s review, I don’t know yet whether I’m interested or not in Bryce’s book.  However, Bryce’s “Five myths about green energy,” an op-ed appearing in the Washington Post just before the his book was published, seems similarly incomplete and ad hoc in its analysis. (How critical for energy policy analysis is a calculation of watts of energy output per square meter of land devoted to energy production? It strikes me as reaching for a techno-scientific sounding statistic to dress up the author’s dismissal of wind power which is itself based on other grounds.) But op-eds are brief and by nature driven to anecdote rather than careful explication of data; maybe the book has more substance.

(A tip of the hat with link to John Whitehead at Environmental Economics for drawing my attention to the McWilliams review at Freakonomics.)

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Electricity generation, New Source Review, and waste

May 17, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

On Friday at Environmental Economics, Tim Haab wrote about the implications of New Source Review for innovation in a regulated industry, and how to represent it in the standard Pigouvian model (do go read the whole post, it’s very useful). The basic question is this: does the stifling of innovation that results from New Source Review regulations change the fundamental analysis of the question of pollution?

I have some quibbles with how Tim frames the “externality” question — in particular, I prefer the “markets don’t fail, they fail to exist” formulation of the fact that some uncompensated cost is present, rather than “market failure” — but his post makes a really important point with respect to New Source Review and the Pigouvian model:

The technological improvements resulting from removal of New Source Review may shift the private supply curve to the right, and may reduce the emissions per unit of output, but that doesn’t solve the fundamental externality problem.   So even though the technological improvements may reduce per unit emissions, emissions may actually increase from the decreased costs of producing electricity (decrease per unit emissions, but increased units). Regardless, with or without the NSR regulation, there will still be emissions and those emissions will remain unpriced (inefficiently) by the market. ‘

While I agree that existing regulations may have reduced the incentive for innovation, their existence doesn’t change the fundamental market failure–emissions are not rationed through prices.  For a market to work efficiently, ALL costs and benefits of production and consumption must be internalized.  In such cases, emissions will be efficiently rationed.

I take issue with a couple of these points. First, if the Pigouvian model is the correct way to model the pollution question, it is incorrect that “ALL costs and benefits of production and consumption must be internalized”. For an illustration of why this claim is not correct, ask yourself this question: how much do you pay your neighbors for the lovely flowers they plant in their front gardens, and if you did pay them, would that induce them to plant more flowers? Of course you don’t pay your neighbors for the external benefit you derive from their lovely gardens, and I think it’s a safe generalization that your neighbor-gardeners have more intense preferences over their gardening decisions than you do over their decisions. What does that imply? It implies that even if you did pay them as compensation to internalize your benefit, if your marginal benefit is small relative to theirs, your payment is unlikely to change their decision at the margin of how much gardening to do. In other words, the only uncompensated costs and benefits that are important for achieving the optimal level of abatement (of a cost) or increase (of a benefit) are the costs and benefits that are Pareto relevant, that would at the margin change the behavior of the relevant party.

This must be a pet issue for me because I’ve written about it before, with respect to inefficient energy efficiency consumer subsidies, with respect to externality accounting, and with respect to the fact that Alex Tabarrok got a flu shot because he wanted to get kissed.

As a coda: I do not think that the Pigouvian model is the correct model, because it ignores the reciprocal nature of costs; in other words, it ignores the fact that the pollution problem is a problem of conflicting uses of a scarce common-pool resources, and the people with those different uses are imposing costs on each other. The polluter is not the only one creating a cost.

Second, I think Tim’s right about his interpretation of NSR and the Pigouvian model, but I also think that the Pigou model of a per-unit tax on output from a polluting firm is not the best model to use to see the effects of NSR, unless the policy you are analyzing is a per-unit output tax. I think a fuller answer to his astute student also includes the following:

If the policy is an emissions tax (e.g., a per-ton tax on sulfur dioxide or greenhouse gases), then NSR regulation artificially keeps abatement costs higher than they would be in the presence of the technological innovation. Thus at the margin, the NSR regulation does affect the firm’s choice, and the amount of abatement/emissions, because if the tax rate is higher than the abatement cost, then the firm will choose to abate. Thus NSR means that less abatement takes place under an emissions tax, by keeping abatement costs higher.

If the policy is a tradeable permit system, then NSR regulation artificially keeps abatement costs higher than they would be in the presence of the technological innovation. A firm’s abatement costs determine its demand for permits in the permit market. Thus at the margin, the NSR regulation increases the firm’s willingness to pay for permits, and leads to higher costs of achieving the abatement/emissions target.

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