Archive for May, 2010

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More on efficient trade between power markets

May 12, 2010

Michael Giberson

A paper by Giorgia Oggioni and Yves Smeers, “Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading,” examines the value of improving coordination between separate-but-interconnected power markets. (A post here last week cited a recent Windpower Monthly article that provides a good non-technical discussion of the issue. If you are not familiar with market coupling, I recommend you first read the Windpower Monthly article linked to in the earlier post. The Oggioni and Smeers paper provides a more technical discussion.)

In brief, Oggioni and Smeers compare market coupling regimes to both an ideal market* on the one hand and separate market-to-market coordination agreements** on the other hand. Not surprisingly, they find the ideal market design is most efficient and independent market-to-market coordination is least efficient in their numerical analysis. An encompassing market coupling system (a single market coupling system able to redispatch all available energy supply resources) also achieves a high degree of efficiency. Somewhat surprising to me was that multiple independent but overlapping market coupling systems achieved similarly high degrees of efficiency so long as each supply resource is available to at least one market coupling system and each supply resource is available on the same terms (i.e. at the same price) to each market coupling system that can access it.

The paper is written to address circumstances in the European market, but has implications for trade between power systems in the United States and elsewhere as well. To put this in a U.S. context, the article suggests that if trade between the New York ISO and ISO-New England was well integrated, and if trade between the New York ISO and PJM was well integrated, then the three systems would attain a high degree of efficiency even without resorting to a single integrated dispatch across the three regional power markets.

In principle, adding efficient trade between PJM and MISO, and efficient trade between MISO and SPP, and suddenly one can obtain efficient power system arbitrage subject to the limits of the transmission system stretching from the tip of Maine down to the eastern edge of New Mexico.

In practice a few issues intrude.  Market coupling in Europe is, I think, still limited to day-ahead coordination between power systems, leaving the transmission system operators to address independently the changes in local supply and demand that arise after the day-ahead result is published.  Moving toward real-time market coupling would create additional economic value, but at the cost of a significant increase in data sharing requirements and a higher computational burden on the system operators. In considering priorities for further power market development, then, the issue is whether the benefits of moving closer to real-time market coupling are worth the costs, and this ratio then compared to the benefit-cost ratio of other identified potential market improvements.

*Ideal market = a single security-constrained economic dispatch covering the entire region, using a fully developed transmission model and accurate depictions of generation characteristics.

**Market-to-market coordination agreements = bilateral agreements between markets that govern access to the transmission capacity between the systems and setting rules to resolve congestion on the interconnecting transmission lines.

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Derivatives markets, storage and price volatility

May 11, 2010

Michael Giberson

I found this discussion of spot oil prices, futures prices, and commodity storage to be insightful:

[R]ecent evidence suggests that the combination of derivative prices and storage stabilized rather than destabilized the oil markets.

Indeed, during the run up in oil prices at the beginning of 2008 the spot price for oil was considerably higher than the futures price for delivery in 12 months, providing an incentive to reduce storage.   By taking oil out of storage and putting more supply on the market, the spot price increase was dampened.  Then at the end of 2008 as spot prices for oil were crashing, futures prices stayed above spot prices, creating an incentive to store oil, softening the collapse.

If anything, the volatility in the oil markets over this period of time was caused by a lack of storage capacity that has not grown nearly as fast as the overall oil market.  So if policymakers are serious about dampening volatility, they should encourage the growth in storage capacity.  What does this have to do with derivatives markets?  An active derivatives market makes investments in storage facilities more attractive, because it reduces the risks associated with storing commodities.  Hence, policy initiatives to dampen speculation and hedging in derivatives markets are likely to make storage less attractive, which will in turn, increase rather than decrease the volatility of the actual physical commodity prices.

I wonder how this idea would translate into electric power markets and grid-connected energy storage?

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When stories compete with statistics for attention, stories win

May 11, 2010

Michael Giberson

Everyone loves a good story, it seems.  Maybe too much.  Three U-Mass researchers have detailed the overwhelming influence of anecdotal information in decision making, even less-than-adequate anecdotes presented alongside directly relevant and authoritative statistical information.  The research also looks at two strategies that mitigate some of the influence of anecdotal bias, priming a more “scientific” outlook and encouraging counterargument.

The paper is “Stories vs. Statistics: The Impact of Anecdotal Data on Accounting Decision Making.” The abstract:

Prior research in psychology and communications suggests that decision makers are biased by anecdotal data, even in the presence of more informative statistical data. A bias for anecdotal data can have significant implications for accounting decision making since judgments are often made when both statistical and anecdotal data are present. We conduct experiments in two different accounting contexts (i.e., managerial accounting and auditing) to investigate whether accounting decision makers are unduly influenced by anecdotal data in the presence of superior, and contradictory, statistical data. Our results suggest that accounting decision makers ignored or underweighted statistical data in favor of anecdotal data, leading to suboptimal decisions. In addition, we investigate whether two decision aids, judgment orientation and counterargument, help to mitigate the effects of this anecdotal bias. The results indicate that both decision aids can reduce the influence of anecdotal data in accounting decision contexts. The implications of these results for decision making in accounting and auditing are discussed.

The one thing that might make the study more persuasive would be if they supplemented their detailed statistical results with a good story or two containing “real world” examples of anecdotal bias.

VIA the Cognitive Social Science eJournal, Vol. 2, No. 24.

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Competition for donated used clothes

May 10, 2010

Michael Giberson

Scott Gustafson, at Arizona Economics, points to an article in the Arizona Republic on the market for donated used clothes.  Apparently the competition is fierce, with donation boxes vandalized, bolted shut, or towed away to discourage rivals.

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Onions and motion picture box office receipts

May 10, 2010

Michael Giberson

Felix Salmon had an op-ed in New York Times on Hollywood’s opposition to the trading of future’s contracts based on box office receipts.  Salmon said:

In the 1950s, onion growers were often shocked at the low prices they were getting. Casting around for a villain to blame, they alighted on derivatives traders, and they persuaded Congress to ban any futures trading in onions.

Today onions are the only commodity for which futures trading is banned. Not coincidentally, onion prices remain extremely volatile: they doubled in 2008, and then fell by 25 percent in 2009.

Today, no one is silly enough to ask a member of Congress to simply outlaw futures trading in a certain type of contract — no one, that is, except Hollywood film producers. Under the proposed financial-reform legislation making its way through the Senate, the bit of the 1958 bill saying “except onions” would be amended to read “except onions and motion picture box office receipts.”

Looking back at 2008-2009 commodity prices, we see a number of other goods for which prices were extremely volatile, some of which were traded on futures market.  (Consider natural gas prices, which began 2008 at $7.80 per mmbtu, rose to over $13.50 mid-year, then tumbled as low as $2.51 in September 2009.)  So Salmon’s brief nod to data on volatility leaves much out.  Fortunately, the onion futures trading ban has been much studied, and analysis pretty strongly comes to the conclusion that the onion futures trading ban has increased spot price volatility.

But Salmon’s observation is more to the point that advocates of bans in futures trading don’t always get what they want, even if, as Salmon said, it isn’t very clear why most of Hollywood seems opposed to the markets.

LINK to recent related KP posts.

HT Chris Masse.

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Dynamic pricing for foodies … and for electricity?

May 10, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

If you like to cook and to eat well in Chicago, you can’t avoid chef Grant Achatz (nor should you want to!). His signature restaurant, Alinea, was recently named the best restaurant in the U.S. and one of the best restaurants in the world, and he is a creative, if controversial, innovator of “molecular gastronomy”.

Achatz, with business partner Nick Kokonas, got the foodie chatterati talking again last week when they announced their new venture, a Chicago restaurant called Next. Next has two novel features: the menu will change every few months and will channel the food and atmosphere of a particular time and place, and the pricing is prix fixe along the lines of a concert ticket. The first time-place that they will feature is Paris 1912, the tail end of the Belle Epoque (one of my favorite artistic and culinary periods!).

The pricing of the experience as a prepaid prix fixe is interesting in and of itself, and other economists have commented on that since the announcement. But the feature that is likely to be of the most interest to KP readers is outlined on the restaurant’s FAQ:

How much?
A meal at Next will represent a great value. Depending on the menu AND what day and time you are dining, food will be $40 to $75 for the entire prix fixe menu. Wine and beverage pairings will begin at a $25 supplement. Next’s goal is to serve 4-star food at 3-star prices.

Tickets?
Yes. Instead of reservations our bookings will be made more like a theater or a sporting event. Your tickets will be fully inclusive of all charges, including service. Ticket price will depend on which seating you buy – Saturday at 8 PM will be more expensive than Wednesday at 9:30 PM. This will allow us to offer an amazing experience at a very reasonable price. We will also offer an annual subscription to all four menus at a discount with preferred seating.
Two walk-in tables will be available every evening.
The tickets will be available via our website, and we are building the reservation system from scratch to ensure the best customer experience. It will be simple to use, efficient, and familiar to anyone who has booked a show or travel online.

This is a pricing system for the foodie economist! Selling tickets in advance signals popularity to the seller, gives the seller more certainty about the number of customers and the amount they will sell, and enables them to optimize their purchases of inputs. They need only procure extra for the two walk-in tables, plus a cushion for mistakes and accidents. That’s one reason why they can expect to deliver “4-star food at 3-star prices”.

But the pricing feature about which I will rhapsodize is, of course, the dynamic pricing: “Saturday at 8 PM will be more expensive than Wednesday at 9:30 PM”. This price discrimination is brilliant but not novel, although its use in restaurant pricing is. It is a decentralized mechanism that enables consumers to sort themselves according to their their willingness to pay, their preferences and their price elasticity of demand while simultaneously enabling the seller to maximize revenue. Combined with the “concert ticket” design, this pricing structure generally looks like a good setup for profit maximization. And given what has driven Achatz’s popularity and the fact that the time-place “Paris 1912″ idea is more like entertainment than any dining experience I know of other than Medieval Times, I think the price discrimination is also a valuable way to allocate dining spaces over which there will probably be excess demand.

Given this innovation in an improbable industry, here’s my challenge to those of you who work in the electricity industry, in electricity policy, or electricity regulation: if a creative innovator can create so much new value for consumers in such an improbable industry by adopting such a contractual form and such a pricing system, why do you reject it so strenuously in electricity? The parallels are striking — potential restaurant customers have a range of preferences, incomes, willingness to pay. We all need to eat. Restaurants have high fixed costs (although of course not in the proportion that we see in infrastructure industries). Customers like me relish the thought of such a choice, and look forward to its availability. Why do you make so many customers worse off relative to the potential value they could achieve from innovation if you removed the barriers to innovation, product differentiation, and competitive choice in retail electricity markets?

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The right market design for trade between power markets

May 7, 2010

Michael Giberson

Windpower Monthly has a great article describing changes in the market for transmission capacity between power systems in Europe and the benefits of the changes.  Here is a summary by way of selected quotes, but the full story is worth reading:

Most of the electricity cables connecting Europe were built when electricity systems in each country were monopolised by a single or, at most, a few companies, each operating within their individual monopoly supply areas. Each utility ran its own system and had its own generation backup for emergencies. There was no competitive pressure on the higher costs of such “island” systems since these could easily be passed on to customers who, in those days, had no alternative suppliers that they could switch to.

These interconnectors were built between neighbouring countries’ electricity grids not to enable trading and competition across borders but rather for the utilities to help each other out….  [As the Eurpopean power industry was liberalized] insufficient connection capacity between some of the national electricity networks [emerged as] one of the key problems.  [An] efficient allocation for the scarce interconnector capacity that is available is crucial to make improvements towards an integrated European electricity market.

Before the new [market coupling] system started, transmission capacity available on the two interconnectors was sold to electricity traders in tranches in annual, monthly and daily auctions, called explicit auctions. This happened completely separate from auctioning of electricity with the result that, due to the time lag in buying the transport capacity and the actual time of use, as well as other reasons, inefficiencies occurred.

Transport capacity could be bought ahead of time and hoarded, a form of market abuse. Or transmission capacity was bought for one direction, say from Germany to Denmark, which then turned out to be inappropriate because the price difference between the two was such that the electricity ought to flow in the other direction – from the low- to the high-price zone. In such instances, the electricity did then flow in the wrong direction, contradicting market forces, or not allowing extra capacity to be used – and traders and end users lost out.

Explicit auctions were implemented for interconnectors at most European borders, recounts [EMCC managing director Enno] Bšttcher. “Even though this can be considered as progress compared to the formerly applied first-come, first-served or pro-rata regimes, explicit auctions still have many disadvantages,” he says.

Today, explicit auction methods have become more sophisticated. The fundamental flaw, however, remains: that actual trade of electricity at energy exchanges in the different market areas is separate from transmission capacity, trading leading to market inefficiency. This can be reduced by combining cross-border transmission capacity allocation and electricity trade from one country or market area to another in a so-called market-coupling regime.

Market coupling uses implicit auctioning and focuses on the short term (day ahead), rather than months or a year ahead. The transmission capacity available on an interconnector the next day, as reported by the transmission system operators (TSOs), is matched with electricity bought or sold on the energy exchanges in the two countries involved for delivery the next day, creating a price for the transmission capacity and making it clear in which direction the market requires use of the transmission capacity of the cables.

In effect, market coupling is a charge placed on the power exported or imported between countries when the network interconnector capacity is optimised to reduce congestion.

The result of market coupling is that the interconnected power systems operate more efficiently, benefiting consumers and low-cost producers of power.

As Tres Amigas works out its design for the sale of transmission capacity across the proposed three-way transmission interconnection, market coupling should be among the designs contemplated.

Note that while day-ahead market coupling seems to work well between systems with relatively few interconnecting links, more complex transmission links between systems – say as exists between PJM and the Midwest ISO – may well call for still more extensive coordination. The market coupling principle seems sound, so probably forms an adequate foundation to build upon, but simple day-ahead coordination is likely insufficient. Real-time market coupling, anyone?

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Automatic trading and market (in)stability

May 7, 2010

Michael Giberson

News and commentary on Thursday’s stock market moves.  First, Newsweek, “The Computer Glitch Felt Round the World.”  Now, Scott Patterson, WSJ, reports “Did Shutdowns Make the Plunge Worse?” (Business Insider comments, “Everyone is rushing to blame [High Frequency Trading (HFT)] and other non-human problems for the crash… when, at least in part, it may have been the cessation of HFT that exacerbated the plunge.)

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Tennessee AG settles price gouging claim against Knoxville gasoline retailer

May 6, 2010

Michael Giberson

Fall 2008 was a time of rapidly falling wholesale and retail gasoline prices throughout the United States, interrupted briefly due to the market disruptions of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in early September.

In Tennessee, retail price increases surrounding Hurricane Ike resulted in more the 4,000 complaints to the state government. Resulting investigations by the Tennessee’s Attorney General and Department of Commerce and Insurance led to settlements with 16 gasoline retailers in April 2009. The AG filed suit in April 2009 against the sole hold-out, a Knoxville-area gasoline retailer, that declined to enter into a settlement at that time. The hold-out, Weigel Stores, Inc., reached a settlement with the Tennessee AG’s office last week. (Links to Tennessee AG provided material.)

Both in the settlements of April 2009 and in the Weigel’s settlement of April 2010, the retailers denied wrongdoing and said they entered into the settlement to avoid the the time and expense associated with litigation.  Weigel’s held out longer and, in the “Agreed Final Order” insisted upon a stronger than usual denial of wrongdoing.  Where the 2009 settlement statements included one sentence (For example: “The Defendant denies any wrongdoing and enters into this Judgment to avoid the time and expense associated with litigation.”), Weigel’s insisted on two paragraphs:

DEFENDANT’S POSITION: Defendant has denied and continues to deny each and all of the claims alleged by Plaintiff.  Defendant expressly has denied and continues to deny any charges of wrongdoing or liability against it arising out of any of the conduct, statement, acts, or omissions alleged, or that could have been alleged, in the Amended Complaint.  This Order of Settlement shall in no event be construed or deemed to be evidence of an admission or concession on the part of Defendant with respect to any claim or of any fault, liability, wrongdoing, or damage whatsoever, or any infirmity in the defenses that Defendant has asserted.  Defendant’s decision to settle the litigation was based on the conclusion that further conduct of the litigation would be protracted and expensive, and it is desirable that the litigation be fully and finally settled in the manner and upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Order, and the uncertainty and risks inherent in any litigation.

This Order only resolves matters set forth in the State’s Amended Complaint commenced under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 and the Tennessee Price Gouging Act of 2002.

In a statement released by Weigel’s, the company said, “Pursuant to the settlement, Weigel’s will make a payment to the State which is well below Weigel’s costs of continuing to litigate the matter….”  The payment to the state will be $57,000 (assuming the agreement is accepted by the court), which says something about the company’s expected cost to defend itself against the State.

The week-end that Hurricane Ike hit the Texas coast, Knoxville temporarily held the dubious distinction of having the highest gasoline prices in the United States according to AAA. While prices rapidly subsided, folks in the area were left wondering how prices went so high, so fast.  I’d offer the following explanation based on several contemporaneous news reports by The Knoxville News-Sentinel (found via LexisNexis, but not freely available online as far as I can tell):

  • Key data to explain: typically gasoline prices in Knoxville are as low as or slightly lower than the rest of the state, but over the Hurricane Ike weekend prices in Knoxville were briefly much higher.
  • News reports indicate Pilot Travel Centers and Weigel’s procured gasoline supplies at spot market prices.  Likely other retailers did, too, but at least these two large gasoline retailers serving the area did.
  • Buying at spot, rather than through longer term supply contracts, can help retailers shave a little off of costs most of the time, but exposes the retailer to price risk when wholesale supplies get tight.
  • If Knoxville-area retailers are more reliant on spot purchases than retailers in other areas of the state, it could explain why prices are typically a low in Knoxville, but supplies were shorter and prices much higher during the market disruption.

So I don’t know whether or not Knoxville-area retailers are more reliant on spot purchases than retailers in the rest of the state, but if it is true it could explain the severity of the price spike.  As the chart above shows, the price effects of the disruption were especially brief, too.  While prices in Nashville and Memphis took one or two weeks to fall back to pre-Ike levels, prices in Knoxville fell back to pre-Ike levels in a matter of days.

The news reports indicate that gasoline was in short supply in Knoxville even before Ike reached the Texas coast.  Some stations had already shut off pumps due to a lack of supply.  The September 12, 2008 News-Sentinel reported Bill Weigel as saying, “We’re working around the clock hunting. We’re not even asking the price. It doesn’t matter right now… There is just no gasoline.” (“Knox hit with gas shortage.”)  A September 13, 2008 News-Sentinel story, “Knoxville, TN area gas prices soar,” describes a bit more of the extraordinary efforts by Pilot Travel Centers and Weigel’s to secure supplies for their stores.

Both Pilot and Weigel’s were later charged with price gouging by the state.

Nothing in the law says retailers have to work hard to keep resupplied during a market disruption. All the law does is make it hard to be compensated for any extra time and trouble. Perhaps next time company executives will just take the weekend off, let the pumps run dry, add to the general market confusion, let consumers suffer, and keep the Tennessee Attorney General off their back.

RELATED:

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FCC and internet regulation: “lobbyists on both sides are already shopping for new vacation houses in Aspen”

May 6, 2010

Michael Giberson

From Regulation 2.0:

Frustrated by a federal appeals court ruling that the FCC had no authority to second-guess Comcast’s treatment of customers and under pressure from the Obama Administration to impose a net neutrality regime (whatever that truly means) on the broadband industry, FCC Chair Julius Genachowski is now asserting the commission’s right to regulate Internet access providers under the ancient rules that govern telephone landlines.

We don’t know whether Congress will let the FCC get away with it – lobbyists on both sides are already shopping for new vacation houses in Aspen — or what the commission would actually do with the authority if it wins the political battle.   But we do know this is very bad news for those who fear that the uncertainty will slow both the expansion of Internet capacity and the pace of innovation.

Links in original, of which this is just an excerpt. The whole thing is short; read it to see why “the specifics of this issue make it especially troubling.”

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