Archive for August, 2010

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Dynamic pricing of street parking in San Francisco

August 18, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

In all of the discussion this week of Tyler’s NYT column on pricing and constructing lot parking, an innovation in pricing street parking has been overlooked. Under a new pilot project in San Francisco called SFpark, street parking will now be priced using dynamic pricing. According to SFpark’s description,

To help achieve the right level of parking availability, SFpark will periodically adjust meter pricing up and down to match demand. Demand-responsive pricing encourages drivers to park in underused areas and garages, reducing demand in overused areas. With SFpark, real-time data and demand-responsive pricing work together to readjust parking patterns in the City so that parking is easier to find.

The prices will not vary dramatically; as this Wired post notes,

The prices won’t fluctuate wildly during the course of a day. The changes will be slow and self-leveling: the prices will change once a month or less, and then only by 50-cents at a time.

Also, as the commenters on this post about the pilot note, it’s not like the price is going to be determined by a real-time double auction. Still, having both the city and potential parkers using digital technology to assess changing demand for parking and access real-time information on the current hourly parking price is a good first start in introducing dynamic pricing.

The anticipated benefits of dynamic pricing of street parking are numerous: saving time (and reducing the opportunity cost of parking in terms of time spent circling and looking for a space), reduced double parking, better parking space capacity utilization (both for street parking and lot parking), increased safety for cyclists and pedestrians who won’t have as many obstacles in the form of double-parked cars and distracted drivers looking for spaces, and (of course!) reduced fuel consumption and emissions because of the reduction in “inefficient” circling the block.

Certainly some observers will complain that the improved capacity utilization and reduced opportunity cost will, at the margin, increase the probability that some people will drive rather than taking pubic transportation; those same folks typically argue that parking pricing should be used as a social policy tool to induce people to drive less. Obviously, such comments ignore the value to people associated with the flexibility and multi-purpose capability of driving rather than taking public transportation.

Here’s my question (of course): if we can overcome our cultural and institutional barriers to dynamic pricing in street parking, why can’t we do so with electricity?

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A post which isn’t about the question marks swirling around high speed rail

August 18, 2010

Michael Giberson

In a post that actually isn’t about the “question marks swirling around high speed rail,” Eric Morris quotes approvingly a remark from Randal O’Toole, a big fan of trains and also a big critic of public subsidies for trains: “I don’t expect taxpayers to subsidize these preferences any more than if I liked hot-air balloons or midget submarines.”

In a way, the remark reflects my own attitude toward my libertarian impulses. I have libertarian attitudes and they certainly affect the way I see the world and what I think public policy should be more like. But when I approach a policy question, I can’t expect folks who don’t share my feelings to simply acquiesce without thinking for themselves. In fact, I think it a quite reasonable Hayekian position to want other people to think for themselves, otherwise that giant discovery process and information generating system comes crashing down. Seems just as true whether we’re talking about pencil making or public policy.

I suspect Morris will have something to say about those swirling high speed rail question marks in future posts on the Freakonomics blog.

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More on unconscionability and price gouging law

August 17, 2010

Michael Giberson

[This post is second of two on Eisenberg’s essay on unconscionability. Link to part one.]

Having spent a little more time with Eisenberg’s essay on unconscionability, I’m less enthusiastic than I was at first, but let’s take a look.  Eisenberg advanced two cases in his essay: The Desperate Traveler and The Desperate Patient. Briefly, the Desperate Traveler (A) is stranded in the desert and facing death, another traveler (B) happens by and offers to rescue A in exchange for an extremely large sum, A agrees to pay but once returned safely home refuses to pay the large sum. B sues to enforce the contract.

The second story is quite similar: The Desperate Patient (P) is seriously ill and will soon die unless he receives an organ transplant that has just recently become possible due to the development efforts of a surgeon (S). At the moment only S is able to perform the surgery, which S offers to do for an extremely large sum. P agrees to pay, but after the surgery refuses to pay S the large sum. S sues to enforce to contract.

See more in the continuation.

Read the rest of this entry ?

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Unconscionability and price gouging law

August 16, 2010

Michael Giberson

[This post is first of two on Eisenberg’s essay on unconscionability. Link to part two.]

Use of vague concepts like “unconscionability” in price gouging laws creates problems. Businesses are not always sure what prices are legal under such laws, and as a result may price products uneconomically low or remove products from the market altogether rather than risk prosecution. Prosecutors gain flexibility from the vagueness, but then bear the burden of convincing a judge or jury that a particular price was in fact unconscionable. In some cases states provide explicit guidance – maybe 10 percent, 15 percent, or even 25 percent over pre-emergency prices – but often states simply prohibit “unconscionable,” “excessive,” or “exorbitant” prices without providing further guidance.

Melvin Eisenberg has an essay on unconscionability in contract law that helps explain that term and may prove useful in understanding price gouging law (link in continuation). As it turns out, Eisenberg does offer some concepts useful to thinking about price gouging, but when he actually addresses price gouging directly his analysis neglects these concepts.  In a subsequent post I’ll discuss Eisenberg’s price gouging analysis, the remainder of this post looks at the general idea of unconscionability.

Read the rest of this entry ?

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Monterey Institute looking for energy/trade economist

August 15, 2010

Michael Giberson

From the inbox, a note from the Monterey Institute about their open position for an energy economist. Technically speaking they are advertising for a international trade & development position, but Monterey professor Jason Scorse said while they need someone for International Econ and Trade, they especially seek someone who can do energy economics and whose work relates to emerging economies.

If this is you (and you can bear to work near the Pacific Ocean at a place with near perfect weather, about equidistant from Gilroy, the garlic capital of the world, and Big Sur), then check them out.

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Defending the ‘three tier’ alcohol distribution system

August 15, 2010

Michael Giberson

A newspaper report said, “Internet and direct-mail sales have become essential to the growth of smaller winemakers and microbrewers in the last decade.”  No doubt the reason that “distributors of alcoholic beverages are pressing for a federal law that would allow states to block interstate sales of wine and beer to their residents….”

The documentary Beer Wars tells the story of the growth of small- and medium-sized craft brewers and their battle against the “big guys” (mostly Anheuser-Busch), but an amusing highlight comes with a trip to Washington, D.C., for the annual beer wholesalers lobbying trip.  Distributor after distributor, when asked what they where lobbying for, answered “to defend the three tier system.”

Do you have to a$k why?  I$n’t it obviou$?

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The Economist: (sing with me!)”Dave and Nick/are punk rockers”

August 13, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Oh, yes, the old 80s girl in me loves the image on what just came in the mail:

And the substance behind their point is equally, well, pointed:

Yet within its first 100 days the Con-Lib coalition has emerged as a radical force. For the first time since Margaret Thatcher handbagged the world in 1979, Britain looks like the West’s test-tube (see article). It is daring again—not always in a good way but in one that is likely to be instructive to more timid souls, not least Mr Obama and his Republican foes.

The most obvious audacity of hope lies in the budget, unveiled by George Osborne, the new chancellor of the exchequer, in June. To balance the books, he raised some taxes, notably VAT, but three-quarters of the savings will come from spending cuts. Most government departments will shrink by a quarter, though Mr Osborne excluded the National Health Service from his savagery. In the heated debate between Keynesian economists (who worry that a weak world economy needs more government spending) and fiscal hawks (who believe deficits must be tackled now to stave off Grecian disaster), Britain is the prime exhibit for tough love. …

So a gamble it remains. But it is one that in general this newspaper supports. Throughout the rich world, government has simply got too big and Mr Cameron’s crew currently have the most promising approach to trimming it. Others—and not just the tottering likes of Greece and Spain—will surely follow. That includes America.

Make no mistake, though; Britain’s coalition government is not libertarian through-and-through. But its practical policy gamble is consistent with a recognition that “government has simply got too big” for both the practical and the moral focus on individual liberty that must be the foundation of a prosperous, resilient, and respectful society.

And you get bonus points if you realized that my title invokes one of the best proto-punk songs ever, The Ramones’ Sheena is a Punk Rocker.

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An economic analysis of comparative fuel economy?

August 13, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Thursday’s Wall Street Journal had an article on airline fuel economy, “A Prius With Wings vs. a Guzzler in the Clouds“, and it presents an analysis that is a good starting point for thinking about an economic comparison of the fuel efficiency of different modes of transportation. The analysis compares the fuel economy of different U.S. airlines, measured in miles per gallon to facilitate comparisons with other modes of transportation: “With airlines, it’s how far one seat (occupied or not) can travel on one gallon of jet fuel.”.

One technical caveat: the measure of m.p.g. uses the number of seats in the airline’s fleet, not the number of occupied seats. Thus if the airline has a low load factor (i.e., flies planes with lots of empty seats), then this measure will overstate their fuel economy relative to what it would be if you measured actual passenger miles flown. Motivated by competition, costs, and narrowing profit margins, though, airlines have had pretty high load factors since deregulation in 1978, so I wouldn’t throw out this analysis based on that caveat.

Two interesting results come out of the analysis. First,

The three worst major U.S. carriers for fuel efficiency happen to be the three biggest: Delta, American and United airlines. They fly the biggest planes, which aren’t always more fuel efficient, and they have the oldest fleets.

Best in fuel economy: Alaska Airlines, jetBlue Airways and Continental Airlines, which all have fleets that average nine years of age or younger. Regardless of an airline’s ranking, your particular flight mpg will vary greatly.

So newer planes are more fuel efficient, and even though larger planes can carry many more passengers, the incremental fuel burned per additional passenger is higher. I’d be interested in seeing an econometric analysis that decomposed the magnitudes of the age effect and the size effect.

Second, note that the average fuel economy for the entire U.S. air fleet is 64 m.p.g. That’s high! Even if you take into account the load factor caveat, that’s an impressive number, as is the improvement in fuel economy that the airlines have generated since 2000 (motivated, certainly, by increases in jet fuel prices and jet fuel price volatility that they can’t hedge fully).

Comparing the fuel efficiency of different modes of passenger transportation is difficult, but this recent post at truecostblog makes a thorough stab at an apples-to-apples comparison of actual passenger miles per gallon, a measure that takes into account average vehicle occupancy and actual vehicle miles traveled, not just passenger capacity. This measure will disfavor the personal car, which for most of us most of the time operates with a load factor of 25% (single drivers). Truecostblog’s results:

Source: truecostblog, May 27, 2010

Each of the calculation is supported by notes, so please check the original post to get further details on the calculations.

Note here that the estimate of the airplane mpg is 42.6, with the decrease relative to the WSJ analysis reflecting the load factor of 79.6%. Passenger trains compare favorably, despite the poor utilization/load factor of Amtrak in the US. But what’s really striking here is how poorly the bus, the car, and the SUV/minivan compare to the airplane and train.

As an aside, note also that these data support all of those CSX commercials we’ve been seeing where CSX trumpets how green it is to ship freight by train rather than truck — the freight train 190.5 PMPG vs. the 18-wheeler 32.2 PMPG.

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Auctioning power transmission capacity contracts of varying duration

August 12, 2010

Michael Giberson

Suppose you are a merchant transmission line operator with a DC power line linking point A to point B.  Some potential customers prefer to buy transmission capability the day before the power flow, while others would like to buy monthly, annual, or even multi-year contracts.  While some customers want 24-hour delivery, others seek “peak hour” (6 AM to 10 PM) or “off peak” contracts (10 PM to 6 AM).  The economic value of transmission capability depends on the difference in the price of power at points A and B.  While this difference is not completely unpredictable, it does vary a great deal over the course of a day and from season to season.

The transmission line operator’s problem is to determine how it will divide up its transmission capability to sell to customers: how much to long term contracts and how much to shorter duration contracts, how much to 24-hour contracts and how much to peak or off-peak packages, and so on.

Perhaps the market design for the job is a “product mix auction.”  Paul Klemperer describes it as:

My design is straightforward in concept – each bidder can make one or more bids, and each bid contains a set of mutually exclusive offers. Each offer specifies a price (or, in the Bank of England’s auction, an interest rate) for a quantity of a specific “variety”. The auctioneer looks at all the bids and then selects a price for each “variety”. From each set of offers in each bid, the auctioneer accepts the one that gives the bidder the greatest surplus evaluated at the selected prices or no offer if all the offers would give the bidder negative surplus. All accepted offers for a variety pay the same (uniform) price for that variety.

The idea is that the menu of mutually exclusive bids allows each bidder to approximate a demand function, so bidders can, in effect, decide how much of each variety to buy after seeing the prices chosen. Meanwhile the auctioneer can look at demand before choosing the prices. (Allowing the auctioneer to choose the prices ex post creates no problem here because it allocates to each bidder precisely what that bidder would have chosen given those prices in the environments for which the auction is proposed.) Importantly, offers for each variety provide a competitive discipline on the offers for the other varieties, because they are all being auctioned simultaneously….

The product-mix auction yields better “matching” between suppliers and demanders, reduced market power, greater volume and liquidity, and therefore also improved efficiency, revenue, and quality of information than feasible alternatives. Its potential applications therefore extend well beyond the financial context.

For more information see Klemperer, Paul (2009). “The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods”.

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Othman on Pickens, Horseflesh, and Hypocrisy

August 11, 2010

Michael Giberson

Abe Othman at Constructive Economics has been reading Boone Pickens:

T. Boone Pickens, from his autobiography The Luckiest Guy in the World:

I believe the greatest opportunity lies in a free marketplace. There are powerful forces afoot trying to restrict that freedom in the interests of the vested and already wealthy.

T. Boone Pickens, in congressional testimony on a bill to prevent the slaughter of horses for food:

The whole thing, it’s a boondoggle on the American people…People that are for the slaughter should be forced to go down on that kill floor…The brutal slaughter of horses for consumption by wealthy diners in Europe and Japan cuts against our moral and cultural fiber — it’s just plain un-American.

Othman remarks, “Remember, if they can come after the horse slaughterers, they can come after the hedge funds.”

(Othman apparently remains under the the influence of Al Roth’s work on repugnance and markets – not that there is anything wrong with that.)

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