Archive for August, 2010

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A personal note on KP

August 11, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

As Mike said last week, the summer “doldrums” have been in force in KP-land. I have been working on a research project unrelated to electricity, which I’ll be willing to share soon, so there will be more to come on that … and frankly, I’m so disappointed (but not surprised) in the direction that electricity policy and smart grid investment have taken that I have not wanted to write about it, because it would come off just sounding like griping. There I am also starting to pull some thoughts together that are more analytical and scholarly and less splenetic.

But there are two big reasons I’ve been so quiet that I should share, just to clear the decks and shake the fuzz from the KP-writing center of my brain. The first reason is that my mother died unexpectedly in April, and in addition to the funeral and grieving and contemplative time and space needed for dealing with that, I am an only child. This means, with my father having died almost four years ago, that I had to focus a lot of time and mental-physical-emotional effort on clearing out the house, estate sale, selling the house, integrating the furniture and mementos of a happy life with two beloved parents into our home, etc. The KP Spouse has been a real champ throughout, and I am grateful that I’ve been very fortunate to get a lot of help from our friends. But it has meant that I’ve not felt very chatty, very witty, or very “teachy”.

The second, much happier reason why I’ve not been here much is that I’ve spent the past year in particular being very focused on my triathlon training, and I am happy to report that in July I competed in and completed the Door County Half Ironman Triathlon in Wisconsin. That’s a 1.2 mile swim, 56 mile bike, and 13.1 mile run, if you’re keeping score, and I did it (with two fairly slow transitions!) in 6 hours 31 minutes. I knew I was well enough trained to finish, and I was about 15 minutes slower than my target time because I ran out of gas on the run, but I wasn’t sure if this was going to be a “one and done” experience or if I’d want to do another. It was actually fun and I enjoyed the race, so I am sure I’ll do more races at this distance in the future, as well as the shorter sprints and Olympic distances. I think my focus for next year, though, will be on training for the Olympic distance (1500 meter swim, 25 mile bike, 10k run) and becoming more efficient at it.

And no, I am never going to do an Ironman. Yes, I am committing to this publicly. No interest whatsoever.

Now that I have accomplished those two personal challenges, it’s time to get the focus back to thinking, writing, and teaching about economics. I hope you’ll find it thought-provoking and useful.

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Tres Amigas in the news

August 10, 2010

Michael Giberson

Tres Amigas, as seen by their hometown newspaper The Santa Fe New Mexican,Supersized power hub in southeastern N.M. to link 3 major U.S. grids“:

Phil Harris is masterminding an electricity superhighway — a facility near Clovis that will connect the nation’s three main power grids for the first time.

The Tres Amigas Superstation will link the Western Interconnection, Eastern Interconnection and Texas Interconnection at a point in southeastern New Mexico. It also will provide the transmission capacity that power managers say is needed to handle the renewable energy expected from new solar and wind sources.

The hub will allow energy to flow between the grids via superconductor cables in underground pipelines and AC/DC converters….

One of the problems is the current system for delivering power across the country is complex and separated by region. The lack of connection limits competition in power markets, Harris said. “In the U.S., no one is in charge. We have over 4,000 entities involved with power.”

Those entities include investor-owned utilities such as Public Service Company of New Mexico, 800 municipal power companies, 900 electric cooperatives, renewable energy generators and power traders such as Goldman Sachs. Regulations vary by group. So do power interconnections.

“There’s no way you can get a single decision about what is best for America,” Harris said.

“People are paying more (for electricity) than they should because it is a constrained market,” he added.

Tres Amigas will make the power market more competitive. Harris is banking on it, to the tune of investing $1 million of his own money in the project, he said.

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Chevy Volt and the definition of price gouging

August 9, 2010

Michael Giberson

The upcoming highly publicized, somewhat politicized release of the Chevy Volt is attracting some unfavorable attention because of the significant dealer markup that at least some Chevrolet dealers are seeking. Edmunds AutoObserver reports being asked for $20,000 for the dealer in addition to the MSRP of $41,000. Around automotive blogs, the phrase “price gouging” is being tossed around a lot (see plugincars.com, GM-Volt.com, worldcarfans.com, egmCarTech.com, and plugincars.com again).

The $20,000 markup appears to be the highest reported, but in an online survey 25 percent of respondents reported seeing markups of $10,000 or more.  At USA Today‘s DriveOn blog, Fred Meier opines “U.S. taxpayers are kicking in a $7,500 tax credit and California is giving buyers another $5,000 to encourage electric car sales. That’s a waste of money if this dealer is right and folks will give him an extra $20K to be first on their block to have a Volt.”  Fully justifying a conclusion that “that’s a waste of money” would require some sophisticated policy analysis, of course, but at first glance the case in favor of the conclusion seems pretty strong.

But, as long time readers know, I’m somewhat more interested in the use of the term “price gouging,” having worried about the meaning, economics and policy application of the term frequently here in the past. (See prior “price gouging” posts here: http://knowledgeproblem.com/?s=price+gouging+giberson.) I’m concerned both with the meaning of the phrase in everyday English and with application of the term in economics, policy and law. (NOTE: The rest of this post is rather pedantic and academic and overly concerned with slight differences in classification and meaning, so it won’t be to everyone’s taste. Proceed, as always, at your own risk.)

Previously I’ve described “price gouging” as involving three elements in its central or prototypical usage: a price increase judged as unfair, an emergency or desperate situation, and a good or service of particular use or value in mitigating the consequences of the emergency.  As also noted, frequently consumers and editorialists fling the term “price gouging” any time they don’t like a price.  See the prior KP posts for examples.  Now I think both parts of this description can be improved.

Notice in the Chevy Volt case, there isn’t a price increase per se. The product hasn’t yet been sold at any price. And while the manufacturer has announced a “suggested retail price” (MSRP), it is well known that actual retail prices for automobiles may be substantially higher or lower than the MSRP.  The “price gouging” term is also invoked in other cases without price increases, but simply when prices for a product are higher in some stores than they are in other stores.  So rather than assert price gouging requires “a price increase judged as unfair,” I’ll assert that price gouging requires “a price judged as unfairly high.”

This isn’t any simpler than before. To judge a price as unfairly high implicitly invokes a further three element breakdown: the price under consideration, a reference price relied upon by the consumer in coming to the conclusion that the price under consideration is too high, and then the negative moral reaction that causes the consumer to evaluate the price under consideration as unfair. The analytical value of this reformulation is in allowing specific attention to the choice of reference prices and to the judgment of unfairness.

The Chevy Volt case also does not involve an emergency or desperate situation, and therefore not a good or service useful in mitigating the desperate situation. Similarly, price gouging is alleged for HDMI cables sold at seemingly high prices along with High Definition TVs, another example lacking an emergency condition. Still, it seems to me there is some useful structure to the concept even in this casual usage.  While there isn’t an emergency, there is a certain urgency involved.  If you want to be the first on your block to drive a Volt, obviously you need to get your Volt before one of your neighbors gets one.  If you’ve committed to buying the HDTV, you must have an HDMI cable to hook it up to your video receiver. I think this urgency aspect makes “price gouging” seem like the appropriate term in these more casual usages.

To be clear, I think an emergency or desperate situation is part of the definition of a prototypical case of price gouging. If you want a good example of price gouging, you need the desperate situation. It is common for legal definitions of price gouging to require an emergency condition.  It is just that it is also possible to properly use the English phrase “price gouging” in cases that lack a desperate situation. Even in casual usage however, not anything goes. For the term “price gouging” to be appropriately applied, you still need a price judged as unfairly high and you need some sort of difficulty or urgency or other constraint on the consumer, however attenuated such constraint may be.

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Complexity essay question from Megan McArdle

August 6, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Megan McArdle offers an essay assignment:

Pascal Emmanuel-Gobry has an essay question:

Tainter’s story goes like this: a group of people, through a combination of social organization and environmental luck, finds itself with a surplus of resources. Managing this surplus makes society more complex–agriculture rewards mathematical skill, granaries require new forms of construction, and so on.

Early on, the marginal value of this complexity is positive–each additional bit of complexity more than pays for itself in improved output–but over time, the law of diminishing returns reduces the marginal value, until it disappears completely. At this point, any additional complexity is pure cost.

Tainter’s thesis is that when society’s elite members add one layer of bureaucracy or demand one tribute too many, they end up extracting all the value from their environment it is possible to extract and then some.

The ‘and them some’ is what causes the trouble. Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond. In retrospect, this can seem mystifying. Why didn’t these societies just re-tool in less complex ways? The answer Tainter gives is the simplest one: When societies fail to respond to reduced circumstances through orderly downsizing, it isn’t because they don’t want to, it’s because they can’t.

In such systems, there is no way to make things a little bit simpler – the whole edifice becomes a huge, interlocking system not readily amenable to change. Tainter doesn’t regard the sudden decoherence of these societies as either a tragedy or a mistake–”[U]nder a situation of declining marginal returns collapse may be the most appropriate response”, to use his pitiless phrase. Furthermore, even when moderate adjustments could be made, they tend to be resisted, because any simplification discomfits elites.

When the value of complexity turns negative, a society plagued by an inability to react remains as complex as ever, right up to the moment where it becomes suddenly and dramatically simpler, which is to say right up to the moment of collapse. Collapse is simply the last remaining method of simplification.

Please write an essay describing whether and how Tainter’s thesis applies to welfare states undergoing demographic slide. You have four hours.

Answer: sounds exactly like the subject of Mancur Olson’s outstanding book about institutionalized, bureaucratic, economic sclerosis, The Rise and Decline of Nations. I’m sure he spent more than four hours writing it, and you’re likely to spend more than four hours reading it, but it’s well worth the investment.

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Cocoa market manipulation? The evidence suggests…

August 3, 2010

Michael Giberson

yes: cocoa market manipulation says Craig Pirrong.  He comes to that conclusion after his examination of price movements in cocoa markets revealed all the fingerprints of a classic squeeze.

In brief, Pirrong compared July London cocoa prices against September and November London prices and July New York prices over a period from January 2000 to June 2010. Anomalous moves in the July London price relative to these related markets suggest manipulation.  When Pirrong’s analysis is combined with one large trader seeking delivery on an unusually large percentage of July London contracts the case is more or less obvious.

Pirrong refers to his 2004 American Law and Economics Review article on the Ferruzzi soybean market episode for background on commodity market manipulation and its detection. For a more generally accessible explanation see his discussion in his recent Energy Law Journal article, “Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence.” (The directly relevant explanation is in Section VI of the paper, but if you are interested in market manipulation then the entire paper is worth reading.)

See also Pirrong’s related recent blog posts: “Chocolate Kisses” and “Get a Room.”

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Yes, KP is alive…

August 2, 2010

Michael Giberson

As the just published blog post suggests, yes the Knowledge Problem blog is alive!  The summer doldrums struck the blog (while the blog authors were gallivanting hither and yon or otherwise engaged).  As the gallivanting and engagements are mostly done for the summer, blogging resumes.

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Coasian bargaining on wind turbine noise

August 2, 2010

Michael Giberson

Preston McAfee and Tracy Lewis introduce Coasian bargaining in their economics textbook with the question, “Can I just bribe my neighbor to stop being annoying?”  The complementary question, perhaps asked by the neighbor in question, “Can I just bribe my neighbor to stop being annoyed (or at least not to complain about me)?”

The New York Times reports that a wind power developer working in eastern Oregon is offering some residents near a power project $5,000 in exchange for an agreement not to complain about the noise made by wind turbines.  Many times neighbors to wind power projects have filed nuisance complaints, and often these complaints get nowhere in part due to lack of clear property rights.  In the case of Oregon a state industrial noise ordinance gives some clarity to the property right, enabling Coasian bargaining to proceed.

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