Archive for October, 2011

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National Research Council committee on the Renewable Fuel Standard: costly program of uncertain benefits

October 6, 2011

Michael Giberson

Congress asked the National Research Council to evaluate the economics and environmental effects of the advanced biofuels mandate in the Renewable Fuels Standard (“RFS2″). The result? It isn’t pretty: barring unforeseen technological advances that dramatically reduce costs or oil prices consistently in the neighborhood of $190 a barrel or higher, RFS2 just doesn’t make much sense.

The real kicker is that the environmental benefits are uncertain and not necessarily positive. That is to say, promoting cellulosic ethanol, the supposedly more-environmentally friendly high-tech version of the fuel, may make the environmental worse.

The news was not welcomed at the Department of Agriculture. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack sneered, “Facts? We don’t need no stinking facts.”

Well, not exactly in those words, but here he is quoted in the Des Moines Register:

Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack slammed the study as based on old data. “I think it’s unfortunate that reports that are based in my view on somewhat outdated information are basically suggesting we should give up the ghost,” he told reporters. He did not provide examples of data in the study that he considered outdated.

I ask you, is this the kind of “science-based” response you expected from this administration? The story also notes that the RFS2 mandate “calls for motorists to use 500 million gallons of cellulose-based fuel [in 2012] but the government estimates that as little as 3.5 million gallons will actually be produced.” So much for technology-forcing policies.

The politics of advanced biofuels are interesting in that most of the political support for the current version of ethanol-as-corporate-welfare is driven by Midwestern agribusiness interests, and especially corn growers. RFS2-quality fuels need not be corn based and hypothetically could be grown elsewhere, and I think that makes the current ethanol caucus at best a weak proponent of RFS2. But at present, corn-based ethanol needs RFS2 as a fig leaf to cover its own inadequacies as a pro-environment policy. In this political drama, current ethanol plays “bridge biofuel” to the forthcoming glories of advanced biofuels.

Well those forthcoming glories are highly uncertain of environmental benefit, but fairly certain to be expensive. We don’t want to go there, we don’t need the bridge.

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Smil’s brief list of the pioneering creators of electric systems

October 5, 2011

Michael Giberson

In the process of explaining why Steve Jobs, though talented, is no Thomas Edison, Vaclav Smil name-drops a “brief list of the pioneering creators of electric systems”:

This fundamental innovation [the electric power system] was created during a remarkably short period of time—most of it between the late 1870s and the beginning of the 20th century—by a surprisingly small number of inventors, engineers, and scientists. In order to avoid the most obvious exclusionary injustice, even a brief list of the pioneering creators of electric systems must include the names of Charles Clarke, Sebastian Ferranti, Lucien Gaulard, John Gibbs, Zénobe-Théophile Gramme, Edward Johnson, Irving Langmuir, Charles Parsons, Emil Rathenau, Werner Siemens, William Stanley, Charles Steinmetz, Joseph Swan, Nikola Tesla, Elihu Thomson, Francis Upton, and George Westinghouse. But, justly, one name stands above them all, that of Thomas Alva Edison.

I thought I knew a bit about this period, but I credit myself for recognizing only 6 of the 18 names mentioned (Siemens, Swan, Tesla, Thomson, Westinghouse, and Edison).

How well do you know your early electric power industry history?

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The WSJ’s confused story on gasoline prices and crude oil prices

October 4, 2011

Michael Giberson

Caption: Change in retail gasoline prices vs. prices of two benchmark crude

WSJ Image: Change in retail gasoline prices vs. prices of two benchmark crude

The story in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal on the link between gasoline prices and crude oil prices was a bit frustrating. The article does a reasonable job explaining key pieces of the puzzle, but then fails to assemble the puzzle into something resembling reality.

The story is headlined, “Gas Stays High as Oil Drops: Prices at the Pump Have Yet to Reflect the Substantial Decline in Crude Futures,” and the first sentence repeats the theme: “U.S. crude-oil prices have hit the skids, but drivers aren’t feeling the impact.” The next couple of sentence fill in some details. In brief, the story says, the benchmark crude oil price is down nearly one-third since April, but U.S. gasoline prices are only down about 13 percent.

The mystery of the just-down-13-percent gasoline prices is almost entirely created by trying to treat the NYMEX price as the relevant benchmark, but it isn’t. (As noted here in February.) Currently the Brent price is a better indicator of the world oil market price for crude oil. Our story here, then, is that world oil prices have dropped 18 percent since April while average gasoline prices dropped 13 percent. Hardly a different warranting a headline.

The reporter fully recognizes this point, as he explains, “gasoline prices on the East Coast and even in the Gulf Coast track the price of Brent crude, which analysts view as a better indicator of global prices than Nymex. While Nymex futures are down 30% since April 29, Brent is down 18%.” And the story is accompanied by a graphic, above, which graphically illustrates the point that Brent seems to be the relevant reference point.

So why the struggle to cast this story about gasoline prices that are not falling fast enough?

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Price gouging laws wasted resources during the Hurricane Irene emergency

October 4, 2011

Michael Giberson

In a post at the Master Resource blog I point out another problem with anti-price gouging laws: during actual emergency conditions both state governments and consumers likely have much more important things to do that worry about whether particular price increases are unconscionable under the state’s understanding of that term.

Among other points, I note that just before Hurricane Irene hit New Jersey the state was warning consumers about potential gasoline price gouging, among other imminent threats.  When the storm was over, the state reported receipt of 103 price complaints. The result:

The investigation ended up finding no stations guilty of price gouging, though three stations allegedly violated the state’s law against changing gasoline prices more than once in a 24-hour period. The three stations have been cited by the state.

Several persons died in New Jersey due to flooding, and the damages may reach “billions of dollars” according to Governor Chris Christie. These are real emergency issues. In response, among many other actions, the state had investigators out counting how many times gasoline stations may have changed prices within each 24-hour period since the emergency was declared.

Concerns over price gouging can also lead to short-term gasoline shortages and consumers waiting in gas lines.

Waiting in line for gasoline is about as useful a response to an emergency as sending out state investigators to count the frequency of gasoline price changes, but with spot shortages and prices unable to go up to limit demand, gas lines and waiting are almost inevitable.

As the note at the end of the piece adds, “For more on price gouging, see Giberson’s article in the Spring 2001 edition of Regulation magazine and his op-ed appearing in the Washington Times on June 6, 2011. In addition, Giberson blogs frequently on price gouging law at Knowledge Problem.”

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Paul Ryan’s review of Sachs’ new book

October 4, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

Today I offer a break in my usual loathing of politics to compliment a politician, not for his political work, but for an intellectually engaging and erudite essay. In Saturday’s Wall Street Journal, Paul Ryan reviewed The Price of Civilization, the new book from Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs is something of a bête noire in economics, rightly so in my opinion, for his post-Soviet consulting career that concentrated on the imposition of top-down “market reforms” in countries like Poland and Russia. Poland’s relative success in liberalizing occurred despite Sachs and because of more transparent and decentralized legal reforms beyond his recommendation.

Ryan’s opening paragraph immediately shed some light on why Sachs’ perspective is so destructive by invoking Rousseau:

Free enterprise has never lacked for moral critics. In the mid-18th century, for instance, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau rejected the proposition that the free exchange of goods and services, and the competitive pursuit of self-interest by economic actors, result in general prosperity—ideas then emanating from Great Britain. In a commercial society, according to Rousseau, the people are “scheming, violent, greedy, ambitious, servile, and knavish . . . and all of it at one extreme or the other of misery and opulence.” Only a people with “simple customs [and] wholesome tastes” can be virtuous.

In “The Price of Civilization,” Jeffrey Sachs carries Rousseau’s argument into the 21st century. Mr. Sachs, a development economist at Columbia University, believes that “at the root of America’s economic crisis lies a moral crisis: the decline of civic virtue among America’s political and economic elite.” The book’s veneer of economic analysis cannot conceal what is essentially a crusade against the free enterprise ethic of our republic.

Only through a reshaping of our principles and a reordering of the American economy, Mr. Sachs believes, can we become “a mindful society.” We must abandon a culture that is defined by hard work and the striving for upward mobility and an economy that has unleashed unparalleled prosperity. Hard work impedes leisure. Ambition is a vice. Economic growth hurts the planet.

Sachs argues for a move to a “French-style” civil law constitution, away from the evolutionary accumulation of institutional knowledge that, as Hayek says, is embedded in the custom reflected in English common law that is the foundation of American law and American principles. In part his argument rests on unpacking that “pursuit of happiness” so treasured in American culture, but as Ryan tells it, Sachs thinks government has a role to play in creating happiness (rather than creating an environment conducive to individual pursuit of it) because he has erroneously adopted a utilitarian framing of the concept:

Yet Mr. Sachs’s gospel of happiness draws not on the inspired tradition of the Founders but rather on the Utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. In the 1780s, Bentham proposed that “happiness,” which he equated with “pleasure,” could be mathematically measured. It was not sufficient, he thought, for government to protect our rights if it was to vouchsafe our pursuit of happiness. Government must instead quantify “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” and set policies and goals accordingly. There was a science to satisfaction, Bentham claimed, and it was a puzzle that trained experts could solve.

Channeling Bentham, Mr. Sachs calls for the establishment of a national metrics for life satisfaction and sets a 10-year goal to “raise America’s happiness.” Although the specific measures are hazy, the steps are clear: For people to be happy, their government must increasingly shield them from the challenges of life. The good life is thus defined as one of ever-more pleasure at the expense of work.

But happiness in this world results not from avoiding challenges but from meeting them. Happiness is the recompense of real effort, whether intellectual or physical, and of earned success. It comes from achievement—from doing something of economic, artistic or emotional value. The satisfaction to be taken in producing valuable things brings with it a lasting sense of personal fulfillment. Mr. Sachs’s design for paternalistic government will only impede the pursuit of happiness.

Ryan’s review reflects substantial insight into the broader political economy and cultural implications of Sachs’ views, and he injects that insight into the essay with, for me, unexpected eloquence and breadth and depth of scholarly knowledge. I was quite impressed with his analysis and commentary simply as a stand-alone essay, let alone as a book review.

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Students for Liberty talk: economics and complexity

October 3, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

UPDATE: I’ve had a report that the link to the slides is not working, but I can’t get it not to work … so if you are having trouble please let me know in the comments and I’ll go bug-stomping. UPDATED UPDATE: mischief managed, I think!

On Saturday I was honored to be the morning keynote speaker at the Students for Liberty Chicago Regional Conference. In only four years SFL has grown into a large and effective organization for bringing together students who share an interest in exploring and promoting individual liberty, classical liberal ideas, and public policy that reflects those principles.

My talk, Beneficial Complexity (pdf of slides), took some basic economic concepts and looked at them through the lens of complexity science. My main objective was to encourage the attendees to see ways to integrate some core classical liberal ideas into their own thinking, their own work, their persuasive discussions with others, and their advocacy activities.

Start with a story: a flower market selling calla lilies grown in Colombia. Lots of buyers and sellers, lots of parties involved in getting the flowers from places like Colombia to your neighborhood flower shop. Mostly impersonal exchange, but not entirely devoid of personal relationships. And without any one person knowing how to do so in its entirety, the flowers get from Colombia to my flower shop for me to buy. If you are familiar with Leonard Reed’s I, Pencil essay about the highly decentralized yet coordinated processes that combine to bring pencils to consumers, you recognize this theme. One of the fundamental economic and epistemological concepts that I, Pencil illustrates is the knowledge problem — no one person knows how to make a pencil, or how to grow and sell calla lilies globally. We associate this idea primarily with the work of F.A. Hayek, as stated in his famous essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society” in 1945 (which also inspires the title of this blog).

Knowledge is dispersed and, importantly, it is also private and often subjective. Your willingness to use some of your resources to buy a cup of coffee, or a pencil or a calla lily bouquet, is known only to you and is context dependent, which means that much of the knowledge that goes into individual decisions is local and hard to centralize. Yet calla lilies show up in Chicago shops, as do pencils, in ways that satisfy the preferences of consumers and profit producers along the supply chain. How does that happen? Markets and prices create networks of dispersed, local, private knowledge that connects and aggregates that knowledge and sends valuable signals to economic actors about the relative benefits and costs of the decisions they take.

When we think about economic activity taking place in networks, and how exchange and prices connect networks and extend and deepen them, we are using the tools of complexity science to understand economic behavior. Think back to the flower market and the pencil. As Eric Beinhocker writes in The Origin of Wealth, “The complexity of all this activity is mind-boggling. … all the jobs that must get done, all the things that need to get coordinated, and the timing and sequence of everything. … there is no one in charge of the global to-do list. … Yet, extraordinarily, these sorts of things happen every day in a bottom-up, self-organized way. … The economy is a marvel of complexity.” (2006, pp. 5-6)

Technically speaking, what is a complex system? It’s a system or arrangement of many component parts, and those parts interact. These interactions generate outcomes that you could not necessarily have predicted in advance. In other words, it’s a non-deterministic system. Scholars in many different fields use this general idea to study a range of systems and phenomena, from molecular and cellular interactions in physics, chemistry, or biology, to the organization of the brain in neuroscience, to species and environment interactions in ecosystems, to cascading network failures in electric power systems, to networks of co-author collaborations in particular fields of research, and many other applications.

These applications share an interest in three features of a complex system: its structure (how are the parts connected, how do they interact?), its rules (physical or human-generated), and its behavior. apply this idea of a complex system to our economic and social interactions. Go back to Beinhocker’s description of the market economy as “a marvel of complexity” in which all sorts of activities get coordinated in a “bottom-up, self-organized way”. Think of the economy as a complex system, in which individuals are the agents, the component parts, with dispersed private knowledge. We are connected in many ways — social relations, economic exchange, organizations, and so on — and our interactions shape individual decisions, individual behavior, and ultimately overall system behavior. The profound insights of writers like Ferguson, Smith, Hayek, and others is that individual agents have their own preferences and private knowledge, but we interact, and in so doing we generate system-level behavior that is generally self-organized — emergent order. In this unplanned order no one person can predict the specific outcome we’ll achieve, but we still experience over and over and over in human history that order generally does emerge.

But order doesn’t necessarily always emerge, and the order that emerges sometimes isn’t pretty. That observation leads to the elephant in the room with respect to emergent order in social system: the rules. All exchange takes place within a framework of rules, an institutional context. Those institutions include formal laws enforcing property ownership, contracts, and punishment for theft and fraud, as well as informal social norms and peer pressure that may, for example, affect how the bargaining and negotiation in the exchange take place. Rules shape how agents interact, and shape their incentives … and as a result they can also affect system behavior. One important implication of studying economies as complex systems is that when we design institutions, we should model and test and strive for rules that enable order to emerge, which means an emphasis on process rather than using rules to achieve some specific outcome. That’s one important intersection of classical liberal principles with complexity science.

I’d like to raise a point that I didn’t in my remarks on Saturday, but builds on a discussion in a later session at the conference. One challenge that we often face as classical liberals is putting “the human face” on our ideas, countering the perception that a libertarian society would be cold, calculating, and lacking in compassion or personal relationships. Nothing is further from the truth, and the language of complexity science gives us a way to communicate that reality, because it frames economic/social interactions as relationships and connections. It emphasizes the mutuality of exchange and the multiple dimensions of our relationships with others in our voluntary associations.

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Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than commonly thought

October 3, 2011

Michael Giberson

A working paper from the UC-Berkeley Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics says that the demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than typically thought. Here is the abstract, which points to publication selection bias as the culprit:

One of the most frequently examined statistical relationships in energy economics has been the price elasticity of gasoline demand. We conduct a quantitative survey of the estimates of elasticity reported for various countries around the world. Our meta-analysis indicates that the literature suffers from publication selection bias: insignificant or positive estimates of the price elasticity are rarely reported, although implausibly large negative estimates are reported regularly. In consequence, the aver- age published estimates of both short- and long-run elasticities are exaggerated twofold. Using mixed effects multilevel meta-regression, we show that after correction for publication bias the average long-run elasticity reaches -0:31 and the average short-run elasticity only -0.09.

The authors are Tomas Havranek, Zuzana Irsova, and Karel Janda.

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