Ten words you need to stop misspelling

Lynne Kiesling

The Oatmeal is a great one-man operation with outstanding, witty visual representations of a range of topics, including 10 Things You Need To Stop Tweeting About. For this one he earns my undying gratitude:

10 Words You Need To Stop Misspelling

Love.Love.Love. Will be sharing with all of my students. I wish I could copy it onto a card and hand it out on the street, like some grammar evangelist. His explanation of the differences among the homonyms “their”, “they’re”, and “there” is hilarious. But I don’t know what he’s got against dolphins …

No results found for “true number may be lower or higher”

Michael Giberson

The true number of hits for the “true number may be higher” are lower than reported.

Mind Hacks (via Cheap Talk and Marginal Revolution) points out news reports often stress when stating an estimated value that the “true number may be higher,” but infrequently that the “true number may be lower.” The primary evidence cited is a comparison of Google search results for the two phrases, with “higher” shown at 20,300 hits and “lower” shown at a mere 3 hits. (I found about 43,000 hits for higher and about 5,300 hits for “lower”, so Google may be targeting results a bit based on search history.)

Ah, but what about the careful journalist who reports that the “true number may be higher or lower“?  Searching for “true number may be higher” will inadvertently capture these quotes as well, biasing the results.

However, the “true number may be higher or lower” only produced 412 hits in my Google search, so the bias is small relative to the numbers above.  Perhaps there are few careful journalists, or many careful journalists who are afflicted by less discriminating copy editors.

No one, at least as indicated by my Google search results, says  the “true number may be lower or higher“. (Of course, sometime soon Google will index this page, and “lower or higher” will gain an entry in that vast catalog.)

The trouble with two-handed economists

Michael Giberson

An economist is quoted in Platts’ Megawatt Daily commenting on a proposal within ERCOT to apply the same performance standards to wind farms as apply to other generators:

On the one hand, it is desirable to have all market players working under the same rules, but on the other hand, rules are usually made with the existing status quo in mind, and when new technologies come along, they don’t always fit neatly with the pre-existing rules.

That certainly does sound like an economist:

  • Stereotypical “On the one hand”/”on the other hand” phrasing? Check.
  • Long, complicated wording of point without much content? Check.
  • Bonus for more than 40 words in a sentence? Check.
  • Double bonus for using five commas in a sentence? Check.

Yes, unfortunately is looks like I was quoted correctly.  At least they spelled my name right and mentioned my employer: “Michael Giberson, an economist at the Texas Tech University Center for Energy Commerce.”

Any publicity is good publicity, right?

Don’t worry, the city council will plusgood monitor Big Brother to prevent abuse

Michael Giberson

So I was quietly reading about Austin, Texas electric power developments in the Austin American-Statesman (“Mueller becoming a lab for energy: Research plans, neighbors’ efforts converging“) when I stumbled across a remark of such – I don’t know what to call it – irony? Orwellian newspeak? Not quite sure what to say, so I’ll just share.

Some elements of the smart grid are already working, Duncan said. For instance, the utility can turn off air conditioners remotely for a few minutes when the system is close to exceeding capacity. The utility does this only with customers who agree ahead of time.

However, in California, regulatory officials withdrew a proposal for a similar program this year after critics accused them of encouraging Big Brother policies.

Duncan said the concerns are unwarranted and noted that the City Council oversees Austin Energy, making political recourse possible.

Really? We don’t have to worry about Big Brother policies because the City Council is watching over everything?

Well then, everything is doubleplusgood.

Actually I’m not too worried about Big Brother in cases in which customers can choose whether or not to participate, and can choose their own competitive retail energy service providers.  What? Consumers can’t choose their own retail energy supplier in Austin because the city government has locked them into the city’s own electric utility?

I hope the Ministry of Plenty is keeping a close eye on the city policies….

Attorneys general, not attorney generals

Lynne Kiesling

All of this Eric Holder gossip today unfortunately creates an opportunity for me to pick a grammatical nit: the plural of “attorney general” is “attorneys general”, not “attorney generals”. The “general” in “attorney general” is an adjective that modifies the noun “attorney”. The plural attaches to the noun, not the adjective.

Bet you didn’t know that I was such a grammar weenie … unless you’re the KP Spouse, my friend Amy, or my long-suffering students whose writing I grade!

On a more substantive note, Eric Holder as Attorney General bodes poorly for both civil rights and a more reasonable legal approach to drug policy. This Reason post and its links make that argument from a libertarian perspective, as well as from John Nichols at The Nation.

Most erudite comment on bailout

Lynne Kiesling

Welcome to Hit & Run, Instapundit, and Volokh Conspiracy readers, and thanks to those respective parties for their links.

Pro Libertate’s comment from Katharine Mangu-Ward’s post yesterday that linked here wins my prize for the most erudite comment I have seen on our current political environment:

Will no one rid me of this troublesome government?

Hah! He shoots, he scores! Brilliant. If you don’t recognize the reference, you should.

Lisa Gold, researcher

Lynne Kiesling

OK, I *love love love* my job, love being an economist, love teaching, love talking to policymakers and firms about technology and policy … but I am having serious career envy of Lisa Gold (as represented at her new blog), who did research for Neal Stephenson’s Baroque Cycle trilogy. If I got this kind of endorsement from him:

Ms. Gold roams at ease through the most difficult and recondite topics, like an Indiana Jones of the world of letters.

I think I might just expire in ecstasy. Being able to immerse oneself in problem solving by doing literary research through the arcana of centuries would just be too.much.fun.

Her blog also promises to offer lots of advice for writers and researchers, which will be useful even to those of us whose daily perambulations involve more mundane non-fiction. Take, for example, the usage note from the Oxford American Writer’s Thesaurus for “utilize” that she quotes:

This is a puff-word. Since it does nothing that good old use doesn’t do, its extra letters and syllables don’t make a writer seem smarter. Rather, using utilize makes you seem like either a pompous twit or someone so insecure that he’ll use pointlessly big words in an attempt to look smart… What’s worth remembering about puff-words is something that good writing teachers spend a lot of time drumming into undergrads: “Formal writing” does not mean gratuitously fancy writing; it means clean, clear, maximally considerate writing.

I think I’m in platonic syntatical love … And I’m definitely going to use her advice in teaching my freshman seminar this fall!

Massive hat tip to Cory Doctorow for the link.

Fairness reasoning in the abstract and the concrete

Michael Giberson

Will Wilkinson points to a post by Joshua Knobe discussing a philosophy experiment conducted by U. of Arizona philosophers Chris Freiman and Shaun Nichols. Here is how Knobe describes the experiment:

Subjects were randomly assigned either to receive [an] ‘abstract’ question or a ‘concrete.’

Subjects who had been assigned to receive an abstract question were asked:

Suppose that some people make more money than others solely because they have genetic advantages.

Please tell us whether you agree with the following statement:

- It is fair that those genetically-advantaged people make more money than others.

Meanwhile, subjects who had been assigned to receive a concrete question were asked:

Suppose that Amy and Beth both want to be professional jazz singers. They both practice singing equally hard. Although jazz singing is the greatest natural talent of both Amy and Beth, Beth’s vocal range and articulation is naturally better than Amy’s because of differences in their genetics. Solely as a result of this genetic advantage, Beth’s singing is much more impressive. As a result, Beth attracts bigger audiences and hence gets more money than Amy.

Please tell us whether you agree with the following statement:

- It is fair that Beth makes more money than Amy.

Freiman and Nichols found that, as Knobe put it, “subjects who were given the abstract question said that it was not fair, but subjects who were given the concrete question said that it actually was fair!”

Knobe suggests that it is a surprising result, and I guess it is surprising on some level. Logically, the cases are the same but for the additional details in the concrete example. The fact that we are talking about jazz singers, and not dockworkers or accountants, should not affect the fairness or lack of fairness of the case. Therefore, adding morally neutral information shouldn’t change conclusions about fairness, but apparently does.

Knobe also tries to put a left-right political interpretation on the result, but doesn’t actually report whether Frieman and Nichols collected any data relevant to a political angle. I can’t find the paper online, so can’t say what if anything the authors have to say about the politics. Wilkinson also joins in the political speculation, but again without any indication that there is data to support a political discussion.

My sense of the difference between the abstract and concrete cases is that the concept of fairness requires a consideration of the balance between, as it were, the inputs and outputs at issue. In the abstract case, the input is a random, unearned genetic advantage and the output is obtaining more money. Clearly, in my view, the concept of fairness cannot support a balancing between these unequal elements – a random input cannot merit a specific positive reward.

While the concrete case is formally identical in terms of structure, the details offered allow for a different mental processing of the fairness concept. In the concrete case, the subject is able to compare the more impressive performances against the the more money obtained and reach the conclusion that the better performances merit a better reward. It no longer matters, to the mind trying to answer the fairness question, that the better performances were themselves the result of a random genetic endowment. What matters is that a good performance can merit a good reward.

However, I’d wager that fairness conclusions for the concrete case would fall way off if Frieman and Nichols followed their concrete example with the same question posed to the subjects facing the abstract case, namely, asking them, “It is fair that those genetically-advantaged people make more money than others.” The question posed this way cues up the random genetic input in the subject’s mental processing again, and a random genetic input can not merit a positive reward.

Language, Metaphor, and Wine Writing

Lynne Kiesling

I found the juxtaposition of two recent articles (found via Arts & Letters Daily) on language quite interesting. Wine writer Colin Bower is frustrated with the use of simile and metaphor in wine writing: why can’t we describe the experience of tasting a wine in a direct, factual way, without the use of metaphor?

Wine is always described as being like something else. This is appealingly post modern. If a chardonnay tastes a bit like a peach, what then does the peach taste like? A chardonnay? And if so, what does either taste like? If you must describe the Van Loveren 2001 limited edition Merlot as being “chocolately”, does it mean that chocolate tastes like the Van Loveren Merlot? And if we like the Merlot on account if its tasting like chocolate, why don’t we eat chocolate instead of drinking wine?

Consider this dilemma facing the wine writer, and then apply the evolutionary psychology and cognitive science prowess of Steven Pinker to the problem. Pinker has a new book on language called The Stuff of Thought coming out in the fall. One of his topics will be metaphor:

While swearing may garner public attention, perhaps the more surprising aspect of Pinker’s work traces the pervasiveness of metaphor in language. Not flowery poetic allusions or rhetorical similes but concrete-to-abstract transitions so common in everyday speech and writing that we often don’t even recognize them as metaphorical.

Consider this sentence:

“He attacked my position and I defended it.” It uses the metaphor of argument as war. Or how about “this program isn’t going anywhere,” which uses the metaphor of progress as motion.

Says Pinker: “Look at almost any passage and you’ll find that a paragraph has five or six metaphors in it. It’s not that the speaker is trying to be poetic, it’s just that that’s the way language works.

“Rather than occasionally reaching for a metaphor to communicate, to a very large extent communication is the use of metaphor,” he says.

“It could be that 95 per cent of our speech is metaphorical, if you go back far enough in language.”

Why? Here, the teacher part of researcher and author Steven Pinker comes to the fore, offering a boring explanation and an interesting explanation, both with an element of truth.

The boring explanation is that using metaphor is a quick-and-dirty way of expressing a new idea without the trouble of coining [notice the metaphor] and propagating a new word.

“But that presupposes that the mind itself works metaphorically, that we see the abstract commonality between argument and war, between progress and motion. And it presupposes that the mind, at some level, must reason very concretely in order that these metaphors be understood and become contagious.

“And that’s the more interesting part of the story.”

Thus, with respect to wine Bower concludes

I’ve had to give up on so-called facts. They don’t exist. It took wine writers to prove this to me. Nothing is ever knowable for what it is. Admit it, you can no more say what a taste is than you can say what a colour is or what a feeling is.

I think Mr. Bower is a little too postmodern for his own good, and should leaven in some Pinker: it is in the nature of human language to use metaphor as hooks into our shared knowledge when we are describing a personal, potentially unknown experience to someone else. Metaphor provides the flavor and culture referents that we use to communicate our personal wine experiences to each other. Facts don’t carry enough information without the metaphor hooks for us to put them in context.

Aggressive IP Lawyers Trump Smart Business Strategy

Michael Giberson

Just like some people enjoy comic books with the same formulaic story line issue after issue, I never get tired of stories in which lawyers play the supervillain. Virginia Postrel blogs about her latest Atlantic article — about superhero glamour — and includes a kicker about how IP lawyers for DC/Marvel blew a chance for their artwork to grace the story.