Archive for the ‘Regulation’ Category

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EPA backs off “imminent and substantial endangerment” claim in Texas hydraulic fracturing case

April 2, 2012

Michael Giberson

On December 7, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency dropped a bomb on Range Resources Corporation. From the EPA news release:

(DALLAS – December 7, 2010) Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has ordered a natural gas company in Forth Worth, Texas, to take immediate action to protect homeowners living near one of its drilling operations who have complained about flammable and bubbling drinking water coming out of their tap. EPA testing has confirmed that extremely high levels of methane in their water pose an imminent and substantial risk of explosion or fire. EPA has also found other contaminants including benzene, which can cause cancer, in their drinking water.

EPA has determined that natural gas drilling near the homes by Range Resources in Parker County, Texas, has caused or contributed to the contamination of at least two residential drinking water wells. Therefore, today, EPA has ordered the company to step in immediately to stop the contamination, provide drinking water and provide methane gas monitors to the homeowners. EPA has issued an imminent and substantial endangerment order under Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act.

The endangerment order threatened Range Resources with thousands of dollars a day in fines if they did not take immediate action in response to EPA’s administrative order. Range Resources denied responsibility for methane in complainants groundwater and objected to being subjected to either fines or expensive remediation efforts without a hearing on the evidence. Range Resources went to court to bar enforcement of the order.

Fast forward to last Thursday, some 15 months after EPA’s order to take immediate action, and EPA has decided to withdraw its endangerment order  in order to “shift the agency’s focus in this particular case away from litigation and toward a joint effort on the science and safety of energy extraction.” Range Resources agreed to collect quarterly groundwater samples from 20 wells for one year, have the samples analyzed, and share the analysis with the EPA. (See also the Bloomberg story and WSJ coverage.)

The industry-side spin is that this is vindication for Range Resources and another black eye for the EPA. From Energy in Depth, “a troubling trend for EPA: Every time EPA intervenes in a high-profile case – generating scads of maligning headlines about shale and hydraulic fracturing in the process – the agency ends up getting it wrong.”  Texas Railroad Commissioner David Porter takes the same position.

At least one fracking critic says “not so fast” with the pro-Range Resource conclusions, apparently inferring from Range’s willingness to conduct groundwater sampling some sort of tacit concession on the company’s part.

My guess is that Range was tacitly admitting they’d rather collect groundwater samples than continue to pay lawyers and operate under the cloud of uncertainty created by the EPA endangerment order. After all, the scientific analysis is probably cheaper than the lawyers, and if the samples turn out the way Range expects, then the data becomes more evidence for the industry and against the EPA in the battle for public opinion.

I’m on board with the industry-side spin: this is vindication for Range Resources and another black eye for the EPA.

RELATED: We first posted on Knowledge Problem about the Range Resources case soon after the initial endangerment order.

Legal action continues. The initial complainants, Steve and Shyla Lipsky have sued Range Resources in civil courts, seeking $6.5 million in damages. Range Resources have counter-sued the Lipskys and their environmental consultant Alisa Rich for $4.2 million plus additional damages. In February of this year a judge refused a motion by the Lipskys and Rich to dismiss the countersuit, with the judge ruling that Lipskys had worked with Rich to create a deceptive video intended to give the impression they could light their groundwater on fire. (Here is the video as annotated by blogger “Texas Sharon.”)

 

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Refiners are getting squeezed by high crude oil prices and faltering U.S. demand, so let’s increase their costs!

March 29, 2012

Michael Giberson

The Houston Chronicle reports on the difficult financial position of many U.S. refineries. Crude oil prices are up for refineries relying on international markets, but U.S. consumers are moderating their gasoline consumption at higher prices and so refiners find their margins to be getting squeezed.

A good article, but right at the end we get this oddball proposal:

Still, refineries could do more to curb skyrocketing gasoline prices, said Amy Myers Jaffe, fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute. A government mandate for refineries to maintain a certain level of gasoline in storage would help to curb market fears of a shortage, fears that fuel rapid price spikes, she said.

“We should be requiring inventories of gasoline,” Jaffe said, to reassure the market that supplies won’t run short.

Seems to me a non sequitur wrapped in a riddle: refineries should be doing more to curb skyrocketing gasoline costs? Why refineries? Every indication is that gasoline prices are being driven by world oil crude oil prices (expect for the bottlenecked supplies of the northern Rocky Mountain states). There is no indication that “the market” is fearing a shortage of gasoline, is there? By the way, gasoline inventories are pretty high for this time of year AND consumption has been trending down, so who thinks consumer fears of a gasoline shortage are a problem?

And, I guess this is my real question, what makes Jaffe think that the solution to the refineries’ current woes is to impose regulations that would significantly add to their costs? Exactly how is this going to “do more to curb skyrocketing gasoline prices”?

Jaffe is usually smarter than this, so I’m a bit confused by the idea.

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Learn Liberty video: should government regulate monopolies?

March 21, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

I am happy to say that Learn Liberty has published another video that we did together. This one is a short one in which I talk about government regulation of monopolies, essentially laying out Schumpeter’s argument that when entry costs are low, monopolies do not persist because monopoly profit serves as a lure to entice entrepreneurs and innovators to create new value propositions (“new combinations”, in Schumpeter’s words) that break down market barriers and definitions.

Those of you with an electricity/natural monopoly background will notice that I assiduously stay away from economies of scale and subadditivity of costs as a cause of monopoly formation. Couldn’t keep the video at 3+ minutes if we opened that Pandora’s box!

The Learn Liberty page for the video also has a description and some discussion of the issues.

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Are refiners and wholesalers price gouging on petroleum products in Alaska?

March 14, 2012

Michael Giberson

As the chart below shows, during the summer of 2008 gasoline prices in Anchorage, Alaska switched from following typical prices in the lower 48 to a modest but notable amount above such typical prices. Not shown, but you can check it out at Gasbuddy.com where I generated the chart, after the summer of 2008 Anchorage prices have tracked more closely with Honolulu, Hawaii prices instead of prices in the continental United States.

Anchorage, Seattle and Houston gasoline prices from March 2006-March 2012

Anchorage, Seattle and Houston gasoline prices from March 2006-March 2012

We’ve discussed this before. As noted here in a post in 2009, “For years, average prices in Alaska were about the same as the U.S. average price.  Higher costs of delivery in Alaska were mostly offset by the nation’s lowest gasoline tax, just 8 cents a gallon, and the result was a price that more or less tracked the U.S. average price.” More from that post:

That pattern changed beginning in June 2008.  Prices had been marching up everywhere, but the price march stalled in the lower 48, while in Alaska (and Hawaii) prices continued to rise for another month.  Prices fell sharply throughout the country from July through December – excepting a short pause during the late hurricane season in the lower 48 – but Alaska’s prices now seemed to track the higher prices of Hawaii rather than returning to the U.S. average.

The 2009 post reported the conclusions of an Alaskan investigation: no illegal collusion found, but oligopoly probably is minimizing competitive pressure.

Some Alaskan politicians want to do something about current, continuing, relatively high (compared to nearby Seattle) prices. A committee of the Alaskan state senate just held hearings on SB 28, an act that would declare it illegal to sell or offer to sell certain petroleum products at unconscionable prices. (More information on SB 28 here.)

From the Associated Press:

JUNEAU, Alaska — A bill aimed at gasoline refiners that would ban price gouging received a hearing Tuesday before a skeptical Senate committee.

Sen. Bill Wielechowski said his proposal is a response to the “unconscionable” disparity between the prices Alaskans pay for gas and heating fuel compared to rates elsewhere on the West Coast that have traditionally been similar. …

Under the proposal, prices could not exceed 10 percent of those charged by Seattle-based refiners. Alaska’s attorney general would be allowed to investigate claims against companies refining more than 1 million gallons of fuel per year, and companies guilty of price gouging would face a penalty equal to at least 10 times the profit gained from the practice.

Sen. Cathy Giessel, R-Anchorage, said the proposal misses its target.

She said it amounts to a “jobs bill for attorneys” by setting up an environment for constant lawsuits, and that it would drain companies providing Alaskans a much-needed product. She also said Seattle isn’t a fair comparison. Tesoro has exorbitant transportation costs to get crude oil from the North Slope and elsewhere, she said, and they also run their production facilities on cheaper fuel.

“This appears to vilify refineries by saying that they’re ‘unconscionable’ and ‘disreputable,’” Giessel said.

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How fear affects policy: Adam Thierer on technopanics

March 14, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

Fear is a strong motivating factor, having evolved over millennia as we have protected ourselves against predators. Fear supports self-preservation by making us risk-averse and cautious. But such a deep, visceral, evolved emotion does not always serve our long-term objectives of thriving; it leads to maximin outcomes, and it is often mismatched to the actual threats to our self-preservation. As our environments change around us, we can fear things we shouldn’t and may not fear things that we should; we overthink everything and tend toward a “precautionary principle” approach, making us risk-averse and cautious.

I think such fear is a component in the persistence of regulation when it’s maladaptive to technological change, so I was happy to read Adam Thierer’s new Mercatus working paper, Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle. Adam lays out a framework for analyzing fear-based attitudes toward technology and technological change that’s informed by economics, sociology, psychology, and rhetoric. He tackles the question of why, and how, participants in public policy debates use appeals to fear to sway opinion toward anticipatory regulation and forms of censorship:

While cyberspace has its fair share of troubles and troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society than previous technologies did. That has not stopped some from suggesting there are reasons to be particularly fearful of the Internet and new digital technologies. There are various individual and institutional factors at work that perpetuate fear-based reasoning and tactics.

He analyzes the use of “appeal to fear” and “appeal to force” logic in the construction of arguments in favor of regulation and censorship, focusing on case studies of online child safety and violent media and online privacy and cybersecurity. In deconstructing these arguments he identifies four ways that fear can be a myth: it may be empirically unfounded and lacking evidence, other variables may be more important in affecting behavior than the feared variable, not all individuals have the same reaction to the feared variable, and other approaches than regulation exist that can mitigate the consequences of the feared variable (pp. 5-6).

Adam introduces the phenomenon of the “technopanic”, which is “… a moral panic centered on societal fears about a particular contemporary technology” (p. 7). Because culture often evolves more slowly than technology, as we are adapting culturally to the new technology we can see these panic phenomena, which can result in demonizing the technology and can lead to calls to “do something”, typically some form of control-based anticipatory regulation or censorship. A crucial part of manipulating individual attitudes to tap into fear and create advocacy for and acceptance of such regulation is what Adam calls “threat inflation”:

Thus, fear appeals are facilitated by the use of threat inflation. Specifically, threat inflation involves the use of fear-inducing rhetoric to inflate artificially the potential harm a new development or technology poses to certain classes of the population, especially children, or to society or the economy at large. These rhetorical flourishes are empirically false or at least greatly blown out of proportion relative to the risk in question. (p. 9)

Allowing threat inflation and technopanics to drive policy outcomes is socially corrosive and wasteful; it diverts resources from their higher-valued uses in dealing with actual risks rather than inflated ones, and it creates an environment of suspicion and social control, particularly censorship and information control. After analyzing six factors that create conditions favorable for the development of threat inflation and technopanics regarding Internet technology (nostalgia, special interests, etc., well worth reading in detail), he proposes two categories of policy response that we should pursue instead of prohibition and anticipatory regulation: resiliency and adaptation. We build resiliency to threats through education, transparency, labeling, etc., and we adapt to living with risk through experimentation, trial-and-error, experience, and social norms. These two are complementary; information-sharing about best practices can shape social norms and get people to change their behavior without regulation. For example, I don’t sign my credit cards, but instead write “CHECK ID” in the signature line and present a photo ID when using them. Having store clerks and other shoppers witness my behavior to protect my identity may lead to their replication of it, and has led over time to a change in behavior (remember back in the 1990s when they used to write your phone number on the receipt? Yikes! But that behavior’s gone extinct.).

We cannot eliminate risk through resilience and adaptation, but we can’t eliminate it through regulation either. Better to have strong, flexible, adaptable institutions and practices that enable us to continue thriving in unknown and changing conditions, while we enjoy the substantial benefits of technological creativity. While I heartily recommend Adam’s paper to you all as a good and thought-provoking read, he also summarizes it in this recent Forbes column.

I would extend Adam’s argument to apply to two case studies. The first is smart grid technology. Fear-based arguments abound in electricity, usually grounded (pun intended!) in the physical reality that electricity is dangerous. But after a century of economic regulation to serve particular social policy objectives, fear-based arguments also show up in arguments against moving away from the status quo both technologically and more economically in general; in my experience these fear-based arguments are used most to advocate for the status quo on behalf of low-income consumers and the elderly, and for that reason I find the use of fear-based arguments heart-wrenching, because when they succeed they deprive vulnerable populations of the benefits of innovation. Another current example is the arguments that digital meters, which transmit data using radio frequency wireless networks and thus emit low-level electromagnetic fields, are making people sick. Despite the absence of any scientific evidence consistent with this hypothesis, California and Maine are using these fear-based claims as a basis for allowing customers to opt out of having a digital meter installed (I have other analyses of this phenomenon, but that’s for another time …).

The second case is threat inflation and the exaggeration of fear to extend the security state. Each of Adam’s six factors contributing to threat inflation is applicable to the growth of the security state — nostalgia, pessimistic bias, “bad news sells”, the political power of the military-security-industrial complex, and so on. The persistence of threat inflation enables these special interests to use fear-based arguments to perpetuate the false belief that we are under constant, persistent threat beyond the actual threat level; this false belief creates the incentives in politicians to “do something” so that they don’t appear “soft on terror” and therefore risk not getting reelected; that political incentive enables security and defense companies to lobby politicians to buy their cutting-edge technologies at very great taxpayer expense to demonstrate to voters that they are “doing something” (even though the technologies have high false positive rates, can be fooled easily, and are more for symbolic security theater than for addressing the most relevant risks that we actually do face).

In both cases, a resiliency-oriented public policy approach would be a substantial improvement on the control-oriented regulation that is not focused on the most meaningful or relevant threats, be they health threats, economic threats, or security threats, from technological dynamism.

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The WSJ’s awful editorial against the wind power industry

March 8, 2012

Michael Giberson

Like the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, I’d like to see the Production Tax Credit for wind and other renewable energy technologies expire at the end of this year as scheduled. So policy-wise, I’m with them. Still, their editorial against the wind power policy yesterday was awful and it deserves public criticism.

So here are quotes from the WSJ in italics, followed by my comments.

“The renewable energy tax credit—mostly for wind and solar power—started in 1992 as a ‘temporary’ benefit for an infant industry.”

Stick with “mostly for wind.” Other technologies qualify, too, including a variety of hydroelectric technologies and geothermal power, but not currently solar power.

Solar was briefly included in the PTC through the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, but then was back out at the end of 2005. Solar power benefits from the Investment Tax Credit, and until December 2011 benefited from “Section 1603″ cash grants in lieu of the ITC.

If you’re tempted to argue they said “renewable energy tax credits”, not specifically the PTC, note that they clearly say the renewable energy tax credits that began back in 1992 (in that year’s Energy Policy Act) – they’re talking about the PTC and they get the solar reference wrong.

Details on the PTC, via DSIRE.

“The ’1603 grant program’ pays up to 30% of the construction costs for renewable energy plants …. Wind producers then get the 2.2% tax credit for every kilowatt of electricity generated.”

No. To get the 1603 cash grant a developer has to forgo the Production Tax Credit. One or the other, but not both.

And for crying out loud, it is a 2.2 cents/kwh tax credit, not a “2.2% tax credit.” The Heritage Foundation can get this right, you’d think the WSJ could do as well.

(Or, more precisely, that was last year’s subsidy but the PTC is adjusted annually for the effects of inflation so in 2012 it will be slightly higher.)

… and Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico has introduced a national renewable-energy mandate so consumers will be required to buy wind and solar power no matter how high the cost.

I didn’t notice this problem myself, not having dug through the details of the bill Sen. Bingaman introduced last week, but Richard Caperton and Stephen Lacey at Climate Progress point out that the bill caps the cost increase at 3 cents/kwh.

These sloppy errors don’t mean the WSJ is wrong, only that they’re willing to publish poorly researched opinion pieces.

The Caperton and Lacey post at the Climate Progress blog mentioned the above errors and raised some additional complaints. Most of their additional complaints concern the relative virtues of oil and gas production when compared to wind power, and who gets how much subsidy. On these points I mostly lean toward the WSJ‘s view. Suffice to say that wind power subsidies are orders of magnitude higher per unit of energy provided to consumers.

But this brings us to one key point they raise: “one justification for the tax credit is to makeup for the fact that taxpayers are bearing the harm from fossil fuels.”

There is, embedded in this idea somewhere, the foundation of an analytically sound justification for policy intervention. My problem with the Production Tax Credit for wind power is that it flows to wind investors for every qualifying kwh of power generated irrespective of any such benefit. The wind power investor gets the same subsidy whether the wind power produced displaces coal-fired electric power or efficient natural gas-fired power or hydropower. Wind would still qualify for a PTC even if its output was displacing solar power while wind turbines chopped up migrating birds.

While there may be an intellectually defensible case for a policy supporting renewable energy because it reduces a harm, the Production Tax Credit bears little resemblance to that policy.

So let’s let the Production Tax Credit die, and get on with the business of developing sound public policy on emissions. (And please, WSJ, stop embarrassing yourself with silly mistakes.)

 

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New video: Richard Epstein on simple rules

February 17, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

In one of the most incredible pieces of fortuitous timing, after I recommended Richard Epstein’s Simple Rules for a Complex World in my post on our regulatory thickets, here’s a new video of Richard discussing this exact topic!

A clear 22-minute discussion, well worth your time (and the time of any Congressional staffers you might happen to know …).

This video and others (some from the vault that are great!) are available at the libertarianism.org website. Libertarianism.org is a project of the Cato Institute, and provides a lot of informative and thought-provoking content on the intellectual foundations of libertarian thought and classical liberalism.

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Extreme Makeover: Regulation Edition

February 17, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

This week’s Economist has an article that points out what many US residents, and readers of this blog, know full well:

But red tape in America is no laughing matter. The problem is not the rules that are self-evidently absurd. It is the ones that sound reasonable on their own but impose a huge burden collectively. America is meant to be the home of laissez-faire. Unlike Europeans, whose lives have long been circumscribed by meddling governments and diktats from Brussels, Americans are supposed to be free to choose, for better or for worse. Yet for some time America has been straying from this ideal.

From federal financial regulation to local lemonade stand regulation, the regulatory systems in the US are a mess. I generally focus on energy and technology regulation (with the occasional foray into national security and surveillance), but that’s one piece of a large, complex, regulatory puzzle that has taken on a lumbering life of its own, beyond the intentions of the designers and well beyond any sincere interest they might have in reining it in. The growing weight of the regulatory state is both economically and socially corrosive.

I think the Economist has also hit on a home truth in its assessment of why we are in this messy, inefficient, costly regulatory thicket:

Two forces make American laws too complex. One is hubris. Many lawmakers seem to believe that they can lay down rules to govern every eventuality. Examples range from the merely annoying (eg, a proposed code for nurseries in Colorado that specifies how many crayons each box must contain) to the delusional (eg, the conceit of Dodd-Frank that you can anticipate and ban every nasty trick financiers will dream up in the future). Far from preventing abuses, complexity creates loopholes that the shrewd can abuse with impunity.

The other force that makes American laws complex is lobbying. The government’s drive to micromanage so many activities creates a huge incentive for interest groups to push for special favours. When a bill is hundreds of pages long, it is not hard for congressmen to slip in clauses that benefit their chums and campaign donors. The health-care bill included tons of favours for the pushy. Congress’s last, failed attempt to regulate greenhouse gases was even worse.

Yes. Hayek’s Pretence of Knowledge meets Smith’s “man of system”, Tullock’s rent seeking, and Olson’s concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Regulatory complexity creates benefits for politically-powerful special interests, but it creates costs for everyone else, and this ongoing process feeds the egos of our elected representatives who believe they can engineer, design, and manipulate society to achieve their desired outcomes.

The Economist rightly recommends that regulatory proposals should have to pass a benefit-cost analysis by an independent group, and more importantly, that regulations should be simpler and more transparent. In this they invoke themes that resonate with Richard Epstein’s Simple Rules for a Complex World.

I would go farther. The underbrush of regulations that are passed and persist beyond their usefulness, the accretion of costly conflicting regulations, all of these have produced a stultifying regulatory thicket that makes attempting productive, entrepreneurial economic activity costly or impossible has to be evaluated and cleared out. I recommend that we make it popular with the American people by turning it into a reality TV show — Extreme Makeover: Regulation Edition. It’ll be like those makeover shows when you go into the house of the hoarder, clear out the stuff and put it all on the driveway, clean the place and modernize it, and then evaluate each piece individually and in its systemic entirety (to see whether or not the complexity is beneficial) before it goes back in the building. D’you think Ty Pennington could whip those legislators into shape and get them to see the folly of their ways?

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Video — Regulating Monopolies

February 15, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

I am pleased to announce my first video in the Learn Liberty series — “Regulating Monopolies: A History of Electricity Regulation“.

It’s a brief overview of the economic history of the origins of the electricity industry and its regulation, and points towards the extent to which in the 21st century we are now having to confront the downsides of regulation, particularly with respect to environmental quality and the creation, adoption, and diffusion of digital technology. And I must give a big thank you to the production folks at the Institute for Humane Studies; I have never been comfortable in front of a camera, but they made it as easy as it could be, and the historical photos they found to illustrate some of the events I discuss are fantastic.

I hope you enjoy it, and share it with your friends!

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Alex Tabarrok on innovation, barriers to it, and the warfare-welfare state

February 13, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

I was glad Mike mentioned Alex Tabarrok’s recent Launching the Innovation Renaissance in his recent post on the Honeywell-Next patent lawsuit, because reading Alex’s new TED book was on my to-do list for this past weekend. Alex’s focus in this book is U.S. innovation policy and ways that we could improve the institutional environment to better enable innovation to create opportunities for people to thrive, and consequently to create growth. He analyzes the patent system, education, and how the federal warfare-welfare state has a high opportunity cost in terms of resources that could be dedicated to R&D (through both public and private funding) but aren’t because of the heavy burden of defense and entitlement spending.

An important variable on which Alex focuses is the ratio of development costs to imitation costs, and he argues that laws such as patents are more likely to be positive-sum and pro-growth in industries with high development costs and low imitation costs. He discusses pharmaceuticals as the canonical industry in this category, where the absence of patents would be likely to reduce the amount of new drug development. But patents in other industries with lower development costs and lower imitation costs can hinder innovation, because they discourage the use of ideas in novel, unexpected ways by people other than the patent-holder. Moreover, notice the dynamic incentives that the current patent system presents to engage mostly in defensive patenting, which is wasteful and reduces the extent to which patents are positive-sum. The high-profile activities of patent trolls in technology-related industries in the past decade indicates just how wasteful this perverse incentive is.

One of Alex’s recommendations to reform the patent systems is variable patent duration in accordance with these differences in development costs and imitation costs. For example, from the book, one-click shopping and a pharmaceutical that cost millions of dollars to develop both receive 20-year patents. Uniform patent length means that the patent system ignores the importance of both development costs and imitation costs in determining whether the monopoly granted by the patent will be positive-sum or not. Granting different monopoly lengths depending on the interplay of development costs and imitation costs in that industry when the invention is created would enable developers to recoup costs while reducing the lost beneficial applications of imitation. Note in particular that a lot of these beneficial applications are not direct imitation, but are rather creative uses of the idea as an input into some other idea. Patents that are either too long or too broad (or both) deter such beneficial activity.

For brevity I’ll skip over his thought-provoking discussion of education (but I do recommend it to your attention), and connect the patent discussion to the implications of federal warfare-welfare spending for whether or not we have an institutional environment that is conducive to unleashing innovation. Alex presents some sobering data on federal government spending on research, entitlements, and defense, data that he elaborates on in a post at Marginal Revolution today in which he puts a NY Times article on the welfare state in the context of his argument.

And that doesn’t even take into account the important, but trickier to estimate, effect of government spending on private R&D funding (the crowding out question). Crowding out can take two forms — government spending on R&D reducing private R&D spending, or government spending on other goods and services reducing the resources available for private R&D spending.

Alex boldly makes what I think is the crucial material point:

The point is not simply that the U.S. should spend more money but that a state with these kinds of budget priorities does not have innovation at the center of its vision. If innovation is not central to the vision, then it is inevitably given short shrift.

Given the incontrovertible evidence that low barriers to innovation are the biggest ultimate institutional cause of the unprecedented growth in well-being and living standards over the past 250 years, the absence of this innovation vision is backward-looking and short-sighted.

Alex also highlights the extent to which regulatory thickets generate wasteful spending, particularly in health care and energy. Money we could spend on medical research and basic energy research gets spent instead on regulation-induced bureaucracy and wasteful projects like Solyndra and others that have failed. Reducing these regulatory thickets and focusing more vision on innovation and basic research than on bureaucratically-weighted and centrally planned projects would be an important incremental move in the right direction. To the extent we’re going to have a state, we should move from a warfare-welfare state to an innovation state.

Sadly, I think Alex is right about the political economy of innovation when he notes that “… few people lobby for innovation because almost by definition, innovation creates present losers and future winners and the present losers are by far the more politically powerful. Innovation has few champions.”

The book closes with seven institutional/policy recommendations touching on patent reform, education, regulation, and open trade in goods, services, and ideas. These recommendations also have implications for issues like immigration and health care.

One of the most valuable features of this book is how well written it is. While being a short, easy, compelling read, it’s a book dense with good and thought-provoking ideas presented clearly for non-specialists (and backed up by extensive references at the end for further analysis). I don’t remember where I saw it, but I think someone commented that we should send a copy of Alex’s book to every member of Congress and their staffers. That would be a valuable education process.

See also a short essay drawn from the book, and listen to Alex’s EconTalk podcast with Russ Roberts discussing the book.

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