On Monday the Union of Concerned Scientists released an analysis estimating the MPG equivalence of electric vehicles. The point of the analysis is this: taking as given an objective of greenhouse gas emission reduction, how do electric vehicles compare to internal combustion vehicles in that dimension? To do such an analysis requires comparing the GHG emissions across the two types of engines, taking into account that the electricity generation fuel mix varies across the country. Here’s how they did that:

Most drivers are familiar with the concept of miles per gallon (mpg), the number of miles a car can travel on a gallon of gasoline. The greater the mpg, the less fuel burned and the lower your global warming emissions. But how can such consumption be figured for electric vehicles, which don’t use gasoline? One way is by determining how many miles per gallon a gasoline-powered vehicle would need to achieve in order to match the global warming emissions of an EV.

The first step in this process is to evaluate the global warming emissions that would result at the power plant from charging a vehicle with a specific amount of electricity. Then we convert this estimate into a gasoline mile-per-gallon equivalent—designated mpg_ghg, where ghg stands for greenhouse gases. If an electric vehicle has an  mpg_ghg value equal to the mpg of a gasoline-powered vehicle, both vehicles will emit the same amounts of global warming pollutants for every mile they travel.

For example, if you were to charge a typical midsize electric vehicle using electricity generated by coal-fired power plants, that vehicle would have an  mpg_ghg of 30. In other words, the global warming emissions from driving that electric vehicle would be equivalent to the emissions from operating a gasoline vehicle with 30 mpg fuel economy over the same distance (Table 1.1).3 Under this equivalency, the cleaner an electricity
generation source, the higher the mpg_ghg . When charging an EV from resources such as wind or solar, the mpg equivalent is in the hundreds (or thousands) because these resources produce very little global warming emissions when generating electricity.

This map, from a New York Times feature on the report, summarizes the results:

The results reflect the regional variety in electricity generation fuel mix — hydro power in the Pacific Northwest increases the mpg_ghg there, as does the predominance of nuclear around Chicago. The results suggest that even in the coal-intensive Midwest and plains states, electric vehicles using coal-generated electricity outperform the standard 4-door 27 MPG sedan in the greenhouse gas dimension.

I found this analysis useful and informative. Frankly, I often take UCS analyses with a grain of salt, because they are an advocacy group and generally start their analyses with presumptions of catastrophic global warming that directs their conclusions, while I think it’s more scientific to make assumptions that weaken your conclusion so that you don’t bias your analysis toward your desired conclusion. This analysis, while still a piece of advocacy, presents the calculations and mpg_ghg comparisons in a more dispassionate fashion that I found informative. The New York Times also had an article on Sunday summarizing the report.

In general, in public policy analysis, you’d like to judge ultimate success or failure of a program by its net results, by actual benefits less the costs involved in achieving those benefits. Admittedly sometimes benefits are hard to measure, but ultimately the point of a policy change is to bring about some improvement in something somewhere. Ultimately it would be nice, once a program is done, to try to find and measure that improvement.

What we often get instead, however, is an attempt to infer a benefit based on the expenditures on the program: how much money was spent, how many people were employed, how many miles of ditches were dug, and so on. This is, more or less, what we see this week from the U.S. Department of Energy in the study it commissioned from the National Renewable Energy Lab on the impact of the Section 1603 Treasury Grant Program.

The Section 1603 grants were payments made to qualifying renewable power projects in lieu of those projects claiming the Investment Tax Credit or Production Tax Credit subsidies for which the projects would have otherwise qualified for. The NREL study looked at the $9.7 billion in program spending up through November 10, 2011; by the time the program ended it’s three-year run in December 31, 2011 over $11 billion in federal funds had be committed.

The DOE asked NREL to estimate the effects of the 1603 program on jobs and economic expenditures. In NREL’s report they explicitly state that their work is an estimate of “gross jobs, earnings, and economic output.” This means that they don’t consider any private sector crowding out, any disincentives from the taxation needed to support the program, any consequences from duplication of other government incentive programs, and so on. They simply treat the federal resources as if it were manna falling from the heavens, and the jobs, capital, and industries that became involved in building renewable power plants would have otherwise sat idle. (Note that I’m not criticizing NREL in performing just a piece of the overall analysis, they just did the work that DOE asked for and paid them to do.)

But note that this is primarily a study which just measures the expenses of the program and a part of what the expenditures bought. So, it is a partial study of the costs of the Section 1603 program, and not any kind of estimate of any of the benefits of the program.

Nonetheless, in the DOE press release accompanying publication of the study, they said the study found “the program has been a huge success.” How does it justify its claim of success? By noting how much was spent, how many people were employed, and how many things were subsidized by the program.

The DOE is not the only one to claim success. At Climate Progress, Stephen Lacey’s assessment is titled, “Grant Program Supported Up To 75,000 Wind And Solar Jobs: Congress Killed It Anyway.” Lacey’s post does mention some of the construction activity might have happened even without the grants, and he observes it estimates just the gross impact (and, by implication, doesn’t reflect any negative effects due to the crowding out of unsubsidized economic activity). But along the way Lacey keeps claiming the program was a success. How does he know? Well, he summarizes from the NREL report: the government spent a lot of money, hired a lot of people, and subsidized the purchase of a lot of things.

Great, but resources consumed is not a measure of success. Any fool can spend money, but spending it well can be a challenge. Is there any evidence in the NREL report that the money was well spent?

If the answer to that question is “no,” then we can’t conclude that the program was a success.

ADDITIONAL LINKS: Reactions to the NREL report from North American Windpower, Solar Industry magazine, and Clean Technica. Rep. Ed Markey (MA) cited the report in calling for Republicans to support “revisions to the tax code that level the playing field for clean energy.”

From time to time a promoter of wind power will encourage the U.S. to follow Denmark’s lead and aim for a much higher levels of wind power on the grid. (Recently Denmark’s legislature established a goal of attaining 50 percent of its energy from wind power by 2020.)

A working paper by Johannes Mauritzen explains one of the key factors supporting Denmark’s current wind power capability: the flexibility inherent in Norway’s vast hydro-power capability. Mauritzen’s abstract:

It is well established within both the economics and power system engineering literature that hydro power can act as a complement to large amounts of intermittent energy. In particular hydro power can act as a “battery” where large amounts of wind power are installed. In this paper I use simple distributed lag models with data from Denmark and Norway. I find that increased wind power in Denmark causes increased marginal exports to Norway and that this effect is larger during periods of net exports when it is difficult to displace local production. Increased wind power can also be shown to slightly reduce prices in southern Norway in the short run. Finally, I estimate that as much as 40 percent of wind power produced in Denmark is stored in Norwegian hydro power magazines.

So, a first step for the United States renewable power policy might be to pick up and move the country a little closer to Norway.

Less facetiously, and projecting a little bit, we might casually infer that the New York power market won’t have too much trouble with a moderate amount of wind power since it also has access to a lot of hydro-power. (11 percent of generating capacity is hydro and another 4 percent is pumped hydro, plus it imports hydro-power from Quebec.) Similarly, we might be more puzzled about all of the difficulties that power system administrators in the Pacific Northwest are having integrating wind into the regional grid, given the extensive hydro-power resources available. (With hydro about 2/3rds of the electric capacity in the region.) Finally, we might be still more surprised by the relative growth of wind power in Texas, which has relatively little hydro-power capacity on its system. (About 0.6 percent of capacity.)

Admittedly, the thing that a mostly-uncontrollable, variable-output technology like wind needs isn’t hydro-power per se, but rather a certain amount of flexibility and control within the power system it is connected to. The necessary flexibility is one part technology and one part power system rules.

The Nordic power system has both the technical means and the supportive power market rules, same for New York, and same for the ERCOT market in Texas (only in Texas the “technical means” are not hydro-power, but rather fast-ramping gas generation along with other resources over which the market has some control).

The Pacific Northwest has tons of flexible capability on the technical side of things* and it has the federal Bonneville Power Administration on the power system rules side of things. Yet somehow the combination of lots of capability and federal agency management produces as much conflict as cooperation.

*About the only caveat in BPA’s defense is that, to some degree, many competing claims to that technical flexibility have already been granted to non-power system users of the water resources involved in the form of environmental constraints, irrigation demands, treaty obligations with Native American organizations, and so on. Maybe the residual flexibility is smaller than it appears.

Like the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, I’d like to see the Production Tax Credit for wind and other renewable energy technologies expire at the end of this year as scheduled. So policy-wise, I’m with them. Still, their editorial against the wind power policy yesterday was awful and it deserves public criticism.

So here are quotes from the WSJ in italics, followed by my comments.

“The renewable energy tax credit—mostly for wind and solar power—started in 1992 as a ‘temporary’ benefit for an infant industry.”

Stick with “mostly for wind.” Other technologies qualify, too, including a variety of hydroelectric technologies and geothermal power, but not currently solar power.

Solar was briefly included in the PTC through the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, but then was back out at the end of 2005. Solar power benefits from the Investment Tax Credit, and until December 2011 benefited from “Section 1603″ cash grants in lieu of the ITC.

If you’re tempted to argue they said “renewable energy tax credits”, not specifically the PTC, note that they clearly say the renewable energy tax credits that began back in 1992 (in that year’s Energy Policy Act) – they’re talking about the PTC and they get the solar reference wrong.

Details on the PTC, via DSIRE.

“The ’1603 grant program’ pays up to 30% of the construction costs for renewable energy plants …. Wind producers then get the 2.2% tax credit for every kilowatt of electricity generated.”

No. To get the 1603 cash grant a developer has to forgo the Production Tax Credit. One or the other, but not both.

And for crying out loud, it is a 2.2 cents/kwh tax credit, not a “2.2% tax credit.” The Heritage Foundation can get this right, you’d think the WSJ could do as well.

(Or, more precisely, that was last year’s subsidy but the PTC is adjusted annually for the effects of inflation so in 2012 it will be slightly higher.)

… and Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico has introduced a national renewable-energy mandate so consumers will be required to buy wind and solar power no matter how high the cost.

I didn’t notice this problem myself, not having dug through the details of the bill Sen. Bingaman introduced last week, but Richard Caperton and Stephen Lacey at Climate Progress point out that the bill caps the cost increase at 3 cents/kwh.

These sloppy errors don’t mean the WSJ is wrong, only that they’re willing to publish poorly researched opinion pieces.

The Caperton and Lacey post at the Climate Progress blog mentioned the above errors and raised some additional complaints. Most of their additional complaints concern the relative virtues of oil and gas production when compared to wind power, and who gets how much subsidy. On these points I mostly lean toward the WSJ‘s view. Suffice to say that wind power subsidies are orders of magnitude higher per unit of energy provided to consumers.

But this brings us to one key point they raise: “one justification for the tax credit is to makeup for the fact that taxpayers are bearing the harm from fossil fuels.”

There is, embedded in this idea somewhere, the foundation of an analytically sound justification for policy intervention. My problem with the Production Tax Credit for wind power is that it flows to wind investors for every qualifying kwh of power generated irrespective of any such benefit. The wind power investor gets the same subsidy whether the wind power produced displaces coal-fired electric power or efficient natural gas-fired power or hydropower. Wind would still qualify for a PTC even if its output was displacing solar power while wind turbines chopped up migrating birds.

While there may be an intellectually defensible case for a policy supporting renewable energy because it reduces a harm, the Production Tax Credit bears little resemblance to that policy.

So let’s let the Production Tax Credit die, and get on with the business of developing sound public policy on emissions. (And please, WSJ, stop embarrassing yourself with silly mistakes.)

The Spectator magazine in the U.K. announces the Matt Ridley Prize for Environmental Heresy:

Matt Ridley has long deplored the wind farm delusion, and was appalled when a family trust was paid by a wind farm company in compensation for mineral rights on land on which it wanted to build a turbine. The trust would be paid £8,500 a year for it, and Matt couldn’t abide the idea of profiting — even in part — from this. So he is donating £8,500 in an annual prize to be given to the best essay exposing environmental fallacies. Entries open today.

The rules are simple. We invite pieces from 1,000 to 2,000 words in length, to gore one of the sacred cows of the environmentalist movement. Matt says more in his cover essay for the new Spectator (which you can also read on Facebook) : ‘There are many to choose from: the idea that wind power is good for the climate, or that biofuels are good for the rain forest or that organic farming is good for the planet or that climate change is a bigger extinction threat than invasive species.’ A shortlist of six will be put to a panel of judges and the winning entry will be published in the magazine in July.

Entries … close on 30 June 2012.

More details at the first link above. £8,500? That is more than US$13,000. Hmmm, which sacred cow do I want to gore?

Matt Ridley is the author of several books on science and society, including The Rational Optimist, The Red Queen, The Origins of Virtue, and Genome.

The “green power paradox” grabs Hotelling by the ankles, turns him upside down, and shakes the change out of his pockets.

Harold Hotelling’s classic article, “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” observes that the owner of an exhaustible resource stock always is making choices in the shadow of the future. If the owner produces and sells a bit today, that necessarily involves sacrificing the opportunity to produce and sell that bit in the future. Given that the resource is exhaustible, we expect the price to increase as the stock of resources nears exhaustion. The resource owner’s choice, then, is whether to sell at a low price today or a higher price tomorrow.

Hotelling’s mathematics says the resource price will tend to increase at the rate of interest, at least under certain conditions (The intuition: if the rate of price increase is below the rate of interest then it will pay to produce more quickly now; if the  price increases are any faster then it will pay to produce more slowly. The adjustments will tend to keep the rate of resource price increases in line with interest rates.)

The green paradox emerges when, in a world of exhaustible energy resources, a new renewable energy supply is introduced. Suddenly, the heavy hand of the future is lifted a little. Therefore, even as the exhaustible energy resource dwindles, no longer can the owner expect ever rising prices. In fact, as the technology of the renewable energy resource improves, the price of all energy resources should drop.

In a world of constantly improving renewable energy technology, the owner of an exhaustible resource may be choosing between a low price today and an even lower price tomorrow. The implication: produce and sell now, before the price drops again!

Paradoxically, government promotion of alternative energy technology as a means to fight global warming may be encouraging the rapid exploitation of fossil fuels!

(This is my optimistic, Julian Simon-esque version of the Green Paradox, with resources becoming cheaper over time. A similar pessimistic version can obtain if owners of an exhaustible energy resource expect that regulatory controls on production will become increasingly onerous over time. Produce now while the controls are light instead of keeping your resource in the ground where future regulations may insist it stay.

And finally, if you are a combination resource optimist and a regulatory pessimist, then you ought to stop reading this post right now and go drill, baby, drill!)

SEE: Hans-Werner Sinn, The Green Paradox, MIT Press (2012). Related Sinn: “Greenhouse gases: Demand control policies, supply and the time path of carbon prices.“

HT: Marginal Revolution.

At the end of a comment on Windfall, a new documentary on the effects of wind power development on a community in upstate New York, Michael Munger pulls out the key Pigou quote.

Pigou is relevant because the best possible case to be made for subsidizing wind power production involves correcting for the externalities associated with conventional electric power production. Maybe we imagine a Pigovian tax on conventional generators as a sort of first-best solution, and direct subsidy to alternative generators as a second- or third-best solution.

Well, here Munger whips out the Pigou:

It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any State authority will attain, or even wholeheartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure, and to personal corruption by private interest. A loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organized for votes, may easily outweigh the whole.

From A. C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare, chapter 20, paragraph 4, available online free via the Library of Economics and Liberty.

Yes, well before James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson, Robert Tollison or even Michael Munger were objecting that government intervention may go awry, Professor Pigou was already there.

[ASIDE: I was led to wonder why this insight was seemingly lost from economics for several decades after Pigou published his work. Maybe someone has researched the question carefully. In the absence of someone setting me straight, I'll blame Paul Samuelson.

Samuelson's influential Foundations of Economic Analysis refers to Pigou several times, according to the book's index, but so far as I noticed just once it mentions that the presence of Pigou's external costs means "there is of course need to interfere with the 'invisible hand'." (p. 196)  Samuelson neglects Pigou's qualification: "The case, however, cannot become more than a prima facie one, until we have considered the qualifications, which governmental agencies may be expected to possess for intervening advantageously." (And then Pigou continues with the public choice-like lines Munger quoted.)]

For your convenience, the energy policy parts from last night’s State of the Union address. Be aware that I’ve dropped some non-energy words, phrases or even short sentences without indicating where such edits happened in order to make this extract relatively clean. In some cases I kept non-energy bits that seemed useful as context for the energy discussion.

Think about the America within our reach: A future where we’re in control of our own energy, and our security and prosperity aren’t so tied to unstable parts of the world.

I want to speak about how we move forward, and lay out a blueprint for an economy that’s built to last – an economy built on American manufacturing, American energy, skills for American workers, and a renewal of American values.

Innovation demands basic research. Don’t let other countries win the race for the future. Support the same kind of research and innovation that led to the computer chip and the Internet; to new American jobs and new American industries.

Nowhere is the promise of innovation greater than in American-made energy. Over the last three years, we’ve opened millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration, and tonight, I’m directing my Administration to open more than 75 percent of our potential offshore oil and gas resources. Right now, American oil production is the highest that it’s been in eight years. That’s right – eight years. Not only that – last year, we relied less on foreign oil than in any of the past sixteen years.

But with only 2 percent of the world’s oil reserves, oil isn’t enough. This country needs an all-out, all-of-the-above strategy that develops every available source of American energy – a strategy that’s cleaner, cheaper, and full of new jobs.

We have a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly one hundred years, and my Administration will take every possible action to safely develop this energy. Experts believe this will support more than 600,000 jobs by the end of the decade. And I’m requiring all companies that drill for gas on public lands to disclose the chemicals they use. America will develop this resource without putting the health and safety of our citizens at risk.

The development of natural gas will create jobs and power trucks and factories that are cleaner and cheaper, proving that we don’t have to choose between our environment and our economy. And by the way, it was public research dollars, over the course of thirty years, that helped develop the technologies to extract all this natural gas out of shale rock – reminding us that Government support is critical in helping businesses get new energy ideas off the ground.

What’s true for natural gas is true for clean energy. In three years, our partnership with the private sector has already positioned America to be the world’s leading manufacturer of high-tech batteries. Because of federal investments, renewable energy use has nearly doubled. And thousands of Americans have jobs because of it.

When Bryan Ritterby was laid off from his job making furniture, he said he worried that at 55, no one would give him a second chance. But he found work at Energetx, a wind turbine manufacturer in Michigan. Before the recession, the factory only made luxury yachts.

Our experience with shale gas shows us that the payoffs on these public investments don’t always come right away. Some technologies don’t pan out; some companies fail. But I will not walk away from the promise of clean energy. I will not cede the wind or solar or battery industry to China or Germany because we refuse to make the same commitment here. We have subsidized oil companies for a century. That’s long enough. It’s time to end the taxpayer giveaways to an industry that’s rarely been more profitable, and double-down on a clean energy industry that’s never been more promising. Pass clean energy tax credits and create these jobs.

We can also spur energy innovation with new incentives. The differences in this chamber may be too deep right now to pass a comprehensive plan to fight climate change. But there’s no reason why Congress shouldn’t at least set a clean energy standard that creates a market for innovation. So far, you haven’t acted. Well tonight, I will. I’m directing my Administration to allow the development of clean energy on enough public land to power three million homes. And I’m proud to announce that the Department of Defense, the world’s largest consumer of energy, will make one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history – with the Navy purchasing enough capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year.

Of course, the easiest way to save money is to waste less energy. So here’s another proposal: Help manufacturers eliminate energy waste in their factories and give businesses incentives to upgrade their buildings. Their energy bills will be $100 billion lower over the next decade, and America will have less pollution, more manufacturing, and more jobs for construction workers who need them. Send me a bill that creates these jobs.

Building this new energy future should be just one part of a broader agenda to repair America’s infrastructure. So much of America needs to be rebuilt. We’ve got a power grid that wastes too much energy.

I recognize that people watching tonight have differing views about energy. But no matter what party they belong to, I bet most Americans are thinking the same thing right now: Nothing will get done this year, or next year, or maybe even the year after that, because Washington is broken.

I’m a Democrat. But I believe what Republican Abraham Lincoln believed: That Government should do for people only what they cannot do better by themselves, and no more.

On the other hand, even my Republican friends who complain the most about Government spending have supported clean energy projects for the folks back home.

The last four paragraphs fell outside the main energy portion of the speech, but since energy was mentioned I’ve included them here.

The full speech clocked in just under 7000 words, while this extract is a bit over 900 words. The word energy appeared 23 times in the speech.

The Hill‘s E2 Wire blogged the energy content of the speech. See:

• Bingaman preps ‘clean’ power plan after SOTU shout-out
• Obama speech steers clear of Keystone pipeline rejection, Solyndra failure
• Obama touts EPA effort to exempt milk from oil-spill rules
• Obama steers clear of climate change talk in speech
• Obama, in speech, touts natural gas while pledging ‘fracking’ rules
• Obama chides Congress for failing to pass ‘clean energy standard’
• Obama speech casts wide political net on domestic energy development plans

For another view, here is a report from CNN.

Can anyone name a major energy policy initiative that emerged from any prior State of the Union address? That is to say, any reason to expect any of this to matter beyond a week from now?

My natural inclination is to say these things don’t matter, but the 2006 State of the Union address lauded the promise of cellulosic ethanol and the following year the Renewable Fuels Standard was implemented.

Michael J. Graetz, "The End of Energy," MIT Press, 2011.

Michael Graetz’s The End of Energy is a fascinating run through 40 years of U.S. energy policy making. Engaging and at times even entertaining if you are at all interested in energy issues. In Graetz’s telling it is mostly a story of 40 years of failure, though he notes a few successes along the way.

I absolutely loved that the first chapter began with President Nixon’s decision to impose wage and price controls on August 15, 1971. If you think that wasn’t energy-policy relevant, then read that chapter (the publisher will let you read it free). Just note that the Arab oil embargo just over two years later caused barely a hiccup in U.S. oil imports; the gas lines and shortages were mostly due to the remaining Nixon oil price regulations. (Yet, 40 years later we still blame OPEC!)

Graetz proceeds to pull us through the swamp of 1970′s energy policy. President Ford joined Congress in giving us automobile fuel economy regulations. President Carter pushed an astounding range of proposals, succeeded on some but failed on others,  and lectured Americans for their supposed consumerist excesses. The book does a good job of surveying the problems created by interstate natural gas price regulation and the difficult politics of casting off that burden.

Reagan’s presidency doesn’t get much attention. Oil and gas price decontrol seemed to work, but these policies were initiated by Carter. After Reagan comes a decade and a half of relatively low energy prices, but for the spike around the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Not much to report, Graetz suggests, as the urge for new energy policy rises and falls with energy prices.

Energy prices pick up again in the mid-2000s, and after a few words on the Energy Policy Act of 1992 we find ourselves in the middle of climate change discussions and the massive difficulties that come with finding reasonable policy. Graetz devotes a late chapter to Congress and the attempted making of a cap-and-trade law. It is enough, perhaps, to turn the most die hard advocate of cap-and-trade into a carbon tax proponent (excepting that, had Waxman-Markey pushed a carbon tax, then a look into the sausage factory likely would have produced the opposite impulse). The book winds down contemplating the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the Obama administration’s efforts in response.

The book mostly covers domestic federal coal, oil and gas, environmental and some nuclear power issues. Relatively little attention goes to electric power beyond nuclear or to  international issues, except when discussing climate change politics. Not much on ethanol and just a little on solar and wind power. Still – coal, oil and gas, the environment – these are where the big money is and so that is where the politics have focused. One lesson of the book seems to be that lobbying expenditure is a product of policymaker ambition and the size of government, and not the other way around.

The hazard of writing a current events-type book is that the book must end even as events continue. So Graetz laments that 40 years of energy policy making hasn’t put a dent in our “energy dependence,” and practically at the same time we have begun importing less oil for the first time in decades. Domestic oil and gas production is up in recent years, and what is more, it is a development that has come about mostly without the attention of federal energy policy makers. (Or perhaps in part due to their lack of attention, even admitting some federal R&D support for oil and gas drilling technology.)

Well, we can’t blame Graetz because history continued after his book ended. It is a strength of his book that is gives us some idea of what to expect of the next few years, as the politicians and regulators in Washington DC begin to take notice of this domestic energy development. I wouldn’t score all of the wins and losses quite the way he does, and I’m not sure where his interest in more grand energy policy comes from given the fairly damning assessment of the federal energy policy system. Still, the book offers its readers a fair view of and deeper insight into the last 40 years of federal energy policy.

Marc Gunther asks, “Should we worry about Chinese government subsidies to its solar industry? Or send the Chinese a thank-you note?“ The issue is a “dumping” complaint filed by several U.S. based manufacturers with the U.S. International Trade Commission alleging China so subsidizes its solar PV production that the PV panels are being sold here at a loss.

As Gunther notes, “it takes chutzpah (that’s a technical term in economics) for US solar manufacturers to complain about subsidies in China since they, too, benefit from … [long list of subsidies provided by U.S. federal and state policies].”

ASIDE: Elements of the wind power industry have taken inspiration, as a few weeks ago four U.S.-based manufacturers of wind turbine towers filed a complaint with the ITC against Chinese and Vietnamese wind turbine tower manufacturers.

[HT to AltEnergyStocks.com, where Gunther's column was republished.]