Posts Tagged ‘airport security’

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The TSA’s wholesale violation of our civil rights, including economic liberty

January 6, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

I have been a too-silent opponent of the Patriot Act’s authorization of invasive surveillance in the name of national security. One of the consequences of that authorization has been the growth of the Department of Homeland Security and, under it, the formation and growth of the TSA. Those of us who travel frequently have known the TSA as “Thousands Standing Around” for years, and have derided the TSA policies on shoes (the “shoe carnival”) and liquids that are the security equivalent of locking the barn after the horse is stolen.

The TSA’s push to increase the intrusiveness of their physical search of passengers for specific items has pushed beyond laughable inconvenience and inefficiency into literally physically invasive search that does not qualify as a reasonable search under the administrative search carve-out of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, as written, protects individuals from unreasonable government search and seizure of their person and property, and the TSA operates under the administrative search carve-out from it — basically, if you put your bags on the conveyor you are presumed to have consented to the search of your person and possessions. The TSA are trying to claim that the new backscatter x-ray full-body scanners, millimeter wave full body scanners, and aggressive, frisking-style pat-downs are a sufficiently reasonable search that they should be considered legal under administrative search.

The TSA’s position is wrong, and instead is an aggressive, authoritarian push that violates not just the dignity of individuals, but also our innate (i.e. NOT government-granted) civil and human rights. Their policies and procedures operate on the presumption that every single person that presents himself or herself at the airport to engage in a commercial transportation transaction is a potential terrorist. That presumption flies in the face of every concept of freedom and individual rights that is at the foundation of a free, dynamic, vibrant society.

They do so in the name of making us safer in the face of terrorist threats, but this is a false equivalence, and one where economic logic is important. Their invasive practices require lots of resources. Did you know that each of these scanners costs $175,000? How many FBI intelligence agents and explosive-sniffing K-9 teams could we train and employ with the millions of dollars that Congress has already authorized for the purchase of these scanners? The opportunity cost of these scanners is enormous. Enormous. And it puts us at more risk than we would face if we instead focused those resources on more effective tools, such as behaviorally-targeted intelligence gathering and explosive-detecting dogs.

But here’s where the political economy comes in. The companies who manufacture these technologies are active lobbyists, and have spread their lobbying dollars liberally among the heads of security-related committees and sub-committees in the 111th Congress, and those members of Congress have delivered millions of dollars in scanner contracts to these companies. If that’s the decision-making dynamic in Congress, what hope do the relatively cheap intelligence and dog options have in the face of well-funded x-ray and MMW scanner lobbyists?

These trampling of individual civil liberties have economic implications. Remember that airlines operate on razor-thin margins, and Herb Kelleher of Southwest famously observed that the last 5 or 6 passengers on a plane make a difference between profit and loss on that flight. It doesn’t take a large reduction in demand for air transportation (an inward shift in the demand curve) for the airlines to see that profit margin evaporate. For example, I used to be both Platinum on American and Premier on United, which meant I flew at least 75,000 miles annually. For 2011, because of the TSA, I am taking 1 flight at the end of January because I made a commitment before these policies were implemented, but after that, I will not fly. I have zero flights planned, and only two tentative trips to which I’ve committed for vacation in July and December. With razor-thin margins, it doesn’t take many frequent flyers who want to maintain their dignity and respect staying off of planes to turn profits to losses, at the hands (literally!) of the TSA.

If you have made some of these arguments yourself, you have probably heard the response that flying is not a right. That is wrong. The Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that flight falls under the individual rights we have to free movement under the Constitution, and this right was reinforced formally in language in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. We do have the right to fly, and to fly without unreasonable search that strips us of our dignity.

Other economists have written about other more directly economic aspects of this important issue, thinking in terms of benefit-cost analysis. In November Art Carden wrote in Forbes that full frontal nudity doesn’t make us safer, and I strongly encourage you to read his analysis. In December Steve Horwitz made the substitution effect argument: if people substitute out of flying and into driving to avoid invasive TSA searches, those people are at much higher risk of accident and death:

To the degree that the new TSA procedures raise the psychic cost of flying, either by increasing the wait time at security and/or by making people very uncomfortable with see-through scanning or being fondled by a TSA agent, it will induce them to look for alternative methods of travel. For most people, that will be driving rather than flying. And the reality is that you are far more likely mile for mile to be killed in an automobile accident than in an airplane. The most dangerous part of air travel is driving to the airport. And if you consider not all of the risks of flying but only the risk of what the TSA procedures are supposed to prevent, namely the extraordinarily small chance of being killed in a terrorist attack on an airplane, it is even more likely that you will die in your car than on the plane.

Today the Electronic Privacy Information Center is hosting an event, The Stripping of Freedom: A Careful Scan of TSA Security Procedures, with several excellent panels. If you care about such rights, and I obviously think you should, I encourage you to check out EPIC’s activity in this area (including their lawsuit against the TSA to gain an injunction against the use of scanners for primary screening), contact your airlines and hotels, and contact your members of Congress. Otherwise our Fourth Amendment rights, which are essential to a dynamic, thriving society, will continue to erode, and will erode at an increasing rate.

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So are you fed up yet? I am

December 30, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Another reason I’ve been staying away from the computer over the holidays is that between the Senate health care bill process, the futilely constructivist quest for government policy to stimulate the economy, proposals for financial regulation, and the craven stupidity of TSA policy proposals after the Christmas day bomb failure, I am fed up and disgusted with pretty much everything having to do with economic policy.

Of course, the frustrating thing with all of these issues is that I am so fed up and annoyed and disgusted, but feel so powerless. It’s not enough to call my so-called elected representatives and tell a staffer that I am fed up and disgusted. Democratic politics is so soul-sucking in this way that I am focusing my mental and emotional energy on the areas where I can find meaning and can see a difference due to my efforts. Sadly, though, I do feel like I’m fiddling while the republic is burning around me.

One meme has recurred in my reading over the past couple of days, particularly at Bruce Schneier’s blog where he discussed the Christmas bomb attempt, Christopher Hitchens on the TSA and how good we are at collective punishment of the innocent, and Bruce Schneier talking with Jeffrey Goldberg at the Atlantic: it’s increasingly hard to escape the feeling of being terrorized by our own government. And not just at the airport.

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Fixing airport security

June 26, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Having just returned from a 1.5-week, three-conference trip, I am having my now-usual visceral reaction to the thought of another airport experience — nausea, which I hope diminishes by the time of my next trip in early August. Thus I’m in violent (irony intended) agreement with a post on Bruce Schneier’s blog today entitled “fixing airport security“, which I recommend reading. Schneier reiterates what we all realize by now: “Airport security is more about CYA than anything else: defending against what the terrorists did last time.”

But he also delves into another aspect that is well worth our attention — the lack of transparency with respect to traveler rules, rights, and responsibilities is due to what I would call the murky legal status of airport security, and the effect of this on both traveling citizens and visitors to the US:

Let’s start with the no-fly and watch lists. Right now, everything about them is secret: You can’t find out if you’re on one, or who put you there and why, and you can’t clear your name if you’re innocent. This Kafkaesque scenario is so un-American it’s embarrassing. Obama should make the no-fly list subject to judicial review.

Then, move on to the checkpoints themselves. What are our rights? What powers do the TSA officers have? If we’re asked “friendly” questions by behavioral detection officers, are we allowed not to answer? If we object to the rough handling of ourselves or our belongings, can the TSA official retaliate against us by putting us on a watch list? Obama should make the rules clear and explicit, and allow people to bring legal action against the TSA for violating those rules; otherwise, airport checkpoints will remain a Constitution-free zone in our country. …

The Constitution provides us, both Americans and visitors to America, with strong protections against invasive police searches. Two exceptions come into play at airport security checkpoints. The first is “implied consent,” which means that you cannot refuse to be searched; your consent is implied when you purchased your ticket. And the second is “plain view,” which means that if the TSA officer happens to see something unrelated to airport security while screening you, he is allowed to act on that.

Both of these principles are well established and make sense, but it’s their combination that turns airport security checkpoints into police-state-like checkpoints.

Unfortunately, the line is blurry between security-enhancing search encompassed within “implied consent” and unreasonable search that borders on harassment and does little to enhance security and reduce terrorist threats. Injecting some transparency and creating procedures that limit the rights of the TSA and enable individuals to query and challenge the TSA would create some much-needed accountability, and would make airports less of a police state than they currently are.

I also wrote about Bruce Schneier on airport “security theater” in January 2009.

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Airport kabuki: Bruce Schneier on “security theater”

January 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

Bruce Schneier is one of the most thoughtful, knowledgeable security experts in the world, and he’s been constructively critical of the TSA’s airport policies and procedures for quite some time (so have I, but I have nothing like his expertise or his street cred). You may have seen Jeffrey Goldberg’s November 2008 Atlantic article, in which Schneier and Goldberg burst Swiss-cheese holes in the TSA’s policies and practices. In this article and other writings, Schneier describes the TSA’s policies and practices as “security theater”, intended to assuage an anxious traveling public without actually doing anything meaningful or substantive to ensure sufficient reduction in the probability of a terrorist attack using airports or airplanes.

Now Katharine Mangu-Ward has an interview with Schneier in Reason, and it’s well worth reading. The good news is that the TSA will phase out the small liquids policy (although until the UK does the same my travel will still involve stupid, pointless plastic bags of tiny bottles); can we expect some reasonable removal of the ludicrous shoe policy to follow? I certainly hope so.

Here’s one of my favorite parts of the article:

Reason: What would success look like for the TSA? If you were made King of Airport Security tomorrow and given the entire current budget of the TSA to do whatever you wanted, what kind of system would you design?

Schneier: If I were in charge of the TSA’s budget, I’d give most of it back. Politically, I wouldn’t be able to, of course, but it would be the best thing to do. Spending money on airport/airplane security only makes sense if the bad guys target airplanes. In general, money spent defending particular targets or tactics only makes sense if we can guess them correctly. If tactics and targets are scarce, defending against specific ones makes us safer. If tactics and targets are plentiful—as they are—it only forces the bad guys to pick new ones. Spending money on intelligence, investigation, and emergency response is effective regardless of the tactic or the target. Airport security is a last line of defense, and not a very good one at that. We need to remember that at budget time.

Schneier, unlike the TSA management, is capable of making reasoned, and reasonable, assessments of relative risk. This relative risk assessment is crucial for getting the most bang from the taxpayer’s money that is spent on security. Schneier argues that much of the TSA budget is better spent on “intelligence, investigation, and emergency response”. Schneier is also very effective at communicating the importance of making those relative risk assessments, and at communicating the necessity of evaluating and making tradeoffs instead of seeing security as a binary absolute. The TSA management could learn a thing (or a few!) from Schneier, both on substance and on communicating ideas.

That said, I’m confused by what I think is a false dichotomy he creates here:

Reason: What’s your reaction when you hear people say that we live in a “security state”?

Schneier: We live in an information state, which is subtly different. All computer processes produce data as a byproduct. As more parts of our lives are mediated by computers, more personal information about us is produced. This information is collected, and then bought and sold, by other institutions, both government and commercial, without our knowledge and consent. Some of this is driven by security concerns, but a lot of it is driven by economics. The problem is that personal data is looked at as property, which can be bought and sold, instead of as a right. Long term, we need to fix that.

I don’t understand the “property instead of a right” distinction. I can reconcile this “instead of” by saying that personal data are property, but they are the property of the individual to whom the data pertain. Therefore, individuals have rights to retain their data, access their data, and prevent others from accessing their data. Isn’t that approach consistent with the way we treat rights to personal data, and other personal property, in other situations?

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