Posts Tagged ‘crude oil’

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Reversing the Seaway Pipeline

March 11, 2011

Michael Giberson

The Seaway Pipeline is built to carry crude oil from the Gulf Coast to Cushing, Oklahoma, but with the current price differential between crude oil at the coast and crude oil at Cushing, each barrel delivered on the pipeline loses about $10-15 of value. The Streetwise Professor does a little back of the envelope calculation to conclude reversing the flow of the pipeline would create substantial economic gains. The (part) owner of the pipeline has substantial refinery assets in the Mid-Continent region, so it benefits from the low crude oil price at Cushing and is not interested in reversing the flow. The only way to reverse the flow may be for someone to buy the current owners out. Can somebody make this deal happen?

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Would granting futures exchanges copyright protection for prices deter some market manipulation?

January 6, 2011

Michael Giberson

In New York Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit denied NYMEX copyright protection for its settlement prices. The decision turned on application of the merger doctrine in copyright law, which governs cases in which the expression of an idea is so completely linked to the idea itself that granting copyright protection to an author’s work would in effect grant copyright protection to the idea expressed. Since ideas are not copyrightable, when a particular expression of an idea is so closely bound to the idea itself then the expression also cannot be copyrighted.

Jeremy Murray analyzes the court’s decision in a Buffalo Law Review piece, “The Death of Copyright Protection in Individual Price Valuations, a Flawed Merger Doctrine, and Financial Market Manipulation.” There is a lot of information here, some of which I only skimmed through, but Murray offers some interesting points on the link between copyright protection for exchange settlement prices and market manipulation exercises such as that of Amaranth Advisors.

In particular, he advises that ICE’s capability to directly link its product prices to NYMEX settlement prices created conditions in which the natural gas market manipulations by a Amaranth trader could flourish (if only for a short time). Among other things, Amaranth sought to profit by holding large short positions in natural gas on ICE, then drive the NYMEX price down by dumping a small long position in the last few minutes of trading. Murray argues that if ICE was required to identify its own settlement prices, rather than copying NYMEX settlement prices, then Amaranth-style manipulations would fail: dumping contracts on one market would not automatically and exactly manipulate the price of the other.

Murray also offers some interesting speculation as to whether NYMEX would have been more successful had it pursued a claim based on “time sensitive information” rather than copyright.

(While I liked much of Murray’s analysis, to motivate his discussion of market manipulation he relies way to heavily on quotes from politician. Let’s just say I’m not willing to take the claims of Sens. Maria Cantwell and Richard Durbin as authorities on energy market operations, nor am I convinced that sharply increasing energy prices in 2007 and 2008 were due to rampant market manipulation. Thankfully, the discussion is mostly irrelevant to his broader analysis.)

NOTES: New York Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).

We discussed the NYMEX case here earlier, see “What is a Price? The Courts Think They Know; The Courts are Wrong“. Also related is “Prices are information goods, and information wants to be expensive, because it’s so valuable” and “CFTC Holds Hearings on Oversight of Energy Trading.”

Several posts here discuss the Amaranth manipulation charges.

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Digging into the resource curse: Research into oil revenue and Brazilian municipalities

December 9, 2009

Michael Giberson

A paper by Francesco Caselli and Guy Michaels, “Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from Brazil,” takes a closer look at the how the resource curse works its anti-magic. (Ungated version here.) The abstract:

We use variation in oil output among Brazilian municipalities to investigate the effects of resource windfalls. We find muted effects of oil through market channels: offshore oil has no effect on municipal non-oil GDP or its composition, while onshore oil has only modest effects on non-oil GDP composition. However, oil abundance causes municipal revenues and reported spending on a range of budgetary items to increase, mainly as a result of royalties paid by Petrobras. Nevertheless, survey-based measures of social transfers, public good provision, infrastructure, and household income increase less (if at all) than one might expect given the increase in reported spending. To explain why oil windfalls contribute little to local living standards, we use data from the Brazilian media and federal police to document that very large oil output increases alleged instances of illegal activities associated with mayors.

The authors observe that focusing closely on an intra-country case provides both disadvantages and advantages.  They realize they risk obtaining findings that are not generalizable elsewhere.  However, an intra-country study naturally holds many institutional and policy variables constant, and therefore should more clearly reveal the relationship between resources and economic outcomes.

Most of the body of the paper is taken up with a discussion of data sources and the analysis by which they conclude that royalties paid by PetroBras to municipalities do increase municipal budgets, but seem to generate very little in the way of a broader increase in income or welfare.  The result leads them to ask: where are the oil revenues going?

To partly address this question we put together a few pieces of tentative evidence. First, oil revenues increase the size of municipal workers’ houses (but not the size of other residents’ houses). Second, Brazil’s news agency is more likely to carry news items mentioning corruption and the mayor in municipalities with very high levels of oil output (on an absolute, though not per capita, basis). Third, federal police operations are more likely to occur in municipalities with very high levels of oil output (again in absolute terms). And finally, we document anecdotal evidence of scandals allegedly involving mayors in several of the largest oil producing municipalities, some involving large sums of money. To partly explain why senior municipal workers may have thought that they could “get away” with large-scale alleged theft in a country where local elections are held regularly, we note that a survey in the largest oil producing municipality found considerable ignorance among residents regarding the scale of the municipal oil windfall.

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