Posts Tagged ‘Electricity’

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Breaking news: State regulatory procedures do not favor consumers

December 22, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

As is the vernacular these days, your response to the title of this post is probably “I know, right?” Or, if you prefer sarcasm, you may say “no, really?” This is the conclusion of an all-too-rare piece of investigative journalism from Dan Garino at the Columbus Dispatch:

Ohio’s unique system for setting electricity rates has created a quagmire of regulations that have benefited industry over consumers. …

The rate increases stem from a complex regulatory approach unlike any other in the country, one that combines elements of both regulated and free-market systems.

Beyond that, The Dispatch found during a yearlong investigation that the state’s regulatory structure misses what many observers see as the underlying problem: Utility companies have tremendous political power that tends to overshadow consumers’ needs in the process.

This lengthy article goes into detail on the legislative history of electricity restructuring in Ohio and the political economy of utility lobbying of legislators, as well as the role of the Public Utility Commission as regulator in this hybrid restructured state. If you are interested in electricity or the political economy of regulation, it’s a worthwhile read — a case study in public choice theory.

In its early years of restructuring, Ohio was held out as a leader with strong potential for consumer-oriented retail competition, but over time that competition has not emerged. One of Ohio’s institutional innovations was “aggregation”, or allowing municipalities to act as a retail aggregator on behalf of a set of customers, in that case its residents. But Ohio’s legislators and regulators did not pay adequate attention to the unintended consequences of the political compromises they made that would continue to serve as entry barriers to potential retail competitors, including aggregation.

In terms of the PUCO regulatory procedures and the processes through which debate and discussion are supposed to happen, the article makes a lot out of the unanimity of the Commission’s decisions, but does not dig into the very formal (and formulaic, I think) procedures for filing comments on cases. That process, and its positive and negative consequences, is in and of itself worthy of a lengthy analysis; because of that process, most issues that the commissioners have are likely to be resolved before the ultimate vote, so unanimity is not that surprising. It’s not unique to Ohio, though.

I don’t want to comment on the particulars of Ohio, but I think that most of the states that have implemented regulatory restructuring have a similarly tortured legislative and regulatory story to tell. This Franken-restructured status arises out of a politically-motivated desire to “ring-fence” competition, to capture the benefits of utilities being able to purchase power in competitive wholesale markets, but to control and manage the retail market in ways that create the (realistic, IMO) impression that retail customers are still subject to the regulated monopoly. Ohio’s record on that front is not good, but Ohio is not alone in that camp.

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An SEA meetings coda

November 29, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

John Whitehead already mentioned our joint AERE/USAEE session at the SEA meetings last week. It turned out well, a combination of carbon offsets analysis and electricity market design experiments. Rim Baltaduonis from Gettysburg College presented two different, interesting experimental papers, one on designing rules for enabling contracts for carbon sequestration in soil (which is a tricky and difficult problem), and one on the individual and system effects in an electric power network of different retail contracts (fixed, TOU, RTP with and without real-time information). The latter paper is very interesting and has some results that I’ll definitely want to discuss here, but he’s not distributing it yet, so I’ll bide my time. The third paper was a very elegant and informative model of different aspects of carbon offsets from Heather Klemick at the EPA. The cross-pollination of the environmental/resource economists and the energy economists made for a wide-ranging and interesting discussion. Thanks to John for letting us co-sponsor a session with AERE!

There were several other highlights, including the panel I chaired on research funding in economics, the panel on which I presented a paper that I’ll discuss here after I revise it (the punch line across all of the papers on that panel was “one size does not fit all!”), the Institute for Humane Studies cocktail reception, and the sessions and banquet for the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics. A very enjoyable conference.

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Rory Sutherland on subjective meaning

November 29, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

This video of a talk from British marketing expert Rory Sutherland is well worth 27 minutes of your time, especially if you are in any way associated with the electricity industry or its regulation. He uses insights from Ludwig von Mises to explain how human subjective and contextual valuation of alternatives can help businesses and governments make better decisions.

Why do I recommend his talk particularly to my electricity colleagues? Because Sutherland draws a poignant contrast between an engineering approach and a psychological approach to consumer value propositions. He does a great job of explaining why value is subjective and contextual and is not determined by the inputs or the costs associated with producing something. Value is a function of context and perception. Electricity has been so regulated and so dominated by the cost-based engineering approach to production that it has no experience having to think about that fact and incorporate it into business models in the industry. Sutherland helps us to think differently.

Thanks to Sam Bowman at the Adam Smith Institute for the link.

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Cost savings and value creation are different

November 28, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

The cost saving-focused mindset has prevailed in regulated industries for over a century, slowing innovation in the process. In electricity, regulation that bases firms’ profits on cost recovery erects market barriers by recognizing only a business model that involves providing a specified product (110v power to the home) transported over a monopoly network. Even in 2011, well into the third decade of the digital revolution, this narrow focus and cost-saving mindset persists, and it fetters smart grid-enabled economic growth by emphasizing cost recovery and ignoring value creation.

In fact, one of the main reasons why smart grid investments face regulatory and political opposition is that focus on cost recovery (among others). I think this Greentech Media article gets the story right: the ways that smart grid investments can lead to cost savings are limited. We’ve discussed this idea here at KP quite a bit — a limitation on the benefits of transactive technologies and dynamic pricing is the fact that for most people, electricity bills are not a large share of their annual expenses, so even saving 15% on the electricity bill may not be a salient enough benefit to induce a lot of people to make technology investments. In other words, smart grid may or may not lead to cost savings for a lot of residential customers.

But is that the right metric by which to evaluate smart grid investments? Of course not. The Greentech Media article linked above starts with a telecom metaphor that I use frequently. In nominal terms, most of us pay much more for our communication services today than we did when all we had was a single land line (and leased Western Electric phone!) back in the 1980s, and even in real terms we probably still pay more than we did then. But look at how much more value we get — mobility, Internet, automation, all of the services that have been created at the edge of the network. We are much richer and better off because of the change in communication technologies and services since the 1980s, even taking into account that we pay more for them. Apply this metaphor to the regulatory calculus today, and the mismatch of its cost recovery focus and the benefits arising from new value creation is apparent. Innovation in telecommunications didn’t occur and thrive and expand because of cost savings and cost recovery, but instead because of new value creation.

Those who argue that the business model for customer-facing smart grid investments has to be grounded only in cost savings are incorrect, and are looking too narrowly at consumer value propositions. This debate came up in the post I wrote in October about the new Nest thermostat, a gorgeous and beautifully designed piece of consumer-focused in-home technology from a group of former Apple engineers, and in other articles about Nest around the same time. Observers from this traditional cost savings mindset dismissed the Nest thermostat because of its $250 price tag, saying that consumers would not save enough money to make the payback period on it make sense, even with dynamic pricing. This criticism overlooks the additional features and capabilities of such a device — motion sensing, serving as a hub to integrate and manage and automate in-home digital devices, learning algorithms, extensibility to be able to bundle with other digital services in the home, and so on. It also overlooks the persistent pattern in the history of new technology adoption, from the Roman baths onward; there will always be consumers with strong “first adopter” preferences, who are willing to pay more to be the first ones to have the novelty, and in the case of digital devices, incur that cost fully aware that prices will fall in the future as the technology matures. They guinea pig new technologies for the rest of us.

Those two aspects — additional features and first adopter preferences — mean that a lot of the value proposition in consumer-facing smart grid technologies is new value creation, not cost savings. This means that the regulatory calculus and the traditional electricity cost-focused mindset misses the real action, the real opportunity, the real potential that the investments could unleash.

One data point supporting my claim is that, only one week after its commercial release, the Nest thermostat was sold out and is now only available on backorder. Such innovation is about value creation more than cost savings, and ignoring and stifling that process holds back the contribution of the electricity industry to economic growth and well-being.

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Nest’s elegant learning thermostat — but is it transactive?

October 25, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

A team of highly skilled and design-savvy engineers have revealed Nest, an elegant, well-designed thermostat that can learn your preferred settings, analyze your data to spot energy-saving and money-saving opportunities, and look lovely on your wall. Earth2Tech has a review article on Nest, as does Greentech Enterprise. This summary description, from the Earth2Tech article, indicates why this device has strong potential:

The Nest thermostat, on the other hand, is supposed to learn your energy consumption behavior and program itself, and then automatically help you save energy in a convenient way. Once installed, the thermostat takes about a week of hardcore learning to recognize the standard way you heat or cool your home, and then recommends settings that are slightly more efficient than what you already do. It also automatically turns down the thermostat at times that are convenient to you. The device also continues to do lighter learning of your behavior via pattern recognition and your manual interaction with it, throughout the life of the device. …

The Nest thermostat has five sensors — temperature, humidity, light and two activity sensors — and the activity sensors can notify the device to turn down the heating and cooling when no one is in the house.

The Nest thermostat also has a feature called “time to temperature,” which shows the home owner how long it will take to heat or cool the home.

I love the idea of this “time to temperature”, because most people don’t realize how large an effect the thermal mass of the home has on energy use, and how pre-cooling and pre-heating before a high-price period can save both money and energy.

Nest also offers a website with more granular data, remote adjustment capabilities (and I expect that those adjustments can be automated, although the article doesn’t specify), and money-saving energy-saving suggestions.

But even more importantly, Nest comes equipped with a Zigbee chip and wi-fi, so it will be a discoverable device on your home network, and able to communicate with a digital meter and other digital devices in the home. It sounds like it has enough intelligence in it to be extensible over time to be a portal for automating the behavior of smart digital devices in the home … and it can be transactive, and consequently make the home transactive and the homeowner capable of automating the responses of a wide range of smart devices in the home to respond autonomously to price signals. If a grid is not transactive it’s not a smart grid, and Nest looks like it will be a step in that direction. The other necessary condition for a smart grid is retail choice and the customer being able to choose dynamic pricing that Nest can automate. Without retail choice and dynamic pricing, the smart grid is not smart.

A final interesting note about Nest is its path to market: rather than going the mass utility deployment route, Nest is going direct to consumer, hurrah!

However, Nest is one of the only companies that is directly targeting consumers for its thermostat. Nest plans to sell its thermostat at Best Buy, via building specialty channels, and through its website. Fadell tells me the company wants to “connect with the iPhone generation where it shops.”

I’ll be watching this development with great interest.

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Whales and electricity, and sustainability

August 29, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

A few weeks ago I was thrilled to speak at the inaugural Summer Institute on Sustainability and Energy, organized by the University of Illinois-Chicago in partnership with Argonne National Laboratory, Northwestern University, Illinois Institute of Technology, and the University of Chicago. The students were from diverse fields and between them and the other speakers I learned a lot (including some cool vertical farming design!).

My talk focused on the history of the electricity industry, the economics of the industry and of its regulation, and how technological change is changing the economics of the industry and making its regulation maladaptive. When thinking about the history of electricity through the lens of technological change, I like to start with lighting, because better-quality lighting was the primary consumer objective toward which entrepreneurs and innovators were driving electricity technology. Talking about lighting in the 18th-19th century in the US means talking about whale oil, which was the dominant lamp fuel because of the bright clarity of its light. You can think through the rest of the story — demand for whale oil shifts to the right, prices rise, whalers have to go further and harder to catch whales from a declining population, which shifts supply to the left, which increases prices … ultimately the increase in the price of whale oil saved the whales, inducing innovators to create new lighting technologies: first kerosene lamps, and then electric lighting. That’s why when you’re thinking about the confluence of energy, why consumers use energy, technological change, and sustainability, whale oil is a good place to start.

My NU colleague Beth Herbert is the Assistant Director of Science in Society, a really good science outreach effort at NU, and she attended SISE that day and blogged about my presentation (thanks Beth!). She draws out the innovation and sustainability lesson and makes it explicit:

There was a time not too long ago when a significant portion of the American public looked to whale oil as its source of power, and the companies who procured and sold the oil were very powerful. But it was a limited resource, and fortunately we looked to alternatives (unfortunately, not entirely sustainable alternatives) before depleting the entire whale population. So the moral of the story? What you think you “need” today—say, lots of fossil fuels—might not seem so necessary in the future, if we continue to apply our creativity and innovation to finding and developing sustainable energy sources.

She also makes some other great observations, so I encourage you to click through and check out the rest of her post, and of Science and Society.

And a reading recommendation: for the history of the evolution from whale oil to kerosene lighting, and the innovation in the kerosene lamp as a great example of the innovation process, Daniel Yergin’s The Prize has an excellent chapter on the subject. The rest of the book also provides a thorough and well-told history of the global oil industry.

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Smart appliances and the innovation cycle

August 25, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

Appliance and consumer electronics manufacturers are starting to incorporate digital technology with energy-related applications into their products … but as with most new technologies, the first commercial stage of the innovation cycle takes the form of “because we can” product differentiation rather than use-specific innovation. Take the example that Technology Review highlighted this week: Samsung’s new refrigerator with an Android LCD display panel on the door. This high-end, gorgeous, stainless-steel refrigerator has an Android touch screen, which I think is pretty neat even if it does not read from the scripture of “the Internet of Things” that Christopher Mims wants it to — if I store my recipes in Evernote or in an Epicurious app, I can pull up a recipe on the door as I’m cooking, or make a shopping list as I’m looking in the fridge to see what I need. Mims’ tone is almost condescending when he observes that

A really smart fridge, part of the Internet of Things, would know when you put that lettuce in the crisper, so it could alert you when it was about to become inedible. It would tweet its current temperature so you know when your kid failed to close the door all the way. A really smart fridge probably doesn’t even have a display — far better to control it from any other internet-connected device.

The cynical view of Samsung’s move to embed a tiny tablet in its fridge is that these devices have become so cheap that sticking one in a fridge hardly makes any difference to their margins. It’s just one of those features — like a pop-up spoiler on the back of a luxury sports car — that makes a buyer feel like they got their splurge’s worth. If that’s the case, we can all look forward to Android-powered microwave ovens and clothes washers.

No. First of all, while I agree that automated monitoring features like produce spoilage detection and door ajar detection are desirable and user-friendly, Mims’ hyperbole about “Oh noes! We’re doomed to useless technology kitchen candy because of this!” shows a strong misunderstanding of the economics of consumer product innovation life cycles. The “version 1.0 mass-market user friendly right out of the gates model” is an outlier, a great exception to the typical evolution of technology; in fact, I’m having trouble thinking of a consumer technology product other than the iPod that comes close to that description. The “because we can” product differentiation puts the technology in the hands of early adopters, who are eager to kick the tires and are willing to spend their income to do so. These customers guinea-pig the technology for the rest of us, and provide companies like Samsung with feedback, which I’m sure will include comments like “it would be great if this technology enabled me to detect produce spoilage” and “this screen is pretty useless if all I can do is get to the Internet and not monitor my food”. Those experiences get incorporated into the evolution of the technology. Starting with the “because we can” technology is not necessarily going to lead to missed opportunities, as Mims argues, as long as companies like Samsung combine their engineering and business knowledge of what’s possible with the feedback they receive throughout the new technology adoption process.

Second, I think his definition of a “really smart fridge” is too limited. A really smart fridge would be transactive. A really smart fridge would enable its owner to program in price triggers to change settings on the chiller during expensive hours, saving the owner (an admittedly fairly small amount of) money and reducing energy use (good if the owner cares about conservation) and reducing peak demand on the distribution infrastructure (good for the wires company) — all without changing the quality of the refrigeration that the owner experiences, thanks to the beauty that is thermal mass. A transactive fridge would enable its owner to choose to cycle the chiller down if there isn’t much green power available, up to the point where the temperature change impairs the refrigeration, if the owner has a preference for green power. A transactive fridge is empowering for consumers.

A better article on the same topic comes from Greentech Media from earlier this summer (and has been sitting open in my browser to be blogged for too long!). In it Katherine Tweed argues that the current, first generation of smart appliances are oversold relative to their features. Without saying it explicitly, she makes the point that these first-generation smart appliances are expensive and likely to appear to early adopters — buyers more at the Viking end of the product line than the bottom of the Whirlpool line. She also, correctly, points out that if the value proposition to the consumer is saving money by reducing energy savings, the smart appliance features do not contribute much at the margin beyond the EnergyStar appliance standard; so if you are buying to save money by saving energy, you aren’t going to get much bang for the buck at the margin by choosing a smart fridge over an EnergyStar fridge. But as I remarked earlier, that’s not the only value proposition, because consumers care about other features.

It’s going to take some time to get the technology integration across the value chain to create all of these features, from spoilage detection to transactive automated response to dynamic pricing to preferentially choosing green power to sending the beer order to the store when my supply is low. It’s also going to take some choice in terms of electricity pricing for residential customers, and (surprise surprise) monopoly utilities and regulators are dragging their feet on that front. But don’t dismiss smart appliances today simply because V1.0 isn’t perfect. V1.0 never is.

ETA: I also recommend reading the comment thread on the Greentech Media article; it has a good back-and-forth about dynamic pricing.

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Free the electricity consumer!

August 23, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

In late July I spoke at Cato University, which was great; I met so many interesting and thoughtful people, and learned a lot from my fellow participants and speakers. I’m also happy that Cato has made the presentation notes and recordings of the presentations available on their website, so you can see and hear them too!

One of my talks was called “The Economics of Intervention”, which is a large topic … so I focused on the interplay of technological change and regulation, ranging from Schumpeterian disruptive innovation to the history of the electricity industry and its regulation to current smart grid issues. You can also listen to a recording of my talk. If you are a regular KP reader you will recognize the themes and connections that I drew in the talk — innovation makes monopolies temporary, regulation that purports to “stand in for competition” cannot do so, and unless smart grid includes transactive technology and transactive market options, it’s not smart. The best way to deliver these potential benefits, and to avoid the distrust and Orwellian concerns attached to having such technology at the behest of government-granted monopolies and regulators is to open up retail electricity markets, reduce entry barriers, and enable innovators and entrepreneurs to transition electricity from a commodity product to a service that can be differentiated, bundled with other services, etc.

While I was there I also talked with Caleb Brown about the potential value creation from smart grid technologies and customer-focused business models, and he has posted our conversation as a podcast. I like his framing of the issue: free the electricity consumer!

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Electricity restructuring and the failure to quarantine the monopoly

August 11, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

In 2011, roughly fifteen years after the passage of the first state-level electricity regulation restructuring legislation (in states like California, Pennsylvania, Maine, …), retail competition for residential customers remains anemic in most of the 15 states + DC that have implemented restructuring and allow retail choice.

Lots of possible theories exist for such weak competition — high customer acquisition costs, incumbent default service contracts as an entry barrier, regulation-mandated full depreciation of long-lived incumbent assets as a barrier to innovation, customer indifference, to name a few. Out of this set, the state where retail rivalry for residential customers has been most robust is Texas, with multiple retail firms offering a variety of traditional and green electricity products. At this point they are still competing primarily on price, not on product differentiation (such as dynamic pricing) other than green power, and not through bundling with other services to the home. If consumers value those products I expect them to develop as the distribution wires companies implement their digital meter installations, which will enable more variety and better information flow and customer engagement.

Based on my previous Texas work and on some reading I’ve been doing on the history of telephone regulation for a paper I’m working on, I want to explore another hypothesis: Texas has done a better job than the other 14 states + DC of quarantining the monopoly.

What does “quarantine the monopoly” mean? The phrase arises from the work of William Baxter, now a law professor at Stanford, who in his position as Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1980s was the primary architect of the settlement of the U.S. vs. AT&T case that led to AT&T’s divestiture in 1982. One of Baxter’s principal concerns regarding the welfare effects of the AT&T monopoly was what came to be known as Baxter’s Law, or the Bell Doctrine — “regulated monopolies have the incentive and opportunity to monopolize related markets in which their monopolized service is an input”, to quote Joskow and Noll’s outstanding 1999 paper on the Bell Doctrine. If there is sufficient rivalry or potential rivalry in that related market, then allowing monopolist participation in that market could reduce or stifle competition, enabling the monopolist to extend its monopoly into the related market, one result of which would be reduced output, higher prices, and deadweight loss arising in that related market.

Baxter’s argument was that the best feasible approach to such a situation, in which a regulated monopolist sits in the middle of a vertical supply chain with competitive or potentially competitive markets on either or both sides, is to quarantine the monopoly by restricting its market participation to its regulated functions. The best way to do this is to separate the ownership and control of the regulated functions from the other vertically-related functions.

Most of the restructured states in the US have failed to quarantine the monopoly in electricity. Regulated wires companies continue to participate in retail markets in states that have granted the default residential service contract to the incumbent, perpetuating the monopolist’s presence in the retail market. While they cannot use that contract to raise retail prices and hence raise their profits, their incumbency still provides an entry barrier in the retail market for residential customers, a market that already has substantial customer acquisition costs and a customer culture that is not yet accustomed to or aware of the potential value creation arising from novel energy-related services and bundles.

Texas, however, quarantined the wires monopoly very clearly in its implementation of restructuring. Incumbents were not permitted to provide default service in their native regulated territories, and they are only permitted to provide wires-related services, which includes metering. Texas has done a better job than the other states of applying the Bell Doctrine in electricity.

 

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Risks and regulation

July 15, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

I’ve just returned from a conference on regulation in Bulgaria organized by the Istituto Bruno Leoni, a classical liberal think tank in Italy that does a lot of extremely good work developing and applying classical liberal principles and ideas to public policy issues in Italy and Europe. The topics included financial markets regulation, energy, and telecom/internet.

The organizers asked me to comment on risks and regulation with respect to energy and the environment. The topic prompted me to ask: risk to whom, and risk of what? The parties whose risks I analyze are consumers, the end users.

Risk of what? Historically, at least in the US, risks related to reliability of service and bankruptcy of firms have been the primary focus of regulatory policy. Keep the lights on, no matter the cost, and treat that as a uniform standard (by technological necessity, until the invention of good switches). Use economic regulation (rate of return + monopoly service territory for the vertically integrated firm) to ensure the firm’s financial stability. These two objectives have had the consequence of significant infrastructure redundancy at a substantial cost, and increased incentives to firms to build those redundant electro-mechanical infrastructure systems.

More recently, environmental risk has become more prominent, and increased the combined economic and environmental regulatory policy focus on electricity generation. Initially the concern was the “criteria pollutants” such as SO2, NOx, etc., but the focus has shifted in the past two decades to greenhouse gases and carbon policy. The emission policy options range from

  1. Do nothing while we do more scientific research into the complex and little-understood climate system
  2. Price carbon with a tax … but with this policy one cannot control emission quantity
  3. Constrain GHG emission quantities with emission permit markets … but with this policy one cannot control emission price
  4. Traditional command-and-control regulation: emission quotas, renewable portfolio standards … but this approach has high enforcement costs, with centralized decision-making that’s likely to be inefficient because it cannot reflect, as Hayek said “individual knowledge of time and place”

Other important economic risks to consumers include the effects of wholesale and retail price volatility as fuel prices fluctuate, and the mounting effects of the lack of innovation and new technology adoption in the customer-facing portion of the value chain.

That was the setup part of my remarks, and I’ll post the rest in a follow-up … but for now, tell me: what are some other ways to think about the risks associated with regulation, and the attempts of regulation to mitigate certain risks, that face electricity consumers?

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