Posts Tagged ‘Electricity’

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Free the electricity consumer!

August 23, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

In late July I spoke at Cato University, which was great; I met so many interesting and thoughtful people, and learned a lot from my fellow participants and speakers. I’m also happy that Cato has made the presentation notes and recordings of the presentations available on their website, so you can see and hear them too!

One of my talks was called “The Economics of Intervention”, which is a large topic … so I focused on the interplay of technological change and regulation, ranging from Schumpeterian disruptive innovation to the history of the electricity industry and its regulation to current smart grid issues. You can also listen to a recording of my talk. If you are a regular KP reader you will recognize the themes and connections that I drew in the talk — innovation makes monopolies temporary, regulation that purports to “stand in for competition” cannot do so, and unless smart grid includes transactive technology and transactive market options, it’s not smart. The best way to deliver these potential benefits, and to avoid the distrust and Orwellian concerns attached to having such technology at the behest of government-granted monopolies and regulators is to open up retail electricity markets, reduce entry barriers, and enable innovators and entrepreneurs to transition electricity from a commodity product to a service that can be differentiated, bundled with other services, etc.

While I was there I also talked with Caleb Brown about the potential value creation from smart grid technologies and customer-focused business models, and he has posted our conversation as a podcast. I like his framing of the issue: free the electricity consumer!

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Electricity restructuring and the failure to quarantine the monopoly

August 11, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

In 2011, roughly fifteen years after the passage of the first state-level electricity regulation restructuring legislation (in states like California, Pennsylvania, Maine, …), retail competition for residential customers remains anemic in most of the 15 states + DC that have implemented restructuring and allow retail choice.

Lots of possible theories exist for such weak competition — high customer acquisition costs, incumbent default service contracts as an entry barrier, regulation-mandated full depreciation of long-lived incumbent assets as a barrier to innovation, customer indifference, to name a few. Out of this set, the state where retail rivalry for residential customers has been most robust is Texas, with multiple retail firms offering a variety of traditional and green electricity products. At this point they are still competing primarily on price, not on product differentiation (such as dynamic pricing) other than green power, and not through bundling with other services to the home. If consumers value those products I expect them to develop as the distribution wires companies implement their digital meter installations, which will enable more variety and better information flow and customer engagement.

Based on my previous Texas work and on some reading I’ve been doing on the history of telephone regulation for a paper I’m working on, I want to explore another hypothesis: Texas has done a better job than the other 14 states + DC of quarantining the monopoly.

What does “quarantine the monopoly” mean? The phrase arises from the work of William Baxter, now a law professor at Stanford, who in his position as Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1980s was the primary architect of the settlement of the U.S. vs. AT&T case that led to AT&T’s divestiture in 1982. One of Baxter’s principal concerns regarding the welfare effects of the AT&T monopoly was what came to be known as Baxter’s Law, or the Bell Doctrine — “regulated monopolies have the incentive and opportunity to monopolize related markets in which their monopolized service is an input”, to quote Joskow and Noll’s outstanding 1999 paper on the Bell Doctrine. If there is sufficient rivalry or potential rivalry in that related market, then allowing monopolist participation in that market could reduce or stifle competition, enabling the monopolist to extend its monopoly into the related market, one result of which would be reduced output, higher prices, and deadweight loss arising in that related market.

Baxter’s argument was that the best feasible approach to such a situation, in which a regulated monopolist sits in the middle of a vertical supply chain with competitive or potentially competitive markets on either or both sides, is to quarantine the monopoly by restricting its market participation to its regulated functions. The best way to do this is to separate the ownership and control of the regulated functions from the other vertically-related functions.

Most of the restructured states in the US have failed to quarantine the monopoly in electricity. Regulated wires companies continue to participate in retail markets in states that have granted the default residential service contract to the incumbent, perpetuating the monopolist’s presence in the retail market. While they cannot use that contract to raise retail prices and hence raise their profits, their incumbency still provides an entry barrier in the retail market for residential customers, a market that already has substantial customer acquisition costs and a customer culture that is not yet accustomed to or aware of the potential value creation arising from novel energy-related services and bundles.

Texas, however, quarantined the wires monopoly very clearly in its implementation of restructuring. Incumbents were not permitted to provide default service in their native regulated territories, and they are only permitted to provide wires-related services, which includes metering. Texas has done a better job than the other states of applying the Bell Doctrine in electricity.

 

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Risks and regulation

July 15, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

I’ve just returned from a conference on regulation in Bulgaria organized by the Istituto Bruno Leoni, a classical liberal think tank in Italy that does a lot of extremely good work developing and applying classical liberal principles and ideas to public policy issues in Italy and Europe. The topics included financial markets regulation, energy, and telecom/internet.

The organizers asked me to comment on risks and regulation with respect to energy and the environment. The topic prompted me to ask: risk to whom, and risk of what? The parties whose risks I analyze are consumers, the end users.

Risk of what? Historically, at least in the US, risks related to reliability of service and bankruptcy of firms have been the primary focus of regulatory policy. Keep the lights on, no matter the cost, and treat that as a uniform standard (by technological necessity, until the invention of good switches). Use economic regulation (rate of return + monopoly service territory for the vertically integrated firm) to ensure the firm’s financial stability. These two objectives have had the consequence of significant infrastructure redundancy at a substantial cost, and increased incentives to firms to build those redundant electro-mechanical infrastructure systems.

More recently, environmental risk has become more prominent, and increased the combined economic and environmental regulatory policy focus on electricity generation. Initially the concern was the “criteria pollutants” such as SO2, NOx, etc., but the focus has shifted in the past two decades to greenhouse gases and carbon policy. The emission policy options range from

  1. Do nothing while we do more scientific research into the complex and little-understood climate system
  2. Price carbon with a tax … but with this policy one cannot control emission quantity
  3. Constrain GHG emission quantities with emission permit markets … but with this policy one cannot control emission price
  4. Traditional command-and-control regulation: emission quotas, renewable portfolio standards … but this approach has high enforcement costs, with centralized decision-making that’s likely to be inefficient because it cannot reflect, as Hayek said “individual knowledge of time and place”

Other important economic risks to consumers include the effects of wholesale and retail price volatility as fuel prices fluctuate, and the mounting effects of the lack of innovation and new technology adoption in the customer-facing portion of the value chain.

That was the setup part of my remarks, and I’ll post the rest in a follow-up … but for now, tell me: what are some other ways to think about the risks associated with regulation, and the attempts of regulation to mitigate certain risks, that face electricity consumers?

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Will Android@Home help make smart grid more consumer-centric?

May 12, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

I think the past 18 months have been disappointing for consumer-centric smart grid proponents and companies. In January 2010 the incisive Katie Fehrenbacher pronounced 2010 the year in which the consumer would be the king of home energy management, and this pronouncement has not come to fruition. I’ve been formulating some ideas about why that’s the case, and in large part I think it’s a combination of the utility-centric rollout of consumer-facing technology, the perverse regulatory incentives facing utilities and regulators, and how those factors combine to perpetuate the consumer’s indifference to home energy management technologies.

However, the new ideas and chipping away at that indifference are happening, slowly. Over the past several weeks I’ve seen ads for ADT Pulse, the new remote service from ADT Security (complete with mobile phone app!) that enables energy efficiency and lighting/thermostat controls under its “lifestyle” and “home automation” features. These features leverage their existing in-home communication technology, and are a form of the kind of bundling and product differentiation that characterizes innovative consumer-facing industries. ADT Pulse is not yet a transactive technology, but I hope there will be a chicken-and-egg development of dynamic pricing as these bundled services proliferate — knowing that they have the automation technology available to them, more and more consumers will be eager to have retail choice in their electricity contract, including dynamic pricing.

On Tuesday this space got more interesting as Google announced its entry into the home management technology space with Android@Home:

At its I/O developer conference on Tuesday, Google showed a sneak preview of its Android@Home project, which will extend the Android platform into household objects. That means some day in the future, you could control home appliances — your dishwasher, the heating system, the lights in your house — using your Android device as a remote control.

“Think of your phone as the nucleus that this all started with,” said Google engineering director Joe Britt in an interview. “We’re opening the platform up to everyone to do whatever they can imagine.”

This makes my geeky heart go pitter-pat; think of the potential here! Android is an open-source development platform, and as such it has interoperability requirements baked into its development culture already. This culture of interoperability is growing, slowly, in the electricity industry, as interoperability standards development proceeds. It can leverage pre-existing wireless sensors and networks in smart buildings, again thanks to interoperability.

The essential next step is to create differentiated products and bundles with dynamic pricing options so consumers can actually simultaneously save money, reduce energy use, and be empowered to control their own choices in their own homes. That will not happen through conventional regulatory processes.

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CERA Week and smart grid “thought leadership”

March 14, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

As you energy gurus know, CERA is one of the leading consulting firms in the energy space, and hosts an increasingly popular event called CERA Week — rather like the Davos of the energy world! In support of the event this past week, CERA has splashed out for two large advertising sections in the Wall Street Journal. Wednesday’s special advertising section (pdf) includes an article from Larry Makovich entitled “What Really to Expect from a Smarter Power Grid.” I recommend reading his high-level analysis, although I find his logic and his thinking limited in some important respects.

He starts by identifying the promise of smart grid, but cautions against being too optimistic:

Many see the smart grid as a disruptive technology ready to transform the power sector. According to this view, the smart grid will unleash pent up efficiency, integrate distributed renewable generation, enable electric vehicles, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and, in the process, lower consumer power bills. But this vision in its entirety is too good to be true.

Both Mike and I fit into that “many” who see smart grid as a disruptive technology that can enable private individuals to create value, but I think we each have our doubts about how many regulatory and cultural barriers will limit that value creation and will make it more incremental. Let’s see if Makovich concurs …

He then goes on to point out that the grid isn’t as “dumb” as it might appear, and as evidence for this claim he offers the fact that “integrated control centers … employ real time data and sophisticated software”. While this claim, and his subsequent claim of the use of virtualization to simulate the grid, do indicate evolution and the use of digital technology, much of what he’s describing there is quite limited to transmission and high-level distribution. Once you get below that in the network, his argument fails. Control centers may be technologically up-to-date, but they see mostly aggregates. Some of the most crucial elements in the network for reliability and for end-user value creation are below the control centers — substations, transformers, and end users are technological black holes. Those are precisely the areas where smart grid technologies can be beneficially disruptive, but Makovich’s glossing over of where in the network the intelligence already exists allows him to dismiss the potential benefits of distribution automation and intelligent end-use technologies.

And that’s where Makovich goes next:

At the heart of the current narrative about the smart grid is a conviction that power customers want to be able to manage their consumption in response to different power prices at different times of the day. The idea is that consumers could adjust their usage to take advantage of lower prices during periods of slack power demand. But it is not very likely that varying pricing over the day—what is called “dynamic power pricing”—will be the hoped for killer app of the smart grid.

Makovich is creating and taking down a shaky straw man here, and omitting some of the most important reasons why smart grid technology could be beneficially disruptive but is not. Not even the most breathy enthusiasts for dynamic pricing (self included) would categorize it as having “killer app” potential — but what does have such potential is the set of possible end-use technologies for home energy management and digital home integration that reduce the transaction costs to consumers of choosing dynamic pricing while still enabling them to save money at an ambient comfort level they choose. Makovich spends almost half of his article on why dynamic pricing isn’t the be-all-end-all and why consumers don’t want it … without even mentioning one single word about such potentially game-changing customer-facing technologies! As we have seen repeatedly in several pilot demonstrations, customers are more enthusiastic about dynamic pricing when

  1. They get to choose it rather than having it foisted upon them by bureaucratic fiat
  2. It accompanies digital end-use technologies that consumers can use to respond to prices for them

Makovich addresses neither of these topics in his article, which is a substantial omission that undermines his argument considerably.

Finally, he also fails to discuss one of the primary drivers of the slow, incremental adoption of smart grid technologies: regulation and regulatory incentives. He comes close when he notes that “… smart grid technologies will likely reinforce the traditional industry structure …” because of focusing investments in the power supply portion of the network. But he leaves the elephant in the room, and doesn’t discuss how regulation makes regulators and firms risk-averse in the face of new technologies, even when said new technologies would improve our ability to provide desired reliability along with a host of other value propositions that their top-down control culture and mindset cannot imagine. He doesn’t discuss how regulation defines market boundaries and stifles the discovery of other value propositions beyond plain-vanilla electricity service. In fact, he’s missing the role that regulation plays in deliberately preventing smart grid technologies from being beneficially disruptive.

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My Grid-Interop talk: Regulation’s role in stifling innovation

January 4, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

In early December I had the pleasure of delivering some lunch remarks at the Grid-Interop conference in Chicago. Grid-Interop is a great place for those interested in innovation in the electricity industry to share ideas about technology, business models, the interoperability that enables such creativity, and the role of economic regulation in how those relationships unfold. Below are my remarks; comments welcome!

We are brought together here by a shared interest in exploring, and expanding, interoperability and innovation in the electricity industry. Many of you come from a technology and/or engineering background. In contrast, I am an economist who studies regulation and its effects on innovation and new technology adoption. Today I’d like to use that perspective, along with some of the lessons I learned during the 5 enjoyable years during which I had the honor of serving on the GridWise Architecture Council, to explore the basic economic foundations of the regulatory environment in which technology and interoperability policy and investment decisions are being made. By “basic” I will abstract from the administrative, rate case, RFP weeds that we encounter regularly, and will instead focus on the economic concepts and incentives inherent in regulation.

In my remarks I’ll certainly say things you won’t like, or that you may not have considered, but my goal is to provide some provocative food for thought for your about the effects of economic regulation on your devices, interfaces, and business models. There’s also a certain degree of comfort in the known status quo, with large-scale utility procurement. But the economic institutions (by which I mean rules) and incentives that have created that status quo over a century will continue to limit innovation and growth unless they evolve.

The fundamental economic reason I make that argument is that traditional economic regulation is based on cost recovery, not on expected value creation, and therefore does a poor job of “standing in for the market” as it is (incorrectly) supposed to do in theory. Read the rest of this entry ?

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Macroeconomic implications of residential electricity consumption

January 3, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

At Grist, Sean Casten muses on the macroeconomic implications of trends in electricity consumption. His musings focus on the established correlation between electricity consumption and economic activity, an association that he fleshed out in an earlier post. In these two posts he looks at trends in residential, commercial, and industrial electricity consumption over the course of 4 different recessions, to see if this one differs from earlier ones. In particular, he’s wondering why this past summer’s residential consumption, measured in millions of megawatt hours, were at an all-time high:

I’m at a loss to explain the residential data. Pre-recession, we had too many homes, easy credit, rapid construction, booming demand for plasma TVs and other consumer electronics … I get why all that leads to rising residential electric sales. But the data is showing that as of this summer, we were at all time highs for residential electric sales. Maybe there’s a seasonal impact, but all these data-points are on a trailing-12-month basis, so that can’t be a huge effect. I’m at a loss to square that with housing vacancy rates, unemployment and slower consumption. Any ideas?

My thoughts start with looking differently at the data. Frankly, I don’t find single-variable time series data particularly informative — there are too many variables that go into determining aggregate residential electricity consumption. Such variables include weather, household income, number of electricity-consuming devices, efficiency of said devices, and the price of electricity. For that reason, I chose instead to look at residential electricity consumption per dollar of GDP. Short of doing an econometric analysis that controls for all of these other variables, looking at MWH consumed per dollar of GDP gives us some (albeit rough) indication of whether or not that electricity consumption is directly associated with increased value of economic activity. If that ratio is higher, then it’s less likely that the electricity consumption is associated with increased value of economic activity.

For electricity consumption I used the same EIA data as Sean, although I did not take a 12-month trailing average. For GDP data I used the BEA’s quarterly real GDP in chained 2005 dollars. One caveat: the GDP data are seasonally adjusted, while the electricity data are not, and you can see the seasonality of residential electricity demand in the graphs I’m going to present (higher demand in QI and QIII, due to heating and cooling respectively). Note also that GDP data are not available monthly, so I aggregated the monthly electricity consumption data up to quarterly data.

Lots of graphs below the cut … Read the rest of this entry ?

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What the Maryland PSC’s rejection of BG&E’s smart grid proposal reveals about regulation

June 28, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Last week the Maryland Public Service Commission rejected Baltimore Gas & Electric’s proposed project to install over 2 million digital electric or gas meters, change the retail electricity rate structure to incorporate time-of-use pricing and peak-time rebates, and recover the meter capital costs through a surcharge on residential retail bills. BG&E’s ambitious and thoughtful project had undergone extensive pilot project testing and had generated economic and physical results similar to those seen in other such projects (customer savings, reduction in peak energy use and in peak strain on system infrastructure, reduction in peak wholesale prices due to the transmission of retail price signals). Their recommended technology and rate designs are not unusual relative to evolving practice in other states (although they are much, much less than I personally would like to see). Despite those promising results, the Maryland PSC rejected BG&E’s business case for structuring their cost recovery from the project as they did.

Although I am pretty familiar with the BG&E pilot, I am not sufficiently informed or expert in rate case matters to have an intelligent opinion on whether the PSC took the correct position. Their position, though, reveals some of the most important and pressing reasons why traditional economic regulation is incompatible with economic dynamism, with technological change, with innovation, and ultimately incompatible with widespread consumer well-being.

1. Traditional economic regulation is based on cost recovery, not on expected value creation, and therefore does a poor job of “standing in for the market” as it is (incorrectly) supposed to do in theory. Whether it’s enshrined in the legislation giving the regulatory agency its mission or in the deeply-embedded Populist culture and history of regulation, traditional regulatory procedures focus regulators and the regulated on providing a narrowly-defined, generic, highly reliable service at the lowest possible long-term cost. As long as you’re in a static environment, the static model from which this theory and culture emanate will do a decent job of providing that generic service. That’s the context in which regulators have developed a norm and a culture of ignoring value creation — focusing narrowly on the provision of generic electricity service and scoping your efforts accordingly fits with that static world. But regulatory models premised on cost recovery fail miserably in a more dynamic context, with pervasive economic and technological change and Schumpeterian creative destruction. That dynamism characterizes the economic and technological context of the early 21st century, and the reason that dynamism and creative destruction become so pervasive in human society is that they create value — value for consumers, variety for consumers, product differentiation for consumers, and value for the risk-taking and opportunity-seeking entrepreneurs who risk private capital to create that value.

If the regulatory institutions and the regulatory culture constrain the electricity value proposition to the provision of generic service to the exclusion of other product/service/pricing bundles, and if they constrain the business model to one of cost recovery instead of value creation, then the regulators will reject the types of projects that are most likely to create value for consumers and entrepreneurial producers. This rejection shows precisely why regulation cannot “stand in for markets”, because the most important function that market processes perform is the pathways for this new value creation. The static, price-determining, resource allocation function of markets is not the most important function of markets, and the formulators of static natural monopoly theory at the end of the 19th century got that wrong. Our current regulatory institutions are built on that incorrect, static natural monopoly theory.

2. Traditional economic regulation stipulates that the regulatory agency controls price determination on behalf of consumers, and regulators are loath to relinquish such power once they have had it for a century. This point is a political economy corollary to the first point. Legislation requires regulators to represent the interests of consumers, and they do so through administrative procedures to control both costs and prices, as well as controlling the profits that the regulated firms are allowed to earn. Control, control, control. Take, for example, this quote from the New York Times/Climatewire story linked above:

The Maryland commission took a fists-up stance toward its powers and prerogatives to rule on utility rates. “For one hundred years, since this Commission was created by the General Assembly in 1910, one of our primary functions has been to establish the rates that public service companies can charge their customers,” the commission said. Currently, it faces a growing trend by regulated companies to cover costs in advance through surcharges rather than subjecting costs to review after they have been incurred.

While it has approved such surcharges in some limited cases, it drew the line on BG&E’s current proposal, it said. “Surcharges guarantee dollar-for-dollar recovery of specific costs, diminish the Company’s incentive to control those costs,” and put those costs outside the commission’s reach, the commission said.

Ironically, Maryland is at least nominally a state that has retail competition and retail choice available for its residential consumers. If they were actually serious about competition and were willing to relinquish this control over prices and costs, then the regulation of prices and costs would occur through the decentralized market processes of firms making retail product/service bundle offerings to consumers, and consumers using their choice and autonomy to say NO. But if you are deeply steeped in regulatory culture, you do not believe that this decentralized process can work effectively for consumers, even though it does so in other markets and industries … even ones that have high infrastructure costs and are considered essential to daily life! You, therefore, believe that your power to control is a salutary intervention, even though the dynamism of economic and technological change are proving you wrong on a daily basis. So you make decisions that reinforce your power and control, believing them to be in the best interest of consumers while you deprive those same consumers of the opportunity to make their own autonomous choices.

3. Traditional economic regulation entrenches the political and economic power of easily identifiable, politically active special interests. Which leads us to the third lesson from this episode for the political economy of regulation. The legislative mandate for regulation, and the stated mission of every regulatory agency, is to control prices and allow the firm to recover costs for the provision of a generic service at a highly reliable level in a way that benefits all consumers. But in the time that I have been involved in regulation, and in debates over smart grid investments and policy, it is abundantly clear that Mancur Olson was correct, and that regulation actually represents the interests of easily identifiable, politically active interests, not the interests of consumers as a whole. On the consumer side, this means that decisions get made frequently based on the organized, coordinated political actions of so-called consumer advocates (who really represent low-income consumers, not all consumers) and groups like the AARP, who perceive their interests as being best served by the perpetuation of the traditional regulatory model — generic service provided at high reliability, controlling price through strict cost recovery.

Take, for example, this quote from the excellent Ahmad Faruqui in the New York Times/Climatewire story above:

While some state utility commissions are willing to back smart meter deployment, they are reluctant to approve new “dynamic” electricity rate plans that allow prices to rise during the day when power demand peaks and fall when demand is slack. Such real-time pricing plans are essential to prompt customers to shift energy usage to slack times and reduce overall consumption, he said.

“There is no doubt in my mind that without state commissions approving the business cases for advanced meters and the smart grid, this is not going anywhere. They control the dollars; they set the rates for the customers,” said Faruqui, an economist and principal with the Brattle Group. Faruqui testified before the Maryland commission in support of the BG&E plan and declined to comment on the commission’s decision in that case.

But he said that around the county, commissions are heeding warnings from state consumer advocates and retiree organizations about possible cost impacts on customers if electricity rates are linked to actual generation costs, hour by hour.

“Most of the state commissions are frozen in time. They are being subjected to these very, very pessimistic, worst-case arguments,” he said.

What’s missed in that calculation is the unseen, lost value that could be created for both these vulnerable groups and for other consumers by moving away from that model. When regulators are already predisposed, by legislation and by culture, to constrain the value proposition of the regulated firm and focus on a generic service and cost recovery, the political action of those who seem to visibly benefit from that constraint will find a big foothold. In that environment, the value proposition based on the idea of better service provision (such as, for example, bundling home health care monitoring services in with a “senior care” electric service contract for the AARP constituency) is going to fight an uphill battle. In open markets with low entry barriers, that type of service bundle would be able to compete, and would sink or swim, fail or profit according to the value it creates for consumers and the ability of the provider to control costs.

In brief, traditional economic regulation is incompatible with economic dynamism, with technological change, with innovation, and ultimately incompatible with widespread consumer well-being because of the enormous extent to which traditional economic regulation stifles experimentation. The really valuable function that market processes provide is this ability for consumers and producers to experiment. Traditional economic regulation is almost reflexively anti-experimentation, and that reflex is the source of lost value creation opportunities from smart grid technologies.

A historical example illustrates why I think these points are important. In the medieval period, China was one of the most forward-looking, open, technologically creative and vibrant societies in the world. Chinese inventions became the foundation of many important technologies, machines, and industries. Yet by 1600, China’s backwardness was obvious to all observers; China had closed herself off from knowledge, had become technologically stagnant. Western Europe and then the young United States surged ahead of China in technology, in economic productivity, in per-capita income, and in living standards for most of the population (China’s elite, of course, continued to enjoy luxury). Economic historians credit this stagnation (or, what Needham argues was “homeostasis”, not stagnation) and worsening of living standards for most of the Chinese population to conscious technocratic policy decisions in China to look inward (growing through population growth and increasing intensification of agriculture), to be backward-looking, and to make strong top-down rules based on status quo bias. Writ large, the dynamic driving the stultification of China had at its core many of the same policy drivers and incentives as we seen in play in electricity regulation in the 21st century.

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Electricity generation, New Source Review, and waste

May 17, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

On Friday at Environmental Economics, Tim Haab wrote about the implications of New Source Review for innovation in a regulated industry, and how to represent it in the standard Pigouvian model (do go read the whole post, it’s very useful). The basic question is this: does the stifling of innovation that results from New Source Review regulations change the fundamental analysis of the question of pollution?

I have some quibbles with how Tim frames the “externality” question — in particular, I prefer the “markets don’t fail, they fail to exist” formulation of the fact that some uncompensated cost is present, rather than “market failure” — but his post makes a really important point with respect to New Source Review and the Pigouvian model:

The technological improvements resulting from removal of New Source Review may shift the private supply curve to the right, and may reduce the emissions per unit of output, but that doesn’t solve the fundamental externality problem.   So even though the technological improvements may reduce per unit emissions, emissions may actually increase from the decreased costs of producing electricity (decrease per unit emissions, but increased units). Regardless, with or without the NSR regulation, there will still be emissions and those emissions will remain unpriced (inefficiently) by the market. ‘

While I agree that existing regulations may have reduced the incentive for innovation, their existence doesn’t change the fundamental market failure–emissions are not rationed through prices.  For a market to work efficiently, ALL costs and benefits of production and consumption must be internalized.  In such cases, emissions will be efficiently rationed.

I take issue with a couple of these points. First, if the Pigouvian model is the correct way to model the pollution question, it is incorrect that “ALL costs and benefits of production and consumption must be internalized”. For an illustration of why this claim is not correct, ask yourself this question: how much do you pay your neighbors for the lovely flowers they plant in their front gardens, and if you did pay them, would that induce them to plant more flowers? Of course you don’t pay your neighbors for the external benefit you derive from their lovely gardens, and I think it’s a safe generalization that your neighbor-gardeners have more intense preferences over their gardening decisions than you do over their decisions. What does that imply? It implies that even if you did pay them as compensation to internalize your benefit, if your marginal benefit is small relative to theirs, your payment is unlikely to change their decision at the margin of how much gardening to do. In other words, the only uncompensated costs and benefits that are important for achieving the optimal level of abatement (of a cost) or increase (of a benefit) are the costs and benefits that are Pareto relevant, that would at the margin change the behavior of the relevant party.

This must be a pet issue for me because I’ve written about it before, with respect to inefficient energy efficiency consumer subsidies, with respect to externality accounting, and with respect to the fact that Alex Tabarrok got a flu shot because he wanted to get kissed.

As a coda: I do not think that the Pigouvian model is the correct model, because it ignores the reciprocal nature of costs; in other words, it ignores the fact that the pollution problem is a problem of conflicting uses of a scarce common-pool resources, and the people with those different uses are imposing costs on each other. The polluter is not the only one creating a cost.

Second, I think Tim’s right about his interpretation of NSR and the Pigouvian model, but I also think that the Pigou model of a per-unit tax on output from a polluting firm is not the best model to use to see the effects of NSR, unless the policy you are analyzing is a per-unit output tax. I think a fuller answer to his astute student also includes the following:

If the policy is an emissions tax (e.g., a per-ton tax on sulfur dioxide or greenhouse gases), then NSR regulation artificially keeps abatement costs higher than they would be in the presence of the technological innovation. Thus at the margin, the NSR regulation does affect the firm’s choice, and the amount of abatement/emissions, because if the tax rate is higher than the abatement cost, then the firm will choose to abate. Thus NSR means that less abatement takes place under an emissions tax, by keeping abatement costs higher.

If the policy is a tradeable permit system, then NSR regulation artificially keeps abatement costs higher than they would be in the presence of the technological innovation. A firm’s abatement costs determine its demand for permits in the permit market. Thus at the margin, the NSR regulation increases the firm’s willingness to pay for permits, and leads to higher costs of achieving the abatement/emissions target.

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Tim Harford asks about inclining block rates …

April 15, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

… he just doesn’t realize it, or doesn’t know that it’s an established regulatory concept. Recently in his Undercover Economist blog, Tim Harford picked up on an idea floated by another FT columnist:

… we need tariff schemes that encourage conservation.

One option is “reverse pricing”, a simple framework that would increase the marginal cost of energy without introducing new taxes or raising average prices. This is important because marginal prices affect our behaviour, but total expenditure affects our wealth. So if we can increase one but not the other, we will create incentives to consume less without leaving households worse off overall.

Actually, what we need is retail competition, retail choice, and the removal of sclerotic and obsolete entry barriers that prevent motivated suppliers from providing innovative electricity-related products and services to residential retail customers. But I digress.

The pricing structure to which Tim alludes in his post is called “inclining block” pricing. When it emanates from a regulatory procedure, it is an inclining block rate. Inclining block pricing means that you price intervals of consumption, and the price per unit for each interval increases. For example:

  1. Block 1: 0-1000 kilowatt hours  $0.06/kwh
  2. Block 2: 1001-1750 kilowatt hours  $0.10/kwh
  3. Block 3: 1751-  kilowatt hours  $0.15/kwh

A few things to note. First, this logic is similar to that underlying David Zetland’s “some water for free, pay for more” proposals for water pricing. Second, the devil’s in the details when these rates are set by regulatory fiat; where do you draw the dividing lines, and what price per unit do you charge?

One of the best electricity economists, Ahmad Faruqui at the Brattle Group, has written extensively about the economic efficiency and conservation effects of inclining block pricing. In that list of resources I’d also recommend this NRRI report for regulators on how and why to consider “economic rates”, including inclining block pricing.

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