Posts Tagged ‘ERCOT’

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The natural gas that didn’t come in from the cold

February 7, 2011

Michael Giberson

Among the complications caused by the cold weather last week, short supply of natural gas throughout much of the southwest United States. Reports indicate some gas wells were freezing up and loss of electric power to gas production systems, but more of the problem was loss of power to natural gas pipelines. And, as mentioned here Friday, in some cases the rolling blackouts in Texas cut power to the natural gas system, resulting in inadequate gas supplies, resulting in some gas-fired power plants being cut off from supply, hampering efforts to end the rolling blackouts. But the shortage wasn’t just a supply-side issue, a gas company official said demand for gas was the highest its been for 30 years.

Sources: Dallas Morning News, “Freeze knocked out coal plants and natural gas supplies, leading to blackouts,” and Wall Street Journal, “Texas Power Outages Cause Natural Gas Shortages In US Southwest.”

Hard hit New Mexico saw lawmakers spring into action. U.S. Representative Ben Ray Lujan is asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to investigate. A state legislative committee is holding hearings today on the outages in the state. Thousands of Arizona gas consumers also lost service. Southern California gas supplies were difficult, but San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern California Gas Co. were able to maintain service to firm customers by drawing on nearby storage supplies and cutting off interruptible customers. (Interruptible customers are typically large industrial consumers who choose to pay a lower rate in exchange for agreeing to be among the first to be cut off during emergencies.)

Texas regulators are also asking questions, “Texas to Probe Rolling Blackouts.”

Texas officials have ordered an investigation into rolling blackouts that struck the state’s electric grid last week, including whether market manipulation played a role along with harsh weather in disrupting natural-gas and electricity supplies to millions of people.

The Public Utility Commission of Texas asked the state’s independent energy-market monitor, Daniel Jones, to conduct a probe to see if power generators, pipeline companies or others broke market rules. …

To be sure, Texas set an all-time winter power demand record one day during the storm, placing historic pressure on power providers.

Electricity-grid officials said Mr. Jones’ team will look at price patterns and power-plant outages remembering that, in California’s energy crisis of 2000-2001, unscrupulous power generators feigned equipment problems to drive up the price of electricity. A significant number of plants in Texas failed last week, and wholesale electricity prices briefly spiked.

Some commentators linked the electric power-gas pipeline interdependency issue to environmental regulation. As this Energy Information Administration document on natural gas compressor stations explains, compressor stations can be either electric or natural gas-fueled. As of the November 2007 date, most compressors were gas fueled, drawing gas from the pipeline itself to run the compressor station, but in some areas of the country “all or some may be electrically powered primarily for environmental or security reasons.” (Note that the document is dated before the current administration took office, so you can’t blame the White House for it.)

Pipelines head north and east from Texas in addition to west, but no reports of supply problems anywhere else in the country.

U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Compressor Stations Illustration, 2008

U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Compressor Stations Illustration, 2008. (EIA)

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Texas Observer: Some Companies Made Millions Off the Texas Blackouts

February 4, 2011

Michael Giberson

In other commentary on ERCOT’s rolling blackouts: “Some Companies Made Millions Off the Texas Blackouts.”

While Texans suffered rolling blackouts yesterday, some power generators were enjoying windfall profits. Starting around 5 a.m., prices in the wholesale market surged to the market cap, $3,000 per megawatt-hour, and stayed there, off and on, until around noon. Prices are typically below $100/megawatt-hour, acknowledged ERCOT CEO H.P. “Trip” Doggett today in a press conference.

There are still more questions than answers but this much is clear: At best, some power generators around the state raked in oodles of money thanks to the way ERCOT has structured the energy market. At worst, some may have manipulated the market to drive up prices.

… ERCOT may have allowed prices to reach the cap in order to maximize the amount of power during the crisis yesterday. In other words, ERCOT was willing to pay whatever it took to secure the system. [Public Citizen-Texas's David] Power compares it to flinging hundred dollar bills at a taxi driver who’s already got the pedal to the floor.

“You just keep throwing money at the front seat,” he said. “You’re not going to get any more out of him; you’re just going to have a really happy driver.”

(First it should be clarified that most power produced during the emergency was likely paid under a long-term contract, so didn’t get paid $3,000 per. Only to the extent that a generator had the capability to increase output over existing contractual commitments would it be able to earn that price on the increase.)

The $3000 price is part of ERCOT’s “scarcity pricing” mechanism. It is a rule that plays about three or four roles all at once. First off, during emergency shortages you want to motivate every generator out there to take every reasonable step to maximize production. At the same time, you want to motivate large-scale customers that see something like a real-time price to cut back on consumption to the degree possible.  In addition, the price is supposed to help motivate longer term investments – generators investing in a little more spare capacity, consumers investing in a little more conservation or the capability to curtail during emergencies.  These later effects won’t help during the current emergency, but the hope is to be a little better prepared for the next emergency.

So it isn’t just a matter of making the current taxi drivers happy.  We want customers who don’t need cabs so badly to find some other way around, and we want to have more taxi drivers in the city for the next emergency. No doubt, though, with the political attention the event is receiving, the possibility of market manipulation will be and should be examined.

ASIDE: By the way, if you assume 1 MWh of energy would keep 250 homes from being blacked out, at $3000/MWh the cost is about $12 each.* Much, much higher than the typical cost of electricity, but I’m sure many (not all) consumers that lost power yesterday would rather have their monthly bill $12-48 higher and kept their power through the cold. With a fully developed smart grid we wouldn’t have to guess whether or not consumers would want to pay these kinds of prices. Consumers could decide for themselves what their limits were, and set their devices to manage instant responses to system emergencies.

My preliminary assessment of the rolling blackouts was posted earlier today: Cold snap brings rolling power outages to Texas; is ERCOT policy of isolation at fault?
*A very rough ‘back of the envelope’ calculation, not based on consumption data from Wednesday. Feel free to improve upon it in the comments.

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Cold snap brings rolling power outages to Texas; is ERCOT policy of isolation at fault?

February 4, 2011

Michael Giberson

[Note: This item was originally posted at MasterResource as: "Texas Power Outages: A Preliminary Analysis (Cold snap brings failure--isolated ERCOT an issue)"]

Wednesday morning, ERCOT, the power grid operator for much of Texas, called upon local distribution companies to cut power to blocks of consumers on a rotating basis. The rolling outages were a great hardship the people throughout the region, and have consumers and policymakers wondering what went wrong and what should be done about it. The following is a preliminary analysis based on public data and news reports. A subsequent post will present more details once more complete information becomes available.

In brief, extreme cold weather pushed power demand to very high levels for the winter.  At the same time, 50 of the state’s power plants were offline due to the effects of the cold and several more were undergoing planned maintenance. The combination of very high demand and reduced supply left the ERCOT grid perilously short of reserves.  Some wondered whether wind power was at fault, but wind power contributed about 7 percent of ERCOT’s power during the emergency – about the same as this time last year. Rolling consumer outages were employed to protect the system from failing completely.

No power system is immune to hazards. But policy decisions that increase the likelihood of hazards or multiply the resulting damages ought to be given careful reconsideration. In this case, the choice by Texas policymakers to keep ERCOT isolated from surrounding power systems prevented power companies within ERCOT from accessing excess power capacity elsewhere in the state and in neighboring states.  Other policy issues also are raised by the emergency, but few solutions are likely to be as cost-effective and technically simple to implement as linking ERCOT to its neighbors.

ERCOT Map

A more detailed examination of the topic follows.

Read the rest of this entry ?

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Think globally, solve locally?

February 3, 2011

Michael Giberson

Among the casualties of yesterday’s rolling blackouts in the ERCOT power system was a Texas A&M University conference dedicated to helping solve global energy challenges.

Via the Texas A&M News and Information Service:

Texas A&M System Gearing Up To Help Solve Global Energy Challenges

COLLEGE STATION, Feb. 3, 2011—The Texas A&M University System is fine-tuning its game plan for playing a leading role in helping solve global energy challenges, with expert input provided by a host of authorities from both the private and public sectors.

Texas A&M’s lineup of researchers in a variety of fields—ranging from its high-ranked petroleum engineering department to an oceanographer who gained widespread attention for his environmental findings from the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico—huddled with key representatives from such entities as the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Public Utility Commission, Texas Railroad Commission, the Argonne National Laboratory and ExxonMobil.

It all played out at the 2011 Energy Forum conducted by the Energy Engineering Institute. …

The 300 conference participants were blind-sided with an up-close and personal experience about dependability and reliance on energy—energy in the form of electricity and lighting. Just as the concluding luncheon for the forum was set to begin, College Station fell victim to the statewide “rolling blackout” prompted by the unusually cold weather and resulting high demand for energy. The result was an unintended candle-light luncheon.

Speaking with the help of a hastily rigged small lectern light, the luncheon speaker, Texas Railroad Commission Chair Elizabeth Ames Jones, recounted the history of oil in the Lone Star State and praised its ‘vibrant and healthy energy industry.”

… Ironically, the lights came back almost immediately after Jones concluded her remarks.

(I’ll have more about the ERCOT’s rolling blackouts tomorrow. -MG)

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Negative Power Prices in ERCOT West: 2009 and 2010 through September

November 11, 2010

Michael Giberson

Below are charts showing data on ERCOT West zone power prices for the 2009 and for 2010 January-September with a focus on negative prices.  The charts were derived from data provided through the ERCOT website, on their “Balancing Energy Services Market Clearing Prices for Energy Annual Report” page.

These charts were prepared in the same way, including use of the same axis scale, as earlier charts showing 2008 data in order to make comparison easier.  General discussion of negative prices in ERCOT West is at “Frequent negative power prices in the West region of ERCOT result from wasteful renewable power subsidies.”  Additional discussion in “2009 power prices in ERCOT’s West zone: a mix of wind power, natural gas prices, transmission constraints, and (inefficient) congestion management practices.”

As the histogram charts show, negative prices in 2009 are not quite so negative as in 2008, and negative prices in 2010 are not so negative as in 2010.  Likely causes for the somewhat less extreme negative prices are changes in zonal congestion managements prices in mid-2008 (more frequent use of “out-of-market” adjustments that don’t directly affect the zonal balancing energy market price) and transmission additions and improvements over the period.

2010 January-September

ERCOT_W_Freq_Neg_Prices_2010-jan-sep

Frequency of negative prices in ERCOT West, January-September 2010

ERCOT_W_Hist_Neg_Prices_2010-jan-sep

Frequency of negative prices by price bin, ERCOT West, January-September 2010

ERCOT_W_Avg_Prices_2010-jan-sep

Daily average prices in ERCOT West, January-September 2010

2009 January-December

ERCOT_W_Hist_Neg_Prices_2009

Frequency of negative prices in ERCOT West, 2009

ERCOT_W_Freq_Neg_Prices_2009

Frequency of negative prices by price bin, ERCOT West, 2009

ERCOT_W_Avg_Prices_2009

Daily average prices in ERCOT West, 2009

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Top 10 longest periods with consecutive negative power prices, ERCOT West

November 11, 2010

Michael Giberson

ERCOT recently set a new record for consecutive pricing intervals below $0/MWh for balancing energy market prices in the ERCOT West region: 39.25 hours of negative prices.  The episode started at 7:45 PM on Saturday, November 6  and the negative prices continued until 11:00 AM on Monday, November 8.

 

ERCOT_W_Top_Ten_Consecutive_Negatives_2010-nov

Top 10 Consecutive Negative Power Prices in ERCOT West, as of November 10, 2010

 

The previous record of 34 hours began at 11:15 PM on Sunday, March 7, and continued until 9:15 AM on Tuesday, March 9.  Most of these records begin on weekends or holidays and are the product of low electrical load and high wind power output in conjunction with other system factors.

Notably, while the overall frequency of negative pricing intervals is down from 2008, 6 of the top 10 periods (and 4 of the top 5 periods) with continuous negative prices are in 2010.

IN (SOMEWHAT) RELATED NEWS: ERCOT is still on track for the switch to a nodal market design, coming up on December 1.  The change should allow for more efficient use of the generation fleet connected to ERCOT and more efficient use of the transmission grid.  All that added efficiency (even if only 1 or 2 percent improvements) should add up to slightly lower prices on average.

More effective use of the transmission grid should reduce the congestion that contributes to negative prices in the ERCOT West zone, but it is a complex switchover so to some degree we will just sit back, watch and learn.

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Nodal pricing coming to Texas wholesale power market

September 9, 2010

Michael Giberson

A story by Purva Patel in the Houston Chronicle does a reasonably good job explaining the upcoming shift from a zonal to a nodal market design for the ERCOT market in Texas. It is a complicated matter and hard to convey to non-specialist readers.

(In fact, even some specialists appear confused about parts of the bigger picture as evidenced by the comments reported of an attorney “who represents cities in utility issues and who sits on ERCOT’s Technical Advisory Committee.”  The attorney claims that while a “nodal system may make it easier to spot congestion and where new power plants are needed, it ignores the reality of how plants are built.”

How does it “ignore the reality of how plants are built”? The gist of the point seems to be that prices will rise at points in places like Houston but it is unlikely a new power plant could be built in Houston because of space limitations, public opposition, and air quality problems.

The misunderstanding may arise because of loose talk about how a more transparent and efficient pricing system will signal where new power plants are needed. This is not quite right. The more transparent and efficient pricing system will just do a better job of revealing the value of power at various locations on the grid.  What consumers and producers do with that information – build new power plants, add transmission, reduce consumption, or just pay the higher prices – is up to them.)

UPDATE: The Austin American-Statesman ran a story on Texas nodal the same day. It reveals something about the differences between Houston and Austin that the Houston story focused more on the practical aspects of the change while the Austin story highlights the behind-the-scenes politics.

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Wind power and natural gas-fired power and power market design

March 3, 2010

Michael Giberson

The Wall Street Journal published a lengthy article by Russel Gold on the behind-the-scenes struggle over cost allocation and performance obligations between wind power producers and conventional generators.  Tension over how variable resources participate in markets have been simmering for years, but wind power and other intermittent resources have been too small to worry too much about.  Now wind power is edging into the big leagues and the rules begin to matter (e.g.: “Big blow boosts Texas wind record“).  The article focuses on the ERCOT power market in Texas, where the action is hottest, but the same kinds of issues arise in other markets.

From the WSJ:

Many environmental groups talk of how wind and relatively clean-burning natural gas can partner to displace dirtier coal, creating a path to power the U.S. while releasing fewer greenhouse gases. A bitter fuel fight in Texas points to a different future: one in which gas and wind are foes.

The gas and wind factions have been clashing over the state’s operating rules for the past several months. The gas people say the playing field is tilted in wind’s favor; wind accuses gas of trying to snuff out the nascent wind energy sector.

[...]

At the heart of the battle is a fight over the vicissitudes of wind itself. The wind industry argues that since it can’t control when the wind blows, it shouldn’t be held to the same rules that require everyone else to make payments when they fail to deliver promised power. The natural-gas generators say everyone should operate under the same rules, and lament that wind’s success is merely coming at the expense of another relatively clean energy source.

[...]

One grievance: Coal, nuclear and gas operators must pay for their own backup if an operational or maintenance problem prevents them from delivering power as promised. But if wind generators fail to deliver promised power because the wind doesn’t blow, the cost of backing up wind power companies is spread among all the generators, state officials say. This puts an unfair burden on nonwind generators, says the gas faction.

For a closer look at the behind-the-scenes battle, try searching the ERCOT website for information about “voltage ride through” requirements for wind generators or the actions of (and reactions to) the Wind Cost Allocation Task Force.  If you drill down beyond the meeting schedules and status reports, all the way down to the presentations, reports, and comments filed by individual parties, things can get a little sharp.

For example, this recent presentation opposing recommendations of the Wind Cost Allocation Task Force uses terms like “fundamentally flawed,” “unfortunate squandering of resources,” “solutions … in search of a largely non-existent problem,” “arbitrary,” “would thwart public policy goals of the State of Texas.” Thems fighting words, and that’s just from page 2 of a 15 page presentation. On page 8, there is the suggestion of “serious anti-trust concerns.”

One of the page 2 phrases is right on target: “not consistent with principles of sound market design.” Unfortunately it isn’t until p. 13 that any market design principles actually get raised by the presenter.  Not surprisingly, the presentation itself seems a bit cavalier in its own use of “the principles of sound market design,” invoking principle when principle is convenient and pleading overall policy benefits when principles are inconvenient. But the principles mentioned are a start: cost causation, non-discrimination, and something about allocating costs to motivate “proper market behavior.”

The way forward, in ERCOT’s committees and in other power market design efforts, is in the systematic working out of principles of sound market design to be invoked in these kinds of discussions.

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Inside the ERCOT control center

February 23, 2010

Michael Giberson

David Wagman, chief editor of Power Engineering magazine, toured the Electric Reliability Council of Texas’ primary control center in Taylor, Texas as part of a group attending the Renewable Energy World Conference in Austin.  If you wonder what ERCOT’s control center is like:

Inside the control room, the most striking feature is the lack of noise. The room, which must be 50 by 50 with a 35-foot ceiling, is library quiet. And that’s the way they like it, Joel Mickey told me in a video interview I filmed with him and which will be on this web site in the near future. Anything else suggests a system that’s out of balance or with a problem. Eight people work in the control room, responsible for everything from day-ahead forecasting to on-the-spot transmission balancing. Each has a bank on consoles.

The front wall consists of a massive projection screen with perhaps a dozen displays showing the grid and various real time operating conditions. Two digital displays at either side of the room report the current load, the time and the system’s cycle. Those numbers in particular move up and down within a narrow range around 60 cycles. Every four seconds the control center pulses commands to generating units around the state, commanding changes in generating output up or down to keep 60 cycles in the center of the target.

More at the link, including some description on how wind power is changing the system operator’s job.

(HT to the Caprock Plains Wind Energy Association.)

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Tres Amigas wants to take cheap electric power away from hard-working Texas families

February 8, 2010

Michael Giberson

I spent the middle of last week in Austin at the University of Texas-Law conference on wind, solar and geothermal energy law, and as a side bonus got to hear some informal, Austin-based commentary on the Tres Amigas proposal to interconnect the Eastern, Western, and Texas electric grids. It will give you some idea of the thinking in the state capital that I heard the term “Dos Amigas” used more than a few times.

During the pre-conference “fundamentals” discussion, in response to a question that asked whether stronger transmission links to other states would help accommodate added growth in Texas wind power, a current member of the Public Utility Commission of Texas arose from the audience, climbed onto the dais, and took the microphone to say, among other things, “ERCOT is just fine the way it is.” The other main point of his comment was to suggest that the Southwest Power Pool, which has long covered the wind resource rich Texas Panhandle (with relatively weak links elsewhere, but a plan to beef up those links), would ably serve to sell the wind resource out of state while not compromising ERCOT’s jurisdictional status with respect to the feds.

Later in the conference a speaker offered a Texas policymaker’s view: ERCOT has its well-regarded CREZ plan to spend $5 billion on transmission enhancements primarily intended to allow wind generation in far west Texas, central west Texas, and the Texas panhandle to be delivered downstate to consumers in the Dallas, Houston, Austin, and San Antonio regions. If those lines link to Tres Amigas, then the prospect arises that consumers elsewhere will – in effect – “drink our milkshake.” Texas policymakers don’t want other consumers to drink our milkshake, especially after ERCOT consumers spend $5 billion to build there own transmission “straw” into the Panhandle region.  (Yeah, I watched “There Will Be Blood” a week or so ago, hence the milkshake and straw references. The presenter did not use this language.)

Peter Behr, writing for ClimateWire, has a more journalistic report on the debate over Tres Amigas. Behr reports that Occidental Petroleum – a large power consumer within the ERCOT region – has actively opposed the Tres Amigas project in filings at FERC, as has the Texas Industrial Energy Consumers. I haven’t read their filings, but apparently they believe ERCOT power prices will be higher on average with Tres Amigas than without, and as consumers they prefer lower prices.

In my opinion, however, they are more likely to get slightly lower (and somewhat less volatile) prices with better links to the rest of the grid.  That’s the way market expansion usually works.

Tres Amigas posts its FERC filings and related documents on its website. Here are links to a couple of the opposing views filed at FERC.  The “Supplemental Protest of Occidental…” includes the expert witness testimony that Behr discusses in his story:

Not all Texas policymakers oppose Tres Amigas. Member of Congress Randy Neugebauer (R-TX) sent FERC a letter indicating the project would encourage investment in renewable power and urging the Commission to give the project a “fair and deliberate view.”  And, as the ClimateWire story suggests, developers aiming to exploit the extensive power generation potential of the region are strongly behind the project.

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