Posts Tagged ‘gasoline prices’

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Zone pricing ban proposal advances in Connecticut, zone price ban law in New York still not working

March 2, 2011

Michael Giberson

Gasoline consumers in well-off Fairfield County, CT, pay gasoline prices that tend to be higher than prices in the rest of the state. The consumers don’t like it.

State legislators representing the region believe the issue is “zone pricing,” a practice by gasoline wholesalers which sets wholesale prices to different levels in different areas based on beliefs about how much consumers are willing to pay. These legislators are proposing to ban zone pricing in Connecticut.

Meanwhile, in New York, a law banning zone pricing went into effect about 2 1/2 years ago. It hasn’t had a noticeable effect on gasoline prices. (See WHAM-ABC 13: “Zone Pricing Law – Why it Didn’t Work.”)

Insight from economics: zone pricing may affect whether retailers or wholesalers capture a larger share of the profit, but a zone pricing ban probably won’t have much affect on retail prices. If the law has an effect, it will tend to raise prices in lower-income areas at least as much as it lowers prices in higher-income areas.

Question for proponent of a zone pricing ban: why do you think your law will succeed where a very similar New York law has failed?

NOTES:

  1. Current text of committee bill.
  2. More info from the CT General Assembly.
  3. Editorial from the Fairfield County-based Connecticut Post.
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Did they really say that? Gasoline market stress coming to eastern Washington, so officials offer advice

December 14, 2010

Michael Giberson

One consequence of a 14-week project to replace several locks on dams on the Columbia and Snake rivers is that gasoline transportation costs will rise in the area. Some gasoline that would have traveled up the river will have to move by train and truck instead, a more expensive process and one much more exposed to potential winter weather. Gasoline prices are likely to rise, so what should consumers do about it?

According to a news report, the state of Washington is advising:

Drive less.

In a document on the fuel supply outlook during the closure, the No. 1 way the fuel shortage will be dealt with is “through reduced demand due to higher prices.”

“We’re going to have to see how it works,” said Mark Anderson, an energy analyst with the state Department of Commerce. “There may be some rough times.”

State officials are warning there could be gas shortages in Eastern Washington during the closure — especially if bad weather hits. Drivers are warned to keep gas tanks full and consider ways to cut down on driving. Officials also are discouraging people from topping off their tanks, as it could cause longer lines at gas stations.

So let’s get this straight, drivers should keep gas tanks full but not top off their tank? The only way I can see to do that is to fill it up and then park it – I guess that is consistent with the “cut down on driving” suggestion.

The Tri-City Herald said, “Normally, 1.47 million gallons of fuel are shipped from Portland to the Port of Pasco every day for delivery around Eastern Washington,” and this it the fuel that will have to take alternate routes during the renovations.  River traffic is subject to annual interruptions for planned maintenance, but typically just for three weeks at a time.  (Fun research project idea: see if you can find evidence of price effects in Eastern Washington due to the annual maintenance breaks.)

More information on gasoline markets in Washington.

Gasoline price gouging addendum: According to the news article, the Washington Office of the Attorney General said, “High prices due to low supply and high demand is not price gouging. Unconscionable pricing that bears no connection to circumstances is price gouging. High prices won’t get us moving. Unconscionable prices will.” Reportedly “consumers receive some redress in 60 percent of the complaints filed” with the Attorney General’s consumer protection office. These claims surprised me because, (a) Washington doesn’t have a specific anti-price gouging law, and (b) states with price gouging laws can receive hundreds or even thousands of price complaints, but typically only a handful become grounds for an investigation and fewer still lead to some sort of settlement.

Apparently the legal authority is the state Consumer Protection Act, which among other things: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” Awfully vague – I wonder whether the law has been enforced in price gouging circumstances.

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Orlando wants to discourage high gas prices near the airport

May 21, 2010

Michael Giberson

News headlines say, “Orlando wants to prevent gas price gouging,” though the practice Orlando politicians want to stop isn’t price gouging, per se. Rather, the target of the proposal is gasoline retailers near Orlando International Airport who charge substantially higher gasoline prices than neighboring stations. The proposal would require gasoline stations near the airport to post prices in a standardized manner.

Normally, competition between gasoline retailers keeps prices from getting too far apart in a region because at least some customers engage in comparison shopping.  Not all customers will comparison shop, and not even all price-aware customers will switch brands or delay refueling for a few pennies a gallon, so retail gasoline markets usually sport a range of prices.

But most of the time the difference between high and low is on the order of 15 or 20 cents a gallon.  A station near the Orlando airport has had gasolines prices that almost doubled the prices of other gasoline retailers in Orlando (for example, as noted here before, prices at $4.99 a gallon with competitors asking $2.59 to $2.75 a gallon).

It is an interesting little business niche.  Likely most of the sales go to tourists returning a rental car to the airport before hopping a flight home.  Likely the tourists are in a rush, they want to refuel near the airport to avoid paying a refueling charge, and they don’t have a good idea on where to buy cheap fuel around the airport. The price isn’t posted on a roadside sign, but the tourist likely assumes, based on general market experience, that the price isn’t too far out of line with neighboring stations.  Many start pumping the gas without checking the price on the pump – a few gag at the price but pump anyway – and a very few get back into the car and go in search of cheaper fuel.

The principled libertarian in me objects to imposing the price posting requirement as an infringement on the station owners’ freedom to operate his business the way he sees fit.  The consequentialist in me, though, finds it hard to oppose the proposal.  It seems a relatively targeted proposal to help consumers avoid paying the high prices that otherwise flourish in this little niche.

Maybe I should worry not so much about this narrowly targeted proposal itself, this minimalist nudge, but rather I should worry about a government that wants to expand its authority over voluntary deals between retailer and consumer.  Is this the sort of nudge that eventually shoves society onto a slipperly slope down the road to serfdom?

The principled libertarian in me objects, but the overwhelming majority of the voices in my head say the benefits of this proposal will exceed the costs: targeted in scope and aimed at helping the consumer make an informed choice. Why not?

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Unfair prices and moral progress

October 29, 2009

Michael Giberson

Unfair Prices

Daniel Little, at Understanding Society, asks about “Fair Prices?“  In exploring the topic he draws some upon E.P. Thompson’s studies of the English working class:

E. P. Thompson’s work on early modern Britain reminds us that there was a “moral economy of the crowd” that profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the market; that these popular moral ideas specifically and deeply challenged the idea of market-defined prices for life’s necessities; and that the crowd demanded “fair prices” for food and housing (Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture). The moral economy of the crowd focused on the poor — it assumed a minimum standard of living and demanded that the millers, merchants, and officials respect this standard by charging prices the poor could afford. And the rioting that took place in Poland in 1988 over meat prices or rice riots in Indonesia in 2008 are reminders that this kind of moral reasoning isn’t merely part of a pre-modern sensibility.

This kind of fairness reasoning addresses only outcomes.  But in the case of $4/gallon gasoline last year in the United States, he found other kinds of moral reasoning involved:

And what about that other necessity of life — gasoline? Public complaints about $4/gallon gas were certainly loud a year ago. But they seem to have been grounded in something different — the suspicion that the oil companies were manipulating prices and taking predatory profits — rather than an assumption of a fair price determined by the needs of the poor.

Reasoning about unfair prices

Sarah Maxwell sums up a great deal of work from marketing, psychology, and economics about fairness in pricing in her book The Price is Wrong.  Generally speaking, she observes that when people are faced with a price that violates expectations in a way disadvantageous to them (a consumer faced with an unexpectedly high price, a producer faced with an unexpectedly low price), they feel distress which motivates inquiry into the reasons for the unexpected price.

In Maxwell’s telling, this inquiry leads to evaluation of the social fairness of the price, first to consider the fairness of the outcome and if that isn’t satisfying then to consider the process which lead to the outcome.  This two-step process then considers issues of distributional fairness then procedural fairness.

Returning to Little’s comments, the first quoted cases seem directed at distributional issues, while the gasoline example draws attention to procedural issues.  That is to say, gasoline consumers confronted with $4 gasoline reacted by suspecting that somehow someone cheated – violated fair procedures – and that the cheating resulted in an unfair price.  Little mentions oil companies as targets of suspicion but speculators and other investors also got prominent mention at the time.

Little observes that contemporary Americans seem willing to accept a relatively broad range of prices and wages despite the varying distributional outcomes.  For many Americans, for example, so long as wages seem somewhat connected to market-based reasoning – for example, what companies need to pay to attract top talent – then the wage is at least tolerated even when very high.

[Admittedly the compilation of evidence is not systematic, and bears examination, but it comports with my prior beliefs.  I'd welcome pointers to systematic inquiry on this topic.]

Moral Progress?

So, and here I know I’m trampling over a host of problematic issues that ought to be examined carefully, I wonder whether this recourse to procedural rather than distributive reasoning in reaction to distressing prices is evidence of moral progress.

I realize the concept of moral progress itself is problematic.  For my own thinking on the issue, I find Jesse Prinz’s discussion of the concept in his book The Emotional Construction of Morals to be reasonably satisfying.  To quote just one line out of his final chapter (Ch. 8, “Moral Progress”), “We can assess moral systems by asking how well they are suited to providing lives that we would find desirable.”  (p. 299)  This isn’t a knock-down argument in favor of  the idea of moral progress, just one line out of a chapter summing up a book-length examination of morality.  The point is only that moral beliefs can by examined and judged, determined to be better or worse, and therefore moral progress can be assessed.

My question, then, is this: “Does recourse to procedural rather than distributional reasoning when confronted by distressing prices signal moral progress?”

(HT to Mark Thoma for the link to Little.)

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Not helping out due to anti-price gouging laws

October 22, 2009

Michael Giberson

It looks like we may get through the 2009 hurricane season without any new evidence generated of the harm due to anti-price gouging legislation. The lack of a lot of hurricane damage is good, obviously (but I foresee that it may leave me bereft of new material for blogging on price gouging).

Wikipedia currently says, “So far this season ties for record low activity with 1982 for lowest number of hurricanes forming in a season.”  The two major hurricanes so far this year have had almost no effect on the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Gulf Coast, which means no supply disruptions, no price spikes, no declarations of emergencies, and no new price gouging complaints to be investigated by states.

Lacking new material, here is a quote from the Federal Trade Commission’s report on its investigation of price increases and price manipulation claims subsequent to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the late Summer of 2005:

Staff interviews with alleged price gouging retailers indicated that some of highest prices occurred when stations were running out of product, were uncertain about when they would be re-supplied or at what price, were trying to ration their dwindling inventory, or were trying to curtail panic buying. In addition, because unbranded stations saw their wholesale costs increase above those of branded stations, the retail prices of unbranded gasoline increased to high levels. One national retailer told staff that it closed its stations in Florida (which normally bought from a refiner at prices tied to a Platts spot market price) because the firm could not afford to re-supply the stations without either selling gasoline at a loss or risking that it would violate the state’s anti-gouging laws.

That last sentence indicates the harm created by anti-gouging laws. Gasoline consumers in the state would obviously be better off with more supply brought into the state rather than less, and with these stations offering gasoline at a high price rather than not offering gasoline at all.  The law impedes activities by gasoline retailers that would help gasoline consumers.

Apparently – despite the FTC’s extensive investigation, thorough analysis and detailed report, despite the logic and evidence presented by economists and others in other forums – many politicians, editorialists, and consumers continue to think anti-price gouging laws are good.

The interesting question: what evidence or argument could persuade open-minded proponents of anti-price gouging legislation to change their minds?

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Oligopoly in Alaska’s wholesale gasoline market

October 9, 2009

Michael Giberson

Last year, as crude oil and gasoline prices went on their wild ride, gasoline prices in Alaska took a somewhat different path than prices in the lower 48 states.  For years, average prices in Alaska were about the same as the U.S. average price.  Higher costs of delivery in Alaska were mostly offset by the nation’s lowest gasoline tax, just 8 cents a gallon, and the result was a price that more or less tracked the U.S. average price.

That pattern changed beginning in June 2008.  Prices had been marching up everywhere, but the price march stalled in the lower 48, while in Alaska (and Hawaii) prices continued to rise for another month.  Prices fell sharply throughout the country from July through December – excepting a short pause during the late hurricane season in the lower 48 – but Alaska’s prices now seemed to track the higher prices of Hawaii rather than returning to the U.S. average. (See this chart at www.alaskagasprices.com.)

Last fall the State of Alaska initiated an investigation, and in January 2009 they concluded that oligopoly was to blame.  No illegal acts were discovered, but the report suggested that with relatively few players involved competitive pressures can be weak and prices above the competitive level can be sustained for some time.

Explanation from the report, 2008 ALASKA GASOLINE PRICING INVESTIGATION:

The fewer the number of sellers in a market, the easier it is for each to observe the other and develop expectations as to the way in which each will likely react to the other’s decisions regarding output and prices. In these markets, each seller will naturally take into account the potential impact of its own actions on market prices, including the potential responses that its actions might elicit from other sellers. This type of “competitive” behavior is often referred to as oligopolistic pricing or “oligopolistic interdependence” because the decisions that each make are “dependent” in part on the expected actions (or reactions) of other sellers. In this environment, it is easier for sellers to develop a “live and let live” attitude toward their rivals that would not be possible to maintain in competitively structured markets with more sellers. As a result, oligopolistic or interdependent behavior can result in prices that are above competitive levels over extended periods of time.

Interdependent behavior on the part of sellers is not generally regarded as a violation of antitrust law as long as firms develop and implement their pricing and output decisions independently.

… Alaska’s gasoline markets can fairly be characterized as oligopolies at the wholesale level. Oligopoly markets can produce a wide range of prices, high or low, without there ever being any illegal behavior or collusion by sellers. …. [The ability to keep prices high] is dependent on the existence of some sort of entry barrier that prevents non-incumbent suppliers from entering the market and taking advantage of the higher profit opportunities. As discussed above, these entry barriers exist in parts of Alaska, limiting competition from outside suppliers, particularly during short-term periods or periods such as the second half of 2008 characterized by extreme market volatility and uncertainty.

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New York’s zone pricing ban not eliminating retail gasoline price differences

September 30, 2009

Michael Giberson

At least some retail gasoline consumers in New York expected that the zone pricing ban implemented last year would tend to equalize retail gasoline prices in an area. Rochester TV station WHEC discovers that a year after the law was signed by the governor, and about 10 months after the zone pricing law went into effect, that gasoline prices in suburban Rochester still vary substantially. WHEC reports that consumers don’t like the price variations and believe the law is not working as intended.

The problem, according to Bill Adams, who owns two area stations and represents the state retail gasoline dealers association, is that the law passed last year applies only to middlemen who buy from refiners and sell to retail stations. The law does not apply to refiners distributing gasoline to affiliated retailers, nor to retail stations that buy directly from refiners. The New York state assembly has passed an amendment to the law that attempts to cover this gap, which the governor says he will sign, but the New York state senate has not acted on the law.

Of course retail gasoline stations remain relatively free to set their own prices, and would continue to have the freedom under the proposed amendment.  Even if the state can limit the pricing flexibility still enjoyed by some middlemen, there is no guarantee that the changes will eliminate price differences within a region, and no reason to believe it would.

(SEE ALSO: Earlier zone pricing posts at Knowledge Problem.)

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Retail gasoline stations shutting down to avoid price gouging complaints

September 15, 2009

Michael Giberson

From Columbia, South Carolina’s The State newspaper, more evidence of the predictable effects of anti-price gouging laws:

A day after drivers began a panic-buying run on gas, S.C. Attorney General Henry McMaster invoked the state’s price-gouging law with fines up to $1,000 per offense and up to 30 days in jail. Hotlines were set up to take complaints.

Fearing gouging accusations, a few station owners refused to take pricey deliveries, said [Michael] Fields, whose trade group represents convenience stores and fuel suppliers.

He did not have numbers on how many stations turned away refills after Hurricane Ike cut off much of the state’s gas supplies from the Gulf of Mexico. A state report on last year’s gas shortage said stations bought at least 180,000 gallons of gas at $5 or more per gallon.

As states have become more active in pursuing allegations of price gouging, gasoline merchants are responding by shutting down rather than offering prices that might trouble consumers.  I don’t know of any data to support my claim – this is just my casual observation fed by reading newspaper stories on price gouging.  (I wonder if oil price information purveyor OPIS has the relevant data?)

More from South Carolina:

McMaster, who is seeking the Republican nomination for governor, said he first learned about some stations refusing to take deliveries after Ike when contacted by The State newspaper this week.

What? McMaster first learned about such refusals just this week?  I guess he doesn’t read Knowledge Problem on a regular basis, because a month ago I posted on exactly that issue in “Gasoline price gouging after Hurricane Ike in South Carolina” (see also the related news from West Virginia, discussed in “Predictable consequences of anti-price gouging laws”).

I guess S.C. Attorney General McMaster also didn’t read the Gas Price Gouging Report issued by the, ahem, South Carolina Office of the Attorney General (and cited in my KP post), which said: “a number of other station owners reported [to investigators from the Attorney General's office! -MG] that to avoid bad publicity they simply shut their doors instead of purchasing gasoline at elevated prices.”

The A.G.’s report illustrates the issue well enough: suppliers losing their normal supply channels during a declared emergency face two choices. First they decide whether to go to extraordinary lengths to obtain supplies or do nothing and shut down.  Second, if they obtain supplies, do they reflect the full cost of gasoline in the price they charge and risk complaints and a state investigation, or absorb at least some of the additional expense?

While no economic logic forces a company going to extraordinary lengths to obtain supplies to pass through all costs in higher prices, it seems reasonable to believe that if it is possible to do so then more retailers are likely to do so.  And, if more retailers go to extraordinary lengths to obtain supplies during emergencies, more retail customers will have a choice whether or not to buy gasoline than before and the larger local supplies should help limit the degree to which prices rise during the emergency.

Anti-price gouging laws, because they penalize some price increases during the emergency period, encourage retailers to shut down rather than risk a state investigation and the bad publicity of a price gouging complaint.  The laws are making consumers worse off.  (I’m dubbing this response the “Zwolinski effect”, after Matt Zwolinski’s “non-worseness claim” in his writings on the ethics of price gouging. See here and follow links.)

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Gasoline price gouging after Hurricane Ike in South Carolina

August 17, 2009

Michael Giberson

In June, the South Carolina’s Office of the Attorney General issued a report on post-Hurricane Ike price gouging. The brief report is worth a look if you have an interest in price gouging laws.

Over 4,300 price gouging complaints were received by the SC attorney general’s office in the post-Hurricane Ike period. Lots of investigating eventually yielded just three retailers and one supplier that appeared to be offering gasoline at prices “out of line with general market prices and … potentially unconscionable” during the time the state’s price gouging law was activated, September 12 – October 12, 2008. In settlements the retailers each agreed to pay $500 and the supplier agreed to pay $5000 to a Red Cross fund for hurricane relief.

The report makes a general case for a supply and demand explanation of the price jump in the state. Gasoline supplies were already constrained due to the effects of Hurricane Gustav. Two major pipelines were offline or operating at reduced capacity. As Hurricane Ike approach, consumers rushed to fill up their gas tanks, causing a temporary spike in demand. The South Carolina law apparently accommodates market responses and the state only targeted companies that raised prices “out of line with general market prices.”

The report indicated that, “although there initially appeared to be significant price gouging, retailers’ markups were actually much less severe than they were with Hurricane Katrina in 2005.” The report concluded:

While there is no single reason that retail price spikes were less significant with Hurricane Ike, conversations with stations owners indicated a variety of factors: the already-high price of gas, fear of alienating customers, and heightened awareness of the state’s price gouging law, including the results the Attorney General obtained in 2005.

The report offered some interesting notes on the diversity of retail station actions during the supply disruptions:

Some stations went to great lengths to obtain fuel, with at least one South Carolina station trucking fuel from as far away as Virginia. Numerous South Carolina retailers purchased from North Carolina and Georgia in their scramble to find supply. Some stations and wholesalers in the Upstate and Midlands which always purchased gas from pipeline terminals had logistical hurdles in purchasing gas from unfamiliar port terminals such as Charleston. At the same time, a number of other station owners reported that to avoid bad publicity they simply shut their doors instead of purchasing gasoline at elevated prices.

Some station owners “simply shut their doors”?  So wait a minute, the state law allows the state government to harass gasoline retailers that remain open and offer high prices, but station owners can simply refuse to sell gasoline at any price – an action which makes consumers worse off – and the state can’t touch them?

Now I wonder about the claim that markups were less severe than with Hurricane Katrina, or rather, wonder whether consumers were actually better off or worse off due to the state law.  If many stations shut their doors in 2008 due the state’s anti-price gouging law, then the law is making consumers worse off.

Once again, Matt Zwolinski’s arguments on the ethics of price gouging seem relevant, and particular his non-worseness claim.  To wit, if you agree that a retailer could ethically refuse to sell a product during an emergency, say by closing shop, then since no one is worse off if the retailer remains open but offers products at a high price, it should not be seen as unethical for a retailer to remain open and offer products at a high price.  (See earlier discussion of Zwolinski and his non-worseness claim.)

ASIDE: Personally, I’m not much of a fan of using the threat of state legal action to generate donations to charity. Sure, as a business-owner under such a threat, I can see the value of paying $500 to charity rather than several times that to my attorney to fight off state action. But if, and it is a big if, if these station owners actually did something harmful to consumers in their area, those consumers are not compensated by these gifts. (Particularly so since the three stations were in the middle and western portions of the state, while hurricane relief money spent by the Red Cross will likely benefit people who live nearer the coast.)

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Refinery outages generally have small effects on gasoline prices, GAO says

July 31, 2009

Michael Giberson

A study by the Government Accountability Office has concluded that gasoline refinery outages tend to have small effects on prices.  While large scale weather events like Hurricane Katrina and Rita did result in large prices increases, such events are rare, the study said. In other findings:

  • Typical unplanned refinery outages tended to increase the cost of branded gasoline by 0.2 cents and the cost of unbranded gasoline by 0.5 cents. (During unplanned outages, branded stations, which are more likely to have long term supply contracts, are served first, while unbranded stations, more likely to not have long term supply contracts with a distributor, find themselves having to scramble a bit more for supplies.)
  • Typical planned refinery outages tended to have no effect on prices at all, likely because planned outages are reasonably scheduled during low demand periods, and the refiner can build inventory in advance of the outage to help maintain supply.
  • Price increases were larger for some special blends of gasoline targeted to smaller markets, since there will be fewer alternative sources of supply in the case of an outage.  As before, prices were much higher for unbranded gasoline than for branded gasoline in areas requiring special gasoline blends (for example, in Tucson, AZ, unbranded stations showed price increased of 4.1 cents per gallon, while branded station prices were up 1.3 cents per gallon due to a refinery outage).

The GAO study examined weekly data on wholesale prices for 75 cities, January 2002 through September 2008. During the period there were about 1,000 planned outages and 1,100 unplanned outages.

The GAO also concluded that there were gaps in federal data collection efforts which have limited the Department of Transportation and GAO efforts to analyze petroleum markets and related issues.

(The link above is to the 48-page pdf version of the report. Sometime soon the GAO will post a summary of the report on this webpage.)

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