Posts Tagged ‘market design’

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Market design helps people attain goals effectively

April 3, 2011

Michael Giberson

Harvard economic systems designer Al Roth is profiled in the Boston Globe:

Academically speaking, Roth is a pioneer of so-called market design: finding situations where a market is failing — often, a place that most people wouldn’t even recognize as a market — and making it work better. Roth has influenced a cadre of young, energetic market designers, many of whom have taken up prominent positions at top universities. Inspired by Roth’s work, these rising economists are also setting their sights on real-world problems. Some are looking at dating websites; others are interested in how universities could do better at scheduling their students’ classes. Like Roth, all of them envision a world in which economists, as unlikely as it may seem, are recognized as society’s mechanics.

Some market-oriented people will react negatively to the idea of “economists … as society’s mechanics,” but the negative reaction is based on a misunderstanding. Roth is no central planner. The point is to rework organizations so that participants in those organizations can more effectively achieve their goals.

When most people think of economics, they think of money — the study of how much things cost and why. Roth distinguishes himself by being more interested in situations where money plays little or no role — for instance, the process that determines who among the thousands of patients awaiting kidney transplants nationwide should receive the small number of organs that are available. As a society, we’ve decided we’re not comfortable with people selling their organs, so some other system — some other kind of market — is required. And a market, in Roth’s view, does not necessarily come down to prices, nor is it always ruled by simple principles like supply and demand: As long as people are competing with each other to get what they want, then resources are being allocated, and that means economists should be thinking about it.

One response to the lack of markets for transplantable kidneys is to agitate for change, to advocate lifting the regulations that prevent it. (Same for bone marrow.) These are good ideas. While we wait for society to get over its squeamishness at allowing compensation to donors, Roth’s kidney exchange is enabling more people to obtain transplants now. And Roth’s work on repugnance in markets is helping probe the reasons many people are reluctant to let markets work in this realm, so useful to advocates for change.

A by-product of working in areas where money plays little or no role is becoming sensitized to the role that money plays when it is allowed:

The trouble is that when you can’t rely on prices to stand in for value, things get complicated. In typical markets, “Money finds the matches,” said Utku Ünver, an associate professor of economics at Boston College who has collaborated with Roth on projects. “But when there’s no money, there’s lots of friction, and there are lots of things that may cause these markets to fail and not function efficiently.”

When you can’t use prices to express how much something’s worth, in other words, figuring out who should get what becomes a complicated business. “That’ll kill your economics 101 market real quick,” said [MIT economist Robert] Gibbons. “Al comes along to help you with situations where you’re not allowed to use the price mechanism.”

 

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Rob Harmon at TEDxRanier: How the market can keep streams flowing

March 14, 2011

Michael Giberson

Rob Harmon gave a TEDx talk last fall in Seattle on a market mechanism that links willing buyers and willing sellers in a way that protects in-stream water flows and helps restore stream ecosystems. Harmon was formerly with the Bonneville Environmental Foundation (BEF) in Portland, Oregon, where he was a developer of the Water Restoration Certificates program.

The TED talk was just posted on the TED website, but a little searching around reveals that the smart water/markets/environment people were already aware. TEDx had the video up on youtube a few months ago, as Shawn Regan of PERC noticed in December.

In December 2009, David Zetland interviewed Rob Harmon about the program. [Zetland comments at Aguanomics; Link to MP3 audio.]

Here is bit from the Zetland interview beginning just after the 9:00 minute mark, where Harmon describes his visit to a stream that would have been dry in August but for the water restoration certificate program:

So, I decided this is a nice view from the bridge – you get the long view, you can see for a ways, you get the beaver dam.

But let’s go down and look right at the water. I walk down and I brought my camera with me and I looked in the water and I saw movement. And a stared and I stared and I stared, and I suddenly focused at the right depth and there were hundreds of baby steelheads. […]

Ordinarily, for the last ten, twenty, fifty years there would be no water for them to hatch into, they’d just die. […]

So, basically, here is habitat for all of these fish that ordinarily would not have habitat. It was a very sort of , it was a very sort of rubber meets the road sort of experience for me, sort of fish meet the water.

It went from the process, for me, of writing the contract, putting a business plan together, figuring out the website and the water calculator there on the website, and all of the things you do to make a business like this work, to actually seeing the results right before my eyes. That was very fulfilling, really nice to see actual ecological benefits right in front of me. (Unofficial transcript, parts edited out, use at your own risk.)

See also Harmon’s blog post about his trip to this site.

An interesting element here is that no laws needed to be changed to allow the program to work. The program works with the existing water laws in Oregon, Washington, and Montana. But for decades that law had led to regulation, extensive litigation, and dry stream beds because owners of water rights had to use their water rights in order to preserve them, and using involved withdrawing the water from the stream.

Until this program came along, there was no mechanism to allow water rights holders to use their rights to preserve in-stream flows. BEF does the necessary legwork: identifying streams at risk, tracking water flows, issuing certificates, and so on all the way up to bringing together willing buyers and willing sellers.

ASIDE: Next time a misguided free-market economist tells me markets can’t be designed, they can only emerge spontaneously, I am going to point to this example.

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Would granting futures exchanges copyright protection for prices deter some market manipulation?

January 6, 2011

Michael Giberson

In New York Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit denied NYMEX copyright protection for its settlement prices. The decision turned on application of the merger doctrine in copyright law, which governs cases in which the expression of an idea is so completely linked to the idea itself that granting copyright protection to an author’s work would in effect grant copyright protection to the idea expressed. Since ideas are not copyrightable, when a particular expression of an idea is so closely bound to the idea itself then the expression also cannot be copyrighted.

Jeremy Murray analyzes the court’s decision in a Buffalo Law Review piece, “The Death of Copyright Protection in Individual Price Valuations, a Flawed Merger Doctrine, and Financial Market Manipulation.” There is a lot of information here, some of which I only skimmed through, but Murray offers some interesting points on the link between copyright protection for exchange settlement prices and market manipulation exercises such as that of Amaranth Advisors.

In particular, he advises that ICE’s capability to directly link its product prices to NYMEX settlement prices created conditions in which the natural gas market manipulations by a Amaranth trader could flourish (if only for a short time). Among other things, Amaranth sought to profit by holding large short positions in natural gas on ICE, then drive the NYMEX price down by dumping a small long position in the last few minutes of trading. Murray argues that if ICE was required to identify its own settlement prices, rather than copying NYMEX settlement prices, then Amaranth-style manipulations would fail: dumping contracts on one market would not automatically and exactly manipulate the price of the other.

Murray also offers some interesting speculation as to whether NYMEX would have been more successful had it pursued a claim based on “time sensitive information” rather than copyright.

(While I liked much of Murray’s analysis, to motivate his discussion of market manipulation he relies way to heavily on quotes from politician. Let’s just say I’m not willing to take the claims of Sens. Maria Cantwell and Richard Durbin as authorities on energy market operations, nor am I convinced that sharply increasing energy prices in 2007 and 2008 were due to rampant market manipulation. Thankfully, the discussion is mostly irrelevant to his broader analysis.)

NOTES: New York Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).

We discussed the NYMEX case here earlier, see “What is a Price? The Courts Think They Know; The Courts are Wrong“. Also related is “Prices are information goods, and information wants to be expensive, because it’s so valuable” and “CFTC Holds Hearings on Oversight of Energy Trading.”

Several posts here discuss the Amaranth manipulation charges.

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An example of ways poorly constructed markets can fail

January 4, 2011

Michael Giberson

From the Mim’s Bits column in the MIT Technology Review: “How Mechanical Turk is Broken
Why the world’s most famous outsourcing hub for tiny tasks is littered with spam and shoddy workmanship
.”

Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is Amazon’s site for linking companies seeking small web-based tasks requiring at least a bit of human intelligence to anonymous piece-rate web workers. Panos Ipeirotis, a computer scientist at NYU’s Stern School of Business, both uses MTurk to do research and does research on the MTurk marketplace.  He’s concluded that MTurk’s market design suffers from a “market for lemons” problem: lack of a reputation system for sellers (i.e. workers) means buyers (i.e. employers) can’t tell if they are getting high quality or low quality effort. If prices in the market reflect the average effort, it will be too low to retain high quality sellers. As high quality sellers leave, the average quality will fall and the price with it.

The Mim’s Bits column concludes, “Without transparency and accountability — the core ingredients of what economists call signaling — the site will continue to function primarily as an object lesson in the ways that poorly constructed markets fail.”

There is more to MTurk than this, including ways buyers can try to detect effort quality in order to improve seller effort. For more insight check out A Computer Scientist in a Business School where Ipeirotis blogs his MTurk research. Ipeirotis has related papers on his university website.

RELATED: Harvard researchers John Horton, David Rand, and Richard Zeckhauser write about using MTurk to conduct online social science research. Horton has related papers on his university website. Here is Horton’s list of economics-relevant stories from The Onion.

Many more academic papers on MTurk, via the Social Science Research Network.

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What market design can do for you

September 30, 2010

Michael Giberson

Medicare pays medical equipment suppliers based on indexed-adjustments to a price list established 25 years ago. It is extremely unlikely that these prices are efficient. For the past 10 years Medicare has explored the possibility of pricing medical equipment via procurement auctions. Their procurement auction plan is fatally flawed.

What can market design do for you? Market design – that branch of economics that seeks to apply economic understanding to the task of creating or repairing markets – helps explain why the Medicare procurement plan will work badly and what can be done to enable it to work well.

At Freakonomics, Ian Ayres presents an op-ed co-written with Peter Cramton, “Fix Medicare’s Bizarre Auction Program,” that lays out two of the fatal flaws with the Medicare auction plan. The op-ed links to a brief analysis by Cramton and Brett Katzman of the issue.

(An overview prepared by staff of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce subcommittee describes the background and current state of Medicare’s payment system. Perhaps surprisingly, even the fatally flawed procurement auctions have produced cost savings of up to 56 percent on certain medical supplies, but that is more a measure of how bad the current method is rather than a recommendation of the proposed procurement auction.)

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NHL’s experiments in hockey

September 23, 2010

Michael Giberson

Stephen Dubner at Freakonomics points to a Macleans story on some wild experimentation going on in the National Hockey League: shallower nets, moving the second referee off the ice, moving the face-off circles, three-on-three and two-on-two shootouts, and more. The article said:

The unusual nature of some items tested at the camp reminded Simon Fraser University business professor Lindsay Meredith of the freewheeling “skunk works” divisions that tech companies create to investigate advanced projects. “Any major corporation should have some kind of skunk works—a bank, a university, whatever,” he says. “An enterprise of that size and sophistication would be foolish not to.”

FIFA, you listening?

(Related: an April 2009 story in the Financial Times about an “experiments in business” course taught by Freakonomics co-author Steve Leavitt and John List at the University of Chicago.)

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Cocoa market manipulation? The evidence suggests…

August 3, 2010

Michael Giberson

yes: cocoa market manipulation says Craig Pirrong.  He comes to that conclusion after his examination of price movements in cocoa markets revealed all the fingerprints of a classic squeeze.

In brief, Pirrong compared July London cocoa prices against September and November London prices and July New York prices over a period from January 2000 to June 2010. Anomalous moves in the July London price relative to these related markets suggest manipulation.  When Pirrong’s analysis is combined with one large trader seeking delivery on an unusually large percentage of July London contracts the case is more or less obvious.

Pirrong refers to his 2004 American Law and Economics Review article on the Ferruzzi soybean market episode for background on commodity market manipulation and its detection. For a more generally accessible explanation see his discussion in his recent Energy Law Journal article, “Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence.” (The directly relevant explanation is in Section VI of the paper, but if you are interested in market manipulation then the entire paper is worth reading.)

See also Pirrong’s related recent blog posts: “Chocolate Kisses” and “Get a Room.”

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More rule/market design recommendations for international football-soccer

June 27, 2010

Lynne Kiesling

Like Mike the other day, I have been thinking about possibly Pareto-improving rule changes in international soccer; like Richard Epstein I have always thought about sports rules (and league organization and market structure) as interesting market design issues. Take, for example, the unintended changes in ice hockey and American football after the introduction of a mandatory helmet rule — an increase in the force and violence of body contact. This is as good an example of moral hazard as you can find outside of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

After the two ludicrous incorrect calls in today’s matches — not calling Frank Lampard’s goal a goal in the England-Germany game, and allowing Carlos Tevez’s goal even though he was ridiculously offside in the Argentina-Mexico game — FIFA’s hidebound refusal to use any sort of technology to review plays and calls is leading to even more anger, acrimony, and charges of unfair outcomes.

I separate the rules issues into two categories: issues affecting the run of play and issues with goals. Epstein’s recommendations that Mike summarized in his earlier post mostly pertain to fouls, diving, and other behavior in the run of play, but I think that the easiest and most beneficial rules changes to implement pertain to goals, not the run of play. A lot of these bad goal calls, one of which we have seen in almost every game thus far in this World Cup, could be corrected with two fairly simple and low-tech rule changes that are cross-pollination from American football:

  • Simple real-time video review of all goals, with the reviewer able to radio down to the referee to tell him that he made the incorrect call. Since the review is in real time, in most cases it should not slow down the pace too much, and you can have a standard rule that if a goal is disallowed the defending team gets a goal kick.
  • From the NFL: A set number of challenges (say 2), restricted to goal-related plays only that will trigger an off-field review and/or referee video review on the field. Somewhat redundant if you have video review, but it gives the teams a clean procedural opportunity to register a disagreement productively, which is impossible given the existing rule structure. As in the NFL, if you register a challenge and your challenge is denied, then there should be some kind of payment, like you lose a substitute or something.

FIFA contends that they do not want video review because it will slow down the pace of “the beautiful game”, and I agree that slowing down the pace is a bad idea. But I think implementing these two rules with respect to goals will reduce the acrimony and ire resulting from bad calls without meaningfully slowing down the game. The existing rules make the game less fun to watch and generate ill will because they lead to unjust outcomes.

UPDATE: Here’s Ross at The Science of Sport making my essential point in more detail. Here’s the money quote:

About two weeks ago, Sepp Blatter was quoted as saying that the introduction of technology into football would detract from the fervour of the sport. He said “Then the science is coming in the game, no discussions, we don’t want that. We want to have these emotions, and then a little bit more than emotions, passion”.  Sepp and FIFA want human error, and so human error they get!

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Soccer rules as a market design problem

June 21, 2010

Michael Giberson

Hadn’t actually thought of the rules of professional sports leagues as a market design issue before, but Richard Epstein’s column in Forbes proposing rule changes for soccer suggests the idea.  Epstein suggests a couple of changes, drawing on basketball and hockey for inspiration:

  • First, he says goals scored in the run of play be granted two points, like a basketball shot, while penalty kicks remain worth a single point.
  • Second, yellow card and red card infractions should be penalized with time in a hockey-like penalty box.

With soccer the most popular sport in the world, it isn’t immediately obvious that it is in need of reform. Why tamper with all that success?  Yet, Epstein has some good points.  Sometimes a minor foul in the 18-yard box results in a game-winning penalty kick, while a much more serious foul just outside the box leads to a mere free kick.  A red card near the beginning of a match is a much harsher penalty than a red card near the end of the match.

One argument for reform is fairness-based: penalties should be proportionate to the foul committed.  A better line of argument (at least to my way of thinking) comes from market design thinking: what incentives do the rules create, and does the resulting behavior add to or detract from the game?  Consider a striker heading to goal and making slight contact with a defender in the 18-yard box: does the striker take a dive in hopes of gaining the all-but-certain penalty kick goal or shake it off and take a shot in the run of play?  Epstein’s rule change would offer an incentive to the striker to choose athleticism over a theatrical dive, surely an improvement.

Epstein’s proposals may not be the best, but they are worth exploring.  I join him in calling for experiments on the topic!  Let’s see if the rule changes would bring about desirable changes in performance.

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Automatic trading and market (in)stability

May 7, 2010

Michael Giberson

News and commentary on Thursday’s stock market moves.  First, Newsweek, “The Computer Glitch Felt Round the World.”  Now, Scott Patterson, WSJ, reports “Did Shutdowns Make the Plunge Worse?” (Business Insider comments, “Everyone is rushing to blame [High Frequency Trading (HFT)] and other non-human problems for the crash… when, at least in part, it may have been the cessation of HFT that exacerbated the plunge.)

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