Price gouging in a second language

Research on differences between decisions made in a person’s native tongue and decisions made in a second language reminded me of an unexplored idea in the social dynamics surrounding price gouging.

I’ve devoted a few posts to the question of whether or not price gouging laws get applied in a discriminatory fashion against “outsiders,” primarily thinking of immigrants or cultural minorities. My evidence is slim, mostly the casual reading of a handful of news stories, but consider these prior posts and possible examples from Mississippi, New Jersey, and West Virginia.

In the New Jersey article I speculated it was possible that “outsiders” were more likely to engage in price gouging behaviors, and observed, “Social distance between buyers and sellers can work both ways.”

Some support for my speculation comes through communication research by Boaz Keysar of the University of Chicago, who has documented the view, as the subtitle of an article in the journal Psychological Science puts it, “thinking in a foreign tongue reduces decision biases.” Part of the explanation Keysar and his coauthors offer is the “foreign language provides greater cognitive and emotional distance than a native tongue does.” (The work was mentioned in a recent Freakonomics podcast.) An immigrant hotelier or retailer may not connect as emotionally as a native does with laws expressed in the native’s language or with customers when transacting in that language. When exchange is seen as impersonal rather than personal, price-setters are less constrained in their pricing decisions.

Interestingly, Keysar is also coauthor on a study concluding that moral judgments are markedly more utilitarian when problems and responses are conducted in a second language. Economic analysis tends to support the view that “price gouging” in response to sudden shifts in demand is the correct utilitarian response (as flexible prices help goods and services move toward those who value them most).

New York Attorney General grapples to regulate new web-based businesses in old ways

The New York Attorney General (AG) had an op-ed in the New York Times presenting a curious mix of resistance to change, insistence on regulating new things in old way, acknowledgement that web-based businesses create some value and regulators can’t always enforce rules intelligently, and sprinkled now and again with the barely disguised threat that regulators will not be refused in their efforts to assert dominance over the upstarts. Actually, the threat is not even barely disguised:

Just because a company has an app instead of a storefront doesn’t mean consumer protection laws don’t apply. The cold shoulder that regulators like me get from self-proclaimed cyberlibertarians deprives us of powerful partners in protecting the public interest online. While this may shield companies in the short run, authorities will ultimately be forced to use the blunt tools of traditional law enforcement. Cooperation is a better path.

Ah, yes, the “blunt tools of traditional law enforcement.”

The two targets of the piece are room-sharing service Airbnb, with which the AG’s office has already clashed in court, and car-finder Uber, which the AG may or may not charge with price gouging for the company’s surge pricing policy.

Another example is Uber, a company valued at more than $3 billion that has revolutionized the old-fashioned act of standing in the street to hail a cab. Uber has been an agent for change in an industry that has long been controlled by small groups of taxi owners. The regulations and bureaucracies that protect these entrenched incumbents do not, by and large, serve the public interest.

But Uber may also have run afoul of New York State laws against price gouging, which do serve the public interest. In the last year, in bad weather, Uber charged New Yorkers as much as eight times the company’s base price. We are investigating whether this is prohibited by the same laws under which I’ve sued gas stations that gouged motorists during Hurricane Sandy. Uber makes some persuasive arguments for its pricing model, but the ability to pay truly exorbitant prices shouldn’t determine someone’s ability to get critical goods and services when they’re in short supply in an emergency. I’m hopeful that the company will collaborate with us to address the problem thoughtfully.

You know the Seinfeld/Uber story, right? Last December during heavy snows in Manhattan Jessica Seinfeld used Uber to get her children to Saturday evening social obligations and, due to the company’s surge pricing policy, was charged $415. Even though the app notifies you of the price up front, before you call a car, Ms. Seinfeld felt compelled to complain on Instagram with a picture of her $415 charge and the caption, “UBER charge, during a snowstorm (to drop one at Bar Mitzvah and one child at a sleepover.) #OMG #neverforget #neveragain #real”

Uber, the AG’s office is giving you time to think it over, so what will it be: thoughtful collaboration or the “the blunt tools of traditional law enforcement”?

But I’m not sure what kind of thoughtful collaboration with the AG’s office is going to help Uber get the children of the rich and famous through the snow to their social obligations in a timely fashion. We can cap the amount that the much, much poorer private car drivers of New York City can offer to drive the offspring of the rich and famous through the snow, but that probably will lead those much, much poorer private car drivers to head home instead, and force the rich and famous to send their doormen out into the streets to compete for access to the limited supplies of well-regulated taxis.

 

Price gouging-moral insights from economics

Dwight Lee in the current issue of Regulation magazine offers “The Two Moralities of Outlawing Price Gouging.” In the article Lee endorsed economists’ traditional arguments against laws prohibiting price gouging, but argued efficiency claims aren’t persuasive to most people as they fail to address the moral issues raised surrounding treatment of victims of disasters.

Lee wrote, “Economists’ best hope for making an effective case against anti-price-gouging laws requires considering two moralities—one intention-based, the other outcome-based—that work together to improve human behavior when each is applied within its proper sphere of human activity.”

Intention-based morality, that realm of neighbors-helping-neighbors and the outpouring of charitable donations from near and far, is good and useful and honorable, said Lee, who term this as “magnanimous morality.” Such morality works great in helping family and friends and, because of the close relationship, naturally has a good idea of just what help may be needed and when and where.

When large scale disasters overwhelm the limited capabilities of the friends and families of victims, large-scale charity kicks in. Charity is the extended version magnanimous morality, but it comes a knowledge problem: how does the charity identify who needs help, and what kind, and when, and where?

The second morality that Lee’s title referenced is the morality of “respecting the rights of others and abiding by general rules such as those necessary for impersonal market exchange.” This “mundane morality” of merely respecting rules does not strike most people as too compelling, Lee observed, but economists know how powerful a little self-interest and local knowledge can be in a world in which rights are respected. Indeed, the vast successes of the modern world–extreme poverty declining, billions fed well enough, life-expectancy and literacy rising, disease rates dropping–can be attributed primarily to the social cooperation enabled by local knowledge and voluntary interaction guided by prices and profits. The value of mundane morality after a disaster is that it puts this same vast power to work in aid of recovery.

The two moralities work together Lee said. Even as friends and families reach out in magnanimous morality, perhaps each making significant sacrifices to aid those in need, the price changes produced by mundane morality will engage millions of people more to make small adjustments similarly in aid. A gasoline price increase in New Jersey after Sandy’s flooding could trickle outward and lead gasoline consumers in Pittsburgh or Chicago to cut back consumption just a little so New Jerseyans could get a little more. Similarly for gallons of water or loaves of bread or flashlights or hundreds of other goods. Millions of people beyond the magnanimous responders get pulled into helping out, even if unknowingly.

Or they would have, had prices been free to adjust. New Jersey laws prohibit significant price increases after a disaster, and post-Sandy the state has persecuted merchants who it has judged as running afoul of the price gouging law.

Surely victims of a disaster appreciate the help that comes from people who care, but they just as surely appreciate the unintended bounty that comes from that system of voluntary social interaction guided by prices and profits called the market. Laws against post-disaster price increases obstruct the workings of mundane morality, increase the burden faced by the magnanimous, and reduce the flow of resources into disaster-struck regions.

Perhaps you think that government can fill the gap? Lee noted that restricting the workings of mundane morality increases the importance of political influence and social connections, but adds the shift is unlikely to benefit the poor. On this point a few New Jersey anecdotes may inform. See these stories on public assistance in the state:

We often honor the magnanimous, but we need not honor the mundane morality-inspired benefactors of disaster victims.  While the mundanely-moral millions may provide more help in the aggregate than the magnanimous few, the millions didn’t sacrifice intentionally. They just did the locally sensible thing given their local knowledge and normal self-awareness; doing the locally sensible thing is its own reward.

We need not honor the mundanely moral, but we also ought not block them from helping.

Discrimination in West Virginia price gouging case?

Are West Virginia “outsiders” more likely to be accused of price gouging?

From the March 8, 2014, Charleston Gazette, “Morrisey accused of discrimination in price gouging response“:

CHARLESTON, W.Va. –A Putnam County storeowner accused of price gouging bottled water during the water crisis says Attorney General Patrick Morrisey discriminated against him because he is Lebanese, questioned him unethically and illegally leaked the charge to the media before informing him of it.

On Feb. 14, Morrisey filed suit in Putnam Circuit Court alleging that Achraf Assi’s convenience stores, Hurricane-based Mid Valley Mart LLC, unfairly raised the price of Tyler Mountain Spring Water from $1.59 a gallon to $3.39 a gallon the day after the Jan. 9 chemical leak that contaminated the region’s drinking water.

Morrisey alleged that Assi, who owns the two stores that allegedly sold water at inflated prices, kept the prices higher for a week following the chemical leak.

In this news report the West Virginia Attorney General refers to alleged price gougers as “bad apples.”

The attorney general’s office reported over 150 calls concerning prices during the water emergency and documented 74 cases of increased prices on water and other goods. As of late February, the AG’s office reported issuing six subpoenas and 15 cease and desist letters. Only one price gouging case has been filed subsequent to the water emergency.

So far as I am aware, this is the first time I’ve seen claimed that price gouging laws have been implemented in a discriminatory fashion.

In 2012 I suggested the possibility that price gouging laws could be applied in discriminatory fashion (here and here). In brief, my claim was (1) the laws typically grant some discretion to the state, and any discretion exercised was unlikely to favor “outsider” groups; and (2) enforcement is almost always triggered by consumer complaint and so gives any consumer bias a role in anti-price gouging law enforcement. I’ve also speculated that “outsider” merchants may be more likely to raise prices in response to emergencies, but know of no research on that possibility.

One year after Superstorm Sandy: Charities, price gougers and the state

Popular Mechanics magazine headlined an article with the question, “One year after Superstorm Sandy, has anything changed?

Well, sure: over the last year the state governments in New York and New Jersey have put a lot of time and money into punishing a few businesses that provided shelter and gasoline to people whose lives were disrupted by the storm. Why, you ask? Because the prices offered by these businesses after the storm hit were somewhat higher than the prices offered by the businesses before the storm hit.

One example, a Holiday Inn Express in Brooklyn recently agreed to pay a total of $40,000 to settle a complaint, part of it to customers and part to the state, because the state concluded the $400+/night rate charged to the customers was too much higher than the $170/night rate charged the week earlier.

As is perhaps obvious, government prosecution of post-emergency price-raising retailers will produce real world consequences. The question for economists is whether on balance the costs of the policies are worth the benefit secured. So far as I know there is no study that tries to answer this question in a comprehensive manner. (Best effort so far: here.)

In related news, the New York Attorney General’s office has reached an agreement with four charities that had collected money to help Sandy victims but not yet spent all of the funds. Under the agreement the four groups committed to a time table for spending most of the remaining funds.

Charities and for-profit enterprises both have provided many useful goods and services to people whose lives were disrupted by Sandy. If the soft price cap imposed by price gouging restrictions reduces for-profit supply responses during emergencies, then the restrictions add to the hardships that charities seek to address (and perhaps also to public demands that government do something, even something foolish).

At Bleeding Heart Libertarians, Matt Zwolinski continues to explore price gouging issues in a couple of recent posts. In “Price gouging and the poor” he takes on the common claim that state laws against price gouging are particularly valuable for protecting poor persons. In “World Cup ‘price gouging’?” he examines the Brazilian government’s declaration it will monitor hotel room prices for the upcoming 2014 World Cup competition and act to prevent abuses. Given that most people willing and able to travel internationally to attend World Cup matches in Brazil next year are far from poor, the two posts make a nice pair. (Related is my February 2012 post “Super Bowl price gouging complaints.”)

Anti-price gouging laws can increase economic welfare

An article by Robert Fleck of Clemson, forthcoming in the International Review of Law and Economics, presented a theoretical case that price gouging restrictions can be value-enhancing under certain conditions. I was skeptical, but Fleck is careful in building his case.

The key qualifier above is under certain conditions. In “Can Prohibitions on ‘Price Gouging’ Reduce Deadweight Losses?” Fleck agreed it is obvious price caps can cause shortages, and price caps designed to apply specifically during emergencies can create shortages at times during which shortages are especially harmful to consumers

But he found a special case for which such laws may be on net beneficial, namely: when consumption of the good creates external benefits, and the price gouging limits are foreseen to create shortages under unpredictable high demand conditions, and production is fixed in the short run, and resale of the good among consumers is impossible, then the policy can induce consumers to buy larger amounts of the external-benefit generating good.

His primary illustration was flu vaccinations, for which production is completed before the flu season type is revealed to be either “high demand” (flu epidemic) or “low demand” (normal). In the absence of shortage-inducing price limits, consumers wait for realization of the flu season type before deciding whether to get a flu shot. Given a price gouging-based price cap and resulting predictable shortage, Fleck explained, more consumers buy a vaccine production prior to the flu season (i.e. before revelation of the flu season type). Because by assumption consumption of the good has external benefits, inducing greater consumption can create net increases in overall economic value.

Fleck clearly stated that his result doesn’t generalize to all price gouging restrictions. While he suggested a few light stories of the potential external benefits associated with drinking water, gasoline, home electrical generators, and chain saws, he didn’t play these alternatives up. (For good reason, too. Unlike flu vaccinations “consumed” at point of retail purchase, these other consumer goods are readily resold. A resale market undermines consumer incentives to purchase the good before the demand type is known and so does not lead to an increase in overall consumption.)

He concluded by raising the possibility the widespread adoption by states of price gouging proscriptions might reflect growth of relatively efficient types of regulation at the expense of less efficient regulation, or perhaps the laws persist because they are not as costly as they otherwise may seen. On this point I remain skeptical.

As Fleck emphasized early in the paper, the model shows that price gouging limits may be on net beneficial, but it does not conclude they must be on net beneficial. In addition, even when the policy may be on net beneficial it will fail to maximize total benefit, and so in theory there are better policies. Finally, he said, the laws would have to be tailored to apply mostly under the restrictive conditions set out above. Price gouging restrictions under other conditions will reduce overall surplus. Fleck suggested (for Hayekian knowledge problem reasons) it was unlikely that policymakers would be so well informed as to be able to identify just which products and at which times the laws should apply.

Overall he has a unique and interesting theoretical case built with traditional microeconomic tools. Other attempts at providing an analytic foundation for price gouging laws are ad hoc and unpersuasive (comments on Rotemberg here, comments on Rapp here and here). But despite Fleck’s offering an efficiency-based justification for price gouging limits, the relatively strict conditions for his theoretical case make the model an unlikely base of support for any existing price gouging policy.

Colorado merchants have pricing freedom

Flooding in Colorado has caused damage across nearly 2,000 square miles of the state. While many businesses are chipping in to help people affected, some people are concerned that lack of a state anti-price gouging law leaves consumers exposed to unjust price increases.

A Denver Post story begins:

Flood-ravaged Colorado is one of only 15 states where price-gouging during an emergency is not illegal — it’s merely capitalism.

To some it might be socially reprehensible and ethically wrong, but legally there’s nothing to prevent a businessperson from upping the cost of necessary post-disaster supplies to meet the pressing needs of those affected by the event.

“The price of a product or service alone is not a scam if it’s fully disclosed,” Colorado Assistant Attorney General Jan Zavislan said. “If the consumer has the information and has the right to shop around, but the sources in an emergency aren’t there, it might be an outrage to people, but there’s no specific law on the price itself.”

As communities begin the process of cleaning up from the floods and taking an inventory of insurance coverage — if any — more immediate needs of food, water, fuel and shelter can be met with surprise over their cost.

As long as a merchant is clear on the price — even if it’s 10 times the rate it had been before the disaster — then there’s no law broken.

The article doesn’t actually cite examples of price gouging in Colorado, just notes that nothing in state law would prevent it. (Another story online said a Longmont, CO resident reported that a septic company nearly doubled it rates after the flood, but that’s it so far as I can find.)

The article explains that a bill to prohibit price gouging in Colorado was vetoed in 2006 by then-Gov. Bill Owens. Owens said, “[the bill] violates the fundamental principles of our market-based economy.”

NOTES: The Denver Post article states Colorado does have an anti-price gouging law solely for needed drugs, the price of which cannot rise more than 10 percent during a disaster declaration.

By the way, by my count 34 states have anti-price gouging laws and 16 states do not have such laws (see my list and the related graphic). The article claims 35 states with and 15 without. Maybe I need to update my list.