Posts Tagged ‘property rights’

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Schmidtz on the philosophy of property

April 27, 2012

Michael Giberson

At Bleeding Heart Libertarians, University of Arizona philosopher David Schmidtz discusses what a good concept of property does for society. He sums his view concisely at the end, reproduced below. Go read the rest of it for the background and support for these conclusions.

To summarize, in more concrete terms, when a system of property is working, it enables people to live good lives together by helping people to solve a cluster of key problems:

  1. It puts people in a position to produce.
  2. It puts producers in a position to trade.
  3. It fosters creative destruction by encouraging people to experiment, and to shut down experiments that are not working, and to acquire and transmit information about which experiments work and which do not.
  4. It limits externalities.  That is, it results in people having to pay the costs of their own experiments, and also in people being able to enjoy the benefits of their own experiments, thereby helping a society make progress. In most times and places, this will mean a mixed regime in which important bits of property are held by the public but in which the primary means of production are in private hands. That kind of mixed regime has been tested repeatedly in practice. Evidently, and for well-known reasons, it just works better.
  5. It limits transaction cost.  A system must enable producers to take steps to minimize the cost of getting their product to their customers. The roads must be good. Tariffs must not prevent them from dealing with foreign suppliers, and so on.
  6. It enables producers to grow their business, setting up production processes that exploit opportunities for productivity-increasing division of labor and economies of scale.

A system of good property law and good government does these six things, then stops.  Property rights don’t do everything for people, any more than do traffic lights, or plumbers, but this much they can do: they can structure people’s opportunities and incentives such that the most profitable thing people can do is to be as useful as possible to the people around them. The key to explosive economic growth is simple: Secure our possessions well enough to make it safe for us to be a part of the community. Put us in a situation where the key to personal prosperity is to devise ever more effective ways of making the people around us better off. That isn’t everything, but it is a lot.

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Applying Coase to wildlife preservation

April 3, 2012

Lynne Kiesling

I loved seeing pictures a couple of weeks ago of an endangered Bengal tiger and her cubs from a hidden camera. Large predator wildlife that roam and are territorial often face reductions in their territory when humans move in; in the Bengal tiger territory in India, both traditional farming and the construction of new vacation resorts increases the margin on which human uses of the land and tiger uses of the land conflict.

Note the way I said that: conflicting uses of a scarce resource, which for most resources we resolve peacefully and productively using property rights. But how do you do that when one use is territorial roaming and hunting by large predators? And how do you reconcile that with settled farming and tourism? This issue is the same as ranchers in Montana and Idaho faced with the reintroduction of the gray wolf, in a classic case in which Defenders of Wildlife members made voluntary contributions to compensate ranchers in the case of livestock killings.

This is an application of Coase’s framework for compensation for harms when there are conflicting uses of a resource — it recognizes wildlife territory as a valuable use of the resource, and compensates the other users for harms so that they don’t pursue the alternative of killing the wildlife.

I discussed one of my favorite examples of this in a class last quarter, as summarized in this NPR story: Namibia has instituted community ownership of wildlife, with village councils establishing “communal conservancies” and retaining the revenues associated with wildlife tourism … including wildlife hunting. Thus at the community level they earn revenues and have a pool for compensation in the case of livestock or crop damage. Both humans and wildlife are thriving and wildlife in Namibia are less prone to poaching, because the villages have property rights in the wildlife. They all prosper by cultivating wildlife in the way that we cultivate chickens.

The Wired article on the Bengal tiger case hints at a livestock compensation system funded by voluntary donations:

Although the tigers managed to kill a domestic cow, the WWF allegedly compensated the animal’s owner to prevent a retaliatory killing. While not an ideal arrangement, the organization asserts that the strategy works.

“The fact that the tigress survived and it was photographed later is an example of the cattle compensation scheme working when implemented in earnest,” the release stated.

The comparison of these cases suggests that perhaps the WWF should build on their cattle compensation strategy and act as an intermediary to work with the resorts in the Bengal forests to develop the potential for tiger tourism revenue at the resorts. If the resorts can profit from the free movement of tigers in their forest corridors, they are less likely to intrude on those corridors. Then farms and resorts and tigers can coexist and thrive.

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A Coasian look at pesticide and genetic drift

September 30, 2011

Michael Giberson

A few weeks back Lynne drew attention to an interesting property dispute between neighboring farmers in Minnesota, currently the subject of legal action (see news summary here, related court decision here). In brief, the issue is pesticide drift from conventionally farmed crops onto a neighboring organic farm, and whether the organic farm can sue the conventional farm for pesticide-drift trespassing. Appeals court says yes.

David Conner wrote about a very similar hypothetical case a few years back in “Pesticides and Genetic Drift: Alternative Property Rights Scenarios,” when considering a Coasian approach to resolving such issues:

Imagine the following hypothetical dispute between Cameron Conventional and Olivia Organic, two farmers with adjacent fields. Cam­eron is a cutting-edge, high-tech farmer, an early adopter of new technologies, making him a low­ cost producer of grains and legumes. “Back to the land” Olivia grows organic specialty orops for sale at a local farmers’ marker.

Someone tests an ear of Olivia’s sweet corn and determines that it is contaminated by pesticides and pollen from GE corn. Her upset consumers begin to boycott her. The belief that she is an organic producer is stripped away. She must now sell her produce conventionally at a much lower price. What are her options?

Conner then explores the case in “Coasian” fashion, considering various scenarios depending upon who would be the least-cost avoider of the conflict and who held what rights.

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On the obligations of income-earners and property-owners to pay taxes

September 29, 2011

Michael Giberson

Perhaps you’ve seen the video of Elizabeth Warren, hoping to be elected to the U.S. Senate from Massachusetts, in which she declaims that since roads and police and fire protection are funded through taxes, people have no real claim to their income or wealth against a government that wants to take it. After all, she says, without use of the roads or protection by the policy, people couldn’t earn income or hold onto their wealth. (By the way, I’m looking forward to part two where she explains the consequences for religious freedom entailed by the fact that church-goers drive to church on tax-funded roads.)

Some people like her way of thinking (see the comments here). But obviously her presentation will grate on the nerves of folks that believe governments are instituted to secure and protect rights rather than the wellspring of those rights in the first place.

There are a number of thoughtful (and probably many more less thoughtful) criticisms of Warren’s little speech. Perhaps the best considered response I’ve seen so far comes from Will Wilkinson at The Moral Sciences Club, “Tax and Justice: It is your money.”

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Coase, legal liability, and pesticide drift

August 5, 2011

Lynne Kiesling

A ruling last week from Minnesota’s Court of Appeals provides an interesting case study in using common law and legal liability (a la Coase) in an environmental case. As summarized in the St. Cloud Times, the issue at hand is pesticide drift — when pesticide spray on one field is carried over to another field by wind. In the case of an organic farm, such pesticide drift has a significant economic cost, because the organic farmer cannot sell the affected produce, and may even have to take affected acreage out of rotation for several years to clear the pesticide and retain the foundation of the organic attribution (usually defined by law).

Here’s a bit more about the fact pattern:

The Johnsons turned their farm into an organic one in the 1990s to take advantage of the higher prices organic crops and seeds bring at market. They posted signs noting that the farm was organic, created a buffer between their property and neighboring farms and asked the co-op to take precautions to avoid overspraying, according to the Court of Appeals opinion.

But the co-op violated state law four times from 1998-2008 by spraying chemicals that landed on the Johnson’s organic farm, the opinion said. The opinion said that the co-op was cited four times by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture for violating pesticide laws that make it illegal to “apply a pesticide resulting in damage to adjacent property.”

A 2002 overspray led to the Johnsons selling their crops at lower, nonorganic prices and taking the tainted field out of production for three years. In 2005, 2007 and 2008, the overspray led the Johnsons to destroy alfalfa and soybeans and plow under and take out of production for three years parts of their fields, according to the Court of Appeals opinion.

What’s interesting to me about this case is the Johnsons’ use of the common law — they filed a lawsuit claiming nuisance and trespass. The district court found against them, but this appeals ruling negates that and sends it back to the district court:

The Court of Appeals opinion Monday decided that what the co-op did could be considered a trespass because it met the two elements necessary — that the Johnsons had rightful possession of their fields and that the cooperative’s unlawful spraying of the pesticide, causing it to drift onto the Johnsons’ otherwise chemical-free fields, constitutes an unlawful entry.

Looks to me like an application of Coase to the pesticide drift question — clarifying who has legal liability for the consequences of actions when those actions affect others, use of the common law concept of nuisance — with the result that the pesticide sprayer is liable for the costs of the consequences.

In a case like this, with two adjoining plots of land, the identification of the actors and the actions is pretty straightforward, so it’s a textbook low transaction cost case. But what happens if, say, the organic farm is adjacent to three other farms, and the issue is not pesticide drift, but is rather GMO propagation drift? If all four farms plant corn, but three of them plant the same strain of drought-resistant GMO corn, some seed propagation across property boundaries is likely. How do you assign liability with multiple potential actors? Is there a way to avoid such a cost, and if so, who is likely to be the least-cost avoider? Or more interestingly, since the GMO corn is drought resistant, how do you net out the beneficial effects of the need for less irrigation against the cost of the corn not being able to be sold as GMO-free any more?

I think I may have just identified a new case study for my fall environmental class …

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Montana-Alberta transmission line developer wants eminent domain power to overcome landowner’s resistance

April 27, 2011

Michael Giberson

The Montana-Alberta Tie Line, a transmission project linking Alberta and Western U.S. power markets, has stalled over the resistance of one landowner, who has claimed the proposed line would cross wetlands and native American heritage sites on her land. MATL tried exercising eminent domain last July to take the easement it wants, but late last year a court ruled the private company does not have that authority. The court case has headed to the Montana Supreme Court. The state legislature has debated bills to clarify legal authority in such cases – one way or another – but it looks like they may take no action instead.

MATL offers a  map of the proposed line on its website. The property under dispute is described as east of Cut Bank, Montana (near the substation at the line’s midpoint).

Environmental groups and energy development interests in the state have tended to side with MATL. While this particular line may have modest effects on the ability of local grids to take wind power, these interests are looking forward to the next transmission line battle and want the ability to condemn the private property when they deem it necessary.

From the National Eminent Domain Blog:

Apparently, Montana Alberta Tie Line is seeking to have the Montana Supreme Court act as a legislature. There has been no delegation allowing the utility to condemn under the Montana Major Facility Siting Act. Despite this, MATL wants the Montana Supreme Court to find a delegation of authority to condemn even though no such permission exists under present Montana legislation.

Of course MATL disputes the claim of “no delegation,” see their opening brief filed at the Montana Supreme Court, linked below.

Links:

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Texas water rampage

March 4, 2011

Michael Giberson

Clarity in the law is usually deemed a virtue. Groundwater planning processes implemented in Texas a few years ago have led to a few legal fights and the legislature has taken up groundwater law to help clear up some of the confusion. The conflict has arisen when groundwater management districts issue landowners permits in quantities less that the landowner desired, and perhaps in quantities less than the landowner has rights to claim.

Maybe we’ll get some clarity someday, but for now we just have a fight. From the Texas Tribune, “Texas Debates Who Owns Its Water“:

It sounds simple: Who owns the groundwater in Texas? But this issue, like others in the hot-button area of aquifer planning, is embroiled in an ongoing policy battle.

At a crowded hearing earlier this week, members of the state Senate’s Committee on Natural Resources heard testimony on a bill introduced by Sen. Troy Fraser, R-Horseshoe Bay and the committee’s chairman, that would declare that landowners have a “vested ownership interest” in the water beneath their land. A less-discussed second bill, filed by Sen. Robert Duncan, R-Lubbock, recognizes both landowner rights and the “compelling public interest” of effective groundwater management.

Generally, surface property owners have long enjoyed the right to drill for water and pump as much as they want under a “rule of capture” regime. It is a regime that has worked fine for a long time, but population growth and extensive irrigation has put increasing demands on groundwater in the more arid parts of the state. Add to that existing conflict plans of some to develop their water rights to capture water for resale in amounts far in excess of historical uses.

“Texas Water Rampage” was the name of a failed Lubbock-area water park. Let’s hope that the current water fight in Austin has a happier ending.

 

 

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The struggle to protect property claims in virtual worlds

May 1, 2010

Michael Giberson

The Los Angeles Times has the story: “A real-world battle over virtual-property rights.”

Apparently virtual world developer/promoter/host Linden Labs has changed its terms of service for Second Life over time to diminish the central importance of user ownership of virtual property created within the Second Life service. The most recent user agreement reportedly dispenses with the idea of user property claims and asserts Linden Labs’ right to allow or revoke a user’s license to use the service at the company’s discretion.

I dabbled in Second Life a few years ago, but never quite had the right combination of graphics, computer power and internet speed to make it an enjoyable experience. Somewhere a small backup file may exist with my old Second Life avatar (which, now that I think about it, had skin about the same color of blue that James Cameron later chose for the Nav’i in the movie Avatar. Weird.). Hadn’t thought much about going back. But maybe it is worth the trip, just to see how the property rights debate is unfolding in virtual worlds.

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Allocating property rights to wind and solar resources

March 25, 2010

Michael Giberson

Troy Rule, a law professor at the University of Missouri, has a pair of articles applying Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral Model” to rights in wind resources and solar resources.  As Rule notes, the law remains unsettled on these resource issues, but the potential for conflict increases as these resources become more frequently exploited.  I like Rule’s article because it brings an explicitly “law and economics” focus to this question of property rights and resource development.  (Links follow below.)

The cathedral model was offered by Calabresi and Melamed in 1972 as a way of organizing legal thinking about property and liability issues in a unified manner.  As summarized by Rule in the wind rights article, using the common example of pollution, the model provides four possible rules for allocating rights between a potential upstream “polluter” and a downstream “victim”:

RULE ONE: The victims are entitled to be free from pollution and their entitlement is protected by a property rule (an injunction against the polluter);

RULE TWO: The victims are entitled to be free from pollution and their entitlement is protected by a liability rule (the victims can force the polluter to pay them compensatory damages);

RULE THREE: The polluter is entitled to pollute and its entitlement is protected by a property rule (the victims have no legal or equitable right to stop the pollution); and

RULE FOUR: The polluter is entitled to pollute and its entitlement is protected by a liability rule (the victims can purchase an injunction to stop the pollution by paying the polluter’s costs of stopping the pollution).

A particular contribution of the Cababresi and Melamed article was the explication of the “Rule Four” possibility, an option which had not been much noticed in legal practice or scholarship up to that point. In the case of Rule’s wind rights article and solar rights article, he argues that Rule Four is the way to go.  For example, a downwind landowner should have the right to, in effect, buy a “non interference” easement from the upwind landowner.

As a practical matter, existing markets are solving the problem without much specific law.  For the most part lenders won’t lend money for a wind turbine that isn’t protected by an adequate buffer to protect the “supply” of wind.  This buffer can be from property owned by the same landowner leasing land to the wind project or it can be an easement negotiated with a neighboring landowner.  Of course this sort of lending market discipline doesn’t impinge on self-funded projects, and may lead to two neighboring landowners devoting too much land to a buffer area when coordinated development could have allowed them to devote less to the buffer.  Rule’s rule is intended to clarify just where the boundaries of neighbors rights and responsibilities are.

Curiously, Rule’s analysis proceeds as if the designation of “upwind developer” and “downwind developer” were stable when actually such designations will literally shift with the changing of the wind (unlike, say, upstream and downstream along a river, since rivers rarely change direction). So far as I recall, Rule didn’t worry about this point. Yet, I think the dynamic element here only complicates the analysis for wind without fundamentally upsetting the principles being advocated.

LINKS:

Troy Rule, “A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights,” San Diego Law Review, (2009).

ABSTRACT: The rapid pace of U.S. wind energy development is generating a growing number of conflicts over competing wind rights. The “wake” of a commercial wind turbine creates turbulence and unsteady wind flow that can reduce the productivity of other wind turbines situated downwind. Existing law is unclear as to whether a landowner who installs a wind turbine on its property is liable for the lost productivity of a downwind neighbor’s turbine resulting from such wake effects. Legal uncertainty as to how competing wind rights are shared among neighbors can induce wind energy developers to abandon otherwise lucrative turbine sites situated near property lines, thus forfeiting valuable wind resources. This paper applies Calabresi and Melamed’s familiar “Cathedral” model to determine which rule regime would best promote the efficient allocation of competing wind rights while maintaining consistency with existing law. Surprisingly, the Cathedral model’s infamous and rarely-applied “Rule Four” seems best-suited for addressing these conflicts.

Troy Rule, “Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different Light,” University of Illinois Law Review, (2010).

ABSTRACT: Unprecedented growth in rooftop solar energy development is drawing increased attention to the issue of solar access. To operate effectively, solar panels require un-shaded access to the sun’s rays during peak sunlight hours. Some landowners are reluctant to invest in rooftop solar panels because they fear that a neighbor will erect a structure or grow a tree on nearby property that shades their panels. Existing statutory approaches to protecting solar access for such landowners vary widely across jurisdictions, and some approaches ignore the airspace rights of neighbors. Which rule regime for solar access protection best promotes the efficient allocation of scarce airspace, within the constraints of existing law? This Article applies Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral” framework of property rules and liability rules to compare and analyze existing solar access laws and to evaluate a model solar access statute recently drafted under funding from the US Department of Energy. Surprisingly, the Article concludes that a statute implementing the Cathedral model’s seldom-used “Rule Four” is best suited for addressing solar access conflicts.

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability. One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review, (1972).

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Endangered species for sale, for their own good and ours

July 21, 2009

Lynne Kiesling

At Aguanomics, David Zetland takes on a topic that I find greatly interesting and important — using private property rights to conserve endangered species, reduce poaching, and enable indigenous communities who live around such animals to thrive without species extinction as a consequence. In fact, one of my first-ever posts back in 2002 was about the Irbis Enterprises work with Mongolian herders and snow leopards. I also discussed property rights in tigers in a 2005 post and a 2006 post. Note that Irbis Enterprises is now part of the Snow Leopard Trust.

David observes

That’s why the Brazilian rainforest is disappearing — because government policy makes it easier to slash and burn and move on than to conserve the greenery.

The way to protect the rainforest, the whales, etc. is with stronger property rights, and individuals and companies (e.g., the Nature Conservancy) are set up to provide that protection. (To learn more about this kind of free market environmentalism, visit the Property and Environment Research Center.)

Note also that property rights are not just a binary yes-no either-or. Ownership implies a variety of rights (the frequent metaphor is that a property right is a bundle of sticks), and if you have defined, defensible, divisible, and alienable property rights, then you are more likely to get the beneficial outcomes David discusses.

For example, if you own a piece of property between my property and a lovely mountain range, if I value my view by enough, I can buy your development rights on your property. If that happens, then you and subsequent owners can build on the property, but not in a way that impedes my view. In that case the divisibility of your property rights means that you can profit from selling me a right that I value more than you do. [With thanks to Randy Simmons, from whom I've plagiarized this example.]

Think about what a boon this would be in the rainforest. Organizations like pharmaceutical companies and environmental nonprofits could own the land and the plants, water, and animals on it, and could exchange specific development rights that were contingent upon not destroying the assets. Think about the implications for another current tradeoff in land use in Brazil — rainforest vs. clear-cutting to plant soybeans for soy biodiesel. If the big ag companies had to pay to buy the rainforest, that would change the economics of soy biodiesel, not to mention the implications of rainforest owners being able to retain development rights and divide up the bundle of rights.

This divisibility is also how conservation easements work — a property owner sells (or gives, in the case of it being a charitable contribution) a piece of his/her bundle of rights.

The idea is pretty intuitive for land, watersheds, viewsheds, etc., but how about animals? To my mind, animals are more like water and less like land; animals move, and that means I think the characteristic of the property right in animals is the ability of the community to define and enforce use rights. That means treating the animal population as a common-pool resource and defining use rights (number allowed to kill per year, for example).

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