Posts Tagged ‘moral psychology’

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What do the Occupy Wall Streeters care about? Haidt on the moral foundations of OWS

October 21, 2011

Michael Giberson

At Reason.com, social psychologist Jonathon Haidt writes about the foundational moral concerns that animate the Zuccotti Park protestors.  Working from a Moral Foundations Theory* perspective, which Haidt and several others have developed, he said, “In my visit to Zuccotti Park, it was clear that the main moral foundation of OWS is fairness, followed by care and liberty. Loyalty, authority, and sanctity, by contrast, are very little in evidence.”

The Occupy Wall Street protests and its progeny are famously leaderless and consensus based, meaning the exact meaning of the movement remains a bit hazy. Politicians left, right and libertarian have stepped into the resulting void to explain what it all means (usually the explanation is that the politician has been right in his views all along, and the explanation seems to serve left, right and libertarian politicians whether the politician is speaking in support of or in opposition OWS).

Haidt attempts a somewhat less self-interested attempt at understanding the basic moral feelings that are motivating participants in the protests. I remark on it here mostly as a complement to Lynne’s thoughts collected here: “A political economy model for Occupy Wall Street.”

*Haidt explains Moral Foundation Theory as, “outlin[ing] six clusters of moral concerns—care/harm, fairness/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation—upon which … all political cultures and movements base their moral appeals.” More information is at www.MoralFoundations.org.

 

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Haidt on political bias among social psychologists

February 9, 2011

Michael Giberson

Several days ago we discussed Jonathan Haidt’s research on libertarianism (see post). In his New York Times column, John Tierney discusses Haidt’s work on political bias among social psychologists:

Some of the world’s pre-eminent experts on bias discovered an unexpected form of it at their annual meeting. …

It was identified by Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist at the University of Virginia who studies the intuitive foundations of morality and ideology. He polled his audience at the San Antonio Convention Center, starting by asking how many considered themselves politically liberal. A sea of hands appeared, and Dr. Haidt estimated that liberals made up 80 percent of the 1,000 psychologists in the ballroom. When he asked for centrists and libertarians, he spotted fewer than three dozen hands. And then, when he asked for conservatives, he counted a grand total of three.

“This is a statistically impossible lack of diversity,” Dr. Haidt concluded, noting polls showing that 40 percent of Americans are conservative and 20 percent are liberal. In his speech and in an interview, Dr. Haidt argued that social psychologists are a “tribal-moral community” united by “sacred values” that hinder research and damage their credibility — and blind them to the hostile climate they’ve created for non-liberals.

“Anywhere in the world that social psychologists see women or minorities underrepresented by a factor of two or three, our minds jump to discrimination as the explanation,” said Dr. Haidt, who called himself a longtime liberal turned centrist. “But when we find out that conservatives are underrepresented among us by a factor of more than 100, suddenly everyone finds it quite easy to generate alternate explanations.”

(Links in source.)

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When emergencies force taboo tradeoffs

October 18, 2010

Michael Giberson

Robin Hanson observes that prospects are not promising for health-case cost containment, in part due to a normal reluctance to give up on sacred values in exchange for money.  I wonder if this same psychological factor is activated in emergency conditions which present opportunities to trade the sacred for cash, and if it is how it complicates recovery efforts.

Hanson quoted a few lines from Scientific American, “The Psychology of the Taboo Trade-Off“; here is the full paragraph:

What truly distinguishes sacred values from secular ones is how people behave when asked to compromise them. When people are asked to trade their sacred values for values considered to be secular—what psychologist Philip Tetlock refers to as a “taboo tradeoff”—they exhibit moral outrage, express anger and disgust, become increasingly inflexible in negotiations, and display an insensitivity to a strict cost-benefit analysis of the exchange. What’s more, when people receive monetary offers for relinquishing a sacred value, they display a particularly striking irrationality. Not only are people unwilling to compromise sacred values for money—contrary to classic economic theory’s assumption that financial incentives motivate behavior—but the inclusion of money in an offer produces a backfire effect such that people become even less likely to give up their sacred values compared to when an offer does not include money. People consider trading sacred values for money so morally reprehensible that they recoil at such proposals.

I further wonder if the outrage that is sometimes expressed with respect to price gouging is related. Not all price gouging episodes are so threatening as to demand a trade off of sacred values for money, but possibly the emotional responses are related.

In the price gouging case, paying a few extra dollars for a hotel room during a hurricane evacuation may not force a family to – say – have to toss out a boxful of old family photos, so there isn’t an explicit “money for your sacred values” demand being made. But facing price increases during an emergency may force a consumer to contemplate transactions that require thinking across normally separate ethical domains.

As Alan Fiske and Philip Tetlock explain in their article “Taboo Tradeoffs: Constitutive Prerequisites for Political and Social Life,” when someone seems to apply a inappropriate social model – say a merchant treating a consumer’s demand for emergency goods and services as an ordinary economic situation – the person is seen as suspect and morally dangerous. The merchant in this example reveals that he is not “one of us,” that is to say, not part of the community which is drawing together in response to the emergency.

More work would have to be done to explore whether these emotional reactions are closely related or not, but maybe it would explain the sometimes excessive moral outrage that some people express in response to allegations of price gouging. To the economist it may just look like a consumer had to pay a few extra bucks to fill up his automobile with gasoline, but to the consumer the transaction confronts him with the strong feeling that the merchant he has been doing business with for years just doesn’t care about his family’s needs during the emergency, and, in fact, that the merchant doesn’t share similar moral values, can’t be trusted when it really matters and really isn’t part of the local community.

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Price gouging, ethics, markets, and the corrupting influence of Econ 101

September 13, 2010

Michael Giberson

Last I checked, James Kwak had 147 comments on his blog post on price gouging and the corrupting influence of Econ 101. Other bloggers have jumped into the fray: Adam Ozimek at Modeled Behavior, the Undergraduate at Observations of a Naive Undergraduate, and David Beckworth at Macro and Other Market Musings.  Quite a firestorm of activity.

Kwak ignited this firestorm with commentary on Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler‘s classic question of the fairness of a snow shovel price increase the day after a snowstorm:

Today in class, the professor posed the first question from the paper:

“A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snowstorm, the store raises the price to $20.”

In 1986, 82 percent of respondents thought this was unfair. In class, it was about 50-50.

As the professor said, this is probably because there are a lot of business school students in this class. Business school students are classic Econ 101 robots.

What follows, in the post and in the comments and the other blog responses, is a delightful jumble of conversations over morality and markets (and rich people vs. poor people and WWJD and shortages of organs for transplants and sudden needs for vaccines and free market ideology and zero-sum games and more, more, more).

Most of the analytical problems in the post and in the comments comes from assuming a fixed supply of snow shovels and a zero sum game, as if the hardware store (vaccine producers, organ donors and transplant facilities, etc.) had no past and no future.  Also, the moral analysis provided is lacking in subtlety.

So here is your test question:

Consider two hardware stores: one prices snow shovels at $15 when there is no snow and at $20 when there is snow; the other maintains a fixed price for snow shovels under both no-snow and snow conditions. In equilibrium, the second store will carry a smaller inventory than the first and offer it a price between $15 and $20. Which pricing policy is more moral?

(Yes, the problem is underspecified – so make any necessary assumptions about frequency of snowstorms, the distribution of income, desperately ill children, number of infirm widows living in the area, the costs of carrying inventory, etc. – that are relevant to your moral analysis and then get on with it. List your assumptions in your answer. Does it matter if the second store’s pricing policy is due to the owner’s preferences, due to the owner’s concern over patron reactions, or due to state law? Does it matter if the fixed price is closer to $15.01 or closer to $19.99? What if the fixed price were $25? Please note: your answer will fail to satisfy if it fails to address Zwolinski’s non-worseness analysis.)

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Repugnance, outrage, and other moral excuses

December 11, 2009

Michael Giberson

Bryan Caplan, in How Wise is Repugnance?,  questions Leon Kass’s argument that “repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom.” (From Kass’s essay, “The Wisdom of Repugnance.”)

Kass runs through a list of things that he thinks the reader will accept as obviously repugnant (incest, bestiality, mutilating corpses, cannibalism, and so on) and wants to use the reader’s reaction to establish the principle that repugnance is a good guide to morality.  For Kass it seems a short step to assert the cloning and cloning-like activities are also repugnant, and having concluded that repugnance is a good guide to morality, he offers that cloning must be immoral.

Caplan identifies a hedging statement made by Kass which, if considered at all, serves to unravel the Kass position: “Revulsion is not an argument; and some of yesterday’s repugnances are today calmly accepted — though, one must add, not always for the better.”

Caplan writes:

It’s quite an admission.  Even if his last clause is dramatic understatement, Kass still acknowledges that calm acceptance of yesterday’s repugnances is sometimes for the better.  And on reflection, that list is very long: vaccination, girls, dissection, religious toleration, kissing, C-sections, inter-racial marriage, paying for parking, colonoscopies, amputation of gangrenous tissue (double yuck), sex, Indian food, male nurses…  Some of these continue to disgust me – I feel faint if I even look at a syringe.  Still, if I think I need a shot, I try to calm down and do what I think - not feel – is the right thing.

My point is not that repugnance is less than 100% reliable.  100% reliability is a silly standard.  My point is that repugnance is habitually unreliable.

The Kass rhetorical approach reminded me of Michael Sandel’s argument in the opening chapter of his book Justice.  Sandel wants to pick out particular emotional responses and privilege them as of moral significance, but he doesn’t explain why some emotional responses point to “a moral argument worth taking seriously” (in his example: outrage at price gougers), while other emotional responses don’t (like anger at a referee that missed a call during your child’s soccer match).

In effect, for Kass and for Sandel, they want to let emotions be a guide to morality.  Realizing, of course, that not every feeling of repugnance or outrage is worthy of moral endorsement, they are left with no more than a claim that at least their own emotions are reliable in this regard.

As I said earlier in a comment on Sandel’s point, “the list of things causing outrage is long and various: alphabetically – alcohol, bigamy, cannibalism, … , same sex marriage, taxation, usury, vivisection, X-rated movies, Yankee imperialists, and zone pricing. In each case I suspect a moral sentiment is involved, at least for the outraged persons, but we need not rush to the conclusion that society should affirm the associated (claim of) civic virtue.”

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Unfair prices and moral progress

October 29, 2009

Michael Giberson

Unfair Prices

Daniel Little, at Understanding Society, asks about “Fair Prices?“  In exploring the topic he draws some upon E.P. Thompson’s studies of the English working class:

E. P. Thompson’s work on early modern Britain reminds us that there was a “moral economy of the crowd” that profoundly challenged the legitimacy of the market; that these popular moral ideas specifically and deeply challenged the idea of market-defined prices for life’s necessities; and that the crowd demanded “fair prices” for food and housing (Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture). The moral economy of the crowd focused on the poor — it assumed a minimum standard of living and demanded that the millers, merchants, and officials respect this standard by charging prices the poor could afford. And the rioting that took place in Poland in 1988 over meat prices or rice riots in Indonesia in 2008 are reminders that this kind of moral reasoning isn’t merely part of a pre-modern sensibility.

This kind of fairness reasoning addresses only outcomes.  But in the case of $4/gallon gasoline last year in the United States, he found other kinds of moral reasoning involved:

And what about that other necessity of life — gasoline? Public complaints about $4/gallon gas were certainly loud a year ago. But they seem to have been grounded in something different — the suspicion that the oil companies were manipulating prices and taking predatory profits — rather than an assumption of a fair price determined by the needs of the poor.

Reasoning about unfair prices

Sarah Maxwell sums up a great deal of work from marketing, psychology, and economics about fairness in pricing in her book The Price is Wrong.  Generally speaking, she observes that when people are faced with a price that violates expectations in a way disadvantageous to them (a consumer faced with an unexpectedly high price, a producer faced with an unexpectedly low price), they feel distress which motivates inquiry into the reasons for the unexpected price.

In Maxwell’s telling, this inquiry leads to evaluation of the social fairness of the price, first to consider the fairness of the outcome and if that isn’t satisfying then to consider the process which lead to the outcome.  This two-step process then considers issues of distributional fairness then procedural fairness.

Returning to Little’s comments, the first quoted cases seem directed at distributional issues, while the gasoline example draws attention to procedural issues.  That is to say, gasoline consumers confronted with $4 gasoline reacted by suspecting that somehow someone cheated – violated fair procedures – and that the cheating resulted in an unfair price.  Little mentions oil companies as targets of suspicion but speculators and other investors also got prominent mention at the time.

Little observes that contemporary Americans seem willing to accept a relatively broad range of prices and wages despite the varying distributional outcomes.  For many Americans, for example, so long as wages seem somewhat connected to market-based reasoning – for example, what companies need to pay to attract top talent – then the wage is at least tolerated even when very high.

[Admittedly the compilation of evidence is not systematic, and bears examination, but it comports with my prior beliefs.  I'd welcome pointers to systematic inquiry on this topic.]

Moral Progress?

So, and here I know I’m trampling over a host of problematic issues that ought to be examined carefully, I wonder whether this recourse to procedural rather than distributive reasoning in reaction to distressing prices is evidence of moral progress.

I realize the concept of moral progress itself is problematic.  For my own thinking on the issue, I find Jesse Prinz’s discussion of the concept in his book The Emotional Construction of Morals to be reasonably satisfying.  To quote just one line out of his final chapter (Ch. 8, “Moral Progress”), “We can assess moral systems by asking how well they are suited to providing lives that we would find desirable.”  (p. 299)  This isn’t a knock-down argument in favor of  the idea of moral progress, just one line out of a chapter summing up a book-length examination of morality.  The point is only that moral beliefs can by examined and judged, determined to be better or worse, and therefore moral progress can be assessed.

My question, then, is this: “Does recourse to procedural rather than distributional reasoning when confronted by distressing prices signal moral progress?”

(HT to Mark Thoma for the link to Little.)

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Price gouging and the “dark side of cooperation”

September 17, 2009

Michael Giberson

At Overcoming Bias, Robin Hanson points out that the human instinct for cooperation has good and bad consequences.  A handful of recent articles in reaction to Frans de Waal’s new book, The Age of Empathy, and other writing on cooperation have treated it as a good thing, as a helpful counterweight to human instincts to act selfishly.  Hanson extends that perspective to point out that instinctive cooperation has a dark side, too.

His primary example refers to price gouging:

[I]n big disasters like hurricanes, certain goods like gas, wood, water, or food become especially valuable.  While natural selfish reactions lead to higher prices for these key items, humans clearly evolved to see this behavior as uncooperative; we resist such price rises, and want to punish those who allow them.

Perhaps this made sense for our distant ancestors, but today it is counter-productive.  If these goods are not allocated by price, they will instead be allocated by standing in lines, personal connections, etc., processes that are consistently worse at giving goods to those who value them the most, and do worse at creating incentives to prepare for such scenarios.

He continues with some speculation on why economists and others who point out the benefits of post-disaster price increases are met with scorn:

But even when some of us realize that disaster price rises are actually cooperative behavior, pro-”cooperation” instincts get in the way of acting on this insight.  If others mistakenly intuit that we are suggesting acts they consider uncooperative, they will punish us for such suggestions.  They will similarly punish us if their usual conformity rumor mill, not exactly designed for subtle analysis, tells them our suggestions are uncooperative….

The problem is that evolved cooperation instincts reward supporting behavior that most people feel is cooperative, and not what is actually cooperative.  In novel situations, where our ancient instincts and simple rumor mills are poor guides, ordinary folks can be quite mistaken about which actions help vs. hurt everyone.

This last part bears emphasis so I’ll repeat: “evolved cooperation instincts reward supporting behavior that most people feel is cooperative, and not what is actually cooperative.  In novel situations, where our ancient instincts and simple rumor mills are poor guides, ordinary folks can be quite mistaken about which actions help vs. hurt everyone.”

NOTE: Previous discussions of price gouging on Knowledge Problem.

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