Posts Tagged ‘market design’

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I nominate “computational economic systems design”

March 22, 2010

Michael Giberson

At his Oddhead Blog, Yahoo! researcher David Pennock reports several links of interest for folks working at the intersection of the fields of economics and computer science and then asks what this subfield should be called.  He finds several terms in use for projects or at conferences: Algorithmic Economics, Market Algorithms, Electronic Commerce, Economics and Computation, Algorithmic Game Theory, and adds “A fun suggestion is Economatics (or Autonomics), meant to invoke a mashup of economics and automation.”

I suggest “computational economic systems design” as an accurate description, even if a bit awkward even by geek science standards, putting the intersection of computer science and economics Pennock is concerned with within the slightly broader subfield of computational economics.

Pennock notes, “the phrase Computational Economics makes sense but is already in use by a different field.” (Link in source)  In a long comment posted in response to Pennock’s related Facebook note, Duke University computer scientist Vincent Conitzer argues for using a wide definition for Computational Economics and finding room within that definition for this intersection.  Conitzer said in part:

As [Pennock] pointed out, the main downside of “computational economics” is that other people have already started using this phrase. But note that they (comp-econ.org) seem to (correctly, IMO) have a very wide interpretation of this phrase, including topics in finance, macroeconomics, and econometrics — but also things like “computational tools for the design of automated Internet markets.” I think it doesn’t make any sense at all to say that the computer scientists working on economics are not part of computational economics! I think we should politely claim our rightful place under the phrase “computational economics,” and the other community may not mind at all — but perhaps we should engage this other community more, and also think more about whether we can in fact make ourselves useful in topics in macro, econometrics, etc. Actually, this may be more important than our struggles with finding a name.

For me at a personal level, when I came to Duke, there was already a strong sense that I would be working in “computational economics,” doubtlessly encouraged by the fact that we have a strong computational biology presence and the parallel is natural (and now we also have a computational economics minor). I went along with that vision (which I think is a good one), though I have tried to make it clear that I work on computational MICROeconomics — I don’t do any macro or econometrics — and I think this mitigates the issue of a conflict with the existing comp econ people.

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Market design for liberty!

March 4, 2010

Michael Giberson

At ThinkMarkets, Roger Koppl urges supporters of liberty to get into market design.  In effect Koppl says: it isn’t especially useful to oppose the growth of government and hold high the beacon of freedom and prosperity, if there is no way to get from here to there.  What is useful is finding a way to bridge the gap.

I’m a fan of this way of thinking. One reason I advocate “restructuring” the electric power industry instead of “deregulation,” is that I think that restructuring is the faster way of achieving the good things that can come from the decentralization of valuation and control (i.e., increased liberty) in electric power markets.

Koppl is too modest when he mentions his own work: (“My work on improving forensic science in the criminal justice system is an example outside the usual context of ‘deregulation.’ See here and here.“)  His work on the flaws inherent in government monopolization of forensic data collection and analysis is original and important.

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Are carbon credit markets inherently prone to fraud and manipulation?

February 11, 2010

Michael Giberson

The headlines about fraud in Europe’s carbon credit trading system (2010: “Fraud Besets E.U. Carbon Trade System,” 2009: “Europol: $7.4 Billion Lost from Carbon Trading Fraud in Europe“) seem to confirm what some critics of carbon credit trading have been saying all along (2007: “Carbon Trading Open Invitation To Fraud,” 2007: “The greenhouse gas emission trading scam“).  Are these news stories proof that the critics are right? Are carbon credit markets inherently susceptible to fraud?

Victor Flatt, at Flatt Out Environment, says no, these stories are just show the growing pains associated with a new market.

The fraud perpetrated on the EU exchange was basic garden variety thievery.  Criminals got access to an asset (carbon credits) and stole them. This could (and has) happened with many assets, and is a risk of electronic records and trading. … The one way that this can be attributed as uniquely related to the carbon market is that the entire trading system is new, and new systems present more opportunities for thievery, rent-seeking, and fraud. It seems clear that the security protocols on some of the EU country registries were not sufficiently strong or that market participants were not educated enough about the protocols of the exchanges to protect their security information from “phishing.” Luckily, the amounts in play were relatively small, they were quickly discovered, and this will provide lessons for future security upgrades.

So far the RGGI trading in carbon credit appears to be fraud free.  At least my searching through news reports and the market monitor’s statements doesn’t turn up any fraud complaints.

Market manipulation can be achieved without fraud, and whether or not the European market is susceptible to manipulation is not revealed by the above complaints.  Again, so far at least, the RGGI markets have not shown evidence of market manipulation.  (The RGGI design team did go to some lengths to design a market that would be difficult to manipulate.)

Of course, since these trading markets are essentially created by legislative action, they could be revised by legislative action.  The temptation to jump in and “fix” the market will rise any time enough legislators think that the prevailing carbon credit price is too high or too low.  Existing pollution credit trading programs in the U.S. have escaped such meddling mostly by being too small to be of much interest.  Also, they seemed to work so well that few people wanted to mess with them.  Carbon credit trading won’t be “too small to be of much interest,” so its best protection from after-the-fact legislative meddling will be to work so well than few people will want to mess with it.

That and, of course, continuing public support for the underlying science of climate change that is motivating efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions in the first place.

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Market design at Harvard

November 23, 2009

Michael Giberson

Al Roth surveys development of the market design course and field of study in economics at Harvard:

[M]arket design is an eclectic field, drawing on game theory, experiments, computation, and field observation of all sorts (rules are data!).”

… When Paul Milgrom and I began the class (when he spent a year at Harvard in 2001), he had the FCC spectrum auction experience under his belt, and I had the redesign of the National Resident Matching Program under mine, and we had plenty of ideas.

I entertained a faint worry that, at the end of the decade, those might still be the only major applications we had to talk about. But, as things turned out, we can no longer fit all the newly implemented market designs into one course (and Susan Athey will again teach a second semester of Market Design, focused on many recent auction applications, in the Spring). Among the designs we talked about this semester are other health care labor markets, Kidney Exchange, School choice mechanisms, signaling for new economists, internet ad auctions, and more.

I’ve also been gratified by developments in market design as a field of study. Not only have there been successful applications, there’s starting to be an academic literature focused on practical market design, and the theoretical and empirical questions it raises.  [Links in source.]

And speaking of “rules as data,” in the prior post Roth notes that rules governing assignment of kidneys from deceased donors may be changing. (See related story from the Arizona Republic.)  In the comments I asked, “Why not favor patients with an unmatched donor, and so use deceased donor kidneys to trigger a exchange chain?” — seemed to make a lot of sense to me — and Roth explained both why it is complicated and a few cases in which something like it has already been done.

 

 

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More post-season tournament design issues: MLS tiebreakers

October 27, 2009

Michael Giberson

For DC United fans, the MLS season is over.  While some fans contemplate coaching and roster changes, a few of us are still scratching our heads about the MLS tiebreaker rules and the complications presented by the final weekend of play (which had five teams angling for two remaining post-season positions. See here for an attempt to list them all, and an updated list.  See here for commentary.  Here a fan calls upon MLS to “stop the madness.”)

The combination of outcomes over the weekend put one of the five teams (New England, which improbably won its game) clearly over the others and one (Dallas, which lost its game) out of the running.  Three (Colorado, DC United, and Real Salt Lake) were tied for the final position and the tie breaker favored Real Salt Lake, which advanced to post-season play.

However, had New England lost, the situation gets interesting.  In this case, the tie breaking rules among Colorado, DC, and RSL would send Colorado and RSL into the playoffs.  However, if Dallas would have tied rather than lost its match, the tie breaking rules among Colorado, Dallas, DC, and RSL would have sent DC and RSL into the playoffs.

This interactive effect seems (at least to me) to violate an intuition about how these sorts of things should work.  Either DC was a better team than Colorado over the season or it was not, and whether Dallas won or lost against some another team in their final match should have little bearing on whether or not DC was better than Colorado during the season.

The intuition I’m talking about has been formalized in economic theory as the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) principle. Formally:

If A is preferred to B out of the choice set {A,B}, then introducing a third alternative X, thus expanding the choice set to {A,B,X}, must not make B preferable to A.*

In this case: If Colorado is preferred to DC out of the set {Colorado, DC, RSL}, then introducing a fourth alternative Dallas, thus expanding the set to {Colorado, Dallas, DC, RSL}, should not make DC preferable to Colorado.  But the rules would have worked in just this way, had New England lost its final match.

Can this problem be fixed?  Why not the way that the professionals in Europe do it: first recourse in the event of a tie is to goal differential over the full season, then to total goals scored.

Sadly, such a rule would not have helped DC this season the way our defense gave up goals.  Is it too late to get Ryan Nelsen back at central defense?

*TECHNICAL NOTE: The formulation is stated in the simpler individual choice form, but the MLS tiebreaking rules may be seen more as a social choice mechanism.  Perhaps some form of Arrow’s impossibility theorem arises, meaning I’m unlikely to see a fully satisfying tiebreaking rule.  However, it does seem that goal differential avoids violating IIA.

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Post-season tournament design: Seeding issues

October 26, 2009

Michael Giberson

The NCAA post-season basketball tournament is seeded such that better teams are paired against weaker teams in the first round.  In fact, the highest seeded team is paired against the weakest team, the second highest seeded team against the next weakest team, and so on.  If the better seeded teams win each game, the pattern of highest seed against lowest remaining seed carries over into the second, third, and forth round.

However, as Robert Baumann, Victor Matheson, and Cara Howe of the College of the Holy Cross point out in a paper, “Anomalies in Tournament Design: The Madness of March Madness,” if a lower seeded team wins a game, then the pattern of matching the strongest team to the weakest will not hold in the NCAA b-ball tournament. For example, if in the first round #1 beats #16, #7 beats #10, and #8 beats #9, but #2 loses to #15, then the second round will feature #1 playing #8, but #7 playing #15. The first round upset by #15 in effect rewards #7 with a (purportedly) easier match than the #1 seeded team faces.

The result is an anomalous blip in the pattern of teams advancing from the second round to the third round:

While a number 10, 11, 12 seed has a lower chance of advancing to the second round than an 8 or 9 seed, their chances of advancing to the third round are much higher than those of 8 or 9 seeds. In fact, number 10 seeds have advanced to the third round, known as the sweet sixteen, 6 times as often as number 9 seeds and over twice as often as number 8 seeds.

Interesting, and those third round games are high profile “Sweet Sixteen” games.

This surprising result is easily explained by the lack of reseeding. First, while number 10 seeds are less likely to advance to the 2nd round than a number 8 or 9 seed, once they get there they will face a number 2 seed or perhaps even a number 15 seed in the event of a first-round upset. An 8 or 9 seed will almost certainly face a tougher 2nd round opponent since number 1 seeds are stronger than number 2 seeds and number 1 seeds are less likely to be upset in the first round. Similarly, number 11 and 12 seeds likely face weaker number 3 or number 4 seeds, respectively, in the second round and are far more likely to benefit from first round upsets than number 8 and 9 seeds. These advantages in the second round outweigh the disadvantages seeds 10 through 12 face in the first round of the competition.

They calculate that each tournament game win yields over $1 million in direct revenue from the NCAA to the schools athletic conference over six years, and observe there are other less tangible benefits, so the extra tournament games played by #10 seeds is significant.

The authors note that, in theory, reseeding the tournament at each round would eliminate the problem.  However, reseeding could require substantial shifts by teams between venues in between each round, which would significantly complicate the scheduling for teams and fans.  In addition, popular forms of gambling on the tournament are based on the fixed seeded approach.  The authors suggest the NCAA would be loathe to admit it, but also loathe to upset the role that March Madness plays in popular American culture.  As a result, they expect the anomalous success of #10 seeds to live on.

(HT to Daniel Houser at George Mason University.

Recall that GMU was a #11 seed the year they reached the Final Four.  They upset #6 Michigan State in the first round, so in the second round a #3 seed played a #11 seed, while the higher-seeded #2 faced a higher seeded #7.  As it turned out, both the #3 – North Carolina – and #2 Tennessee lost, and in the third round #11 GMU faced off against #7 Wichita State, while #1 Connecticut had to face #5 seeded Washington.)

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The real meaning of Al Roth’s spam blog email: time to leave the bargain bin

August 23, 2009

Michael Giberson

Al Roth, at his Market Design blog, mentions that his site had been flagged as possibly in violation of Blogger terms of service by his blog host’s anti-spam blog software.  He reports that he can still post, but until he gets a review by the Blogger folks he must prove he is probably human by responding to a Captcha challenge.

He doesn’t offer any commentary on his blog being mistaken for spam, so as a dedicated reader and a fan, let me offer my interpretation:

It is time for Roth to move Market Design out of the ‘blogspot’ wasteland and into a proper host.  Blogger is a fine place for a trial, for an experiment, but like having your consumer products show up on the shelves at the Dollar Store, it sends a particular signal.  Roth should jump to WordPress (or similar) and get his own URL (unfortunately marketdesign.com is already taken, as Roth knows, but marketdesignblog.com appears to be available).

The blog is approaching it’s first anniversary.  The experiment is proved a success.  Time to get out of the bargain bin and into a respectable commercial district.

In a nicer location, perhaps with a few tweaks in the site’s web design, the Market Design blog will do an even better job in matching readers to ideas.

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We can “cure” high frequency trading, but is it really a public policy problem?

August 3, 2009

Michael Giberson

High frequency trading practices by some financial firms have spilled into the news. The Economist provides a summary of the issue.  Bloomberg notes the Sen. Charles Schumer has proposed to ban one such trading strategy.

Here, Tyler Cowen said he is not worred about high frequency trading (HFT).  In a follow-up, he said:

Even if you think HFT is bad, on an actual list of bad policies or practices in our world, would it be in the top million?  Mostly it’s a canvas on which to paint complaints about the continuing political and economic power of finance, but we shouldn’t let that skew our judgment of the practice itself.

I think that that is about right.

I’m not sure that there is a public policy issue involved, but stock exchanges themselves may have an interest in managing the issue. A costly communication-speed arms race among member firms may burn off any economic value attainable in the form of investment in computing and telecom systems.  Member firms that choose not to play the arms race game may adopt costly defensive trading strategies instead.

A simple way to avoid the arms race is to reconfigure the underlying market structure from a continuous double auction to a periodic call market. The double auction works by continuously collecting bids and offers, with transactions occurring anytime a new bid matches the best available offer (or new offer matches the best available bid) at the matched price.  A call market works by continuously collecting bids and offers, then at announced intervals a clearing price determined such that the quantity offered is equal to quantity bid at the price.

Personally, I can’t imagine much value from running the call market more frequently than once every 5 or 10 minutes, but my lack of an imagination isn’t really a good guide here. (This paper from 1995 proposed clearing an electronic call market three times a day.)  In any case the call mechanism is quite adaptable, and the technology clearly exists to run frequent calls. If high frequency price discovery offers some value to the market, the call could be run every minute, every second or half-second, or even every hundredth of a second.

There are interesting market design issues involved.  But, like Cowen suggested, high frequency trading practices probably does not raise any significant public policy issues.


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Auctions as tools to limit government discretion

May 26, 2009

Michael Giberson

Auctions, especially auctions of government property, are not a tool of the rich…  As principles of market design become more thoroughly articulated and widely understood, the sphere of governmental discretion will shrink. More and more, politicians will be forced to play by the rules.

That’s David Warsh writing on the relationship between the economics of auctions and government. His main point is that when government property (anything from radio spectrum licenses to surplus office furniture) is sold by auction rather than disposed of in other ways, the tendency is for rules to limit discretion. Lobbying and personal relationships become less important, and cash deposited into government accounts becomes more important.

It might be objected that the current lobbying frenzy occasioned by the Waxman-Markey carbon emission cap-and-trade bill is a counter example. For example, from the New York Times:

Cap and trade, by contrast, is almost perfectly designed for the buying and selling of political support through the granting of valuable emissions permits to favor specific industries and even specific Congressional districts. That is precisely what is taking place now in the House Energy and Commerce Committee….

Yes, a lot of lobbying is going on. Regulation of carbon emissions will occasion a substantial increase in the influence of the government over the economy, and the consequences of that potential regulation provide significant motivation for firms to invest in lobbying.

But observe carefully, this isn’t a case in which auction tools enhance the granting of political favors. Instead it is an example of how, if you want an advantage in an auction system, your best bet is to get your advantage placed in the rules in writing up front. No CEO is saying to his board, “Don’t worry, I went to school with the guy at the EPA (or DOE or wherever) who will be in charge of the auction; he owes me a few favors, he’ll take care of us.” Instead, they are lobbying like crazy.

When the rules are in place (and the subsequent narrower lobbying over the implementing regulations, and the subsequent lawsuits roll through the courts), the ability of wealth to buy political favors will be constrained.

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One aspect of auction design that may need greater attention

March 3, 2009

Michael Giberson

Al Roth at Market Design, once again commenting on bidding in auctions while not intending to pay as a form of protest. (Earlier he posted on a similar tactic in an BLM oil and gas lease auction; here was my earlier post on his earlier post.)  Roth cites the New York Times: article one, article two.  A story on the same topic appeared in the Wall Street Journal.

The very practical “market design” concern is how the auction manager can prevent such protest bids, short of, say, requiring everyone to pay their million dollar bids in cash before they leave the room.

Or, as Roth put it, “One aspect of auction design that may need greater attention if these kinds of disruptions become commonplace is how to qualify and verify bidders and winners, and notify other bidders in the event that winners default, so that auctions can be made more resistant to attack by fake bidders.”

Apparently auctioner Christie’s policy allows the seller to request that Christie’s attempt to directly negotiate a sale to the party submitting the next highest bid in these cases.  However, in this case the seller has indicated he would retain the property if the winning bidder will not pay.

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